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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis analyses legal issues related to the participation in the Eurosystem by a national 
central bank (NCB). My aim is to develop principles that could be used for a national central 
bank law for a European Union Member State that has adopted the euro.  
The transfer of monetary policy to the supranational level has substantially changed the 
European central banking framework and confronted the NCBs with their new role as 
members of the Eurosystem.  
This membership has affected the governance structures of NCBs, with the emphasis on 
Governors and their independence. Most of the changes relate to the fulfilment of tasks of the 
Eurosystem and the level of independence needed by the NCBs to carry out these tasks. I 
have found that although there are differences amongst the Member States, the understanding 
of central bank independence is fairly similar throughout the EU.  
The accountability of the NCBs is driven not by the EU but by national rules, which is why 
the extent of reporting commitments varies between the Member States. The same is true of 
transparency, with some NCBs tending to be more open towards the general public than the 
others. However, it remains debatable whether there should be a harmonisation of rules on 
transparency and accountability at the EU level and whether the establishment of such 
harmonised rules would set higher standards than the current average.  
A debate on whether the prudential supervision of credit institutions should be a European 
rather than a national matter has been going on for a number of years, and I would like to add 
to the discussion as far as the financial stability and ESCB-related tasks are concerned.  
Finally, on the basis of the Estonian NCB Statute, I suggest amendments reflecting best 
practices for central bank tasks, independence and accountability. 
 
 
Andres Tupits 
Frankfurt am Main, 8 September 2010  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) was established by former Article 8 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) and Article 1 of the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank 
(the Statute),
1
 which entered into force on 1 November 1993. Under the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), the European Central Bank (ECB) is one of the Union‘s 
institutions as set forth in Article 13(1) TEU. This status is further affirmed by the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The fact that provisions 
governing the ESCB and the ECB are to be found in TFEU as well as the Statute has 
lead some scholars to point out that the dispersal of the institutional and operational 
rules has resulted in a legal basis that includes unnecessary repetitions and at times 
makes difficult reading.
2
  
Since the establishment of the ESCB and the Eurosystem the traditional roles as well 
as the governance of NCBs have also been altered in order to reflect the obligations of 
the national central banks (NCBs) in the Eurosystem under the Treaties and the 
Statute. NCBs belonging to the Eurosystem are the following: 
1) Nationale Bank van België / Banque Nationale de Belgique; 
2) Deutsche Bundesbank; 
3) Eesti Pank (as from 1 January 2011); 
4) Bank of Greece; 
5) Banco de España; 
6) Banque de France; 
7) Central Bank of Ireland; 
8) Banca d´Italia; 
9) Central Bank of Cyprus; 
10) Banque centrale du Luxembourg; 
11) Central Bank of Malta; 
12) De Nederlandsche Bank; 
                                                 
1  Protocol No 4 on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.  
2  See Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, p. 944.  
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13) Oesterreichische Nationalbank; 
14) Banco de Portugal; 
15) Banka Slovenije; 
16) Národná banka Slovenska; 
17) Suomen Pankki - Finlands Bank.  
The aim of this thesis is to list and describe the mandatory legal provisions in the 
Statute of a Eurosystem NCB; as an example of the practical applicability of these 
findings, amendments to the Statute for the Estonian central bank will be proposed, 
assuming that Estonia adopts the euro on 1 January 2011.  
The purpose of this thesis is to study how practical needs combined with uniform 
Eurosystem decision-making would force the NCBs to align their Statutes more 
closely, bearing in mind that under Article 14.3 of the Statute the NCBs are an 
integral part of the ESCB and shall act in accordance with the guidelines and 
instructions of the ECB. However, it is arguable whether there is a need for a ―one 
size fits all‖ approach towards the legislation governing the NCBs in the ESCB3 
Basically, any Eurosystem NCB Statute would be influenced by the Treaty and the 
Statute as well as the national implementing provisions of the Statute to make the 
Eurosystem function. There will therefore always be some similarities and some 
differences since the NCBs will also continue to carry out their national functions, 
which are performed on the responsibility and liability of the NCBs as referred to in 
Article 14.4 of the Statute, alongside the ESCB-related tasks.  
With regard to the objective and tasks, my intention is not to analyse the compatibility 
of the NCB Statutes with the Treaties and the Statute. Instead, with regard to the 
status of NCBs, I intend to examine the institutional and financial structure of NCBs, 
as well as their accountability and transparency as set forth in their respective NCB 
Statutes. I have therefore analysed and systematised all the NCB Statutes in the 27 EU 
Member States (Eurosystem NCBs, Bulgarian National Bank, Česká národní banka, 
Denmarks Nationalbank, Eesti Pank (until 31 December 2010), Latvijas Banka, 
Lietuvos bankas, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Narodowy Bank Polski, Banca Naţională a 
României, Sveriges Riksbank, Bank of England) in order to find parallels or common 
                                                 
3  After all, legal provisions are necessary but not sufficient to ensure central bank independence. Amtenbrink 
also discusses the possibility for a model central bank law but remains sceptical about it (Amtenbrink, The 
Three Pillars of Central Bank Governance - Towards a Model central Bank Law or a Code of Good 
Governance?, 2005).  
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provisions. In addition, the Convergence Reports of the Commission and the ECB as 
well as ECB legal opinions provide valuable insight on something that may be 
regarded as best practices when addressing these issues.  
The selection of Estonia as a testing ground for the applicability of the findings of this 
research is not incidental. Estonia is at present a Member State with a derogation and 
has to adapt its legislation in order to adopt the euro. By using the findings of this 
research, I can then propose possible amendments for the Estonian NCB Statute. 
Therefore, this thesis will not present a classical model central bank law that can be 
observed in isolation, but rather an example of how the provisions arising out of the 
Treaties and the Statute could be implemented at the national level so that the NCB 
Statute complies with the Treaties and the Statute and facilitates the functioning of the 
Eurosystem  
In this regard, the practical part of the thesis will be somewhat similar to the advice 
that is often given by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to countries that are 
willing to reform their central bank statutes. However, although the IMF has advised 
numerous countries, there is no model central bank law published by the IMF as the 
central bank statutes tend to be tailor-made for each country. As far as I am aware, the 
IMF has not advised Estonia on matters relating to Eurosystem participation and 
subsequent amendment of its central bank law.  
This research is also different from the surveys conducted by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS),
4
 since the target group is limited to the EU Member 
States only and the questions addressed are related to the functioning of the 
Eurosystem. As far as I am aware, the BIS has not carried out a survey of that scale 
and extent and has not created a database that is similar to the tables attached to this 
thesis.  
The main addressees of this research are mostly legal counsels working for the NCBs 
in the ESCB as well as academic audiences interested in the functioning of monetary 
unions. The findings of this research could hopefully be useful for any monetary 
union with organisational and decision-making structures similar to those of the 
                                                 
4  It should be noted that the surveys conducted by the BIS are not usually available to the general public. Much 
of the central bank governance information that is available at the BIS can be accessed (by registered users) on 
the password-protected platform. 
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Eurosystem. Most of the relevant definitions are described in Section 2.2 of this 
paper. 
1.2 Literature review 
While the creation of the ECB has attracted considerable scientific attention,
5
 the new 
role of the NCBs has previously not been subject to EU-wide research.
6
 There are 
thus very few authors, such as Lastra, Smits, van den Berg and Zilioli, who have 
specifically addressed legal issues relating to NCBs in the context of the 
Eurosystem/ESCB.
7
  
Regarding central bank independence, I will assess the NCB Statutes of all 27 
Member States.  
This assessment follows the concept of central bank independence as defined in the 
Convergence Reports of the Commission and the ECB. Under Article 140 TFEU 
[former Article 121(1) TEC, Article 122(2) TEC, and Article 123(5) TEC], at least 
once every two years, or at the request of a Member State with a derogation, the 
Commission and the ECB shall report to the Council on the progress made by the 
Member States with a derogation in fulfilling their obligations regarding the 
achievement of economic and monetary union. These reports shall include an 
examination of the compatibility between the national legislation of each of these 
Member States, including the statutes of its national central bank, and Articles 130 
and 131 TEFU and the Statute. These reports also have to examine the achievement of 
a high degree of sustainable convergence in the Member State concerned by reference 
to the fulfilment of the convergence criteria (price stability, government budgetary 
position, exchange rate stability, long-term interest rates), and take account of several 
other factors mentioned in the final sub-paragraph of Article 140(1) TFEU. The four 
                                                 
5  See, for example, Amtenbrink, A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank, 1999; Amtenbrink & de 
Haan, The European Central Bank: an Independent Specialised Organisation of Community Law - A 
Comment, 2002; Goodhart C. A., European Monetary Union: A Progress Report, 1994, Goodhart C. , The 
Draft Statute of the European System of Central Banks: A Commentary, 1990; Krauskopf & Steven, 2009; 
Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006; Proctor, 2005; Smits, European 
Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000; Torrent, 1999; van den Berg, 2005; 
Zilioli & Selmayr, The European Central Bank: An independent specialised organisation of community law, 
2000, Zilioli & Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank, 2001.   
6  There have been publications addressing the NCBs as members of the ESCB for example by Hochreiter 
(2000). Also, in a language other than English: Tupits, Ühisraha euro kasutuselvõtu riigiõiguslikud aspektid, 
2005; Tupits, Tingimused kandidaatriigi keskpangale Euroopa Liiduga liitumisel, 2001. 
7  See for example Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006; Zilioli & Selmayr, 
The Law of the European Central Bank, 2001. To some extent also the topic has been covered by Smits, 
European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000; van den Berg, 2005.  
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convergence criteria are further developed in a Protocol (No 13) on the convergence 
criteria.  
Although the wording of Article 140 TFEU may suggest that there would be one 
report prepared by the two Institutions, in fact each of them prepares reports of its 
own,
8
 despite the fact that differences between the two reports are not substantial. 
Under Article 43 of the Statute, read in conjunction with Article 46.1 of the Statute, 
the General Council shall give advice in the preparations for the abrogation of the 
derogations specified in Article 140 TFEU.  
Equally relevant for this study has been the analysis of various ECB opinions on draft 
national legislation,
9
 which has helped to clarify which draft national law provisions 
the ECB considers incompatible with the Treaties and the Statute. It has been 
described as a preventive system to forestall problems with potentially incompatible 
or inconsistent national legislation.
10
 The consultation procedure has a number of 
advantages, such as (1) being a vehicle for sharing information and expertise; (2) 
keeping the ECB informed about legislative developments in the Member States 
within the ECB‘s fields of competence;11 (3) enabling the ECB to formulate its own 
position in the European Union or internationally when similar matters are discussed; 
(4) harmonising Member States‘ legislation within the ECB‘s fields of competence 
and contributing to enhancing the quality of national legislation.
12
 ECB Opinions shall 
                                                 
8  The Convergence Reports by the Commission are made available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/convergence_reports_en.htm, while the 
ECB Convergence Reports are accessible at http://www.ecb.int/pub/convergence/html/index.en.html (visited 
on 4 September 2010).  
9  The ECB Opinions are available at: http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/opinions/html/index.en.html (visited on 4 
September 2010); an Opinion is a legal act under Article 288 TFEU and it has binding force. The ECB can 
deliver opinions under the fourth indent of Article 132(1) TFEU and of Article 34.1 of the Statute in order to 
carry out the tasks entrusted to the ESCB in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties and under the 
conditions laid down in the Statute. The ECB must be consulted by the Union institutions and the Member 
States on draft legislative provisions in its fields of competence, pursuant to Article 127(4) TFEU, Article 
282(5) TFEU and Article 4 of the Statute. Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of 
the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions, OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 
42, expressly requires that the Member States take the measures necessary to ensure compliance with this 
obligation. Pursuant to Articles 4 and 7 of Protocol No 15 on certain provisions relating to the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, such duty of consultation shall not apply to the United 
Kingdom. 
10  See ―Guide to Consultation of the European Central Bank by National Authorities Regarding Draft Legislative 
Provisions‖ (European Central Bank, 2005, pp. 10-11). ECB opinions may also constitute a source which the 
Court of Justice (in proceedings related to the compatibility with the Treaties of the legislative provisions 
concerned) or national courts (in proceedings on the interpretation or validity of the legislative provisions 
concerned) can take into account, as stated in the Guide.  
11  Note the linguistically different approach between Article 127(4) TFEU and Article 4(a) of the Statute on the 
one hand (‗in its fields of competence‘), and Article 282(5) TFEU on the other hand (‗within the areas falling 
within its responsibilities‘), to which the legal literature has paid no attention so far.  
12  See footnote 10.  
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be adopted by the Governing Council, except under the second paragraph of Article 
43 of the Statute and the first indent of Article 46.1 of the Statute, in which case the 
General Council shall adopt opinions. 
However, due to the fact that the ECB updates its Convergence Reports with the 
findings referred to in the ECB Opinions, and there is no similar instrument adopted 
by the Commission, I have mostly relied on the Convergence Reports prepared by the 
ECB and the ECB‘s Opinions. 
1.3 Method and the way forward 
My intention is to analyse the provisions of NCB Statutes in order to find any 
parallels and to derive principles that are common to all ESCB Members. My interest 
targets the implementation of the Treaties as well as the Statute; however, the 
functioning of the Governing Council and General Council in the case of Governor‘s 
absence and the financial and reporting regime of an NCB will also be assessed.  
For this study, I have used the NCB Statutes that have been either drafted and enacted 
in English or translated into the English language and are as such publicly available 
on the websites of the respective NCBs. The reference to an ‗NCB Statute‘ will be 
used as a notion for a legislative instrument that governs the NCB.  
I have analysed mostly the NCB Statutes in a comparative manner and only 
exceptionally other legislation has also been referred to (e.g. national Constitutions or 
other laws). Therefore, the aim of this study is not to analyse whether the NCB 
Statutes are compatible with the Treaty and the Statute, although obvious conflicts 
will be highlighted. Moreover, as the legal instruments are authentic only in the 
official languages of the Member States, there is always a possibility that some of the 
meaning of the original provisions may have been lost in translation. Furthermore, the 
possibility cannot be ruled out that some of the provisions may be outdated. The NCB 
Statutes will be referred to using the format ‗[Member State‘s] NCB Statute‘, for 
example ‗Estonian NCB Statute‘ for the Law on Eesti Pank or ‗German NCB Statute‘ 
for the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
The legal provisions will be extracted from the NCB Statutes and placed into 
comparative tables for further assessment. The methodology I am going to use is to 
refer to a general provision as ‗Article‘, followed by Article number in the respective 
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NCB Statute. For the comparative study, I am going to include the actual text of the 
Article. In some cases, also assessments are included.  
The comparative tables represent various topics that have been highlighted in either 
the ECB Convergence Reports or ECB opinions. These comparative tables, annexed 
to this paper, did not exist prior to the launch of this study.  
Chapter 2 will describe the functioning of the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
describing the legal basis for its functioning and explaining the differences between 
the ECB, the ESCB and the Eurosystem as well as the Executive Board, Governing 
Council and the General Council of the ECB. The reasons for referring to some 
national central banks as either ‗Eurosystem NCB‘ or ‗non-Eurosystem NCB‘ will 
become apparent from this discussion. I will also explain the structure of ESCB 
committees and their roles vis-à-vis the Executive Board and the Governing Council 
of the ECB. For the purposes of this thesis, the tasks of the Eurosystem will not be 
analysed separately.  
Chapter 3 will address central bank independence and accountability and will explain 
how this affects both Eurosystem NCBs and non-Eurosystem NCBs. The NCB 
Statutes will be analysed with regard to their functional, institutional, personal and 
financial independence as well as their accountability and transparency regimes  and 
the rules on professional secrecy.  
Chapter 4 will address the issue of the stability of the financial system. In this respect, 
I will pay further attention to the financial stability and the role of central banks, and 
their role in the architecture of future EU-wide supervision. Furthermore, emergency 
liquidity assistance and the monetary financing prohibition will be discussed.  
The purpose of Chapter 5 is to address the objective of this thesis as laid down in 
Section 1.1 – to provide concrete drafting suggestions for the statute of the central 
bank of Estonia, Eesti Pank, as a member of the Eurosystem For this purpose, the 
research conducted in all previous Chapters will be brought together to asses the 
Estonian NCB Statute and pinpoint the areas of further development.  
Each chapter will be concluded by a summary. The tables (annexes) containing 
references to the NCB Statutes can be found at the end of this Thesis.  
For the reason outlined in Section 1.1, the NCB Statutes of all EU Member States 
have been analysed in the light of any legislative amendments enacted before 1 
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January 2010. Legislative changes made after that date have been reflected in 
footnotes where appropriate. Union law has been taken into account until 1 September 
2010. The suggestions for amendments to the Estonian NCB Statute will be based on 
the version of the law as it will stand on 1 January 2011.  
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2 Central banking in the European Union 
2.1 Overview of the history of European monetary integration  
A monetary union or single currency was originally not in the mind of the authors of the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community that entered into force on 1 January 
1958; the aims and objectives of the original treaties were much more limited. At the time, all 
signatories to the Treaty were part of the Bretton Woods system whereby exchange rates were 
fixed with regard to the US dollar. The first discussion on monetary integration at the 
Community level was initiated by the Marjolin Memorandum of 1962.
13
 The outcome of the 
Memorandum was the creation of a Committee of Governors of the central banks of the 
Member States of the EEC (the Committee of Governors)
14
 in 1964. From an institutional point 
of view, the creation of the Committee of Governors was an important step. The Committee of 
Governors developed and managed the framework for monetary cooperation.
15
  
In 1969 the European Commission submitted a plan (the Barre Plan) to create a distinct 
monetary identity in the Community. The resulting Werner Report,
16
 which was published in 
1970, proposed creating economic and monetary union in several stages by 1980.  
However, the efforts, such as the creation of the Community system for the progressive 
narrowing of the fluctuation margins of the members‘ currencies (―Snake‖) after the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system, and the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, were not a 
success.
17
 In March 1979 the process of monetary integration was launched again with the 
creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) with the introduction of the European 
Currency Unit (ECU).
18
 
                                                 
13  See Scheller, 2006, pp. 15-17.  
14  The Committee of Governors was given a mandate 
(http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/history/archive/pdf/released/Presidents_note_on_organisation_CoG_14_12_1964_EN.pdf) which 
was later expanded and had its own Rules of Procedure 
(http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/history/archive/pdf/released/Rules_of_Procedure_12_10_1964_EN.pdf), visited on 6 September 
2010.  
15  The most widely known contribution by the Committee of Governors is the ―Introductory Report on the draft Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank‖ of 27 November 1990. The archives of the 
Committee of Governors were recognised as part of the ECB archives by the Decision ECB/2004/3 of 4 March 2004 on 
public access to European Central Bank documents, OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p. 42.  
16  Pierre Werner, who chaired the group of experts, was the Prime Minister of Luxembourg at the time.  
17  See Scheller, 2006, p. 18.  
18  The ECU remained an artificial currency serving as a unit of account. The ECU was composed of the currencies of the 
Member States.  
 40 
 
However, the issue was placed to the political agenda with the signing of the Single European 
Act. The main purpose of the Single European Act was to introduce the single market as a 
Community objective. As a follow-up, a committee, headed by Jacques Delors,
19
 was set up by 
the European Council at its meeting in Hanover on 27 and 28 June 1988 in order to study and 
propose concrete stages leading to economic and monetary union in Europe. In response to this 
mandate the Committee prepared a ―Report on economic and monetary union in the European 
Community‖, which was submitted to the Heads of State or Government in April 1989. The 
Delors Committee Report
20
 recommended that EMU should be approached in three stages: 
1) the completion of the internal market; 
2) the creation of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB); 
3) the adoption of a common currency.21  
With the adoption of the Treaty on European Union, which came into force on 1 November 
1993, the legal foundations for progress towards EMU were laid down. Subsequently, the TEC 
was amended and the Statute was introduced.
22
  
In order to prepare for Stage Three, the European Monetary Institute (EMI) was created on 1 
January 1994 and the Committee of Governors ceased to exist.
23
 The roadmap to the single 
currency was adopted by the Madrid European Council in December 1995.
24
 In accordance 
with the Council presidency conclusions, the Member States implemented policies to fulfil 
economic convergence criteria and revised their national legislation extensively in order to 
comply with the requirements on legal convergence.
25
  
On 25 May 1998 the President, Vice-President and the four other members of the ECB‘s 
Executive Board were formally appointed with effect from 1 June 1998, when the European 
Central Bank (ECB) was established as the legal successor of the EMI.
26
  
                                                 
19  Jacques Delors was the President of the Commission at that time.  
20  Delors, Thygesen, Lamfalussy, & Boyer, 1989.  
21  See Craig & de Burca, 2008, pp. 729-741. 
22  The Statute was in fact largely modelled on the Bundesbank‘s structure at that time. See Goodhart C. A. (European 
Monetary Union: A Progress Report, 1994, p. 7) and van den Berg (2005).  
23  See Scheller, 2006, p. 22.  
24  Madrid European Council 15 and 16 December 1995 Presidency Conclusions. Available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/mad2_en.htm#annex1 (visited on 6 September 2010).  
25  See publications by the European Monetary Institute (Progress Towards Convergence: Report prepared in accordance with 
Article 7 of the EMI Statute), (Progress towards convergence (EMI) 1996) and (Convergence Report (EMI) 1998); as well 
as the Commission (Report on progress towards convergence and recommendation with a view to the transition to the stage 
three of economic and monetary union COM(1998) final).  
26  See Scheller, 2006, p. 25; see also Article 123(2) TEC establishing the legal succession.  
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The third stage of EMU began on 1 January 1999 with the irrevocable fixing of the conversion 
rates, and the euro banknotes and coins were introduced on 1 January 2002.
27
  
2.2 The Eurosystem and the ESCB 
2.2.1 Legal background 
Depending on the applicable rules of law, a central bank may be vested with rights and powers 
that range from a very narrow to a very broad list. There are also considerable differences in the 
organisation of central banks and the relationship with the authorities of the territory within 
which they operate. Traditionally, a central bank is governed by national law, but may also be 
governed by international law. The law governing central banking in the European Union 
consists of different elements originating from supranational and national levels.  
Pursuant to Article 282(1) TFEU the ECB, together with the NCBs, shall constitute the ESCB – 
currently 27 NCBs and the ECB. The ECB, together with the NCBs of the Member States 
whose currency is the euro, which constitute the Eurosystem, shall conduct the monetary policy 
of the Union. Pursuant to Article 282(2) TFEU, the ESCB shall be governed by the decision-
making bodies of the ECB. The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price 
stability.
28
 Without prejudice to that objective, it shall support the general economic policies in 
the Union in order to contribute to the achievement of the latter‘s objectives. 
The ESCB has no legal personality and no decision-making powers of its own. Instead, Article 
282(3) TFEU provides that the ECB shall have legal personality. It alone may authorise the 
issue of the euro. It shall be independent in the exercise of its powers and in the management of 
its finances.
29
 Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the governments of the 
Member States shall respect that independence. In this respect, Article 282 TFEU summarises 
Articles 127 to 130 TFEU.  
Article 127(1) TFEU [former Article 105(1) TEC] together with Article 282(2) TFEU and 
Article 2 of the Statute state that the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price 
stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the 
general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the 
                                                 
27  See also Scheller, 2006, pp. 25-28.  
28  ECB has defined ‗price stability‘ as a year-on-year increase below 2% in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 
for the euro area (Scheller, 2006, p. 80). Price stability does not mean securing the stability of the euro as has been 
suggested by some authors (Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, p. 943).  
29  In this regard, Article 282(3) TFEU establishes institutional (legal personality), functional (independent in the exercise of 
its powers) and financial (independent in the management of its finances) independence for the ECB.  
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objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 TEU. The ESCB shall act in accordance with 
the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient 
allocation of resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 119 TFEU. 
Under Article 127(2) TFEU [former Article 105(2) TEC] and Article 3 of the Statute, the basic 
tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be: 
- to define and implement the monetary policy of the Union,
30
 
- to conduct foreign exchange operations consistent with the provisions of Article 219 TFEU,
31
 
- to hold and manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States,
32
 
- to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.
33
 
Furthermore, under Article 127(4) TFEU [former Article 105(4) TEC], Article 282(5) TFEU 
and Article 4 of the Statute the ECB shall be consulted: 
- on any proposed Union act in its fields of competence,
34
 
- by national authorities regarding any draft legislative provision in its fields of competence, but 
within the limits and under the conditions set out by the Council in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in Article 129(4) TFEU and Article 41 of the Statute.
35
 
In addition, under Article 127(4) TFEU [former Article 105(4) TEC] and Article 4 of the 
Statute, the ECB may submit opinions to the appropriate Union institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies or to national authorities on matters in its fields of competence. 
                                                 
30  Monetary policy instruments are laid down in Articles 17-20 of the Statute and relevant legal acts of the ECB and include 
conducting open market and credit operations, holding minimum reserves with the ECB and NCBs and other instruments of 
monetary control. 
31  Foreign exchange operations are also regulated in Articles 23  and 31 of the Statute and relevant legal acts of the ECB .  
32  This shall be without prejudice to the holding and management by the governments of Member States of foreign-exchange 
working balances; see Article 127(3) TFEU [former Article 105(3) TEC]. The holding and managing of official foreign 
reserves is further regulated by the third indent of Article 3 of the Statute and Article 30 of the Statute and relevant legal 
acts of the ECB.  
33  Clearing and payment systems are regulated in Article 22 of the Statute and relevant legal acts of the ECB.  
34  The provision to consult the ECB on any proposed act in its field of competence is intended essentially to ensure that the 
legislature adopts the act only when the body has been heard, which by virtue of the specific functions that it exercises in 
the Union framework in the area concerned and by virtue of the high degree of expertise that it enjoys, is particularly well 
placed to play a useful role in the legislative process envisaged; see Case C-11/00, paragraph 110. In such instances, 
consulting the ECB forms part of the applicable Union decision-making procedure and its participation has to be considered 
as an important element in the institutional balance at the Union level (Smits, European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 
1997, reprinted with corrections 2000, p. 212). The participation of the ECB constitutes an ‗essential procedural 
requirement‘ whose non-observance by the Union institutions can render the Union act void, subject to a judgement to that 
effect by the Court of Justice by analogy with Case C-65/93 European Parliament v Council of the European Union [1995] 
ECR I-643 (Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, pp. 969-970).  
35  See Council Decision 98/415/EC of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities 
regarding draft legislative provisions, OJ L 189, 3.7.1998, p. 42, and footnotes 9 and 10. Pursuant to Articles 4 and 7 of 
Protocol No 15 on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, such duty of 
consultation shall not apply to the United Kingdom. 
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Pursuant to Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 105(5) TEC]  and Article 3.3 of the Statute the 
ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial 
system.
36
 
Article 129(1) TFEU [former Article 107(1) TEC] as well as Article 282(2) TFEU establishes 
that the ESCB shall be governed by the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank, 
which shall be the Governing Council and the Executive Board. 
Finally, Article 130 TFEU [former Article 108 TEC] and Article 7 of the Statute establish that 
when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the 
Treaties and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, neither the European Central Bank, nor a 
national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take 
instructions from Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a 
Member State or from any other body. The Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies and 
the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to 
influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the European Central Bank or of the 
national central banks in the performance of their tasks.
37
 
ECB is also one of the Union institutions
38
 set forth in Article 13(1) TEU,
 39
 and Krauskopf and 
Steven have argued that the ECB is not the central bank of the Union.
40
 Pursuant to Article 12.1 
of the Statute, the ECB shall have recourse to the national central banks to carry out operations 
which form part of the tasks of the ESCB. Therefore, the ESCB rather a partly decentralised 
structure, with central coordinating organs and separate operational entities for different parts of 
the monetary area.  
                                                 
36  See Chapter 4 regarding the extent of these provisions.  
37  The Court of Justice has noted that the outside influences from which that provision seeks to shield the ECB and its 
decision-making bodies are those likely to interfere with the performence of the tasks which the Treaties and the Statute 
assign to the ECB; it essentially seeks to shield the ECB from all political pressure in order to enable it effectively to pursue 
the objectives attributed to its tasks, through the independent exercise of the specific powers conferred on it for that purpose 
by the TFEU and the Statute; see Case C-11/00, paragraph 134. However, at that time Article 282(3) TFEU did not exist 
and one may argue that Case C-11/00 recognised the principles that were present at the time of the establishment of the 
ESCB and the ECB.  
38  This fact was first recognised by the Court of Justice in the Case C-11/00, paragraph 63.  
39  The precise nature of the ECB used to prompted much controversy in the literature: Zilioli and Selmayr have argued that 
the ECB is ‗an independent specialised organisation of Community law‘ (Zilioli & Selmayr, The Law of the European 
Central Bank, 2001, p. 31), and ‗a new Community‘ (Zilioli & Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank, 2001, pp. 
29-30) where the legislations subsist at the same regulatory level. Some clarity into the topic was brought by the Case C-
11/00 Commission v ECB [2003] ECR I-7147. The earlier academic literature arguing with the concept presented by Zilioli 
and Selmayr includes (Torrent, 1999); (Amtenbrink & de Haan, The European Central Bank: an Independent Specialised 
Organisation of Community Law - A Comment, 2002, pp. 65-67).   
40  Krauskopf & Steven, 2009.  
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The institutional aspect of monetary union requires monetary powers to be pooled in the ESCB 
and in order for the ESCB to function properly the participants of the system have to be 
independent of any outside influence. This implies that there has to be subordination in the 
group, which is reflected in Article 14.3 of the Statute, specifying that the national central 
banks are an integral part of the ESCB and shall act in accordance with the guidelines and 
instructions of the ECB.
41
 The Governing Council shall take the necessary steps to ensure 
compliance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB, and shall require that any 
necessary information be given to it.  
Pursuant to Article 132(1) TFEU and Article 34 of the Statute and in accordance with Article 
132 TFEU, the ECB shall: 
- make regulations to the extent necessary to implement the tasks defined in Article 3.1 , first 
indent, Articles 19.1 , 22  or 25.2 of the Statute and in cases which shall be laid down in the acts 
of the Council referred to in Article 129(4) TFEU and Article 41 of the Statute;
42
 
- take decisions necessary for carrying out the tasks entrusted to the ESCB under the Treaties 
and the Statute;
43
 
- make recommendations
44
 and deliver opinions;
45
 
                                                 
41  Some scholars have noted that the ESCB includes features of both a centralised and a decentralised system, but the 
emphasis lies on the former (Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, pp. 946-947). 
42  The ECB regulations, which are adopted by the Governing Council, shall have general application and be binding in their 
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States, with the exception of the Member States with a derogation and the 
UK as explained in Section 2.2.3. 
43  The ECB decisions referred to in Article 132(1) TFEU and Article 34.1 of the Statute have to be understood as enabling the 
Executive Board or Governing Council (or the General Council in limited occasions) to act in order to carry out the tasks 
entrusted to the ESCB under the Treaties and the Statute and should be used when any other ECB legal instrument, for 
example regulation, recommendation, opinion, (guideline or instruction) cannot be used. Under Article 288 TFEU (former 
Article 249 TEC) a decision shall be binding in its entirety; a decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall 
be binding on them only. For the exception of the Member States with a derogation and the UK, please see the discussion in 
Section 2.2.3. Article 17.4 of the ECB Rules of Procedure foresees that the ECB decisions shall be adopted by the 
Governing Council or the Executive Board in their respective domain of competence and shall be signed by the President. It 
further provides that ECB decisions imposing sanctions on third parties shall be signed by the President, the Vice-President 
or any two other members of the Executive Board. It is also a requirement under Article 17.4 of the ECB Rules of 
Procedure that, inter alia, ECB decisions shall state the reasoning on which they are based. The adoption of decisions by the 
General Council is not foreseen in the ECB Rules of Procedure. The General Council can adopt decisions under Article 
45.4  and 47 of the Statute as further stipulated in Article 9(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Council (see 
Decision ECB/2004/12 of 17 June 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the General Council of the European Central 
Bank, OJ L 230, 30.6.2004, p. 61), which shall then be signed by the President. 
44  The ECB recommendations under the third indents of Article 132(1) TFEU and of Article 34.1 of the Statute are an 
instrument of legislative initiative which, pursuant to Article 288 TFEU, shall have no binding force. The use of ECB 
recommendations has been foreseen in Articles 129(3) , 129(4) , 289(4)  and 292 TFEU as well as in Article 27.1  and 
Article 40 of the Statute. For the exception of the Member States with a derogation and the UK, please see the discussion in 
Section 2.2.3. Pursuant to Article 17.4 of the ECB Rules of Procedure, ECB recommendations shall be adopted by the 
Governing Council or the Executive Board in their respective domain of competence and shall be signed by the President. It 
further specifies that the recommendations for secondary Union legislation under Article 41 shall be adopted by the 
Governing Council. The adoption of recommendations by the General Council is not foreseen in the ECB Rules of 
Procedure. The General Council can adopt recommendations under Article 43 of the Statute as further stipulated in Article 
9(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Council, which shall then be signed by the President. 
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and the ECB may decide to publish its decisions, recommendations and opinions. 
The legal acts of the ECB are adopted neither by ordinary legislative procedure under Article 
289(1) TFEU nor special legislative procedure under Article 289(2) TFEU and therefore 
constitute non-legislative legal acts.
46
 
The procedural requirements for non-legislative acts are established in Article 297(2) TFEU; 
pursuant to the first paragraph, non-legislative acts adopted in the form of regulations, 
directives or decisions, when the latter do not specify to whom they are addressed, shall be 
signed by the President of the institution which adopted them.  
The second paragraph of Article 297(2) TFEU specifies that regulations and directives which 
are addressed to all Member States, as well as decisions which do not specify to whom they are 
addressed, shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. They shall enter 
into force on the date specified in them or, in the absence thereof, on the twentieth day 
following that of their publication. 
The third paragraph of Article 297(2) TFEU provides that other directives, and decisions which 
specify to whom they are addressed, shall be notified to those to whom they are addressed and 
shall take effect upon such notification. 
The legal instruments adopted by the ECB under Article 132(1) TFEU and Article 34.1 of the 
Statute are subject to judicial accountability.
47
  
                                                                                                                                                           
45  An Opinion is a legal act under Article 288 TFEU and it shall have no binding force. The ECB delivers opinions based 
mostly on Article 127(4) TFEU, Article 282(5) TFEU and Article 4 of the Statute. 
46  Dougan lists them as falling within the ‗non-legislative legal acts adopted directly under the Treaties‘. However he 
considers that the ECB adopts legal acts in the field of monetary policy and does not explore them any further (Dougan, 
2008, p. 644).  
47  The first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU [former Article 230 TEC] provides that the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(Court of Justice) shall review the legality of legislative acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European 
Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of the European 
Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or 
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. Under the second paragraph, the Court of 
Justice shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the European Parliament, the Council 
or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of 
the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers. Furthermore, under the third paragraph 
the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions brought by the Court of Auditors, by the 
European Central Bank and by the Committee of the Regions for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives. Under the 
fourth paragraph, any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs, 
institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and 
against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures. Pursuant to the fifth 
paragraph, acts setting up bodies, offices and agencies of the Union may lay down specific conditions and arrangements 
concerning actions brought by natural or legal persons against acts of these bodies, offices or agencies intended to produce 
legal effects in relation to them. The sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU establishes that the proceedings provided for in 
this Article shall be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, 
in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be. 
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Article 271(d) TFEU and Article 35.6 of the Statute provide the ECB with further control 
mechanisms as these Articles enable the ECB to open infringement proceedings directly against 
a national central bank which it considers to have acted in breach of the Treaties or the 
Statute.
48
 It concerns the fulfilment by national central banks of obligations under the Treaties 
and the Statute and in this connection the powers of the Governing Council in respect of 
national central banks under Article 271(d) TFEU shall be the same as those conferred upon the 
Commission in respect of Member States by Article 258 TFEU. If the ECB Governing Council 
considers that an NCB has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaty and the Statute, it shall 
deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the NCB concerned the opportunity to 
submit its observations. If the NCB concerned does not comply with the opinion within the 
period laid down by the ECB Governing Council, the latter may bring the matter before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. Under Article 271(d) TFEU and Article 35.6 of the 
Statute, the Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction in disputes concerning the fulfilment by 
NCBs of obligations under the Treaty and the Statute. If the Court of Justice finds that an NCB 
has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties, that bank shall be required to take the 
necessary measures to comply with the judgement of the Court of Justice. 
However, it should be borne in mind that it is the ECB, and not the Eurosystem or ESCB which 
from a formal point of view is in the driving seat with regard to deciding monetary policy; 
second, the NCBs have a role in the implementation of monetary policy, but they are subject in 
a clear hierarchy to the authority of the ECB; third, all legal acts adopted on the basis of Treaty 
provisions are acts of the ECB and not of the ESCB or Eurosystem.
49
  
2.2.2 Eurosystem NCBs 
The Member States that have adopted the euro participate in the monetary union with all rights 
and obligations foreseen in the Treaties and the Statute. Full participation in the third stage of 
Economic and Monetary Union means that the participating Member States have limited their 
sovereign rights in the field of monetary policy, have submitted their national central banks to 
                                                 
48  Zilioli and Selmayr note that this is the only instance in Community law where a ‗national‘ authority can directly be sued 
before the Court of Justice, which is normally only competent to settle disputes between the Community institutions and the 
Member States (Zilioli & Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank, 2001, p. 77). In accordance with Article 139 
TFEU, Article 42 of the Statute and Protocol No 16  and Protocol No 15 there are no derogations and the above provisions 
of TFEU and the Statute are applicable to all NCBs in the ESCB.  
49  See Louis, Monetary policy and central banking in the Constitution, 2005, p. 35.  
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the governance of the ECB and transferred national competences in this field entirely to a 
supranational level.
50
  
From the very beginning, there was a tendency to refer to the respective NCBs and the ECB as 
the ‗Eurosystem‘.51 Hanspeter Scheller has outlined three reasons why a system was established 
and not a single central bank: 
1) the establishment of a single central bank for the whole euro area would not have been 
acceptable on political grounds; 
2) the Eurosystem approach builds on the experience of the NCBs, preserves their 
institutional set-up, infrastructure and operational capabilities and expertise; 
3) given the large geographic extent of the euro area, it was deemed appropriate to give 
credit institutions an access point to central banking in each participating Member 
State.
52
 
This system has been set up taking full account of the principle of decentralisation.
53
  
Pursuant to Article 9.2 of the Statute, the ECB shall ensure that the tasks conferred upon the 
ESCB under Article 127(2) TFEU, Article 127(3) TFEU and Article 127(5) TFEU are 
implemented either by its own activities pursuant to the Statute or through the NCBs pursuant 
to Article 12.1  and Article 14 of the Statute.  
Under Article 12.1 of the Statute the Governing Council shall adopt the guidelines
54
 and take 
the decisions necessary to ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to the ESCB under 
                                                 
50  See Zilioli & Selmayr, The European Central Bank: An independent specialised organisation of community law, 2000, p. 
604. For different interpretations, see Torrent, 1999; Amtenbrink & de Haan, The European Central Bank: an Independent 
Specialised Organisation of Community Law - A Comment, 2002. 
51  Although in active use since November 1998, the legal notion was introduced for the first time in Article 1 of the Decision 
ECB/2004/2 of 19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, OJ L 80, 18.03.2004, p. 33, as amended 
(ECB Rules of Procedure). The notion ‗Eurosystem‘ was adopted by the Governing Council of the ECB in November 1998 
in order to help general public to understand the complex structure of the European central banking system more easily. See 
Scheller, 2006, p. 42. 
52  See Scheller, 2006, p. 42. 
53  The principle of decentralisation should not be confused with the principle of subsidiarity. Zilioli and Selmayr argue that 
there is no room for subsidiarity as foreseen in [former] Article 5(2) TEC because no concurrent competences are assigned 
to NCBs, but all tasks entrusted to the ESCB are subject to the decision-making of the ECB and are its exclusive 
competence. See Zilioli & Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank, 2001, p. 70.  
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these Treaties and this Statute. The Governing Council shall formulate the monetary policy of 
the Union including, as appropriate, decisions relating to intermediate monetary objectives, key 
interest rates and the supply of reserves in the ESCB, and shall establish the necessary 
guidelines for their implementation. 
The Executive Board shall implement monetary policy in accordance with the guidelines and 
decisions laid down by the Governing Council. In doing so, the Executive Board shall give the 
necessary instructions to national central banks. In addition, the Executive Board may have 
certain powers delegated to it where the Governing Council so decides. 
To the extent deemed possible and appropriate and without prejudice to the provisions of 
Article 12.1 of the Statute, the ECB shall have recourse to the national central banks to carry 
out operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB. 
Under Article 14.3 of the Statute, the NCBs are an integral part of the ESCB and shall act in 
accordance with the guidelines and instructions
55
 of the ECB; the Governing Council shall take 
the necessary steps to ensure compliance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB, and 
shall require that any necessary [related] information be given. Pursuant to Article 14.4 of the 
Statute, the Eurosystem NCBs may perform non-Eurosystem functions on their own 
responsibility, provided that these functions do not interfere with the tasks and objectives of the 
Eurosystem. These functions vary and appear to be related to the contribution to financial 
                                                                                                                                                           
54  Guidelines are not referred to in Article 132(1) TFEU and Article 34.1 of the Statute as legal acts. The notion of 
‗guidelines‘ has been used in Articles 12.1, 14.3, 31.3, 32.2, and 32.6 of the Statute. It appears that no other EU Institution 
but the ECB would publish guidelines as a separate legal act, e.g. not a regulation, directive, recommendation or opinion 
but a ‗guideline‘. The Commission on the other hand publishes its ‗guidelines‘ in the form of a communication (see, for 
example Communication from the Commission — Guideline on the details of the various categories of variations to the 
terms of marketing authorisations for medicinal products for human use and veterinary medicinal products OJ C 17, 
22.1.2010, p. 1, or Communication from the Commission — Guideline on the operation of the procedures laid down in 
Chapters II, III and IV of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1234/2008 concerning the examination of variations to the 
terms of marketing authorisations for medicinal products for human use and veterinary medicinal products, OJ C 323, 
31.12.2009, p. 9). The publication of guidelines is at the ECB‘s discretion and a number of them have been published in the 
Official Journal.One should not confuse the notion ‗guideline‘ in the Statute with, for example, strategic guidelines referred 
to in Article 16(6) TEU, working arrangements for the Commission set forth in Article 17(6)(a) TEU, common foreign and 
security policy guidelines under Articles 25  and 26 TEU, guidelines regarding the withdrawal from the Union under Article 
50(2) TEU, guidelines for broad economic policies pursuant to Article 5(1) , 120 , 121  and 136(1)(b) TFEU, guidelines for 
employment policies under Article 5(2) , 146(1)  and 148 TFEU, guidelines for the internal market set forth in Article 26(3) 
TFEU, strategic guidelines for legislative planning within the area of freedom, security and justice under Article 68 TFEU, 
social policy under Article 156 TFEU, public health under Article 168(2) TFEU, trans-European networks under Article 
171(1) and 172 TFEU, industry under 173(2) TFEU, research and technological development under Article 181(2) TFEU, 
multiannual financial guidelines for managing the assets of the Research Fund for Coal and Steel and technical guidelines 
for the research programme of the Research Fund for Coal and Steel under Protocol (No 37) on the financial consequences 
of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty and on the Research fund for Coal and Steel. 
55  Instructions are not referred to in Article 132(1) TFEU and of Article 34.1 of the Statute as legal acts. However, Article 
17.6 of the ECB Rules of Procedure establishes that ECB Instructions shall be adopted by the Executive Board, and 
thereafter notified, in one of the official languages of the European Union, and signed on the Executive Board‘s behalf by 
the President or any two Executive Board members. Notification of the national central banks may take place by means of 
telefax, electronic mail or telex or in paper form. Any ECB Instruction that is to be officially published shall be translated 
into the official languages of the European Union. 
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stability as discussed in Chapter 4 or involve acting as an agent for the respective Member 
State.
56
  
2.2.3 Non-Eurosystem NCBs 
The non-Eurosystem NCBs are responsible for their respective national monetary policies and 
do not participate in the conduct of the single monetary policy. The non-Eurosystem NCBs 
contribute to the collection of statistical information under Article 5.2 of the Statute and the 
ECB‘s advisory functions. The non-Eurosystem NCBs are subject to Article 130 TFEU [former 
Article 108 TEC] and Articles 7 and 14.2 of the Statute. However, since Article 14.3 of the 
Statute does not apply to the non-Eurosystem NCBs, under Article 42.1 of the Statute, the latter 
are not subject to the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. 
The non-Eurosystem NCBs are a phenomenon under EU law. Article 14.1 of the Statute 
provides that in accordance with Article 131 TFEU [former Article 109 TEC], each Member 
State shall ensure that its national legislation, including the statutes of its national central bank, 
is compatible with these Treaties and this Statute. However, Article 139(1) TFEU sets forth that 
Member States in respect of which the Council has not decided that they fulfil the necessary 
conditions for the adoption of the euro shall be referred to as ―Member States with a 
derogation‖.  
Under Article 139(1) TFEU and Article 42.2 of the Statute the NCBs of Member States with a 
derogation shall retain their powers in the field of monetary policy according to national law. 
Pursuant to Article 139(2) TFEU the exceptions that apply to Member States with a derogation 
include, among others:  
1) the objectives and tasks of the ESCB (Article 127(1) to (3) and (5) TFEU);57  
2) issue of the euro (Article 128 TFEU);  
3) acts of the European Central Bank (Article 132 TFEU); 
4) measures governing the use of the euro (Article 133 TFEU);  
5) monetary agreements and other measures relating to exchange rate policy (Article 219 
TFEU); 
                                                 
56  Lastra has pointed out that ‗some NCBs have exclusive responsibility for banking supervision (e.g. Spain or Italy), while 
others either share supervisory responsibilities with other bodies (e.g. France) or have limited supervisory responsibilities 
(e.g. in Germany, where BaFin is formally in charge of supervision‘), see Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International 
Monetary Stability, 2006, p. 211. These functions are not part of the ESCB-related tasks (Doherty & Lenihan, 2005, pp. 
214-215). Arguably, as will be discussed in Section 4.3.1, the provision of emergency liquidity assistance also falls within 
the scope of Article 14.4 of the Statute (see also Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 65).  
57  This exception is, however, not absolute; see the discussion in Section 3.2.1.  
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6) appointment of members of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (Article 
283(2) TFEU);  
7) decisions establishing common positions on issues of particular relevance for economic 
and monetary union within the competent international financial institutions and 
conferences (Article 138(1) TFEU);  
8) measures to ensure unified representation within the international financial institutions 
and conferences (Article 138(2) TFEU); and 
9) under Chapter IX of the Statute (Transitional and other provisions for the ESCB), 
Member States with a derogation and their national central banks are excluded from 
rights and obligations within the ESCB. 
Pursuant to Article 142 TFEU [former Article 124(1) TEC], each Member State with a 
derogation shall treat its exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest. In so doing, 
Member States shall take account of the experience acquired in cooperation within the 
framework of the exchange rate mechanism. 
Zilioli and Selmayer differentiate between the non-Eurosystem NCBs,
58
 referring to some of 
them as having a special status (Denmark and the United Kingdom).
59
 Indeed, Denmark and the 
United Kingdom occupy a special position outside the euro area.
60
 The legal basis for the 
different treatment of the United Kingdom is Protocol No 15 on certain provisions relating to 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland which recognises that unless the 
United Kingdom notifies the Council that it intends to adopt the euro, it shall be under no 
obligation to do so,
61
 and for Denmark Protocol No 16 on certain provisions relating to 
Denmark, which refers to Denmark as a Member State with a derogation.
62
  
                                                 
58  The Member States with a derogation can also be called ―pre-ins‖ in order to distinguish them from the Member States with 
a special status (―outs‖), see Zilioli & Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank, 2001, p. 134. It is noted that each 
of the new Member States shall participate in Economic and Monetary Union from the date of accession as a Member State 
with a derogation within the meaning of Article 139(1) TFEU. See Article 4 of the Act concerning the conditions of 
accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of 
Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, p. 33. 
For Bulgaria and Romania, see Article 5 of the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and 
Romania and the adjustments to the treaties on which the European Union is founded, OJ L 157, 21.6.2005, p. 203; see the 
ECB Convergence Report of May 2010 (European Central Bank, 2010, p. 15).  
59  The interpretation under EU law on the notion of special status (―outs‖) has been the subject of fierce academic debate 
regarding Denmark, see Zilioli & Selmayr, The Law of the European Central Bank, 2001, p. 137. 
60  See Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, p. 941.  
61  It has also been suggested that in some regards the United Kingdom can be compared to a Member State with a derogation, 
see Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, p. 941.  
62  The ECB is of the opinion that for as long as Denmark does not notify the EU Council that it intends to adopt the euro, no 
Danish legislation needs to be adapted. For the latest statement, see the ECB Convergence Report of May 2010 (p. 16). 
Pursuant to Article 2 of Protocol No 16, the procedure for the abrogation of the exemption shall only be initiated at the 
request of Denmark. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, both types of cases are referred to as ‗non-Eurosystem NCBs‘. 
2.3 The functioning of European Monetary Union 
2.3.1 Decision-making bodies 
2.3.1.1 ECB decision-making bodies 
In accordance with Article 129(1) TFEU and Article 9.3 of the Statute, the decision-making 
bodies of the ECB shall be the Governing Council and the Executive Board.  
Governing Council 
Pursuant to Article 283(1) TFEU [former Article 112(1) TEC] and Article 10.1 of the Statute, 
the Governing Council of the European Central Bank shall comprise the members of the 
Executive Board of the European Central Bank and the Governors of the national central banks 
of the Member States whose currency is the euro.  
The decision-making is centralised with the Governing Council and the Executive Board, while 
the implementation of decisions is decentralised under Article 14.3 of the Statute. Since the 
transfer of monetary policy powers to the ESCB, the ECB‘s Governing Council has been, and 
still is, the consensus-based, collegial decision-making body defining the euro area‘s monetary 
policy and, in particular, the body that adopts the guidelines and takes the decisions necessary 
to ensure the performance of the Eurosystem‘s tasks.63 The Governors of the Eurosystem NCBs 
are ex officio members of the Governing Council of the ECB.
64
 Carel C. A. van den Berg points 
out that the ECB has taken most of its decisions on the basis of consensus, only in exceptional 
circumstances resorting to voting; consensus is not the same as unanimity, it refers to a 
willingness to accept a ‗majority‘ view in which arguments are weighed and not votes.65 
Pursuant to Article 284(1) TFEU [former Article 113(1) TEC], the President of the Council and 
a Member of the Commission may participate, without having the right to vote, in meetings of 
the Governing Council, where the President of the Council also may submit a motion for 
deliberation to the Governing Council. 
                                                 
63  See Paragraph 2.1 of the ECB Opinion CON/2006/32 of 22 June 2006 at the request of the French Senate on a draft law on 
the Banque de France, available at http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2006_32_f_sign.pdf.  
64  One of the earlier drafts even stipulated that the NCB Governors can be appointed only after consultation with the Council, 
see Goodhart C. , The Draft Statute of the European System of Central Banks: A Commentary, 1990, p. 4.  
65  See van den Berg, 2005, p. 405. Bénassy-Quéré and Turkish note that a consensus is sought and decisions are taken 
unanimously when possible (Bénassy-Quéré & Turkish, 2009, p. 32). 
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Under Article 10.2 of the Statute, each member of the Governing Council shall have one vote. 
As from the date on which the number of members of the Governing Council exceeds 21, each 
member of the Executive Board shall have one vote and the number of governors with a voting 
right shall be 15. The latter voting rights shall be assigned and shall rotate as follows: 
- as from the date on which the number of governors exceeds 15, until it reaches 22, the 
governors shall be allocated to two groups, according to a ranking of the size of the share of 
their national central bank‘s Member State in the aggregate gross domestic product at market 
prices and in the total aggregated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions of the 
Member States whose currency is the euro. The shares in the aggregate gross domestic product 
at market prices and in the total aggregated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions 
shall be assigned weights of 5/6 and 1/6, respectively. The first group shall be composed of five 
governors and the second group of the remaining governors. The frequency of voting rights of 
the governors allocated to the first group shall not be lower than the frequency of voting rights 
of those of the second group. Subject to the previous sentence, the first group shall be assigned 
four voting rights and the second group eleven voting rights; 
- as from the date on which the number of governors reaches 22, the governors shall be 
allocated to three groups according to a ranking based on the above criteria. The first group 
shall be composed of five governors and shall be assigned four voting rights. The second group 
shall be composed of half the total number of governors, with any fraction rounded up to the 
nearest integer, and shall be assigned eight voting rights. The third group shall be composed of 
the remaining governors and shall be assigned three voting rights; 
- within each group, the governors shall have their voting rights for equal amounts of time; 
- for the calculation of the shares in the aggregate gross domestic product at market prices, 
Article 29.2 of the Statute shall apply. The total aggregated balance sheet of the monetary 
financial institutions shall be calculated in accordance with the statistical framework applying 
in the Union at the time of the calculation; 
- whenever the aggregate gross domestic product at market prices is adjusted in accordance 
with Article 29.3 of the Statute, or whenever the number of governors increases, the size and/or 
composition of the groups shall be adjusted in accordance with the above principles; 
- the Governing Council, acting by a two-thirds majority of all its members, with and without a 
voting right, shall take all measures necessary for the implementation of the above principles 
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and may decide to postpone the start of the rotation system until the date on which the number 
of governors exceeds 18.
66
 
Under Article 10.2 of the Statute, the right to vote shall be exercised in person. By way of 
derogation from this rule, the Rules of Procedure referred to in Article 12.3 of the Statute may 
lay down that members of the Governing Council may cast their vote by means of 
teleconferencing. These rules also provide that a member of the Governing Council who is 
prevented from attending meetings of the Governing Council for a prolonged period may 
appoint an alternate as a member of the Governing Council.
67
 
The provisions of Article 10.3 of the Statute are without prejudice to the voting rights of all 
members of the Governing Council, with and without a voting right, under Articles 10.3, 40.2  
and 40.3 of the Statute, in which case the votes in the Governing Council shall be weighted 
according to the national central banks‘ shares in the subscribed capital of the ECB:  
1) the weights of the votes of the members of the Executive Board shall be zero;  
2) a decision requiring a qualified majority shall be adopted if the votes cast in favour 
represent at least two-thirds of the subscribed capital of the ECB and represent at least 
half the shareholders.  
3) if a Governor is unable to be present, he may nominate an alternate to cast his weighted 
vote. 
As a general rule, under Article 10.2 of the Statute, the Governing Council shall act by a simple 
majority of the members having a voting right. In the event of a tie, the President shall have the 
casting vote. In order for the Governing Council to vote, there shall be a quorum of two-thirds 
of the members having a voting right. If the quorum is not met, the President may convene an 
extraordinary meeting at which decisions may be taken without regard to the quorum. 
The reason behind such a complicated procedure is that there was a danger that an expanded 
euro area would lead to a large Governing Council that was unlikely to be capable of acting. 
The Treaty of Nice in 2000 introduced an enabling clause – Article 10.6 of the Statute, allowing 
the Heads of State to amend by unanimity Article 10.2 of the Statute, either based on a 
recommendation of the ECB or on a recommendation by the Commission. The ECB therefore 
                                                 
66  Note that the Governing Council has decided to postpone the rotation system; see Decision ECB/2008/29 of 18 December 
2008 to postpone the start of the rotation system in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, OJ L 3, 7.1.2009, 
p. 4.  
67  The ECB‘s practice seems to contradict the principle of the Governing Council membership‘s inalienability. Hanspeter 
Scheller claims that Article 10.2 of the Statute has also been used when a Governor relinquished office before the successor 
was appointed. See Scheller, 2006, p. 52; as well as footnote 325 for examples.  
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adopted a recommendation,
68
 which limited the number of votes for governors to fifteen, while 
also introducing a rotation scheme, using a three group model with a first group of the five 
largest
69
 Member States sharing four rotating votes, a second group consisting of half all euro 
area NCB Governors who share eight votes, and the remaining Governors sharing three votes.
70
 
Within these groups votes rotate on an equal basis. Carel C. A. van den Berg notes that this 
system keeps alive the ad personam concept and the one person, one vote system, allowing all 
Governors to speak, even if they do not have a vote.
71
 However, Belke and Styczynska claim 
the opposite, noting that the rotation model violates the fundamental principle of ‗one vote, one 
member‘, which is intended to ensure that the Governing Council members participate 
personally and independently, and not as national shareholders.
72
 
Carel C. A. van den Berg concludes that the system could be described as containing three 
circles: the largest circle is the Governing Council, containing all voting and non-voting 
members; the next, smaller circle contains only those with a vote; and the innermost circle 
contains the Executive Board members who are responsible for the day-to-day management of 
the Eurosystem‘s monetary policy.73 It is interesting to note that while Belke and Styczynska 
claim that as a result of the reform, the voting power of the Executive Board would be 
considerably strengthened,
74
 Fahrholz and Mohl arrive at different conclusions.
75
 Moreover, a 
study conducted by Bénassy-Quéré and Turkish claims that moving from the ‗old‘ rule to 
rotations has very little impact on the decisions made by the Governing Council in an enlarged 
euro area.
76
  
Executive Board 
Article 283(2) TFEU and Article 11 of the Statute provide that the Executive Board shall 
comprise the President, the Vice-President and four other members. 
                                                 
68  Recommendation, under Article 10.6 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank, for a Council Decision on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and 
of the European Central Bank (ECB/2003/1), OJ C 29, 7.2.2003, p. 6. See also ECB Opinion CON/00/30 of 5 December 
2000 at the request of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union on a proposal to amend Article 10.2 of the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, OJ C 362, 16.12.2000, p. 13.  
69  Large in terms of a weighted indicator based on GDP and a financial criterion.  
70  Although criticised by many authors for not coping with the requirements of efficiency, transparency and accountability the 
rotation system was chosen because it was the only way to reduce the gap between countries‘ size and representation, while 
keeping the involvement of all national governors in the decision-making process (Bénassy-Quéré & Turkish, 2009, p. 34). 
71  See van den Berg, 2005, p. 465.  
72  See Belke & Styczynska, 2006, p. 867; see also Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, p. 950.  
73  See van den Berg, 2005, p. 466.  
74  See Belke & Styczynska, 2006, p. 891. 
75  See Fahrholz & Mohl, 2004, p. 19. 
76  See Bénassy-Quéré & Turkish, 2009, p. 45. 
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The Executive Board is the operational decision-making body of the ECB and is responsible for 
the daily management of the bank. Under Article 11.6 of the Statute, which provides that the 
Executive Board shall be responsible for the current business of the ECB, several decisions 
have been adopted by the Executive Board.
77
 
The members of the Executive Board are appointed on a full-time basis by common accord of 
the governments of the euro area countries at the level of Heads of State or Government.
78
 The 
appointment is preceded by a recommendation from the EU Council and consultations of the 
European Parliament and the Governing Council of the ECB. 
General Council 
Under Article 141 TFEU [former Articles 123(3) and 117(2) first five indents, TEC], as long as 
there are Member States with a derogation, and without prejudice to Article 129(1) TFEU, the 
General Council of the European Central Bank referred to in Article 44 of the Statute of the 
ESCB and of the ECB shall be constituted as a third decision-making body of the European 
Central Bank. 
The institutional link between the Eurosystem and the non-euro area NCBs is ensured by the 
General Council under Article 44 of the Statute. The General Council comprises the President 
and Vice-President of the ECB and the Governors of all NCBs. An institutional link between 
the Eurosystem and the non-euro area NCBs is ensured by the General Council. The General 
Council comprises the President and Vice-President of the ECB and the Governors of all NCBs. 
The four other Executive Board members, as well as the President of the EU Council and a 
member of the European Commission may also participate in General Council meetings, but 
they do not have a right to vote. Under Article 141 TFEU [former Articles 123(3) and 117(2) 
first five indents, TEC] Article 43 of the Statute and Article 46 of the Statute, the tasks of the 
General Council are the following: 
1) strengthening cooperation between the national central banks; 
2) strengthening the coordination of the monetary policies of the Member States, with the 
aim of ensuring price stability; 
                                                 
77  For example: (1) Decision ECB/2007/7 of 24 July 2007 concerning the terms and conditions of TARGET2-ECB, OJ L 237, 
8.9.2007, p. 71, as amended;. (2) Decision ECB/2007/5 of 3 July 2007 laying down the Rules on Procurement, OJ L 184, 
14.7.2007, p. 34, as amended. (3) Decision ECB/2007/1 of 17 April 2007 adopting implementing rules concerning data 
protection at the European Central Bank, OJ L 116, 4.5.2007, p. 64. 
78  The composition of the Executive Board has no national census. Until 2010, the practice of the appointments shows that the 
nationals of Germany, Italy, France and Spain tend to be appointed more often than those of Austria, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Portugal or Finland. As of 1 September 2010, there were no citizens of Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia or Slovenia appointed.  
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3) monitoring the functioning of the exchange rate mechanism; 
4) holding consultations concerning issues falling within the competence of the national 
central banks and affecting the stability of financial institutions and markets; 
5) carrying out the former tasks of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, which had 
subsequently been taken over by the European Monetary Institute; 
6) giving advice in the preparations for the abrogation of the derogations specified in 
Article 140 TFEU and contributing to the necessary preparations for irrevocably fixing 
the exchange rates of the currencies of Member States with a derogation against the euro 
as referred to in Article 140(3) TFEU; 
7) contributing to the advisory functions referred to in Articles 4 and 25.1 of the Statute; 
8) contributing to the collection of statistical information as referred to in Article 5 of the 
Statute; 
9) contributing to the reporting activities of the ECB as referred to in Article 15 of the 
Statute; 
10) contributing to the establishment of the necessary rules for the application of Article 26  
as referred to in Article 26.4 of the Statute; 
11) contributing to all other measures necessary for the application of Article 29 as referred 
to in Article 29.4 of the Statute; 
12) contributing to the laying down of the conditions of employment of the staff of the ECB 
as referred to in Article 36 of the Statute. 
Although legal acts of the ECB under Article 132 TFEU and Article 34.1 of the Statute, should 
not, under Article 139 TFEU and Article 42.1 of the Statute, confer any rights or impose any 
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obligations on the Member State concerned, there are also legal acts adopted by the General 
Council.
79
  
2.3.1.2 Overview of the NCBs’ decision-making bodies 
This overview is based on the information extracted from Table 2-1 and aims at determining the 
position of the Governor in the NCBs‘ internal governance structure. The appointment of 
Governors of NCBs is regulated neither in TFEU nor in the Statute but has remained a national 
matter (see Section 3.2.3.3) except for the term of office of a minimum of five years as set forth 
in Article 14.2 of the Statute. 
Austria - The organs of the Austrian NCB are the General Meeting, the General Council and 
the Governing Board, which is chaired by the Governor. The Governor‘s status as a member of 
the ECB Governing Council and General Council is specifically mentioned in Article 34(1) of 
the Austrian NCB Statute.  
The General Meeting is entitled to receive a report from the General Council and approve the 
annual accounts. The General Council is a supervisory body at the Austrian NCB which is not 
involved in the daily management of the bank (such as the implementation of the ESCB-related 
tasks). The responsibility for the overall running of the Austrian NCB is entrusted to the 
Governing Board, which consists of the Governor, the Vice Governor and two other members.  
Belgium - The organs of the Belgian NCB are the Governor, the Board of Directors, the 
Council of Regency, the Board of Censors and the General Meeting. The Governor of the 
Belgian NCB presides over the Board of Directors and the Council of Regency.  
The General Meeting is subject to reporting by the Council of Regency on at least an annual 
basis. 
                                                 
79  The General Council has adopted formal ECB decisions, such as (1) Decision ECB/2009/17 of 19 June 2009 amending 
Decision ECB/2003/14 concerning the administration of the borrowing-and-lending operations concluded by the European 
Community under the medium-term financial assistance facility, OJ L 190, 22.7.2009, p. 11. (2) Decision ECB/2008/28 of 
15 December 2008 laying down the measures necessary for the paying-up of the European Central Bank‘s capital by the 
non-participating national central banks, OJ L 21, 24.1.2009, p. 81. (3) Decision ECB/2006/26 of 18 December 2006 laying 
down the measures necessary for the paying-up of the European Central Bank‘s capital by the non-participating national 
central banks, OJ L 24, 31.1.2007, p. 15. (4) Decision ECB/2004/12 of 17 June 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the 
General Council of the European Central Bank, OJ L 230, 30.6.2004, p. 61; (5) Decision ECB/2004/10 of 23 April 2004 
laying down the measures necessary for the paying-up of the European Central Bank's capital by the non-participating 
national central banks, OJ L 205, 9.6.2004, p. 19; (6) Decision ECB/2003/19 of 18 December 2003 laying down the 
measures necessary for the paying-up of the European Central Bank‘s capital by the non-participating national central 
banks, OJ L 9, 15.1.2004, p. 31. (7) Decision ECB/2003/14 of 7 November 2003 concerning the administration of the 
borrowing-and-lending operations concluded by the European Community under the medium-term financial assistance 
facility, OJ L 297, 15.11.2003, p. 35. (8) Decision ECB/1998/NP15 of 1 December 1998 concerning the performance by the 
European Central Bank of certain functions relating to medium-term financial assistance for Member States' balances of 
payments, OJ L 55, 24.2.2001, p. 76; (9) Decision ECB/1998/14 of 1 December 1998 laying down the measures necessary 
for the paying-up of the capital of the European Central Bank by the non-participating national central banks, OJ L 110, 
28.4.1999, p. 33. 
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The Board of Directors is responsible for the administration and the management of the Belgian 
NCB. The Council of Regency is in charge of general issues concerning the NCB; however, it 
cannot be regarded as supervisory organ. Given that if the Governor is present in the Board as 
well as the Council, the fact that under Article 30 of the Belgian NCB Statute the Council can 
delegate some of its functions to the Board would lead to the conclusion that the Belgian NCB 
has two decision-making organs. However, it is arguable to what extent the Council of Regency 
participates in ESCB-related tasks; it is likely that the Council exercises its influence over the 
Board‘s activities.  
The task of the Board of Censors is to supervise the preparation and implementation of the 
budget.  
Bulgaria - The Bulgarian NCB Statute lists the Governing Council, the Governor and three 
Deputy Governors as the management bodies of the NCB. The Governor and three Deputy 
Governors along with three other members constitute the Governing Council, which is entitled 
to adopt decisions listed in Article 16 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute.  
The Governor is entrusted with the task of organising, directing and supervising the activities of 
the Bulgarian NCB.  
Cyprus - The organs of the Cypriot NCB are the Board of Directors, the Governor and the 
Deputy Governor. The Governor‘s role as a member of the ECB Governing Council and the 
General Council is noted in Articles 17(4) and 20(3) of the Cypriot NCB Statute.  
Under the articles of the Cypriot NCB Statute, the Board shall supervise the administration of 
the bank and define and implement the policy of the Cypriot NCB as far as non-ESCB-related 
issues are concerned. ESCB-related tasks are exclusively entrusted to the Governor of the 
Cypriot NCB. However, the Board of Directors cannot be regarded as a supervisory body since 
the Governor and Deputy Governors are ex officio members of the Board and would therefore 
be supervising their own activities. Rather, the Board of Directors can be defined as ‗another‘ 
decision-making organ that addresses issues outside the scope of ESCB-related tasks.  
The Czech Republic - Under Article 5(1) of the Czech NCB Statute, the supreme governing 
body of the Czech National Bank is the Bank Board. The Bank Board is in charge of monetary 
policy and other basic central banking tasks. The Bank Board consists of seven members, 
including the Governor and two Deputy Governors.  
Denmark - Under the Danish NCB Statute, the management of the NCB is carried out by a 
Board of Directors, a Committee of Directors and a Board of Governors.  
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The Board of Directors addresses, as a rule, issues that are outside the management of daily 
affairs; it supervises the NCB‘s activities. Its relationship and hierarchical position with regard 
to the Committee of Governors is not clear, it seems to be a body between the Board of 
Directors and the Board of Governors charged with a duty to review matters before the Board 
of Directors makes a decision.  
The daily management of the NCB is vested in the Board of Governors.  
Estonia - The Supervisory Board of the Estonian NCB is entitled to supervise all activities of 
the NCB. The Supervisory Board consists of a Chairman and seven members who are 
appointed by the Estonian Parliament.  
The daily management of the NCB is vested in the Governor and the Executive Board. The 
Executive Board is composed of the Governor and the Deputy Governors; none of them may be 
a member of the Supervisory Board. The Executive Board is in charge of planning and 
organising the Estonian NCB‘s activities. However, certain competences, such as ESCB-related 
tasks, are allocated to the Governor exclusively.  
Finland - The Finnish NCB‘s governing bodies are the Parliamentary Supervisory Council and 
the Board.  
The Parliamentary Supervisory Council is appointed by the Finnish Parliament from among its 
members.  
The Board, which includes the Governor, is responsible for the administration of the NCB and 
for ensuring that all tasks assigned to the NCB are duly executed, except for the tasks of the 
Parliamentary Supervisory Council.  
France - The French NCB is managed by the Governor, who presides over the Monetary 
Policy Council and the General Council.  
The Monetary Policy Council advises the Governor on issues related to the monetary policy of 
the Eurosystem The General Council manages the NCB and decide on matters other than 
ESCB-related issues.  
Germany - The governing body of the German NCB is the Executive Board, which consists of 
the Governor, Deputy Governor and six other members. The Executive Board is a collegiate 
body, but it may allocate responsibility for dealing with specific matters to one of its members.  
Greece - The supreme organ of the Greek NCB is the General Meeting of Shareholders. The 
general management of affairs is entrusted with the General Council, which consists of the 
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Governor, the two Deputy Governors and the other members of the Monetary Policy Council as 
well as six Councillors. The General Council decides on matters outside the scope of ESCB-
related tasks.  
The Monetary Policy Council advises the Governor on economic and monetary developments. 
The Governor and Deputy Governors are members of the Monetary Policy Council by virtue of 
their office. The Governor‘s status as a member of the ECB Governing Council and General 
Council is noted in Article 22(2) of the Greek NCB Statute.  
Hungary - The organs of the Hungarian NCB are the General Meeting, the Monetary Council, 
the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Board.  
The General Meeting is the addressee of annual reports of the Hungarian NCB. The highest 
decision-making organ is the Monetary Council, which consists of the Governor, one Deputy 
Governor and other members. The Governor and Deputy Governors constitute the Board of 
Directors, which shall be responsible for the implementation of the decisions of the Monetary 
Council and the operations of the Hungarian NCB.  
The NCB‘s activities are supervised by the Supervisory Board, whose members are appointed 
by the Hungarian Parliament and the Ministry of Finance.  
Ireland - The Irish NCB is governed by the Board of Directors, which consists of the Governor 
and up to 11 Directors. The Governor shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the 
Government.  
Italy - The organs of the Italian NCB are the Shareholders‘ Meeting, the Board of Directors, the 
Board of Auditors, the Directorate, the Governor, the Director General and the Deputy 
Directors General.  
The Board of Auditors, which consists of five auditors, is responsible for monitoring the 
management of the NCB with regard to observance of the law and it carries out accounting 
checks in addition to the task carried out by the Italian NCB‘s statutory auditors.  
The Board of Directors, which consists of the Governor and thirteen directors, is responsible for 
general management, supervision and internal control of the Italian NCB. The Directorate, 
which consists of the Governor, the Director General and three Deputy Directors General, has 
the authority to manage the NCB‘s daily affairs. The matters that are not expressly mentioned 
as a duty of the Board of Directors or the Directorate are entrusted to the Governor. The 
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Governor‘s status as a member of the ECB Governing Council and General Council is noted in 
Article 24(2) of the Italian NCB Statute.  
Latvia - The Latvian NCB is managed by the Council and the Board.  
The Council consists of eight persons, including the Governor and the Deputy Governor. The 
Council decides on basic central banking issues. The Council‘s decisions are carried out by the 
Board. The Board is chaired by a person appointed by the Governor.  
Lithuania - The Lithuanian NCB is governed by the Board. The Board consists of the 
Governor, the two Deputy Governors and two other members. The Board is entitled to decide 
on basic central banking issues until the introduction of the euro in Lithuania, after which the 
Board shall address matters that are outside the competence of the ESCB  
The Governor is responsible for the daily management of the Lithuanian NCB and he can 
delegate some of his duties to the Deputy Governors.  
Luxembourg - The organs of the Luxemburg NCB are the Council and the Board of Directors. 
The latter is the executive authority of the NCB charged with the implementation of ESCB-
related tasks, while the Council addresses more general issues.  
The Board of Directors comprises the Governor and two Directors; the Council consists of the 
members of the Board of Directors and six other members. Both organs are headed by the 
Governor. The Governor‘s status as a member of the ECB Governing Council80 is explicitly 
noted in the Luxembourg NCB Statute. 
Malta - The organs of the Maltese NCB are the Board of Directors, the Governor and the 
Deputy Governor. Under the provisions of the Maltese NCB Statute, the Board of Directors is 
responsible for the policy and general management of the NCB, with the exception of ESCB-
related tasks, which are in the remit of the Governor.  
The Netherlands - The Netherlands NCB has the following organs: the Governing Board, the 
Supervisory Board, the Council and the Shareholders‘ Meeting.  
The Governing Board, which consists of the Governor and up to five Executive Directors, is 
responsible for the daily management of the NCB. The Governor‘s role as a member of the 
ECB Governing Council
81
 is explicitly mentioned not in the Netherlands NCB Statute but in the 
                                                 
80  Surprisingly, the Governor‘s status as a member of the ECB General Council is not mentioned in the Luxembourg NCB 
Statute.  
81  The Governor‘s status as a member of the ECB General Council is mentioned neither in the Netherlands NCB Statute nor in 
its Articles of Association.  
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Netherlands NCB Articles of Association. The Governor may not be a member of the 
Supervisory Board and the Council. 
The Supervisory Board supervises the management of the NCB‘s affairs. In addition to 
reporting to the Supervisory Board, the Governor is also accountable to the Council with regard 
to information on the general economic and financial situation and the NCB‘s policy.  
Poland - The Polish NCB has the following organs: the Governor, the Monetary Policy Council 
and the Management Board.  
The Governor chairs the Monetary Policy Council as well as the Management Board.  
The nine members of the Monetary Policy Council other than the Governor are appointed in 
equal numbers by the President of the Republic of Poland, the Sejm and the Senate from among 
the persons of recognised standing in [the world of] finance.  
The Monetary Policy Council is responsible for defining monetary policy and the Management 
Board is responsible for the daily management of the NCB. 
The Management Board has, in addition to the Governor, up to eight members, including two 
Deputy Governors.  
Portugal - The organs of the Portuguese NCB are the Governor, the Board of Directors, the 
Board of Auditors and the Advisory Board.  
The Governor is accountable for the overall management of the NCB. The Governor‘s status as 
a member of the ECB Governing Council and the General Council is explicitly mentioned in 
the Portuguese NCB Statute.  
The Governor chairs the Board of Directors, which is responsible for all activities of the NCB 
not assigned to any other body. In addition to the Governor, the Board of Directors may consist 
of one or two Deputy Governors and of three to five Directors.  
The Governor also chairs the Advisory Board, which includes the Deputy Governors, former 
Governors, the Chairman of the Portuguese Association of Banks, the Chairman of the Public 
Credit Management Institute, a representative of each of the Autonomous Regions of the 
Azores and Madeira and four other members. The Advisory Board provides its opinions on the 
draft Annual Report, the NCB‘s activities and other matters addressed either by the Governor or 
the Board of Directors.  
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The Board of Auditors is liable for monitoring and assessing the NCB‘s activities. Most of the 
members of the Board of Auditors are appointed by the Portuguese Finance Minister.  
Romania - The Romanian NCB is managed by the Board. The Board consists of nine members, 
including the Governor, the Senior Deputy Governor and seven other members, of whom two 
are Deputy Governors. The latter may not be employees of the Romanian NCB.  
The daily affairs of the NCB are managed by the Governor, the Senior Deputy Governor and 
two Deputy Governors.  
Slovakia - The Slovak NCB is governed by the Board, which consists of 11 members. The 
Governor, two Deputy Governors and at least five employees of the Slovak NCB constitute the 
Board.  
Slovenia - The decision-making bodies of the Slovenian NCB are the Governor and the 
Governing Board.  
The Governor is responsible for the daily management of the NCB and for implementing 
decisions adopted by the Governing Board, which he presides.  
The Governing Board is composed of the Governor, four Deputy Governors and four other 
members. Under the Slovenian NCB Statute, the Governing Board shall decide on all issues 
that, on the basis of the Slovenian NCB Statute, fall within the responsibility of the Slovenian 
NCB.  
Spain - The governing bodies of the Spanish NCB are the Governor, the Deputy Governor, the 
Governing Council and the Executive Commission.  
The Governor is responsible for the daily management of the NCB and presides over the 
Governing Council and the Executive Commission. The Governor‘s role as a member of the 
ECB Governing Council and the General Council is explicitly mentioned in the Spanish NCB 
Statute.  
The Governing Council is composed of the Governor, the Deputy Governor, six elected 
Council members, the Director-General of the Treasury and Financial Policy and the Vice-
President of the National Securities Market Commission. The Governing Council is the highest 
decision-making body of the NCB, which has an advisory role with regard to ESCB-related 
tasks.  
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The Executive Commission, which consists of the Governor, the Deputy Governor and two 
elected Council Members, is responsible for the daily management of the NCB, including 
ESCB-related tasks.  
Sweden - The decision-making bodies of the Swedish NCB are the General Council and the 
Executive Board.  
The 11 members of the General Council are appointed by the Swedish Parliament from among 
its members. The General Council appoints the Executive Board, which consists of six 
members and is responsible for the daily business of the NCB. The General Council also 
appoints the Governor and at least one Deputy Governor from among the members of the 
Executive Board.  
The Executive Board is competent to adopt any decision at the NCB, except in the areas that 
fall within the competence of the General Council.  
The United Kingdom - The United Kingdom NCB Statute provides for a Court of Directors, a 
Committee of Non-executive Directors within the Court, and a Monetary Policy Committee. 
The Court of Directors is responsible for managing the affairs of the Bank other than the 
formulation of monetary policy. The Court of Directors consists of the Governor, the two 
Deputy Governors and nine Directors. The Monetary Policy Committee consists of the 
Governor and Deputy Governors, two of the Bank‘s Executive Directors and four members 
appointed by the Chancellor. 
2.3.2 ESCB Committees 
The system of committees dates back to the establishment of the Committee of Governors in 
1964. In a way, the General Council, the Governing Council and the Executive Board can also 
be regarded as committees.  
Moutot, Jung and Mongelli explain that the widespread use of committees in so many areas 
within the ESCBEurosystem reflects the need to share information and coordinate the work of 
the ECB and of the NCBs mostly for three reasons: (i) the ECB constitutes only a relatively 
small share of the Eurosystem‘s total staff, and considerable expertise is available at the 
national level in all areas related to the ECB‘s monetary policy; (ii) most NCBs have been in 
existence for much longer than the ECB and a committee structure ensures consistency with 
past policies and across countries, thereby securing a harmonious level playing-field; (iii) 
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committees provide the framework in which best practices and technical expertise can be 
shared, and they foster cooperation within the Eurosystem at the staff and management level.
82
 
Committees shall be established and dissolved by the Governing Council pursuant to Article 
9.1 of the ECB Rules of Procedure; the committees shall assist in the work of the decision-
making bodies of the ECB and shall report to the Governing Council via the Executive Board.  
Article 9.2 of the ECB Rules of Procedure stipulates that committees shall be composed of up 
to two members from each of the Eurosystem NCBs and the ECB, appointed by each Governor 
and the Executive Board respectively [standard composition]; the Governing Council shall lay 
down the mandates
83
 of the committees and appoint their chairpersons. As a rule, the 
chairperson shall be an ECB staff member; the ECB shall also provide secretarial assistance for 
the committees. Under Article 9.3 of the ECB Rules of Procedure, the non-Eurosystem NCBs 
may also appoint up to two staff members to take part in the meetings of a committee whenever 
it deals with matters falling within the field of competence of the General Council and 
whenever the chairperson of a committee and the Executive Board deems this appropriate 
[extended composition]. With regard to the other participants of the committees, Article 9.4 of 
the ECB Rules of Procedure establishes that representatives of other Community institutions 
and bodies and any other third party may also be invited to take part in the meetings of a 
committee whenever the chairperson of a committee and the Executive Board deems this 
appropriate. 
The list of ESCB committees and their mandates is published on the ECB‘s website:84 
1. The Accounting and Monetary Income Committee (AMICO) advises on all intra-
Eurosystem issues relating to accounting, financial reporting and the allocation of 
monetary income;  
2. The Banking Supervision Committee (BSC) assists regarding the contribution to 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system (see 
also the discussion in Section 4.2.1.3);  
3. The Banknote Committee (BANCO) advises on all banknotes policy-related matters and 
assists in the strategic planning of banknote production and issuance;  
                                                 
82  See Moutot, Jung, & Mongelli, 2008, p. 38.  
83  Further to this, under Article 9.2 of the ECB Rules of Procedure, both the Governing Council and the Executive Board shall 
have the right to request studies of specific topics by committees. 
84  Available at http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/educational/facts/orga/html/or_019.en.html (visited on 6 September 2010).   
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4. The Budget Committee (BUCOM), which assists and reports directly to the Governing 
Council in matters related to the ECB‘s budget. BUCOM is composed of representatives 
of the ECB and the Eurosystem NCBs;  
5. The Communications Committee (ECCO) assists in external and intra-system 
communication policy;  
6. The Human Resources Conference (HRC) includes the heads of personnel of all EU 
central banks; 
7. The Information Technology Committee (ITC) assists in the development, 
implementation and maintenance of IT networks and communications infrastructures 
which support the joint operational systems;  
8. The Internal Auditors Committee (IAC) develops common standards for auditing 
Eurosystem operations and audits joint projects and joint operational systems at the 
Eurosystem/ESCB level;  
9. The International Relations Committee (IRC) assists in the performance of the ECB's 
statutory tasks with regard to international cooperation and acts as a forum for 
exchanging views on matters of common interest in the field of international relations;  
10. The Legal Committee (LEGCO) provides legal advice for the fulfilment of the ECB‘s 
statutory task and prepares the legal acts for the operation of the Eurosystem;  
11. The Market Operations Committee (MOC) assists in the execution of monetary policy 
operations and foreign exchange transactions, including those related to the operation of 
ERM II, and to the management of the ECB‘s foreign reserves;  
12. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) does not make monetary policy decisions as its 
name suggests
85
; it mainly advises on strategic and longer-term issues relating to the 
formulation of the monetary and exchange rate policy and is responsible for the 
Eurosystem staff projections;  
13. The Payment and Settlement Systems Committee (PSSC) advises on the operation and 
maintenance of TARGET, general payment systems policy and oversight issues and 
issues of interest for central banks in the field of securities clearing and settlement;  
14. The Statistics Committee (STC) mainly advises on the design and compilation of 
statistical information collected by the ECB with the assistance of the NCBs. 
                                                 
85  The real monetary policy committee is the Governing Council. See also the explanation provided by Moutot, Jung, & 
Mongelli, 2008, pp. 22-23.  
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The creation of a Procurement Committee is further envisaged in Guideline ECB/2004/18 on 
the procurement of euro banknotes.
86
 
All ESCB committees operate in a similar way; they have a well-defined mandate which 
clarifies the range of contributions that they have to prepare as input in the policy process; the 
working language is English; and there are regular meetings (typically once a month).
87
 
Documentation and technical background information are subject to Article 23.1 of the ECB 
Rules of Procedure,
88
 the documents are made available to all committee members, their 
deliberations are confidential, and reports are published on issues of more general interest, 
subject to the approval of the Governing Council.  
However, while Moutot, Jung and Mongelli claim that all ESCB committees have clear 
mandates, very little is known about them since they are not publicly available. In various legal 
instruments some references have been made: AMICO, for instance, reports to the Governing 
Council, via the Executive Board, on the development, application and implementation of the 
ESCB accounting and financial reporting rules.
89
 With regard to BSC, information is not so 
                                                 
86  Guideline ECB/2004/18 of 16 September 2004 on the procurement of euro banknotes, OJ L 320, 21.10.2004, p. 21.  
87  See Moutot, Jung, & Mongelli, 2008, p. 39.  
88  Article 23.1 reads as follows: The proceedings of the decision-making bodies of the ECB and of any committee or group 
established by them shall be confidential unless the Governing Council authorises the President to make the outcome of 
their deliberations public.  
89  Decision ECB/2006/17 of 10 November 2006 on the annual accounts of the European Central Bank OJ L 348, 11.12.2006, 
p. 38; Guideline ECB/2006/16 of 10 November 2006 on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the 
European System of Central Banks, OJ L 348, 11.12.2006, p. 1. 
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clear.
90
 BANCO assists the Executive Board,
91
 as does the ITC
92
 and the STC.
93
 The PSSC 
appears to have the broadest powers, as it can also adopt binding rules.
94
 
Committees can delegate work of a more technical nature to working groups with a specific 
mandate or to task forces that meet until the task at hand is accomplished.
95
 For example, the 
MPC is supported by the Working Group on Forecasting (WGF), the Working Group on 
Econometric Modelling (WGEM) and the Working Group on Public Finance (WGPF).
 96
 
2.4 Conclusions of Chapter 2 
The ECB, together with NCBs, is usually referred to as the ESCB, that being the institutional 
set-up covering all central banks in the Union. The ECB and the national central banks of the 
Member States whose currency is the euro constitute the Eurosystem, which conducts the 
monetary policy of the Union. 
In practice, this means a separation between the Eurosystem NCBs and the non-Eurosystem 
NCBs, as their tasks and obligations are different under the Treaties and the Statute.  
Neither the ESCB nor the Eurosystem is a legal person. They function through the decision-
making bodies of the ECB, which are the Executive Board, the Governing Council and the 
General Council. The Executive Board and the Governing Council can also be regarded as the 
main decision-making organs, while a third decision-making body, the General Council, will 
exist as long as there are Member States that have not adopted the euro. 
                                                 
90  ECB Opinion CON/2008/63 of 7 November 2008 on a draft Commission decision establishing the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors, OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, p. 1; ECB Opinion CON/2004/7 of 20 February 2004 at the request of the 
Council of the European Union on a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 94/19/EC and Directives 2000/12/EC, 
2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, in order to establish a new financial services 
committee organisational structure (COM(2003) 659 final), OJ C 58, 6.3.2004, p. 23. 
91  Guideline ECB/2008/8 of 11 September 2008 on data collection regarding the euro and the operation of the Currency 
Information System 2, OJ L 346, 23.12.2008, p. 89. Decision ECB/2008/3 of 15 May 2008 on security accreditation 
procedures for manufacturers of euro secure items for euro banknotes, OJ L 140, 30.5.2008, p. 26. Guideline ECB/2004/18 
of 16 September 2004 on the procurement of euro banknotes, OJ L 320, 21.10.2004, p. 21. Decision ECB/2001/11of 8 
November 2001 on certain conditions regarding access to the Counterfeit Monitoring System (CMS), OJ L 337, 
20.12.2001, p. 49. 
92  Guideline ECB/2008/8 of 11 September 2008 on data collection regarding the euro and the operation of the Currency 
Information System 2, OJ L 346, 23.12.2008, p. 89.  
93  Guideline ECB/2004/15 of 16 July 2004 on the statistical reporting requirements of the European Central Bank in the field 
of balance of payments and international investment position statistics, and the international reserves template, OJ L 354, 
30.11.2004, p. 34. 
94  However, it is arguable whether these kinds of powers comply with the Treaties, the Statute and the ECB Rules of 
Procedure. See Decision ECB/2010/9 of 29 July 2010 on access to and use of certain TARGET2 data, OJ L 211, 12.8.2010, 
p. 45. In other legal instruments, it is referred to as an advisory body only; see Decision ECB/2009/6 of 19 March 2009 on 
the establishment of the TARGET2-Securities Programme Board, OJ L 102, 22.4.2009, p. 12. Guideline ECB/2007/2 of 
26 April 2007 on a Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET2), OJ L 
237, 8.9.2007, p. 1. 
95  See Moutot, Jung, & Mongelli, 2008, p. 39.  
96  See Moutot, Jung, & Mongelli, 2008, p. 38.  
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The NCB Statutes, while describing their decision-making bodies, refer to the status of the 
Governor as a member of the Governing and/or General Council as evidenced in Table 2-1. 
This reference is important for the discussion in Chapter 3, where many of the issues are related 
to the notion of ‗Governor‘.  
The ESCB and the Eurosystem both operate through various committees, which assist in the 
work of the decision-making bodies of the ECB and report to the Governing Council via the 
Executive Board.  
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3 A national central bank in the European Union 
3.1 Interaction between central bank independence and accountability 
Due to the institutional set-up of the Eurosystem and the ESCB as explained in 
Chapter 2, an NCB is granted independence under the Treaties and the Statute while 
maintaining, to a large extent, the accountability regime established under the national 
legal system.  
This Chapter is divided into two parts: the first will assess central bank independence; 
the second part will address central bank accountability transparency and its 
confidentiality regime.  
The assessment has been broken down into functional (Section 3.2.1), institutional 
(Section 3.2.2), personal (Section 3.2.3) and financial (Section 3.2.4) independence 
and each discussion point will be supported by a separate comparative table. I will 
also explain the link between central bank independence and accountability, by 
analysing the duty of loyalty (Section 3.2.3.4) and the duty of non-competition 
(Section 3.2.3.5) that apply to the Governors and make them accountable to the 
institutions that have either appointed them or participated in the process of 
appointment (Section 3.3.1).  
Second, I will discuss the notion of accountability and the assessment that I provide 
will also be supported by tables comparing the relevant national provisions. Those 
provisions will be analysed, placing the NCB within the existing system of checks and 
balances. Central bank transparency (Section 3.3.2) will be discussed in a broader 
context, referring to the activities which the central banks have to carry out pursuant 
to their respective Statutes but which are different from the formal aspect of 
accountability. Finally, I will explain the limits set for accountability and transparency 
by Article 37.1 of the Statute [former Article 38 of the Statute], namely 
confidentiality and professional secrecy (Section 3.3.3).  
3.2 Central bank independence 
The Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the 
European Economic Community noted in 1990 that „in order to enable the System to 
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attain the primary objective of price stability it is important that the decision-making 
bodies should not be influenced by considerations which would be in conflict with the 
pursuit of price stability. [...] The favourable experience with independent monetary 
authorities made by a number of countries is particularly relevant for a plural 
Community society where competing interests may tend to give greater thought to 
short-term considerations and thus lead to pressures in favour of a monetary policy 
stance which would not always be compatible with  price stability in longer term‟.97 
Almost immediately, legal scholars started paying attention to the issues concerning 
the extent to which the central banks can be independent from political influence 
while being accountable for their actions.
98
  
The move towards central bank independence is not something that can be attributed 
to the ESCB or the Eurosystem; even without EMU the separate European countries 
can, and indeed are, moving in the direction of more independent national central 
banks.
99
 The phenomenon of independence is not unique to central banking – it is a 
feature inherent in an administrative law tradition in which certain powers are 
delegated to certain agencies with regulatory powers.
100
 Central bank independence 
reflects the division of powers between the central bank and the government – the 
central bank sets goals and controls monetary policy while the government controls 
fiscal policy. In the framework of the Treaties and the Statute, Advocate General 
Jacobs has noted that central bank independence shall not imply that there should be 
total isolation from, or a complete absence of, cooperation with the institutions and 
bodies of the Union – the only prohibition is of bringing influence to bear that is liable 
to undermine the ability of the ECB to carry out its tasks effectively with a view to 
price stability.
101
  
The original set of features of the principle of central bank independence, 
distinguishing between functional, institutional, personal and financial independence, 
were established in the ―Introductory Report on the Draft Statute of the European 
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank‖ 102 and repeated, together 
                                                 
97  See Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic 
Community, 1990, p. 5. 
98  Lastra R. M., The Independence of the European System of Central Banks, 1992.  
99  See Goodhart C. A., European Monetary Union: A Progress Report, 1994, p. 10.  
100  Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, p. 45. 
101  See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, delivered on 3 October 2002, paragraph 155, in Case C-11/00.  
102  See footnote 97.  
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with the description of legal integration into the Eurosystem in the European 
Monetary Institute‘s ―Progress towards convergence‖, which was published in 
November 1995.
103
 Over the years, the concept of central bank independence has been 
developed in Convergence Reports as well as in ECB Opinions on draft national legal 
instruments.  
3.2.1 Functional independence 
The ECB supports the view according to which functional independence requires each 
NCB‘s primary objective to be stated in a clear and legally certain manner and to be 
fully in line with the primary objective of price stability established by the Treaties.
104
 
Furthermore, functional independence is served by providing the NCBs with the 
necessary means and instruments to achieve this objective independently of any other 
authority.
105
 Berger and de Haan have said that by specifying the objectives of the 
central bank and by giving it certain powers, politicians determine the extent of their 
commitment to a policy rule.
106
 In a way, functional independence summarises what 
core purpose of institutional, personal and financial independence are all about
107
 and 
explains in a simple manner why central bank independence is necessary as well as its 
limitations.  
The requirement of central bank independence reflects the generally held view that 
the primary objective of price stability is best served by a fully independent institution 
with a precisely defined mandate.
108
 Therefore provisions of national law stating, for 
example, that the main objective of an NCB is implementing monetary policy by 
controlling the amount of money in circulation with the aim of maintaining price 
                                                 
103  See European Monetary Institute, 1995, pp. 91-93.  
104  See, for example, the ECB Convergence Report 2010 (p. 18). The ECB also used the same text in the earlier 
ECB Convergence Reports (European Central Bank, 2008, p. 17), (European Central Bank, 2007, p. 16), 
(European Central Bank, 2006, p. 62), (European Central Bank, 2006, p. 24), (European Central Bank, 2005, 
p. 25). A more detailed review has been provided by Niall Lenihan (Lenihan, 2006).  
105  See footnote 104.  
106  See Berger & de Haan, 1999, p. 20. 
107  The Court of Justice of the European Union has outlined the following aspects with regard to the independence 
of the ECB: (1) legal personality; (2) its own resources and budget; (3) its own decision-making bodies; (4) 
existence of such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the performance of its tasks; (5) that only the 
Court may retire a member of the Executive Board. See paragraph 132 of Case C-11/00 Commission v ECB 
[2003] ECR I-7147.  
108  See footnote 97.  
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stability in the State cannot be deemed compliant with the Treaties and the Statute.
109
 
This requirement is supported by the monetary financing prohibition, which is 
discussed in Section 4.3.2.
110
  
However, the objectives and tasks of the ESCB as set forth in Article 127(1) to (3) 
and (5) TFEU [former Article 105(1) to (3) and (5) TEC],
111
 do not apply to the 
Member States with a derogation under Article 139(2)(c) TFEU. The interpretation 
previously taken by the ECB that the non-Eurosystem NCBs are also subject to the 
primary objective of price stability even though for some reason Article 127(1) TFEU 
does not apply to them
112
 was therefore misleading.
113
 However, Article 282(2) TFEU 
and Article 2 of the Statute, which also refer to the primary objective, do not enjoy a 
similar derogation, which would therefore mean that the Members States with a 
derogation are bound by this duty.
114
 The above provisions, with the exception of 
Article 2 of the Statute, do not apply to the United Kingdom under Article 4 of 
Protocol No 15.
115
 It should be noted that price stability as an objective is mentioned 
in the United Kingdom NCB Statutes.
116
 
Table 3-1 reveals that the NCB Statutes of Austria,
117
 Belgium,
118
 Cyprus,
119
 
Finland
120
 France,
121
 Greece,
122
 Italy,
123
 Malta,
124
 the Netherlands,
125
 Portugal,
126
 
                                                 
109  Such provision was previously set forth in Article 3 of the Latvian NCB Statute and subsequently criticised by 
the ECB in the Convergence Report of December 2004 (European Central Bank, 2004, p. 223). The provision 
was modified on 1 December 2005 but the new version was still found unsatisfactory in the ECB Convergence 
Reports (2006, p. 219); (2008, p. 236); (2010, p. 243). 
110  Further studies were conducted by several scholars already in 1998 (Hahn, 1998; Herdegen, 1998).  
111  Also repeated in Article 282(2) TFEU and Article 2 of the Statute. 
112  The position was first taken in the ECB Convergence Report of 2004 (2004, p. 25). With some variations in 
presentational style, the same statements were repeated in the ECB Convergence Reports of May 2006 (2006, 
p. 62) and December 2006 (2006, p. 24), as well as in the report of May 2007 (2007, p. 16) and May 2008 
(European Central Bank, 2008, p. 17).  
113  However, the ECB continues to maintain its position; see the ECB Convergence Report of May 2010 
(European Central Bank, 2010, p. 18).  
114  Article 42.1 of the Statute, which provides that a derogation referred to in Article 139 TFEU (and that this 
shall entail that certain provisions do not confer any rights or impose any obligations on the Member State 
concerned), does not list Article 2 of the Statute; similarly there is no exemption regarding Article 282(2) 
TFEU.   
115  It is noteworthy that while Article 4 of Protocol No 15 provides that, among other, Articles 127(1) to (5) TFEU 
and Article 282(2) TFEU, with the exception of the first and last sentences thereof, shall not apply to the 
United Kingdom, there is no such corresponding duty in Article 7 of Protocol No 15.  
116  Article 11 of the United Kingdom NCB Statute. Notably, the Bank of England‘s objectives are not determined 
by the Bank itself but the Treasury under Article 12 of the United Kingdom NCB Statute.  
117  Article 2(2) of the Austrian NCB Statute. 
118  Article 12 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association. 
119  Article 5(2) of the Cypriot NCB Statute.  
120  Article 2(1) of the Finnish NCB Statute. 
121  Article L 141-1 of the French NCB Statute.  
122  Article 4(3) of the Greek NCB Statute.  
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Slovenia,
127
 and Spain,
128
 as well as conditionally Estonia,
129
 and Lithuania,
130
 refer to 
the Treaties and the Statute while addressing the functional independence. Against 
this background, it should be noted that such references were included in response to 
the advice of the ECB in its Convergence Reports.
131
 A simple reference to the 
maintenance of price stability, sometimes with a link to membership of the ESCB is 
made in the NCB Statutes of the Czech Republic,
132
 Germany,
133
 Lithuania,
134
 
Slovakia,
135
 and Sweden.
136
  
Some deviations with regard to the ESCB statutory objectives are currently present in 
the NCB Statutes of Bulgaria,
137
 Estonia
138
, Hungary,
139
 Latvia,
140
 Poland,
141
 and 
                                                                                                                                            
123  Article 1(3) of the Italian NCB Statute.  
124  Article 4 of the Maltese NCB Statute. 
125  Article 2 of the Dutch NCB Statute. 
126  Article 3(2) of the Portuguese NCB Statute.  
127  Article 4(2) of the Slovenian NCB Statute.  
128  Article 7(2) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
129  See the new Article 2(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute, entering into force on a day provided by a Council 
decision on abrogation of the derogation.  
130  See the new Article 7(1) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute, entering into force on a day provided by a Council 
decision on abrogation of the derogation. 
131  For Lithuania and Slovenia, see the ECB Convergence Report of May 2006 (European Central Bank, 2006, pp. 
73, 76) respectively; for Cyprus and Malta, see the ECB Convergence Report of May 2007 (European Central 
Bank, 2007, pp. 74, 78) respectively.  
132  Article 2(1) of the Czech NCB Statute as amended by Section II of Act No 442/2000 Coll. However, it appears 
that Section II of the Act No 442/2000 actually did not repeal Article 2(1), which makes it difficult to 
understand which provisions remain valid.  
133  Article 3 read in conjunction with Article 12 of the German NCB Statute.  
134  Article 7 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute.  
135  Article 2 of the Slovak NCB. 
136  Article 2(2) of Chapter 1 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
137  Article 2(1) of the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank stipulates that ‗the primary objective of the Bulgarian 
National Bank shall be to maintain price stability through ensuring the stability of national currency and 
implementing monetary policy as provided by this law‘. [My emphasis – AT.] Under Article 2(2), the 
Bulgarian National Bank shall support the general economic policies in the Community.  
138  Until the date provided by a Council Decision on abrogation of the derogation, Article 2(1) of the Estonian 
NCB Statute stipulates that the primary objective of Eesti Pank is to ensure price stability; Eesti Pank shall 
regulate currency circulation both in Estonia and with other countries and seek to uphold the stability of 
national currency. However, the new Article 2(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute sets forth that the primary 
objective of Eesti Pank is to maintain price stability; Eesti Pank also supports the achievement of other 
economic policy objectives in accordance with the Treaty. [My emphasis – AT.] Article 4(4) of the Estonian 
NCB Statute provides that Eesti Pank shall, within the limits of its authority, support the economic policy of 
the Government provided that this policy is not in conflict with the objectives and functions of Eesti Pank 
provided by Article 2 and does not prevent Eesti Pank from performing them.  
139  Article 3(1) of the Hungarian NCB Statute sets forth that the primary objective of Magyar Nemzeti Bank shall 
be to achieve and maintain price stability; without prejudice to its primary objective, Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
shall support the economic policy of the Government. [My emphasis – AT.] 
140  Article 3 of the Latvian NCB Statute sets forth that the main objective of Latvijas Banka shall be to maintain 
price stability in the country.  
141  Article 3(1) of the Polish NCB Statute sets forth that the primary objective of Narodowy Bank Polski shall be 
to maintain price stability and it shall at the same time act in support of the Government‘s economic policies, 
insofar as this does not constrain pursuit of the main objective of Narodowy Bank Polski.  
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Romania,
142
 and it is arguable whether these provisions comply with the Treaties and 
the Statute.  
Some of these examples require closer attention. The legal framework for a currency 
board arrangement focuses on the external stability of a currency, which differs from 
price stability under Article 127(1) TFEU and Article 2 of the Statute, and it is 
arguable whether the two can be linked together since the operational framework 
would be entirely different. A currency board is a special type of fixed exchange rate 
arrangement, which is based on strong explicit legislative commitment to a fixed 
exchange rate and the requirement that the domestic currency be issued only against 
foreign exchange [reserves].
143
 The issuance of domestic currency is tied to the 
growth of foreign reserves in the currency board arrangement, and money supply 
becomes endogenous, resulting in automatic changes to central bank foreign reserves. 
A currency board arrangement is thus an extreme form of fixed exchange rate systems 
whereby irreversibility of commitment is secured by a legally fixed parity between the 
national currency and the reserve currency. As a currency board arrangement is rule-
based, it is not affected by political pressures. The government cannot print money or 
borrow from the central bank to fund its budget deficit; thus, inflationary financing of 
government activities cannot take place.
144
 A currency board arrangement does not 
enable any active measures for maintaining price stability. At the same time, the 
Eurosystem has made it clear that under no circumstances could a currency board 
substitute for the required ERM II membership
145
 as an ‗antechamber‘ to the euro; 
                                                 
142  Article 2(1) of the Romanian NCB Statute provides that the primary objective of the Banca Nationala a 
Romanei shall be to ensure and maintain price stability. Subsection (3) further stipulates that the Bank shall 
support the general economic policy of the State. [My emphasis – AT.] 
143  See Sepp, Lättemäe, & Randveer, 2002, p. 238. 
144  See Sepp, Lättemäe, & Randveer, 2002, p. 330. The downside, of course, is that inflation can be accelerated by 
private borrowing and that the central bank cannot really control it.  
145  Participation in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) is voluntary for non-euro area Member States. However, 
as membership of ERM II is one of the convergence criteria for the eventual adoption of the euro, non-euro 
area Member States are expected to join the mechanism at some stage. For the currency of each Member State 
participating in the mechanism, a central rate against the euro and a standard fluctuation band of ± 15% will be 
defined. Decisions on central rates and standard fluctuation bands must be taken by mutual agreement of the 
ministers of the euro area Member States, the ECB and the ministers and central bank governors of the non-
euro area Member States participating in ERM II. In this regard, see the Agreement of 16 March 2006 between 
the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the Members States outside the euro area laying 
down the operating procedures for an exchange rate mechanism in stage three of Economic and Monetary 
Union, OJ C 73, 25.3.2006, p. 21, as last amended on 14 December 2007, OJ C 319, 29.12.2007, p. 7. 
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however, it could constitute an additional and unilateral commitment within ERM 
II.
146
  
The Bulgarian and Estonian legislators have, however, been confident that a currency 
board arrangement could be linked to the objective of price stability – it therefore 
comes as no surprise that the National Bank of Bulgaria intends to ‗maintain price 
stability through ensuring the stability of national currency‘147 or that until the 
adoption of the euro Eesti Pank‘s duty to ‗ensure price stability‘ and ‗uphold the 
stability of national currency‘ are both referred to in the Estonian NCB Statute.148 
However, the Lithuanian legislation does not follow the above examples. What is 
surprising is that the Lithuanian NCB Statute does not contain any reference to a 
currency board arrangement and that the references to the obligation to ensure the 
stability of national currency were repealed upon the accession to the EU, while the 
currency board arrangement itself was kept.
149
  
In contrast, no reference to the maintenance of price stability or to the provisions of 
EU law is made in the Danish NCB Statute,
150
 although Protocol No 16 on certain 
provisions relating to Denmark refers to Denmark as a Member State with a 
derogation and does not exempt Denmark from either Article 127 TFEU (or Article 
282(2) TFEU) or Article 2 of the Statute.
151
  
Under Article 127(1) TFEU, Article 282(2) TFEU and Article 2 of the Statute, the 
ESCB shall, without prejudice to the objective of price stability, support the general 
economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the 
objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 TEU – also often referred to as the 
secondary objectives. The Member States do not have a common implementing 
                                                 
146  See Padoa-Schioppa, High-level seminar with the EU-candidate countries, 2000. Estonia and Lithuania kept 
their currency boards as a unilateral commitment in ERM II from 28 June 2004 and Latvia as of 29 April 2005. 
Bulgaria has not yet joined ERM II. See also ―Policy position of the Governing Council of the ECB on 
exchange rate issues relating to the acceding countries‖ published on 18 December 2003, available at 
https://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/policyaccexchangerateen.pdf as well as point 4 in Frequently Asked 
Questions: EU enlargement and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/enlargement/html/faqenlarge.en.html (visited on 6 September 2010).  
147  Article 2(1) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute. 
148  Article 2(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute. 
149  Article 7 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute was amended on 15 April 2004 in order to repeal the reference to the 
duty to achieve stability of the currency of the Republic of Lithuania and establish price stability as the bank‘s 
primary objective. The earlier versions of the Lithuanian NCB Statute in English can be found at 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.rezult_e?p_nr=I-678&p_kalb_id=2 (visited on 20 February 2010).  
150  Article 1 of the Danish NCB Statute.  
151  The ECB is of the opinion that as long as Denmark does not notify the EU Council that it intends to adopt the 
euro, no Danish legislation needs to be adapted. For the latest statement, see the ECB Convergence Report of 
May 2010 (p. 16).  
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practice in this regard. While support for the general economic policies in the Union 
(formerly in the Community)
152
 [my emphasis – AT] is present in the current NCB 
Statutes of Austria,
153
 Belgium,
154
 Bulgaria,
155
 the Czech Republic,
156
 Finland,
157
 
Italy,
158
 Luxembourg,
159
 Malta,
160
 the Netherlands,
161
 Slovenia,
162
 and the new NCB 
Statutes of Estonia
163
 and Lithuania;
164
 several NCB Statutes still provide for the 
support of national government: Cyprus,
165
 France,
166
 Germany,
167
 Greece,
168
 
Hungary,
169
 Lithuania,
170 
Poland,
171
 Romania,
172
 and Spain.
173,
 
174
 No such provision 
can be found in the NCB Statutes of Denmark, Latvia and Sweden.  
3.2.2 Institutional independence 
3.2.2.1 Background to institutional independence 
Institutional independence aims at institutionally separating the monetary policy 
decision making from the other executive branches of the State. For this reason, the 
ECB has been granted legal personality under Article 282(3) TFEU and independence 
in the exercise of its powers and the management of its finances. The principle of 
institutional independence for the NCBs is derived from Article 130 TFEU and 
Article 7 of the Statute. These two articles prohibit the NCBs and members of their 
                                                 
152  See also comments by Lenihan, specifying that, first, the ESCB has only one overriding objective, that, 
second, the secondary objective of the ESCB is to support the general economic policies (plural) in (rather than 
of) the Community and that, third, this support is general and not specific (Lenihan, 2006).  
153  Article 2(2) of the Austrian NCB Statute.  
154  Article 12 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association.  
155  Article 2(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute.  
156  Article 1 of Section II of Act No. 442/2000 Coll.  
157  Article 2(2) of the Finnish NCB Statute.  
158  Article 1(3) of the Italian NCB Statute.  
159  Article 2(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute.  
160  Article 4 of the Maltese NCB Statute.  
161  Article 2(2) of the Dutch NCB Statute.  
162  Article 4(2) of the Slovenian NCB Statute.  
163  Article 2(1) of the new Estonian NCB Statute.  
164  Article 7(2) of the new Lithuanian NCB Statute.  
165  Article 5(2) of the Cypriot NCB Statute.  
166  Article L 141-1 of the French NCB Statute.  
167  Article 12 of the German NCB Statute. 
168  Article 4(2) of the Greek NCB Statute.  
169  Article 3(2) of the Hungarian NCB Statute.  
170  Article 7(2) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute.  
171  Article 3(1) of the Polish NCB Statute.  
172  Article 2(3) of the Romanian NCB Statute.  
173  Article 7(2) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
174  The United Kingdom also belongs to the latter group but does not have to comply with Article 127 TFEU. 
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decision-making bodies from seeking or taking instructions from Union institutions 
and bodies, offices or agencies, from any government of a Member State or from any 
other body; in addition, they prohibit Union institutions and bodies, offices or 
agencies and the governments of the Member States from seeking to influence those 
members of the NCBs‘ decision-making bodies whose decisions may affect the 
fulfilment of the NCBs‘ ESCB-related tasks.175 These two articles apply to the 
Member States with a derogation but not to the United Kingdom.
176
 As a result, the 
United Kingdom NCB is the only member of the ESCB that is not subject to the 
central bank independence requirement. 
Nowhere in the Treaties or the Statute has it been explicitly established that the NCBs 
shall be legal persons, although all members of the ESCB in fact have legal 
personality.
177
 Each NCB of the Eurosystem has legal personality pursuant to the 
national law of its respective Member State.
178
 The non-Eurosystem NCBs also have 
legal personality.
179
 Separate legal personality is different from independence granted 
in the exercise of some delegated government functions.
180
 Article 35.6 of the Statute, 
which places the NCBs under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, clearly assumes that both the ECB and the other members of the ESCB (note 
that Article 35.6 of the Statute also applies to the Member States with a derogation as 
well as to the United Kingdom) are legal persons.  
However, irrespective of whether an NCB is organised as a state-owned body, a 
special public law body or simply a public limited company, there is a risk that 
influence may be exercised by the owner, which is why the ECB has elaborated the 
following prohibitions to limit such influence:
181
 
                                                 
175  Other authors have referred to this prohibition as ―‗No‘ to instructions and ‗Yes‘ to dialogue‖ (Arda, 2006).  
176  See Articles 4 and 7 of Protocol No 15.  
177  Under Article 282(3) TFEU, the ECB shall have legal personality.  
178  Of all Eurosystem NCBs, the Banque Nationale de Belgique, the Banca d‘Italia, the Bank of Greece and De 
Nederlandsche Bank NV are public limited companies, in which the State‘s share does not usually exceed 
50%, except with regard to De Nederlandsche Bank NV, where it is 100% and the Banca d‘Italia, which is 
currently in the process of raising the State‘s ownership to 100%. The other Eurosystem NCBs are regarded as 
public legal persons and are fully owned by the State.  
179  Most of them are regarded as public legal persons, except Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which is a public limited 
company. 
180  See Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, p. 41. 
181  See the ECB Convergence Report of May 2010 (pp. 19-20).  
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1) Rights of third parties to give instructions to NCBs, their decision-making 
bodies or their members are incompatible with the Treaties and the Statute as 
far as ESCB-related tasks are concerned; 
2) Rights of third parties to approve, suspend, annul or defer NCBs‘ decisions are 
incompatible with the Treaties and the Statute as far as ESCB-related tasks are 
concerned; 
3) A right for bodies other than independent courts to censor, on legal grounds, 
decisions relating to the performance of the ESCB-related tasks is 
incompatible with the Treaties and the Statute since the performance of these 
tasks may not be reassessed at the political level;
182
 
4) Participation by representatives of third parties in an NCB‘s decision-making 
body with a right to vote concerning the exercise by the NCB of ESCB-related 
tasks is incompatible with the Treaties and the Statute even if this vote is not 
decisive; 
5) An express statutory obligation for an NCB to consult third parties ex ante 
provides the latter with a formal mechanism with which to influence the final 
decision and is therefore incompatible with the Treaties and the Statute; 
however, a dialogue between NCBs and third parties can be deemed 
compatible with the Treaties and the Statute.
183
 
The sixth element, ‗discharge provided for the duties of members of the NCB‘s 
decision-making bodies‘ has been omitted from my research since it does not contain 
any direct prohibitions.  
Lorenzo Bini Smaghi notes that institutional independence has to be guaranteed at the 
time when each country joins the European Union, rather than at the time when it 
joins the euro area.
184
 However, the ECB Convergence Report 2004 found that in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and 
Sweden, incompatibilities persisted to a lesser or greater degree between national 
legislation and the Treaties and the Statute in the key area of central bank 
                                                 
182  This also concerns the right of the Governor to suspend the implementation of ECB legal instruments; see the 
ECB Convergence Report of May 2010 (p. 19).  
183  The criteria for compatibility are: (i) the consultation does not result in interference with the independence of 
the members of the NCB‘s decision-making bodies; (ii) the special status of Governors in their capacity as 
members of the ECB‘s General Council is fully respected; and (iii) confidentiality requirements resulting from 
the Statute are observed. See ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 19). 
184  See Bini Smaghi, Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice, 2008, p. 449.  
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independence.
185
 By May 2006, Lithuania and Slovenia had removed all these 
incompatibilities,
186
 followed by Estonia in December 2006,
187
 Cyprus and Malta in 
May 2007,
188
 and Slovakia in May 2008.
189
  
However, there are also a few negative examples that can be mentioned (1) with 
regard to the requirement for Magyar Nemzeti Bank to obtain opinion of the 
Hungarian Ministry of Justice ex ante on the basic tasks of the Bank;
190
 and (2) with 
regard to the duty of forwarding draft monetary policy guidelines to the 
Government.
191
 These NCB obligations clearly undermine their institutional 
independence, as explained below. 
3.2.2.2 Prohibition on giving or taking of instructions 
Table 3-2 shows that the prohibition on giving or taking of instructions is present in 
almost all the NCB Statutes. The Danish, the Irish and the Polish NCB Statutes do not 
contain express prohibition, which would mean that in these cases Article 130 TFEU 
and Article 7 of the Statute and the subsequent interpretation of these articles would 
apply directly. Contrary to the spirit of the Treaties and the Statute, but in compliance 
with the United Kingdom‘s opt-out position, Article 19(1) of the United Kingdom 
NCB Statute authorises the Treasury to give instructions to the NCB. 
The prohibition is mostly addressed to the NCBs and their decision-making bodies; 
only on rare occasions is the addressee just an NCB.
192
 Alternatively, an NCB 
decision-making body can be subject to the prohibition.
193
  
                                                 
185  ECB Convergence Report 2004 (p. 32).  
186  ECB Convergence Report, May 2006 (pp. 75-77). 
187  ECB Convergence Report, December 2006 (p. 38). This does not take account of Estonia‘s legal integration 
into the Eurosystem.   
188  ECB Convergence Report, May 2007 (pp. 73-81).  
189  ECB Convergence Report, May 2008 (p. 52). 
190  Paragraph 3.1.1 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/55 of 6 December 2006 at the request of the Hungarian Ministry 
of Finance on a draft law amending the Law LVIII of 2001 on Magyar Nemzeti Bank and the Law XI of 1987, 
available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2006_55_f_sign.pdf. See also the ECB 
Convergence Reports of 2004 and 2006 (p. 227) and (p. 222). The incompatibility has been addressed in the 
new Article 60(2) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; see footnote 206. 
191  See footnotes 465 and 466.   
192  Articles 3(1) and 3(11) of the Estonian NCB Statute, Articles 13(1) and 13(2) of the Latvian NCB Statute. 
Article 10(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute, which establishes the independence of the Governor and Deputy 
Governors, falls within the conflict of interest provisions and is only remotely connected with Article 130 
TFEU (former Article 108 TEC) and Article 7 of the Statute.  
193  Article 2 of Chapter 3 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
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The prohibition on giving or taking instructions from third parties has been expressed 
in several ways. Based on the text of the prohibitions, three options have been used: 
(1) transformation of the negative prohibition into a positive duty by establishing that 
‗in implementation of the Treaty the NCB may seek and take instructions exclusively 
from the ECB‘;194 (2) copying the text of Article 130 TFEU and Article 7 of the 
Statute or referring to these Articles;
195
 (3) establishing the prohibition in a primarily 
national context.
196
  
However, making such a distinction may be somewhat artificial – for example, Article 
9(1) of the Czech NCB Statute as amended by Section II (c) of Act No 442/2000 Coll. 
provides that when exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties 
conferred upon them by this Act, the Treaties and the Statute, neither the Czech 
National Bank, nor any member of its Bank Board shall seek or take instructions from 
the Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State of the 
European Union or from any other entity. Therefore, one could assume that the Czech 
NCB Statute should belong to the second category listed above. However, since the 
amendment act did not repeal the text of Article 9(1) of the Czech NCB Statute, it 
would be more appropriate to list it in the third category.  
Moreover, as the NCB Statutes do not follow uniform drafting, same legal provision 
can fall into several categories – for example Article 2(5) of the Austrian NCB Statute 
and Article 4(1) of the Finnish NCB Statute could well fall into the first as well as the 
second category. In substance, all the NCB Statutes that fell into at least one category 
have the aim of protecting the NCB against any external influence on the NCB and its 
decision-making bodies.  
An interesting aspect with regard to the Czech NCB Statutes is the power of the 
Czech Parliament to instruct the Czech NCB to provide reports to the former under 
Article 3 of the Czech NCB Statute. The ECB notes in its Convergence Report of 
                                                 
194  Article 3(11) of the Estonian NCB Statute; Article 4(1) of the Finnish NCB Statute; Article 1(2) of the 
Hungarian NCB Statute; Article 3(3) of the Dutch NCB Statute.  
195  (1) Article 2(5) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 15 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (3) 
Article 7 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 1(2) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (5) Article 3(2) of the 
Lithuanian NCB Statute; (6) Article 5(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (7) Article 27(2) of the Portuguese 
NCB Statute; (8) Article 7(4) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
196  (1) Article 44 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 9(1) of the Czech NCB Statute; (3) Article 3(1) of the 
Estonian NCB Statute; (4) Article L 141-1 of the French NCB Statute; (5) Article 12 of the German NCB 
Statute; (6) Article 5A of the Greek NCB Statute; (7) Article 1(2) of the Italian NCB Statute; (8) Article 13 of 
the Latvian NCB Statute; (9) Article 5(2) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (10) Article 3(1) of the Romanian NCB 
Statute; (11) Articles 7(7) and 12(1) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (12) Article 2 of the Slovenian NCB Statute; 
(13) Article 2 of Chapter 3 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
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May 2008 that these parliamentary powers could potentially breach the prohibition on 
giving instructions and that such a provision should be adapted.
197
  
Similarly, Article 11(3) of the Polish NCB Statute sets forth that the Governor of the 
Polish NCB shall represent the interests of the Republic of Poland within international 
banking institutions and, unless the Council of Ministers decides otherwise, within 
international financial institutions – this provision may be seen as a legal ground for 
the Government to instruct the Governor also in the ESCB decision-making bodies, 
which is why the ECB has suggested that the Polish law be adapted.
198
  
3.2.2.3 Prohibition on approving, suspending, annulling or deferring decisions 
As shown in Table 3-3, there are three Member States that have maintained the right 
of a third party to approve, suspend, annul or defer NCBs‘ decisions. However, the 
Belgian NCB Statute exempts tasks and transactions within the domain of the 
ESCB
199
 while Article 47(2) of the Greek NCB Statute does not.
200
 However, under 
Greek law, the State‘s commissioner‘s salary will be paid by the State,201 while in 
Belgium it is paid by the NCB.
202
 The situation is unclear with regard to France, 
where an observer appointed by the Government seems to have the power to veto the 
decisions adopted by the NCB‘s decision-making body.203 
Furthermore, Article 47(5) of the Czech NCB Statute sets forth that if the Czech 
Parliament rejects the financial report of the Czech National Bank, the Czech National 
Bank shall within six weeks submit a revised report that complies with the 
requirements of Parliament. The ECB has noted that such parliamentary powers 
                                                 
197  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 239).  
198  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 253).  
199  Article 22(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute (Article 41 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association) provides 
that, except as regards the tasks and transactions within the domain of the ESCB, the representative of the 
Minister of Finance shall supervise the Bank‘s transactions and shall suspend and bring to the attention of the 
Minister of Finance any decision which is contrary to the law, the Statutes or the interests of the State.  
200  Article 47(2) of the Greek NCB Statute stipulates that ‗The Commissioner shall have the right to protest 
against any decision of either the General Meeting of Shareholders or the General Council, which he considers 
in conflict to this Statute or other laws of the State. Any such protest, if adopted by the Minister of Finance 
within two days, shall have the force of a suspensive veto until the question in dispute has been resolved by a 
Committee consisting of three persons, to be named within seven days on a request to that effect being made 
either by the Bank or the Government Commissioner; the Committee should report within seven days from 
nomination. The Committee shall consist of one representative of the Government, one representative of the 
General Council, and a Chairman, to be elected upon a mutual agreement of the Government and the Bank. 
Failing an agreement, Chairman shall be the President of the Supreme Court‘. 
201  Article 47(1) of the Greek NCB Statute. 
202  Article 22(3) of the Belgian NCB Statute (Article 41 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association).  
203  Article L.142-3, II (4-5) of the French NCB Statute.  
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breach the prohibition on approving, annulling or deferring decisions, and 
recommended that the provision be adapted.
204
 
Although also doubtful at first sight, the system under Article 11(3) of the Estonian 
NCB Statute, whereby if a Governor does not agree with a decision of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, he shall report to the President of the Estonian 
Parliament within three working days and make a proposal to submit an interpellation 
in the matter to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board, does not violate the 
prohibition on approving, suspending, annulling or deferring decisions. The Estonian 
Parliament has only the power to ask the Chairman of the Supervisory Board to 
explain in public the nature of the supervisory decisions and this does not concern any 
of the Estonian NCB‘s daily activities.  
3.2.2.4 Prohibition on censoring draft decisions on legal grounds 
Legal provisions addressing the prohibition on censoring decisions on legal grounds 
have been introduced, to a varying degree, in the NCB Statutes of Belgium
205
 and 
Hungary.
206
 As is shown in Table 3-4, the other NCB Statutes remain silent on this 
issue.  
3.2.2.5 Prohibition on participation in decision-making bodies of an NCB with a 
right to vote 
The underlying principle for this prohibition is that participation by representatives of 
third parties in an NCB‘s decision-making body with a right to vote concerning the 
exercise by the NCB of ESCB-related tasks is incompatible with the Treaties and the 
Statute. At the moment, only the Danish NCB Statute contains provisions contrary to 
this principle.
207
  
The participation by representatives of third parties in an NCB‘s decision-making 
body has been regulated in most of the NCB Statutes, as is apparent from Table 3-5, 
with the exception of Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
                                                 
204  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 239). 
205  See Article 22(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute and Article 41(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association, 
where the exception only refers to ESCB-related activities. In this respect, certain provisions discussed in 
Section 3.2.2.3 with regard to Greece may be compared. However, there is no such limitation in the Greek law. 
206  Article 60(2) of the Hungarian NCB Statute sets forth that the Minister responsible for justice affairs need not 
be consulted in the case of a decree of the Governor of the Bank.  
207  Article 7 of the Danish NCB Statute; Articles 6 and 25 of the Danish NCB By-laws.  
 84 
 
Lithuania, Malta, Portugal and the United Kingdom. The prohibition in a classical 
sense, i.e. the prohibition of a Minister or his representative from participating in a 
meeting with a right to vote, has been introduced into the NCB Statutes of the Czech 
Republic,
208
 Hungary,
209
 Luxembourg,
210
 the Netherlands,
211
 Romania,
212
 Slovakia,
213
 
Slovenia
214
 and Spain.
215
  
Third party representatives sometimes attend meetings of an NCB organ that is not 
responsible for monetary policy decisions. Such situations are regulated in the NCB 
Statutes of Austria,
216
 Belgium,
217
 Greece
218
 and the Netherlands.
219
 Of all these 
provisions, attention should be drawn to the NCB Statutes of Belgium, Greece and the 
Netherlands.  
The NCB Statutes of Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands nonetheless require further 
analysis. The Belgian and Greek legal provisions and the potential veto powers of the 
Minister were addressed earlier under Section 3.2.2.3 and the arguments will therefore 
not be repeated here. However, a review of the Dutch NCB Statute
220
 raises different 
concerns. Under Article 14 of the Dutch NCB Statute the Minister does not participate 
directly in the meetings of the Dutch NCB decision-making bodies but has a 
representative whose authority to inform the Minister appears rather limited. In effect, 
a Supervisory Board member appointed by the Government has the right to collect 
information from the NCB and pass it on to the Minister. At the same time he has the 
conflicting duty under Article 14 of the Dutch NCB Statute to observe Article 130 
                                                 
208  Article 11(1) of the Czech NCB Statute.  
209  Article 39(2) of the Hungarian NCB Statute.  
210  Article 9(5) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute.  
211  Article 15(4) of the Dutch NCB Statute.  
212  Article 33(10) of the Romanian NCB Statute.  
213  Article 8(4) of the Slovak NCB Statute.  
214  Article 33(1) of the Slovenian NCB Statute.  
215  Articles 20(3) and 20(4) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
216  Article 40 of the Austrian NCB Statute.  
217  Articles 22(2) and 22(3) of the Belgian NCB Statute and Articles 41(2) of the Belgian NCB Articles of 
Association.  
218  Articles 47(1) and 47(2) of the Greek NCB Statute.  
219  Article 14(1) and 14(2) of the Dutch NCB Statute.  
220  Under Article 13(2) of the Dutch NCB Statute, one member of the Supervisory Board shall be appointed by 
the Government. Under Article 14(1), this person acts on behalf of the Minister and may, either at the request 
of the Minister or at its own initiative, without prejudice to Article 108 of the Treaty, obtain from the 
Governing Board of the Bank data and information about the manner in which the Bank performs its tasks and 
to communicate his findings to the Minister. Article 14(2) further stipulates that the Governing Board and the 
Bank are under an obligation to provide the requested information, the exceptions being the date and 
information which is secret pursuant to the Treaty or the statutory regulations.  
 85 
 
TFEU [former Article 108 TEC] and not to pass on confidential data under the 
Treaties and the Statute. The information that can be revealed in that manner could 
not possibly relate to ESCB-related tasks, which in turn makes it questionable 
whether there should be such an information duty at the Supervisory Board level at 
all. If, however, the Supervisory Board member has to act at Supervisory Board 
meetings as a representative of the Government and the Minister of Finance, it would 
be difficult for him to comply with Article 130 TFEU [former Article 108 TEC] and 
Article 7 of the Statute while at the same time exercising his voting rights at the 
Supervisory Board meetings. Similarly, there are provisions under the French law, 
which would enable an observer appointed by the Government to submit draft 
resolutions to an NCB‘s decision-making body.221 
Finally, there are provisions aimed at regulating the internal order of an NCB, 
enabling, for example, members of an executive organ to take part in a meeting of a 
supervisory organ or the other way around. Such provisions can be found in the NCB 
Statutes of Estonia,
222
 Finland,
223
 Poland
224
 and Sweden.
225
  
Under the Finnish NCB Statute the members of the Board shall have the right to be 
present and to be heard at meetings of the Parliamentary Supervisory Council; under 
the Swedish NCB Statute the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the General Council 
have the right to be present at the Executive Board‘s meetings with the right to speak 
but without the right to make proposals or vote.  
3.2.2.6 Prohibition on ex ante consultations of an NCB decision 
The prohibition of an ex ante consultation of an NCB decision assumes that an 
express statutory obligation for an NCB to consult third parties ex ante provides the 
latter with formal mechanism to influence the final decision and is therefore 
incompatible with the Treaties and the Statute; however, a dialogue between NCBs 
and third parties can be deemed compatible with the Treaties and the Statute.
226
  
                                                 
221  Article L.142-3, II (4-5) of the French NCB Statute.  
222  Article 9(5) of the Estonian NCB Statute.  
223  Article 12(2) of the Finnish NCB Statute.  
224  Article 15 of the Polish NCB Statute.  
225  Article 3(3) of Chapter 3 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
226  See the ECB Convergence Reports of May 2010 (p. 19), May 2008 (p. 18), May 2007 (pp. 17-18), December 
2006 (p. 25), May 2006 (p. 63), December 2004 (pp. 26-27). See also footnotes 183 and 458.  
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As is apparent from Table 3-6, the only Member State that has introduced an express 
statutory prohibition is Hungary.
227
 There are also four NCB Statutes that enable ex 
ante consultation by third parties, usually by the Minister of Finance.
228
 Article 3 of 
the Bulgarian NCB Statute needs to be especially outlined since it assumes that the 
Council of Ministers also has a role in formulating monetary policy, which in turn 
implies that the central bank is not independent. The problem could have been 
avoided by rephrasing the provision in a manner similar to Article 13(1) of the 
German NCB Statute, which provides that the Deutsche Bundesbank shall advise the 
Federal Government on monetary policy issues of major importance and shall furnish 
it with information on request. 
Instead of a prohibition on ex ante consultation on an NCB decision, some NCB 
Statutes provide a cooperation mechanism between the NCB and the national 
government. This will be discussed in Section 3.3.1.2. 
3.2.3 Personal independence 
3.2.3.1 The concept of personal independence 
The concept of personal independence is derived from the principle of central bank 
independence. It relates to the personal composition of the decision-making bodies of 
a central bank and the legal arrangements concerning the appointment, the duration of 
office, the duties of loyalty and non-competition, the possibility of reappointment, and 
dismissal of central bank officials.
229
 
Article 283(2) TFEU [former Article 112(2)(b) TEC] and Article 11.2 of the Statute 
establish that the President, the Vice-President and the other members of the 
Executive Board shall be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, from among persons of recognised standing and professional experience in 
monetary or banking matters on a recommendation from the Council
230
 after it has 
                                                 
227  Article 38 of the Hungarian NCB Statute.  
228  (1) Article 3 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 7 of the Danish NCB Statute; (3) Article 23(1) of the 
Polish NCB Statute; (4) Article 3 of Chapter 6 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
229  Some authors refer to ‗personal independence‘ as ‗organisational independence‘ (Kapteyn & VerLoren van 
Themaat, 2008, p. 954). 
230  For example, Council Recommendation of 16 February 2010 on the appointment of the Vice-President of the 
European Central Bank, OJ C 52, 2.3.2010, p. 1.  
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consulted the European Parliament
231
 and the Governing Council.
232
 Carel C. A. van 
den Berg outlines three safeguards against the appointment of political ‗cronies‘: 
1. the appointment decision requires a qualified majority among the governments 
of the participating Member States; 
2. the nominees have to be of a good professional reputation; 
3. the ECB Governing Council has to be consulted.233 
Article 283(2) TFEU [former Article 112(2)(b) TEC] and Article 11.2 of the Statute 
further stipulate that their term of office shall be eight years and shall not be 
renewable and only nationals of Member States may be members of the Executive 
Board. Non-renewability is one of the safeguards of personal independence, a unique 
figure in the constitutional structure of the EU as both the Commissioners, Judges of 
the Court of Justice as well as the members of the Court of Auditors can be 
reappointed.
234
 The length of the term of office for the Executive Board members has 
been explained as contributing to a so-called ‗Becket-effect‘,235 which is indicative of 
the phenomenon that people tend to fairly quickly start defending the interests of the 
organisation that they have joined, especially when that organisation is 
independent.
236
 There is no upper age limit for the members of the Executive Board.  
Pursuant to the second sentence of Article 11.1 of the Statute, the members shall 
perform their duties on a full-time basis. No member shall engage in any occupation, 
whether gainful or not, unless exemption is exceptionally granted by the Governing 
Council.  
                                                 
231  The European Parliament has no power to enforce its decision or legally to prevent a nomination. However, it 
has been claimed that a candidate who fails to convince the European Parliament should not be acceptable, see 
Randzio-Plath, 2000, p. 13. 
232 For one of the recent consultations, see ECB Opinion CON/2010/19 of 4 March 2010 on a Council 
recommendation on the appointment of the Vice-President of the European Central Bank, OJ C 58, 10.3.2010, 
p. 3, also available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:058:0003:0003:EN:PDF. Usually the ECB 
Governing Council states, after making reference to the eligibility criteria under Article 283(2) TFEU, that it 
‗has no objections‘ to the Council‘s recommendation.  
233  However, van den Berg seemed to assume that ‗common accord‘ equals ‗unanimity‘ (van den Berg, 2005, p. 
122).  
234  See Article 17(3) TEU, Article 17(7) TEU, Article 253 TFEU and Article 286(2) TFEU respectively.  
235  The phrase refers to Thomas Becket who became Archbishop of Canterbury after having served as the King‘s 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and his adviser. Once he had obtained the bishop‘s position he became a 
relentless critic of the king‘s usurpation of power (van den Berg, 2005, p. 122). 
236  Van den Berg concludes that, in other words, they very quickly lose their loyalty to their former employer (van 
den Berg, 2005, p. 121). 
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Article 11.4 of the Statute sets forth that if a member of the Executive Board no 
longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has 
been guilty of serious misconduct, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court 
of Justice) may, on application by the Governing Council or the Executive Board, 
compulsorily retire him. Furthermore, Article 11.7 of the Statute provides that any 
vacancy on the Executive Board shall be filled by the appointment of a new member 
in accordance with Article 11.2 of the Statute.  
3.2.3.2 Notion of Governor 
Article 14.2 of the Statute provides that the NCB statutes must, in particular, provide 
for a minimum term of office of five years for the Governor; Governors may only be 
relieved from office if they no longer fulfil the conditions required for the 
performance of their duties or if they have been guilty of serious misconduct, with the 
possibility of recourse to the Court of Justice.  
Article 130 TFEU [former Article 108 TEC] and Article 7 of the Statute which 
establish the basic principle of ESCB independence refer to ‗any members of 
decision-making bodies of national central banks‘ and not to ‗Governors‘.  
Neither the notion of ‗Governor‘, nor the conditions required for his performance are 
defined in EU law.
237
 The only criteria under Union law concerning a Governor could 
be determined by analogy with Article 283(2) TFEU [former Article 112(2)(b) TEC] 
and Article 11.2 of the Statute, which refer to a rather wide ‗recognised standing and 
professional experience in monetary or banking matters‘; it is arguable whether this 
phrase indeed constitutes the ‗conditions required for the performance of his duties‘ 
noted in Article 14.2 of the Statute. Therefore, Table 3-7 analyses the ways in which 
the Member States have responded to the text of Article 14.2 of the Statute.  
It has been said that central bankers should have professional skills that correspond to 
their functions as well as ‗professional independence‘ – the suitability of candidates 
would be enhanced by adequate tests of their experience, knowledge and ability to 
                                                 
237  The ECB acknowledges that Member States are free to set the conditions required for the appointment of the 
NCB Governing Council members; see paragraph 3.4 of ECB Opinion CON/2009/13 of 16 February 2009 at 
the request of the Bulgarian Ministry of Justice on a draft law supplementing the Law on Administration, 
available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_opinion_con_2009_13_bg_amending_law_on_administration.pdf.  
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implement central bank policies.
238
 The most common conditions required of a 
Governor as described in the NCB Statutes are:  
1. Citizenship of a particular Member State;239 
2. Full legal capacity;240 and  
3. Either proof of higher (university) education241 or high integrity and prominent 
qualifications in economics, finance or banking.
242
  
Some NCB Statutes
243
 simply establish that the Governor shall meet the ‗expertise 
and qualifications required‘ without providing any further specification. The 
Governor‘s age-limits are regulated in five NCB Statutes,244 ranging from sixty-five 
                                                 
238  See Lastra R. M., The Independence of the European System of Central Banks, 1992, p. 482. Bini Smaghi 
notes that it is not sufficient for the person to have the necessary professional qualifications; he or she must 
also be perceived to have them by the public (Bini Smaghi, Central Bank Independence in the EU: From 
Theory to Practice, 2008, p. 451). 
239  (1) Article 33(3) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 29(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; 
(3) Article 11(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (4) Article 18(1) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (5) Articles 6(7) 
and 6(8) of the Czech NCB Statute; (6) Article 3(2) of the Danish NCB Statute; (7) Article 10(2) of the 
Estonian NCB Statute; (8) Article 22(1) read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Greek NCB Statute; (9) 
Article 49(5) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (10) Article 31 of the Latvian NCB Statute; (11) Article 10(2) of 
the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (12) Article 24(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
240  (1) Article 33(3) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 14(f) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Articles 6(7) 
and 6(8) of the Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 3(2) of the Danish NCB Statute; (5) Article 22(1) read in 
conjunction with Article 14 of the Greek NCB Statute; (6) Article 7(4) of the Slovak NCB Statute;  (7) Chapter 
3, Article 1(2) of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
241  (1) Articles 6(7) and 6(8) of the Czech NCB Statute; (2) Article 10(2) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (3) Article 
7(4) of the Slovak NCB Statute. The Estonian NCB Statute was amended in the course of 2008 by removing 
the requirement of only a law or economics degree and establishing that any university degree would suffice. 
See ECB Opinion CON/2008/14 of 25 March 2008 at the request of Riigikogu on a draft law amending the 
Law on Eesti Pank. In addition, (1) Article 12(5) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 14 of the Cypriot 
NCB Statute; (3) Articles L. 142-5(2) and L. 142-8(9),(10) of the French NCB Statute; (4) Articles 29(2) and 
35A(4) of the Greek NCB Statute; (5) Article 58(5) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (6) Article 14(1) of the 
Polish NCB Statute; (7) Article 61(2) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; and (8) Article 38(4) of the Slovenian 
NCB Statute can be interpreted as implicitly establishing the higher education requirement since holding a 
teaching post at a university or its equivalent usually implies that the holder has pursued a course of higher 
education.  
242  (1) Article 11(3) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 18(1) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Articles 6(7) 
and 6(8) of the Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 13(1) of the Finnish NCB Statute; (5) Article L. 142-3(3) of the 
French NCB Statute; (6) Article 7(2) of the German NCB Statute; (7) Article 35A(4) of the Greek NCB 
Statute; (8) Article 49(5) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (9) Article 8(1) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (10) 
Article 7(4) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (11) Article 24(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute. An implicit 
requirement for the sound background can be drawn from Article 33(3) of the Austrian NCB Statute; Article 
37 of the Belgian NCB Statute; the first part of Article 14 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; Article 58(1) of the 
Hungarian NCB Statute; Article 34(1) of the Romanian NCB Statute; and Article 7(6) of the Slovak NCB 
Statute, since these provisions describe offices indicating that the candidate could possibly be deemed suitable 
for the Governor‘s position, such as positions in the civil service or judiciary authorities. This means that the 
criteria for these offices are considered to be equivalent to if not identical with those applying to the position of 
Governor.  
243  See last sentence of Article 13(1) of the Finnish NCB Statute and the last sentence of Article 7(2) of the 
German NCB Statute. The lack of pre-determined criteria has raised concerns in Germany, especially after the 
appointment of Carl-Ludwig Thiele and Andreas Dombret, as reported by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(Ruhkamp, 2010), referring to the paper of Emilie Yoo and Stefan Gerlach.  
244  (1) Article 40 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association and Article 27 of the Belgian NCB Statute; (2) 
Article 3(2) and 6(2) of the Danish NCB Statute; (3) Article L. 142-8 of the French NCB Statute; (4) Article 
10(2) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute. Article 25(4)(c) of the Spanish NCB Statute establishes that reaching 
seventy years of age is the ground for leaving the office.  
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to seventy years. The range of issues subject to regulation by national law is broader 
than the provisions regulating the appointment of the Executive Board members, as 
discussed in Section 3.2.3.1 of this thesis.  
Far more attention is paid to in the NCB Statutes factors that are incompatible with 
the Governor‘s working arrangements:  
1. With the exception of research or pedagogical activities,245 having any 
position outside NCB as:  
a. an elected politician, minister or civil servant in the public sector;246 
b. a manager or employee in the private sector;247 
2. Being sentenced to imprisonment;248  
3. Being adjudicated on bankruptcy in the past;249 or 
4. Having a conflict of interest in general.250  
Sometimes, the NCB Statutes refer to Article 130 TFEU [former Article 108 TEC] 
and Article 7 of the Statute with regard to the Governor‘s personal independence.251 It 
                                                 
245  (1) Article 12(5) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) the second part of Article 14 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; 
(3) Articles 29(2) and 35A(4) of the Greek NCB Statute; (4) Article 58(5) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (5) 
Article 16(1) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (6) Article 34(4) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (7) Article 
38(4)4) of the Slovenian NCB Statute. In addition to the exception for scientific and pedagogical activities, 
Article 6(6) of the Czech NCB Statute also exempts literary, journalistic and artistic activities as well as 
management of personal assets.  
246  (1) Articles 33(3) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 25 of the Belgian NCB Statute and Article 37 of the 
Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (3) the first part of Article 14 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 
6(6) of the Czech NCB Statute; (5) Article L. 142-8 (9) (10) of the French NCB Statute; (6) Articles 22(1) and 
35A(4) of the Greek NCB Statute; (7) Article 58(1) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (8) Article 19(2) of the 
Irish NCB Statute; (9) Article 43(1) of the Italian NCB Statute; (10) Article 7(3) of the Luxembourg NCB 
Statute; (11) Article 14(1) of the Polish NCB Statute; (12) Article 34(1) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (13) 
Article 7(6) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (14) Article 38(4) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (15) Chapter 3 
Article 1(1) of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
247  (1) Article 26(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute and Article 38(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (2) 
the third part of Article 14 and Articles 19(1) and 19(2) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 6(6) of the 
Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 6(2) of the Danish NCB Statute and Article 8(2) of the Danish NCB By-laws; 
(5) Articles 22(1) and 35A(4) of the Greek NCB Statute; (6) Article 17 of the Finnish NCB Statute; (7) 
Articles 58(2) and 58(3) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (8) Articles 19(5), 19(6), 20(1), 20(2), 20(3), 20(4) 
and 20(4A) of the Irish NCB Statute; (9) Article 42(1) of the Italian NCB Statute; (10) Article 16(1) of the 
Lithuanian NCB Statute; (11) Article 8(4) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (12) Article 7(6) of the Slovak NCB 
Statute; (13) Article 38(4) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (14) Article 26(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute; (15) 
Chapter 3 Article 1(1) of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
248  (1) Article 11(4) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Articles 6(7) and 6(8) of the Czech NCB Statute; (3) 
Article 22(1) read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Greek NCB Statute; (4) Article 7(4) of the Slovak 
NCB Statute; (5) Article 25(4) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
249  (1) Article 11(4) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) the third part of Article 14 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) 
Article 22(1) read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Greek NCB Statute; (4) Chapter 3 Article 1(2) of the 
Swedish NCB Statute.  
250  (1) Article 6(6) of the Czech NCB Statute; (2) Article 10(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (3) Article 17 of the 
Finnis NCB Statute; (4) Article 7(3) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (5) Article 34(2) of the Romanian NCB 
Statute; (6) Article 7(6) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (7) Article 38(4) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (8) 
Articles 1(1) and 1(3) of Chapter 2 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
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is questionable whether such a drafting technique aims at creating more legal certainty 
as it narrows the scope to the members of decision-making bodies, while EU law 
covers both the NCBs and their decision-making bodies.  
Finally, Bini Smaghi has also raised the issue of whether political affiliations are of 
concern. He notes that problems may arise if the members of decision-making bodies 
have a political affiliation or have played an active political role prior to their 
appointment, or if they are expected to play such a role afterwards.
252
 However, 
political affiliations, or absence of them, cannot be regulated by law and, as far as I 
am aware, none of the reviewed NCB Statutes contains such clauses. Rather, Bini 
Smaghi‘s point is addressing a political culture which should be observed by the 
members of the ESCB decision-making bodies and respected by third parties.  
3.2.3.3 Appointment procedure and term of office 
Table 3-8 illustrates the procedures conducted at the national level. The most 
extensive regulations regarding the Governor‘s appointment procedure are found in 
the Slovenian NCB Statute, where six paragraphs regulate the procedure of 
nomination. The same amount of legislative text is dedicated to the potential 
Governor‘s security vetting in the Estonian NCB Statute.  
In principle, ethical considerations can be taken into account in the recruitment 
process, such as (i) investigating the background; (ii) issuing security clearance for 
positions representing a potential risk to national security; (iii) checking criminal 
records; (iv) evaluating candidate‘s ethical standards during the interviews.253  
It may be mandatory in one Member State for a vacancy to be announced publicly,
254
 
while in another Member State exactly the opposite is true.
255
 However, in general the 
NCB Statutes tend to be rather brief as far as the appointment procedure is concerned.  
                                                                                                                                            
251  Article 7(3) read in conjunction with Article 5(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; Article 7(7) of the Slovak 
NCB Statute;  
252  Bini Smaghi refers to examples of political affiliation of central bank Governors or board members being used 
by other institutions or political parties as an excuse to put pressure on the central bank, especially after a 
change in government. He explains that the ability of the central bank to speak out, if necessary, in critical 
terms with respect to economic and budgetary policies might be impaired if the Governor, or other members of 
the board, are perceived to have a political affiliation, as this might be interpreted as political interference 
rather than fair judgement (Bini Smaghi, Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice, 
2008, pp. 451-452).  
253  OECD, 2000, p. 44.  
254  Article 33(8) of the Romanian NCB Statute; Article 37(2) of the Slovenian NCB Statute. 
255  See Article 13(1) of the Finnish NCB Statute.  
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The Governors are usually appointed by the Head of State
256
 (such as the King, Grand 
Duke or President) by virtue of a decree,
257
 and only on a few occasions is the 
Governor appointed by the Government.
258
 However, there are seven Member States 
in which the Governor is appointed by the national Parliament or its sub-
committee.
259
 With the exception of Sweden, all those parliamentary appointment 
systems are represented by the new Member States. Lastra has raised some concerns 
over this trend; however, it is arguable whether appointment by an authority other 
than the Parliament would address the democratic deficit concern.
260
 
As a rule, Governors should have a sufficiently long term of office to safeguard 
independence and to avoid political influence and short-term perspectives; tenure 
longer that of legislators serves these ends.
261
 In general, the term of office for the 
Governors complies with Article 14.2 of the Statute in all Member States. In Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal Romania and Slovakia the term of office 
is five years.
262
 Article 14.2 of the Statute should not be interpreted as prohibiting 
longer terms of office or an indefinite period of office.
263
 However, legislative 
                                                 
256  (1) Article 33(2) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Articles 34(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association 
and Article 23(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute; (3) Article 18(1) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 6(2) of 
the Czech NCB Statute; (5) Article 6(1) of the Danish NCB Statute and Article 8(1) of the Danish NCB By-
laws; (6) Article 10(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (7) Article 13(1) of the Finnish NCB Statute; (8) Article 
7(3) of the German NCB Statute; (9) Article 29(1) of the Greek NCB Statute; (10) Article 50(3) of the 
Hungarian NCB Statute; (11) Article 19(1) of the Irish NCB Statute; (12) Article 17(1) of the Italian NCB 
Statute; (13) Article 12(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (14) Article 8(1) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (15) 
Article 12(2) of the Dutch NCB Statute and Article 6(6) of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association; (16) 
Article 7(2) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (17) Article 24(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
257  Only Article 33(8) of the Romanian NCB Statute provides that such documents are to be published in the 
Monitorul Oficial al României, Part One. 
258 Article L. 142-8 of the French NCB Statute; Article 27 of the Portuguese NCB Statute.  
259 (1) Article 12(1) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 22(1) of the Latvian NCB Statute; (3) Article 10(4) 
of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (4) Article 9(1) of the Polish NCB Statute; (5) Article 33(3) of the Romanian 
NCB Statute; (6) Article 35 of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (7) Chapter 1 Article 4(1) of the Swedish NCB 
Statute.  
260  Lastra argues that there may nevertheless be undesirable results if parliament is dominated by the Executive – 
the political party in power – it might be tempted to make appointments purely on the basis of political 
patronage or by willingness to adhere to the government‘s economic policy, thereby undermining the purpose 
of independence (Lastra R. M., The Independence of the European System of Central Banks, 1992, p. 483).  
261  See Lastra R. M., The Independence of the European System of Central Banks, 1992, p. 484.  
262  (1) Article 33 of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 23(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute and Article 34(1) of 
the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (3) Article 18(3) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 10(4) of the 
Lithuanian NCB Statute; (5) Article 8(1) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (6) Article 33(2) of the Portuguese NCB 
Statute; (7) Article 33(4) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (8) Article 7(4) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (9) Article 
1(1) of Schedule 1 of the United Kingdom NCB Statute.  
263  See paragraph 8 of ECB Opinion CON/2004/16 of 11 May 2004 at the request of the Italian Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and finance on a draft law on the protection of savings, available at 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2004_16_f_sign.pdf.  
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provisions providing for terms shorter than five years need to be amended.
264
 A term 
of six years is provided for in the NCB Statutes of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
265
 Seven 
years of office is provided for the NCB Governors of Estonia, Finland and the 
Netherlands.
266
 The German NCB Statute foresees a term of office of eight years or, 
in exceptional circumstances, a term of office of five years.
267
 The Danish NCB 
Statute sets forth that the Governor‘s term is unlimited.268  
Upon entering into office, some NCB Statutes make provision for the Governor to 
take an oath.
269
 As a rule, an oath concerns the duty of loyalty and secrecy and, as 
such, is referred to in the NCB Statutes in a rather general manner. However, the 
Luxembourg and the Polish NCB Statutes stipulate the exact text of the oath, which in 
the latter case was also criticised by the ECB for its concentration on national 
issues.
270
 While the ECB‘s criticism of the Polish NCB Statute is well founded, it is 
true that none of the assessed NCB Statutes focuses particularly on ESCB-related 
issues.
271
 One could therefore argue that Article 14.3 of the Statute and, in a more 
general context, Article 130 TFEU [former Article 108 TEC] and Article 7 of the 
Statute, will be better enforced if the national authorities taking the oath also 
                                                 
264  See Paragraph 7 of EMI Opinion CON/97/10 of 30 May 1997 at the request of the German Minister of Finance 
on the Draft 6th Act amending the Bundesbank Act, available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_97_10.pdf. In cases in which a person is appointed for the 
outstanding period of the term of office of a Governing Council member whose duties have ceased, in which 
case the term of office can also be less than five years, the ECB has recommended aligning the wording of the 
law with Article 14.2 of the Statute. See the ECB Convergence Report of May 2010 (p. 254). 
265  (1) Article 12(4) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 6(5) of the Czech NCB Statute; (3) Article L. 142-8 
of the French NCB Statute; (4) Article 29(1) of the Greek NCB Statute; (5) Article 50(3) of the Hungarian 
NCB Statute; (6) Article 24(6) of the Italian NCB Statute; (7) Article 22(3) of the Latvian NCB Statute; (8) 
Article 12(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (9) Article 9(2) of the Polish NCB Statute; (10) Article 35 of 
the Slovenian NCB Statute; (11) Article 25(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute; (12) Chapter 1, Article 4(1) of the 
Swedish NCB Statute.  
266  (1) Article 10(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (2) Article 13(1) of the Finnish NCB Statute; (3) Article 12(2) 
of the Dutch NCB Statute and Article 6(6) of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association.   
267  Article 7(3) of the German NCB Statute.  
268  Article 9(1) of the Danish NCB By-laws.   
269  (1) Articles 13(1) and 13(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 26 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) 
Article 22(5) of the Greek NCB Statute; (4) Article 49(7) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (5) Article 12(5) of 
the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (6) Article 9(3) of the Polish NCB Statute.  
270  The ECB has noted that Article 9(3) of the Polish NCB Statute does not take the Polish NCB‘s participation in 
the ESCB into account since the text of the oath refers to ‗the economic development of our nation and the 
well-being of its citizens‘ (European Central Bank, 2004, p. 230).  
271  Against this background it should be noted that both Greece and Luxembourg are ‗old‘ Member States and 
their legislation had to be compatible by the date of establishment of the ESCB.  
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recognise the Governor‘s duties as a member of the Governing Council and the 
General Council.
272
  
Reappointment of the Governor is possible in 15 Member States,
273
 while it is 
prohibited in two.
274
 There appears to be no correlation between the length of the 
period in office and the possibility for the Governor to be reappointed. The 
Governor‘s terms of office in Estonia and Spain are seven and six years respectively. 
However, there are eight Member States that allow Governors to be reappointed after 
six or more years in office.
275
 Five-year terms can be renewed under the NCB Statutes 
of eight Member States.
276
 The legislation is unclear with regard to reappointment in 
the remaining Member States.  
3.2.3.4 Duty of loyalty 
A Governor is expected to comply with the duty of loyalty during his term of office. 
The duty of loyalty could be described as a sum of several types of loyal conduct, 
such as proper case, due diligence, duty to act bona fide, etc.
277
 Pursuant to Article 2 
of the Code of Conduct,
278
 the Members of the Governing Council are expected to 
observe the highest standard of ethical conduct, to act honestly, independently and 
                                                 
272  This double reference may be necessary as Article 14.3 of the Statute applies only to the Eurosystem NCBs. 
For the Governors of non-Eurosystem NCBs a possible solution would be to refer to their status as a member 
of a ESCB decision-making body, such as the General Council. 
273  (1) Article 33(2) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 34(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association 
and Article 23(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute; (3) Article 6(4) of the Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 13(3) of 
the Finnish NCB Statute; (5) Article L. 142-8 of the French NCB Statute; (6) Article 19(4) of the Irish NCB 
Statute; (7) Article 24(6) of the Italian NCB Statute; (8) Article 10(6) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (9) 
Article 12(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (10) Article 8(1) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (11) Article 9(2) 
of the Polish NCB Statute; (12) Article 33(2) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (13) Article 33(4) of the 
Romanian NCB Statute; (14) Article 7(4) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (15) Article 35 of the Slovenian NCB 
Statute.  
274  Article 10(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute; Article 25(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
275  (1) Articles 6(4) and 6(5) of the Czech NCB Statute; (2) Articles 13(1) and 13(3) of the Finnish NCB Statute; 
(3) Article L. 142-8 of the French NCB Statute; (4) Article 19(4) of the Irish NCB Statute; (5) Article 24(6) of 
the Italian NCB Statute; (6) Article 12(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (7) Article 9(2) of the Polish NCB 
Statute; (8) Article 35 of the Slovenian NCB Statute.  
276  (1) Article 33(2) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 34(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association 
and Article 23(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute; (3) Article 18(3) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Articles 10(4) 
and 10(6) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (5) Article 8(1) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (6) Article 33(2) of the 
Portuguese NCB Statute; (7) Article 33(4) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (8) Article 7(4) of the Slovak NCB 
Statute. 
277  The duties of Governors are in essence very similar to those of company directors, and in fact some of the 
NCBs are established as companies under national law. An extensive survey with regard to EU company law 
has been carried out by Eric Werlauff (Werlauff, 2003).  
278  Code of Conduct for the Members of the Governing Council, OJ C 123, 24.5.2002, p. 9. The Code was 
amended by another Memorandum of Understanding of 21 December 2006. The Code is without prejudice to 
other rules of conduct addressed to NCB Governors and the Code of Conduct of the European Central Bank 
that gives guidance to the members of the Executive Board of the ECB.  
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impartially, and to avoid any situation that might give rise to a personal conflict of 
interest.  
The duty of loyalty can be divided into a positive and a negative aspects; these aspects 
can be further divided into material and formal criteria.  
The positive aspect is that the person is to promote the ESCB/NCB and must act in 
diligent and prudent manner. The positive aspect means that Governor must act to 
promote the interests of the ESCB and the NCB.
279
 Under Article 2 of the Code of 
Conduct, the Governors are expected to be mindful of the importance of their duties 
and responsibilities, to take into account the public character of their function and to 
conduct themselves in a way that maintains and promotes the public‘s trust in the 
ECB. This would imply that the Governor is under an obligation to be active and 
participate at the Governing and General Council meetings; if he cannot attend 
personally, he must appoint an alternate. Pursuant to Article 10.2 of the Statute, the 
NCB Governors participate ad personam at the Governing Council meetings and vote 
in their personal capacity, except in cases referred to in Article 10.3 of the Statute, 
where the Governors as representatives of their respective NCBs decide upon the 
issues related to the shareholdings.
280
  
There is another positive duty concerning professional secrecy. Under Article 5 of the 
Code of Conduct, the members of the Governing Council shall take all necessary 
measures to ensure that the persons having access to their information also respect the 
professional secrecy obligations imposed by Article 37 of the Statute [former Article 
38 of the Statute]. Pursuant to Article 37 of the Statute, the obligation of professional 
secrecy for ECB and NCB staff also applies to the Governors. Article 5 of the Code of 
Conduct stipulates that professional secrecy requires the non-divulgence of 
confidential information; this shall be taken into account in particular in public 
speeches or statements and in relations with media with regard to monetary policy 
decisions that have not yet been officially disclosed to the public.  
The negative aspect of the duty of loyalty is that the person shall refrain from 
damaging the ESCB/NCB and has to keep secret all confidential information. It also 
means that Governors must refrain from any action that is incompatible with their 
                                                 
279  Under Article 14.3 of the Statute, the NCBs are an integral part of the ESCB and shall act in accordance with 
the guidelines and instructions of the ECB.  
280  This has also been described as a ―one person-one vote rule‖ (Servais, 2006, p. 251). 
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duties and that may have a damaging effect on the ESCB and their respective 
NCBs.
281
 Several NCB Statutes have either listed sanctions or references to the 
sanctions for the breach of the duty of confidentiality.
282
  
Under Article 3.3 of the Code of Conduct, respect for the principle of independence is 
incompatible with applying for, receiving or accepting from any source except from 
within the ESCB any benefits, rewards, remuneration or gifts in excess of EUR 200, 
whether financial or non-financial, which are connected in any way whatsoever with 
the function as a member of the Governing Council. However, under Article 3.4 of 
the Code of Conduct, they may accept invitations to conferences,
283
 receptions or 
cultural events and connected entertainment, including appropriate hospitality, if their 
participation in the event is compatible with the fulfilment of their duties as members 
of the Governing Council. In this respect, they may accept refunding by the organisers 
of travel and accommodation expenses commensurate with the duration of their 
commitment except when the organisers are institutions under their supervision In 
particular, members of the Governing Council should observe special prudence with 
regard to individual invitations. Article 3.4 further states that the above rules should 
apply equally to their spouses or partners if the invitations are also extended to them 
and if their participation is consistent with internationally accepted custom. One 
would therefore argue that willingness to use the office to confer benefits on personal 
                                                 
281  By comparison, the individual Commissioners must perform their duties in complete independence and in the 
general interest of the Union. They must refrain from any action incompatible with their duties. When taking 
up office, Members of the Commission are required to give the solemn undertaking that both during and after 
their term of office, ‗they will respect the obligations arising there from and in particular their duty to behave 
with integrity and discretion as regards the acceptance, after they have ceased to hold office, of certain 
appointments or benefits‘. Any failure to meet these standards can potentially lead to significant damage to the 
public image of the institution ad undermine confidence in it, which in turn will diminish its efficacy. This was 
demonstrated by the effects of the events leading up to the collective resignation of the Santer Commission in 
1999. See Case C-432/04, opinion of Mr Advocate General Geelhoed, paragraphs 74 and 74. However, 
Mastroianni and Arena point out that this procedure is not subject to the same rules as disciplinary 
proceedings, involving an official or servant of the Union and that, accordingly, solutions applied in the latter 
cannot be applied to this case, thereby forming a sui generic type of personal legal responsibility (Mastroianni 
& Arena, 2008, p. 1222).  
282  (1) Article 35 of the Belgian NCB Statute and Article 56 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (2) 
Article 35(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute, (3) Articles 55C(5), 55C(6) and 55(7) of the Greek NCB Statute; 
(4) Article 33(1) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute, (5) Article 52 of the Romanian NCB Statute, (6) Article 6 
of the Spanish NCB Statute, and (7) Schedule 7 of the UK NCB Statute.  
283  However, under Article 3.5 of the Code of Conduct, members of the Governing Council shall not accept for 
themselves fees for lectures and speeches undertaken in their official capacity as members of the Governing 
Council. 
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acquaintances would also clearly constitute breach of the obligations arising from the 
office.
284
  
These negative and positive aspects form a material criterion; the formal criterion in 
turn requires disclosure of transactions that might constitute a conflict of interest, and 
the person involved must abstain from the decision-making process.
285
  
Making the Governors subject to a requirement to submit a wealth declaration is in 
principle acceptable.
286
 A study carried out for the European Commission Bureau of 
European Policy Advisers reveals that with regard to the registers and financial 
disclosure policies of NCBs and the ECB, only 10 of them have a register for 
declarations (Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain) while the others do not, including the ECB; the duty to declare the 
financial interests nonetheless seems to exist.
287
  
The NCB Statutes of Hungary and Spain provide for the Governor‘s duty to provide a 
wealth declaration.
288
 However, in cases where Governors fail to provide or update 
their declaration of wealth, the issue is whether the Governor can be dismissed as a 
result.
289
  
The Code of Conduct aims at the same objectives as any national anti-corruption 
mechanism. Articles 2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 stipulate that the members of the 
Governing Council shall observe the highest standard of ethical conduct and shall not 
                                                 
284  See Case C-432/04 Commission of the European Communities v Édith Cresson [2006] ECR I-6387, opinion of 
Mr Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 23 February 2006, paragraph 120. Article 4.1 of the Code of 
Conduct provides that the members of the Governing Council shall avoid any situation liable to give rise to a 
conflict of interests; a conflict of interest arises where the members of the Governing Council have private or 
personal interests which may influence or appear to influence the impartial and objective performance of their 
duties; private or personal interests of the members of the Governing Council mean any potential advantage for 
themselves, their families, their other relatives or their circle of friends and acquaintances.  
285  Criminal legislation constitutes the ‗teeth‘ of the overall ethics infrastructure; penal codes determine the 
baseline by defining the types of misconduct that are not acceptable in the public service. It is noted that all 
OECD countries impose sanctions on corrupt behaviour by public officials. See OECD, 2000, p. 61.  
286  See Paragraph 3.1.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/55.  
287  See Demmke, et al., 2007, pp. 78, 83-84.   
288  Article 58A(1) of the Hungarian NCB Statute, Article 28(2) of the Spanish NCB Statute. Other NCB Statutes 
either refer to other laws governing prevention of corruption or are silent on the matter.  
289  For example, Article 39a of the Slovenian NCB Statute provides that sanctions of early termination of office 
shall not apply to the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije. The ECB Convergence Report of May 2006 noted 
that the Slovenian law on prevention of corruption no longer applies to members of the Governing Board of 
Banka Slovenije (European Central Bank, 2006, p. 76). On a similar occasion, the ECB invited the national 
legislator to take full account of Article 108 of the Treaty and Article 14.2 of the Statute. See Paragraph 3.1.2 
of ECB Opinion CON/2006/55. See also paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2010/27 of 29 March 
2010 on a new legal framework concerning integrity and prevention of corruption as regards its application to 
Banka Slovenije and its decision-making bodies, available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2010_27_f_sign.pdf.  
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accept any payments, benefits, rewards or excessive gifts, and that each Governor is 
obliged to provide the President of the ECB with the list of his/her external mandates.  
Considering the above, one may wonder whether the addressees of the duty of loyalty 
would be the ESCB the ECB or the respective national authorities. It may well be that 
the beneficiaries of the duty of loyalty would be the ESCB and the NCB. The issue is 
whether the Governors are required to exercise their functions bona fide in the interest 
of the NCB or some other organ or authority. Article 3.2 of the Code of Conduct sets 
forth that the members of the Governing Council shall act in the general interest of the 
euro area; for decisions to be taken in accordance with Article 10.3 of the Statute, the 
Governors may also take into account the interest of their respective NCB as 
shareholder.  
If the Governors owe their duties to the ESCB that would safeguard the well-being of 
their respective NCB as a member of the ESCB and follow the principle that 
monetary policy should be decided at the supranational level. However, it is arguable 
whether there is an accountability mechanism at the ESCB-level for the duty of 
loyalty. On the other hand, the Governors would continue to owe their duties to 
Member States that have appointed them as Governors. It is arguable whether this 
would imply that the national interest, and not those of the Eurosystem or ESCB 
prevail. After all, the Member States have decided to form a monetary union and the 
officials appointed to govern the institutions of the monetary union should not operate 
in isolation, without any accountability to the Member States. I would therefore 
support the idea that although the Governors have to act in the best interests of the 
ESCB, they still remain accountable to the national institutions, as discussed in 
Section 3.3.1.  
It is arguable whether the Governors owe a duty of loyalty towards the general public 
because the general public has no direct connection to or interest in an NCB.
290
 The 
general public is an abstract notion that cannot be determined individually as, for 
example, Member States which have representative organs; it is therefore difficult to 
argue that there is a duty of loyalty towards the general public. It can be assumed that 
                                                 
290  At the same time, the general public is entitled to access ECB documents under Decision ECB/2004/3 of 4 
March 2004 on public access to European Central Bank documents, OJ L 80, 18.3.2004, p. 42 (the ECB Public 
Access Decision). Article 2(1) of the ECB Public Access Decision provides that ‗any citizen of the Union, and 
any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State has a right of access to 
ECB documents, subject to the conditions and limits defined in this Decision‘. Article 2(2) of the ECB Public 
Access Decision extends the scope of beneficiaries outside the European Union.  
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in the long run the general public benefits from the Governors‘ duty of loyalty to the 
ESCB as the maintenance of price stability is clearly in their interests. There remains, 
however, the obligation to be transparent, which is discussed in Section 3.3.2.  
There is no expressed time limit for the duty of loyalty;
291
 the duty to keep 
confidential certain information therefore basically applies without a time limit. 
Article 37.1 of the Statute sets forth that members of the governing bodies and the 
staff of the ECB and the national central banks shall be required, even after their 
duties have ceased, not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation 
of professional secrecy. The indefinite duration of the duty of confidentiality is 
expressly mentioned in several NCB Statutes.
292
 However, as the information that was 
originally confidential tends to lose its value over time, one could assume that at some 
point in time this duty loses its meaning, although formally continuing to apply. 
3.2.3.5 Duty of non-competition 
As noted earlier, it is incompatible with the Governor‘s position for him/her to hold 
any position outside NCB,
293
 with the exception of research or pedagogical 
activities.
294
 The duty of non-competition is an obligation that is derived from the 
duty of loyalty and has no express legal basis in the Treaties or Statute. The timing 
aspect of the duty of non-competition, which has a pre-defined term, differentiates it 
from the duty of loyalty, which is in principle indefinite.
295
 The material criterion of 
the duty of non-competition consists of a negative aspect and a positive aspect.  
                                                 
291  Werlauff has noted that the duty of secrecy will survive the termination of the office of the member in question 
and since there is no time limit under Union company law, the duty is in principle applicable indefinitely, 
although the period of time which has passed may, of course, indicate that the information is no longer 
confidential (Werlauff, 2003, p. 405). 
292  (1) Article 45 of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 23 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (3) Article 25(1) of 
the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 50(1) of the Czech NCB Statute; (5) Article 35(2) of the Estonian NCB 
Statute; (6) Articles 35A(5) and 55C(4) of the Greek NCB Statute; (7) Article 54(1) of the Hungarian NCB 
Statute; (8) Article 33AK(1) of the Irish NCB Statute; (9) Article 33 of the Latvian NCB Statute; (10) Article 
19(1) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (11) Article 33(1) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (12) Article 55 of 
the Polish NCB Statute; (13) Article 52(1) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (14) Article 41 of the Slovak NCB 
Statute; (15) Article 47(1) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; and (16) Article 6(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
293  See footnotes 246 and 247. 
294  See Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the Code of Conduct. Article 3.5 of the Code of Conduct sets forth that members of 
the Governing Council shall not accept fees for lectures and speeches undertaken in their official capacity as 
members of the Governing Council. For the respective national legislation, see footnote 245.  
295  See Tupits, The Duties and Liabilities of Directors under EU Company Law, 2000, p. 404. One could argue 
that it is not proper to refer to the duty of non-competition where it is unlikely that a Governor would take a 
position in another central bank (even for the ECB, a Governor has to resign from his position first in order to 
take up an  appointment as a member of the Executive Board). However, there is no better definition currently 
available.  
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The positive aspect means that a Governor may be involved outside the NCB in 
research or pedagogical activities. The negative aspect provides that a Governor may 
not exercise his/her activities outside the NCB as a Governor of the NCB. Under 
Article 3.4 of the Code of Conduct, members of the Governing Council may accept 
invitations to conferences, receptions or cultural events and connected entertainment, 
including appropriate hospitality, if their participation in the event is compatible with 
the fulfilment of their duties as members of the Governing Council; they may accept 
refunding by the organisers of travel and accommodation expenses commensurate 
with the duration of their commitment except when the organisers are institutions 
under their supervision and they should observe special prudence with regard to 
individual invitations. Pursuant to Article 3.5 of the Code of Conduct, members of the 
Governing Council shall not accept for themselves fees for lectures and speeches 
undertaken in their official capacity as members of the Governing Council.  
Under the formal criterion, the Governor shall disclose his external activities. Under 
Article 3.6 of the Code of Conduct, the members of the Governing Council shall once 
a year send to the President of the ECB a list of their external mandates, either public 
or private, which are to be exercised during their term of office.
296
  
As far as the beneficiaries of the duty of non-competition are concerned, it appears 
that the duty of non-competition is mainly owed to the NCB at which a person has 
his/her position as a Governor; however, it is apparent from the wording of the Code 
of Conduct that it may also be owed to the ESCB in general.
297
 It also clear from 
Article 6 of the Code of Conduct that this provision is unlikely to apply in situations 
where the Governor becomes a member of the ECB Executive Board. However, the 
accountability mechanism in the Code of Conduct does not appear as firm as under 
national provisions. In this respect, the assumption in Section 3.3.1 that the Governors 
should be accountable to the national authorities is firmly grounded. However, this 
does not preclude the Governors‘ accountability towards their colleagues under the 
Code of Conduct.  
                                                 
296  Almost all the OECD countries require disclosure of personal financial interest in the public service; the 
majority of OECD countries requires information on current financial interests and positions, such as assets, 
liabilities, including loans, sources and level of incomes, etc. (OECD, 2000, pp. 49-50). 
297  Under Article 6 of the Code of Conduct, during the first year after their duties have ceased, the members of the 
Governing Council shall continue to avoid any conflict of interests that could arise from any new private or 
professional activities. They shall, in particular, inform the members of the Governing Council in writing 
whenever they intend to engage in such activities and shall seek their advice before committing themselves. 
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With regard to the duration of the duty of non-competition, the duty will exist until 
the Governor has retired from office and for one more year thereafter.
298
 This limit of 
duration distinguishes the duty of don-competition from the duty of loyalty. Article 6 
of the Code of Conduct sets forth that during the first year after their duties have 
ceased, the members of the Governing Council shall continue to avoid any conflict of 
interest that could arise from any new private or professional activities. However, this 
does not mean that the former Governor will no longer be bound to the duty of 
loyalty. It should be noted that the termination of the duty of non-competition does 
not terminate the general duty of loyalty, especially the obligation to keep information 
confidential , which is not subject to any time limit.  
3.2.3.6 Appointment of alternates 
Pursuant to Article 10.2 of the Statute, as members of the Governing Council, the 
NCB Governors participate ad personam and vote in their personal capacity, except in 
cases referred to in Article 10.3 of the Statute where, as representatives of their 
respective NCBs, the Governors decide on the issues related to the shareholdings. 
Article 3.1 of the Rules of Procedure confirms this principle and in the case of 
absences, Article 3.3 in conjunction with Article 4.4 of the Rules of Procedure 
provides that if Governors are unable to attend, they may appoint, in writing, an 
alternate; if Governors are prevented from voting for a prolonged period (more than 
one month) they may appoint a member of the Governing Council as an alternate. 
Provisions of national law that are corresponding to Article 10.2 of the Statute and 
Article 3.3 of the Rules of Procedure can only be found in two NCB Statutes.
299
 
It is clear from the above provisions that the status of an alternate is in both cases 
closely linked to the membership of the Governor. One would assume that the 
alternate has to have the same level of personal independence as a Governor but at the 
same time remain at the disposal of the Governor if the latter decides to resume 
his/her seat in the Governing Council. The ECB has said that any person who takes 
over the duties of the Governor or President on an interim basis until a newly 
appointed Governor or President takes up his duties benefits from the same rules on 
                                                 
298  The BIS has observed that the vast majority of central banks have policies limiting the activity of the Governor 
and other senior officials during a period that extends from some point before to some point after their 
departures from the institution (Bank for International Settlements, 2009, p. 180).  
299  (1) Article 18 of the Belgian NCB Statute and Article 28 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (2) 
Article 6(4) of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association.  
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security of tenure of office and grounds for dismissal as any member of the decision-
making bodies of national central banks involved in the performance of ESCB-related 
tasks.
300
 The relevant provisions of national law have been explored in Table 3-9.  
Normally, the Governor‘s substitution is either automatic or he himself decides on his 
substitution;
301
 however, his substitution can also be decided by a supervisory 
[decision-making] organ of the NCB, especially when the Governor has failed to 
decide.
302
 Alternatively, the right to appoint an alternate may also be an exclusive 
privilege of a supervisory organ at the NCB.
303
 
Some NCB Statutes specify that the Governor can be substituted by a member of the 
same decision-making body,
304
 ranked on the basis of either seniority in office
305
 or 
seniority of age.
306
 Alternatively, a member of the same decision-making body can 
replace the Governor without any specific ranking stipulated in the NCB Statute.
307
 In 
these cases, the official title (for example ‗Deputy Governor‘) of a member of the 
                                                 
300  See paragraph 2.1 of ECB Opinion CON/2010/37 of 7 May 2010 on an amendment to the rules securing the 
continuation of office of the President of Narodowy Bank Polski, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_ecb_2010_37_f_sign.pdf.  
301  For the Eurosystem, see (1) Article 34(4) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 18 of the Belgian NCB 
Statute and Articles 28 and 71(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (3) Articles 9(6), 17(2) and 21 
of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article L. 142-8(5) of the French NCB Statute; (5) Article 1(5) of the German 
NCB Organisational Statute; (6) Articles 32(2), 32(3) and 32(4) of the Greek NCB Statute; (7) Article 22A of 
the Irish NCB Statute; (8) Articles 22(1) and 25(4) of the Italian NCB Statute; (9) Article 8(1) of the 
Luxembourg NCB Statute; (10) Article 8(3) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (11) Article 6(4) of the Dutch NCB 
Articles of Association; (12) Article 31 of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (13) Article 9(1) of the Slovak NCB 
Statute; (14) Article 30(3) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (15) Article 19 of the Spanish NCB Statute. For the 
non-Eurosystem, see (1) Articles 15(2) and 18(1) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Articles 7(1) and 8 of the 
Czech NCB Statute; (3) Article 3 of the Danish NCB By-laws; (4) Article 10(4) of the Estonian NCB Statute; 
(5) Article 50(6) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (6) Article 28(5) and 29 of the Latvian NCB Statute; (7) 
Article 17(2) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (8) Articles 10(1), 16(1a) and 16(2) of the Polish NCB Statute; 
(9) Articles 35(1) and 35(5) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (10) Article 4(2) of Chapter 1 of the Swedish NCB 
Statute.  
302  (1) Article 10(4) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (2) Article 8 of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association; (3) 
Article 9(1) of the Slovak NCB Statute. 
303  (1) Article 11 of the Finnish NCB Statute; (2) Article 4(2) of Chapter 1 of the Swedish NCB Statute. 
304  As a rule, in all NCB Statutes the Governor can be substituted by a member of the same decision-making 
body; it is, however, also possible for the Governor to be substituted exceptionally by a member of the higher 
organisational body (Articles 8(2) and 8(3) of the Dutch NCB Statute) in the NCB or by a member of the lower 
organisational body (Article 29 of the Latvian NCB Statute). Theoretically, the wording of Article 28(5) of the 
Latvian NCB Statute also be interpreted as also allowing the rights and obligations of the Governor to be 
delegated to a third person, but there is no such case known to the author.  
305  (1) Article 34(4) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 10(4) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (3) Article 32 of 
the Greek NCB Statute.  
306  (1) Article 34(4) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 10(4) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (3) Article 32 of 
the Greek NCB Statute; (4) Article 8 of the Articles of Association of de Nederlandsche Bank; (5) Article 
31(1) of the Portuguese NCB Statute. 
307  (1) Article 21 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (2) Article 25(4) of the Italian NCB Statute; (3) Article 8(3) of the 
Maltese NCB Statute; (4) Article 10(1) of the Polish NCB Statute; (5) Article 35(5) of the Romanian NCB 
Statute; (6) Article 30(3) of the Slovenian NCB Statute.  
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same decision-making body is provided for in the NCB Statute.
308
 Sometimes the 
alternate‘s powers are restricted with regard to policy decisions and organisational 
changes.
309
 
As a result, it can be concluded that for the majority of Member States, the authority 
to appoint an alternate is based on the existence of a Governor in office, physically 
prevented from acting, whereby the alternate is his/her agent or representative and the 
Governor remains ultimately responsible.
310
  
Quite often the NCB Statutes regulate the Governor being ‗absent‘.311 In addition, 
phrases such as ‗unable to perform his duties‘,312 ‗temporary incapacity‘,313 
‗prevented from attending a meeting‘,314 ‗unable to be present‘,315 ‗unable to vote‘,316 
‗obstructed‘,317 ‗inability to act‘,318 ‗unavailable to act/unable to act‘,319 ‗incapacitated 
to act‘,320 or ‗illness‘321 are also used, which would lead to the conclusion that there 
appears to be a distinction in some Member States between short and long absences 
by a Governor.  
                                                 
308  See footnote 307.  
309  Article 1(5) of the German NCB Organisational Statute.  
310  See footnote 301.   
311  (1) Article 34(4) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 15(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (3) Articles 
9(6), 17(2) and 21 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Articles 7(1) and 8 of the Czech NCB Statute; (5) Article 3 
of the Danish NCB By-laws; (6) Article 10(4) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (7) Article 11 of the Finnish NCB 
Statute; (8) Article L. 142-8(5) of the French NCB Statute; (9) Article 1(5) of the German NCB Organisational 
Statute; (10) Articles 32(2), 32(3) and 32(4) of the Greek NCB Statute; (11) Article 22A of the Irish NCB 
Statute; (12) Articles 22(1), 22(2), 25(1), and 26(1) of the Italian NCB Statute; (13) Articles 28(5) and 29 of 
the Latvian NCB Statute; (14) Article 8(1) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (15) Article 8(3) of the Maltese 
NCB Statute; (16) Article 8 of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association; (17) Articles 10(1) and 16(1a) of the 
Polish NCB Statute; (18) Article 31(1) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (19) Article 35(5) of the Romanian 
NCB Statute; (20) Article 9(1) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (21) Article 19 of the Spanish NCB Statute; (22) 
Article 4(2) of Chapter 1 of the Swedish NCB Statute. All refer to ‗absence‘ of a Governor in the English 
language versions of the NCB Statutes. The same is true for Article 18 of the Belgian NCB Statute and Article 
28 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association and Article 52(6) of the Hungarian NCB Statute which refer to 
the ‗being unable to attend/vote‘ instead of ‗absence‘. Surprisingly, the Slovenian NCB Statute does not refer 
to any of the reasons for absence discussed above, as it simply states that one of the Deputy Governors shall be 
empowered to ‗act in the capacity of a deputy‘ by the Governor; see Article 30(3) of the Slovenian NCB 
Statute.  
312  Article 34(4) of the Austrian NCB Statute. 
313  Articles 9(6), 17(2) and 21 of the Cypriot NCB Statute. 
314  (1) Article L. 142-8(5) of the French NCB Statute; (2) Article 31(1) of the Portuguese NCB Statute. 
315  (1) Article 28 of the Belgian NCB Statute and Article 18 of the Belgian NCB Organic Act; (2) Article 32 of 
the Greek NCB Statute. 
316  Article 52(6) of the Hungarian NCB Statute.  
317  Article 50(6) of the Hungarian NCB Statute. 
318  Articles 22(1), 22(2), 25(1), and 26(1) of the Italian NCB Statute. 
319  Article 8 of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association. 
320  (1) Article 35(5) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (2) Chapter 1 Article 4(2) of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
321  Article 19 of the Spanish NCB Statute. 
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That would leave several Member States, such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and 
Slovakia, where the Governor‘s ‗absence‘322 can be interpreted differently than, for 
example, in Austria, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain and Sweden, where the Governor can be ‗absent‘ or have an 
alternative reason for taking leave.
323
 In both of these occasions, the Governor is 
apparently assumed to be able to delegate his functions during the period of his 
business trips, illness or other similar causes of absence.  
Articles 3.3 and 4.4 of the Rules of Procedure do not address cases in which the 
Governor‘s term of office has expired and his/her successor has still to be appointed. 
However, in some Member States it is also possible for the alternate to act when no 
Governor has been appointed.
324
 Throughout the history of ECB, this situation has 
occurred several times
325
 and the solution adopted can be legally arguable as it 
deviates from the principle that the Governors participate and vote in their personal 
capacity. When the Governor‘s term of office has expired, he has no authority to 
appoint an alternate under Article 10.2 of the Statute and Articles 3.3 and 4.4 of the 
Rules of Procedure. A general principle of the law of agency is that the representative 
capacity of the agent ceases when the principal wanes. However, the situation could 
be different if a national law contains specific provisions concerning situations in 
which a Governor‘s term of office has expired before the new Governor is appointed. 
                                                 
322  For Belgian and Hungarian NCB Statutes the phrase would be ‗being unable to attend/vote‘ instead of 
‗absence‘. 
323  The Irish and Maltese NCB Statutes would be in a different category since they regulate ‗absence‘ as well as 
‗vacancy‘.  
324  (1) Article 32(2) of the Greek NCB Statute; (2) Article 22A of the Irish NCB Statute; (3) Article 8(3) of the 
Maltese NCB Statute; (4) Article 31(2) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (5) Article 9(1) of the Slovak NCB 
Statute.  
325  Governor Ernst Welteke of the Bundesbank retired from office and consequently from the Governing Council 
on 16 April 2004, while Governor Axel Weber of the Bundesbank took office as late as 30 April 2004. The 
interim period was covered by Mr Jürgen Stark, who was deemed to be the Acting President of the 
Bundesbank. Mr Matti Vanhala, the Governor of Suomen Pankki, stepped down from office on 31 March 2004 
and Mr Erkki Liikanen was appointed as the new Governor on 12 July 2004. The interim period was covered 
by Mr Matti Louekoski, who was referred to as the Acting Governor of Suomen Pankki (see the ECB Annual 
Report 2004 (2005, p. 165)). Governor Antonio Fazio of the Banca d‘Italia left the office on 19 December 
2005 and was replaced by Governor Mario Draghi as of 16 January 2006. The interim period was covered by 
Mr Vincenzo Desario, who was officially noted as the Acting Governor of the Governor of the Banca d‘Italia 
(see the ECB Annual Report 2005 (2006, p. 167)). The term of Governor Mitja Gaspari of Banka Slovenije 
expired on 31 March 2007 and a new Governor had not been appointed by that date. Governor Marko Kranjec 
assumed office as from 16 July 2007, with Mr Andrej Rant assuming the position of Acting Governor from 1 
April until 15 July 2007 (see the ECB Annual Report 2007 (p. 193)). Similarly, there was a gap between 
Governor Hurley‘s terms of office and Mr Tony Grimes was the Acting Governor of the Central Bank and 
Financial Services Authority of Ireland from 19 July until 19 September 2008 (see the ECB Annual Report 
2008 (p. 199)).  
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For example, the NCB Statutes of Estonia,
326
 Greece,
327
 Malta
328
 the Netherlands,
329
 
Portugal
330
 and Slovakia
331
 contain such clear provisions. The situation is less clear, 
still leaving scope for interpretation, in those Member States where the NCB Statutes 
foresee automatic substitution for the Governor.
332
 The situation is more problematic 
with regard to the provisions in those NCB Statutes, by which the scope of regulation 
is limited to temporary absences; that could nevertheless be applied in cases where the 
Governor‘s position is vacant.333  
3.2.3.7 Grounds for dismissal 
Under Article 14.2 of the Statute, a Governor may be removed from office ‗only if he 
no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has 
been guilty of serious misconduct‘. René Smits assumes that this phrase is a reference 
to ‗reasons of health or misconduct‘,334 which appears to be too restrictive. Advocate 
General Geelhoed has said that the Community institutions and bodies, with the 
exception of the European Ombudsman, act as collegiate bodies and that the 
individual members cannot be removed for reasons relating to the exercise of the 
functions of these bodies; as the members of these institutions hold the highest office 
in their respective fields and are not subject to any kind of hierarchical scrutiny, 
special arrangements must be provided for in order to ensure that any misuse of 
powers is sanctioned in an appropriate manner.
335
 By ensuring that holders of public 
offices are not, by reason of the office they hold, immune from any corrective 
response where they fail to comply with the requisite standards of personal conduct, 
procedures such as Article 14.2 of the Statute provide basic guarantees that the 
institutions concerned operate in accordance with their constitutional task. The ECB 
                                                 
326  Article 10(4) of the Estonian NCB Statute. Article 10(4) read in conjunction with Article 113 of the Estonian 
NCB Statute would lead to a conclusion that the substitution rules described in Article 10(4) would apply in 
the case of death of the Governor, rather than in situations in which no Governor has been appointed.  
327  Articles 32(2) and 32(3) of the Greek NCB Statute.  
328  Article 8(3) of the Maltese NCB Statute. 
329  Article 8 of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association.  
330  Article 31(2) of the Portuguese NCB Statute.  
331  Article 9(1) of the Slovak NCB Statute. 
332  See footnote 301.  
333  Note that the Bulgarian and Estonian NCB Statutes contain a safeguard clause, in Articles 12(7) and 113 
respectively, which would extend the incumbent Governor‘s mandate until the vacancy is officially filled.  
334  See Smits, European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000, p. 165.  
335  It is inherent in this function that the sanctioning power is vested either in the institution of which the 
individual concerned is a member or in another institution with equivalent status in the constitutional 
framework. Case C-432/04 Commission of the European Communities v Édith Cresson [2006] ECR I-06387, 
opinion of Mr Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 23 February 2006, paragraph 69. 
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Convergence Reports have advised that the NCB Statutes should either contain 
grounds for dismissal that are compatible with those laid down in Article 14.2 of the 
Statute or omit any mention of grounds for dismissal since Article 14.2 is directly 
applicable.
336
  
Article 14.2 of the Statute consists of two parts that should be analysed separately. 
The first part consists of the non-fulfilment of the ‗conditions required for the 
performance of his duties‘ and the second part refers to being ‗guilty of serious 
misconduct‘.  
The NCB Statutes list several criteria, such as citizenship, higher education or full 
legal capacity, which can be deemed to be the ‗conditions required for the 
performance of his duties‘.337 As the conditions required for the performance of the 
Governors‘ duties are not defined in EU law but in national law, the ECB‘s 
argumentation raises some concerns. If, for example, an NCB Statute prescribes the 
requirement of sound health,
338
 then it would be legitimate to remove the Governor if 
he is in ill health for more than certain period of time. The problem is that in several 
NCB Statutes, the ‗sound health requirements‘ are drafted not as preconditions for 
office but as grounds for removal, which technically justifies the ECB‘s point of view. 
For example, these NCB Statues interpret the non-fulfilment of the conditions for 
holding office as including the failure of the Governor to perform his duties for a 
certain period of time. The ECB is, however, unwilling to accept this interpretation.
339
  
There are legal risks, however, with regard to those NCB Statutes that do not have 
any conditions for the Governor‘s performance, where the grounds for his/her 
removal from office are compatible with Article 14.2 of the Statute; in those instances 
                                                 
336  See the ECB Convergence Report 2010 (p. 20), 2008 (p. 19), 2007 (p. 18), December 2006 (p. 26); May 2006 
(p. 64), and 2004 (p. 27). No reference to the grounds of dismissal is mentioned in the ECB Convergence 
Report 2002. The EMI mentioned this in its Convergence Reports of 1998 (p. 294), 1996 (p. 102). A rather 
general reference was made in 1995 (European Monetary Institute, 1995, p. 93).   
337  See footnotes 239, 240, 241 and 242.  
338  Article 14 of the Cypriot NCB Statute.  
339 The ECB is of the opinion that this is in addition to the two grounds for dismissal provided for in Article 14.2 
of the Statute, with regard to Article 6(13) of the Czech NCB Statute, see the ECB Convergence Report of 
December 2006 (p. 210). Article 22(4) of the Latvian NCB Statute receives similar criticism; see the ECB 
Convergence Report 2006 (pp. 219-220). Article 14(1) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute, Article 9(5) of the Polish 
NCB Statute. Article 33(4) the Austrian NCB Statute contains the same interpretation. Note Article 19(7) of 
the Irish NCB Statute, which contains rather extensive list of reasons terminating the Governor‘s right to hold 
office, or Article 25(4) of the Spanish NCB Statute with similar content.  
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the phrase ‗no longer fulfils the conditions‘ would be meaningless since there are no 
preconditions in the first place.
340
  
To explain the meaning of ‗guilty of serious misconduct‘ is far more problematic as 
‗serious misconduct‘ is defined neither in the Treaties nor the Statute. Under EU Law, 
the ECB Executive Board members and the NCB Governors are not the only persons 
that can be removed from office on the grounds of ‗serious misconduct‘. Article 247 
TFEU [former Article 216 TEC] provides that if any Member of the Commission no 
longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has 
been guilty of serious misconduct, the Court of Justice may, on application by the 
Council acting by a simple majority or the Commission, compulsorily retire him.
341
 
The second sentence of Article 228(2) TFEU [former Article 195(2) TEC] sets forth 
that the Ombudsman may be dismissed by the Court of Justice at the request of the 
European Parliament if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the 
performance of his duties or if he is guilty of serious misconduct. Similarly, Article 
286(6) TFEU [former Article 247(7) TEC] stipulates that a Member of the Court of 
Auditors may be deprived of his office or of his right to a pension or other benefits in 
its stead only if the Court of Justice, at the request of Court of Auditors, finds that he 
no longer fulfils the requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from his 
office. These procedures coexist with two other corrective mechanisms, namely 
political accountability and criminal liability.
342
 
The Court of Justice has held that the Members of European Commission must 
respect the obligations arising from their office; they have to ensure that the general 
interest of the Community takes precedence at all times, not only over national 
interests, but also over personal interests; the penalty of compulsory retirement will 
apply [only] where a breach has arisen and continues, during the term of office of the 
                                                 
340 The problem would arise for example with regard to the German NCB Statute and the Finnish NCB Statute. 
341  Article 245(2) TFEU provides that the Members of the Commission may not, during their term of office, 
engage in any other occupation, whether gainful or not; […I]n the event of any breach of these obligations, the 
Court of Justice may, on application by the Council acting by a simple majority or the Commission, rule that 
the Member concerned be, according to the circumstances, either compulsorily retired in accordance with 
Article 247 TFEU or deprived of his right to a pension or other benefits in its stead. Mastroianni and Arena 
also note that according to the Court, the procedure under Article 245(2) TFEU is not subject to the same rules 
as disciplinary proceedings involving an official or servant of the Union and that, accordingly, solutions 
applied in the latter ―cannot necessarily be transposed‖ to the former, which Mastroianni and Arena interpret 
as that arguably sometimes the principles of disciplinary proceedings do apply, see Mastroianni & Arena, 
2008, p. 1222.  
342  See Mastroianni & Arena, 2008, p. 1220.   
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Member of the Commission in question.
343
 It therefore follows that ‗serious 
misconduct‘ can also be explained as ‗breach of obligations‘ that the person was 
obliged to honour;
344
 It can also be said that where the person has correctly performed 
the mission entrusted to him, the concept of ‗serious misconduct‘ cannot be used on 
the grounds that the outcome of the person‘s activities was unsatisfactory.345  
So far, only the German NCB Statute has remained silent with regard to the grounds 
for dismissal. Sixteen NCB Statutes copy the language of Article 14.2 of the 
Statute.
346
 However, several other Statutes provide for an interpretation of Article 
14.2.
347 
In this regard, the ECB has stated on numerous occasions that the wording 
chosen in respect of the grounds for dismissal of the Governor can copy the text of 
Article 14.2 of the Statute,
348
 but cannot create new grounds for dismissal.
349
 Some of 
the NCB Statutes provide grounds for dismissal that do not copy Article 14.2 of the 
                                                 
343  Case C-432/04 Commission v. Cresson [2006] ECR I 6387, paragraphs 69, 71 and 73. 
344  Case C-432/04 Commission v. Cresson [2006] ECR I 6387, paragraphs 147 and 150.  
345  Case C-234/02 P Ombudsman v. Lamberts [2004] ECR I 2803, paragraph 82. The case was analysed in great 
detail by Suksi (2005). In the ESCB context this would mean that the Governor cannot be relieved from office 
by national authorities when the latter believe that the Governing Council‘s decisions do not serve the national 
interest. This argumentation is further supported by the language of Article 130 TFEU and the requirement of 
price stability.  
346 (1) Article 33(4) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Articles 34(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association 
and Article 23(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute; (3) Article 18(4) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 12(2) 
of the Estonian NCB Statute; (5) Article 16(1) of the Finnish NCB Statute; (6) Article L. 142-5(1) of the 
French NCB Statute; (7) Article 24 of the Greek NCB Statute; (8) Article 17(1) of the Italian NCB Statute; (9) 
Article 12(1) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (10) Article 12(3) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (11) Article 
8(5) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (12) Article 12(3) of the Dutch NCB Statute and Article 6(7) of the Dutch 
NCB Articles of Association; (13) Article 33(4) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (14) Article 33(6) of the 
Romanian NCB Statute, (15) Article 7(9) of the Slovak NCB Statute, (16) Article 39(1) of the Slovenian NCB 
Statute.  
347 (1) Article 33(4) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 14(1) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (3) Article 6(13) 
of the Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 24 of the Greek NCB Statute; (5) Article 49(10) of the Hungarian NCB 
Statute. 
348  See paragraph 7(g) of EMI Opinion CON/98/06 of 12 February 1998 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of 
Finance for an opinion on draft legislative proposals concerning the Act on the Bank of Finland, available at 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_98_06.pdf.  
349  See paragraph 3.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/19 of 3 April 2006 at the request of Latvijas Banka on a draft 
law amending the Law on Latvijas Banka, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2006_19_f_sign.pdf; paragraph 8 of the ECB Opinion CON/2005/26 
of 4 August 2005 at the request of Národná banka Slovenska on a draft law amending the Act No 566/1992 
Coll. on Národná banka Slovenska, as amended, available at 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2005_26_f_sign.pdf.  
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Statute but are still deemed compatible with Article 14.2.
350
 Grounds for dismissal 
that differ from those established under Article 14.2 of the Statute have been 
established in eight NCB Statutes.
351
  
Article 14.2 of the Statute provides that ‗a Governor may be relieved from office only 
if […] he has been guilty of serious misconduct‘ [My emphasis – AT.]. This wording 
suggests that (a) ‗serious misconduct‘ has to have actually occurred; (b) there has to 
be an authority to decide that the Governor is guilty of breaching his duties; and (c) 
once preconditions (a) and (b) have been fulfilled, a Governor can be removed from 
office.
352
  
In the case of dispute, proceedings before the Court of Justice shall be instituted by 
the Governor concerned or the Governing Council within two months of the 
                                                 
350  Article 39(1) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; Article 25(4) of the Spanish NCB Statute; Chapter 2 Article 2(1) 
of the Swedish NCB Statute. The EMI Convergence Report 1998 noted that the Spanish NCB Statute is 
compatible with Treaty and Statute requirements for Stage Three, (1998, p. 17). The ECB Convergence Report 
of May 2006 concluded that the Slovenian NCB Statute is compatible with Treaty and Statute requirements for 
Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union (2006, p. 77). However, the wording did receive some criticism 
in the ECB Opinion CON/2006/17 of 13 March 2006 on a draft law amending the Law on Banka Slovenije, 
available at http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2006_17_f_sign.pdf. In paragraph 2.6 the ECB noted that 
it would ‗welcome further amendments to this Article to bring the grounds for dismissal of the Governor of 
Banka Slovenije fully into line with the wording of Article 14.2 of the Statute. In particular, the Law should 
specify, without supplementary conditions, that a Governor may be relieved from office if they no longer fulfil 
the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if they have been guilty of serious misconduct‘. 
The EMI Opinion CON/1998/25 of 10 June 1998 on a draft law amending the Statute of Sveriges Riksbank, 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/EN_CON_98_25.pdf, does not address the grounds for removal as an issue 
and neither do the EMI/ECB Convergence Reports.  
351  (1) Article 9(1) of the Danish NCB By-laws; (2) Article 19(7) of the Irish NCB Statute; (3) Article 22(4) of the 
Latvian NCB Statute; (4) Article 9(5) of the Polish NCB Statute; (5) Article 25(4) of the Spanish NCB Statute; 
(6) Chapter 9, Article 13, of the Swedish Instrument of Government; (7) Articles 5(1), 7(1), 7(2) and 8 of 
Schedule 1 of the UK NCB Statute. To a certain extent, Article 14(1) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute could also 
belong to this group.  
352  For the example of (a) and (b), the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank distanced itself categorically 
from discriminatory remarks made by its member, Dr Thilo Sarrazin in the press release issued on 30 August 
2010 (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2010). Dr Sarrazin, a former member of the Berlin Senate, had repeatedly and 
persistently made provocative statements, especially on issues relating to immigration. It noted that owing to 
their special position, the members of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank are obliged, in any 
political activity, to exercise the moderation and restraint commensurate with their position with regard to 
society at large and with due regard to the duties of their office. Under the code of conduct for members of the 
German NCB‘s Executive Board, members of the Executive Board are to conduct themselves at all times in a 
manner ‗that upholds and promotes the Bundesbank‘s reputation and the public‘s trust in the Bundesbank‘. 
The Executive Board of the Bundesbank found that Dr Sarrazin‘s remarks were damaging to the reputation of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank. The Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank announced that it would 
immediately conduct a discussion with Dr Sarrazin, give him a hearing and take prompt further action. On 2 
September 2010, the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank took a unanimous decision to submit to the 
Federal President an application for the dismissal of Dr Thilo Sarrazin from the Executive Board. The 
Deutsche Bundesbank‘s corporate governance officer, Professor Uwe Schneider, fully supported this 
application (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2010). 
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publication of the decision or of its notification to the plaintiff or of the day on which 
it came to the knowledge of the latter.
353
  
However, from Table 3-10, it is apparent that there is confusion as to what extent 
Article 14.2 of the Statute applies. Some NCB Statutes refer to conviction by a 
criminal court as a ground for removal and it is not clear whether this should be 
interpreted as non-compliance with conditions required for the performance of the 
Governor‘s duties or as he/she being found guilty of serious misconduct.  
From the substantial point of view, the notion ‗serious misconduct‘ is part of Union 
law and is not defined in national law.
354
 Therefore, an additional ground for removal, 
according to which only conviction for criminal offences justify dismissal, would 
consequently lead to a Governor remaining in office until the end of the judicial 
procedure, is debatable.
355
 It is true that not every judicial procedure ends with the 
removal of the Governor from office
356
 and one could therefore argue that it is better 
for the Governor‘s independence to be protected by such a safeguard. It would 
therefore be misleading to argue whether ‗serious misconduct‘ should be treated as 
‗serious crime‘ or an ‗administrative offence‘ in order to fit it into the national 
                                                 
353  Article 14.2 of the Statute thus complies with Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which provides that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Zilioli and Selmayr note 
that Article 14.2 of the Statute is the first time that Union law allows a ―national‖ official to challenge a 
national decision directly in the European Court of Justice, see Zilioli & Selmayr, The Law of the European 
Central Bank, 2001, p. 78. 
354  In an analogous case involving a former member of the European Commission, Advocate General Geelhoed 
said that ‗there is no objection to a national procedure and an Article 213(2) EC procedure being applied 
concurrently; both types of procedure serve different purposes in the national and Community legal orders 
respectively. Whereas the former is aimed at enforcing standards which are deemed to be essential to the fabric 
of society at the national level, the latter is designed to ensure the proper functioning of the Community 
institutions with a view to realising the objectives of the Treaties. Even if the national criminal procedure had 
continued and had resulted in the imposition of a penalty, there still would be scope for imposing the sanctions 
provided for in Article 213(2) EC‘. See Case C-432/04 Commission of the European Communities v Édith 
Cresson [2006] ECR I-06387, opinion of Mr Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 23 February 2006, 
paragraph 97.  
355  If this argument were true, there would be three grounds for removal of the Governor: (1) the non-fulfilment of 
conditions required for the performance of his duties; (2) being guilty of breaching his duties; and (3) being 
convicted by the court for a deliberate crime. The grounds (2) and (3) do not necessarily overlap, as there may 
be several duties that can be breached but not all such breaches can be regarded as crime. For example, it can 
be perfectly legal for a Governor to accept benefits from third parties, but in so doing he is breaching the duty 
of loyalty and there is a conflict of interest which would justify his removal from office. It may also occur that 
the Governor is brought before the court for acts or omissions that have nothing to do with his duties as a 
Governor. According to Mastroianni and Arena, the dismissal procedure coexists with political accountability 
and criminal liability (Mastroianni & Arena, 2008, p. 1220) as evidenced by Case C-432/04 Commission v. 
Cresson [2006] ECR I 6387. 
356  For example, Jean-Claude Trichet‘s path to the presidency of the ECB was cleared on 18 June 2003 when the 
Governor of the French NCB was acquitted of all responsibility in the collapse of Crédit Lyonnais. The 
charges against Mr Trichet were related to the financial accounts of Crédit Lyonnais between 1991 and 1993, 
when he was director of the French Finance Ministry, see Marsh, 2009, p. 190; Webster, 2003; or some of the 
newspaper articles from the period (Top Euro banker cleared of scandal cover-up, 2003).  
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framework. Since the concept has its origins in Union law, a national court hearing 
the case would have to request a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice under 
Article 267 TFEU [former Article 234 TEC] in order to ensure uniform interpretation. 
From the procedural point of view, a court decision dismissing the Governor is 
subject to Article 14.2. However this would be tantamount to making the Court of 
Justice the highest national criminal court, which obviously was not the intention of 
the drafters of the Treaties.
357
  
It should be noted that in the dismissal of a Governor is different from the dismissal of 
a member of the ECB Executive Board under Article 11.4 of the Statute, where the 
Governing Council (or the Executive Board) has a specific role and it is the Court of 
Justice that dismisses the Executive Board Member. This is because the appointment 
of Governors is a national competence, which implies that dismissal also belongs to 
the sphere of national competence. The Governing Council may initiate proceedings 
under Article 14.2 of the Statute if the Governor concerned has not initiated the 
proceedings.
358
 A dismissal procedure is prescribed to a greater or lesser extent in 
eighteen NCB Statutes,
359
 while the other NCB Statutes are silent on the issue.  
The competence of the Court of Justice to hear cases regarding the dismissal of the 
Governor is noted in eight NCB Statutes.
360
 Article 14.2 of the Statute uses the 
expression ‗may be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union‘; this 
                                                 
357  This however should not invite national legislators to amend the NCB Statutes so that a Governor is to be 
relieved from office when criminal investigations against him are initiated, as is currently the case in Spain. 
Such an approach would have clearly stopped Mr Trichet‘s career as the Governor of the French NCB and 
possibly prevented his appointment as President of the ECB. Against this background, the wording of Article 
25(4)(d) of the Spanish NCB Statute raises concern as to whether such an automatism would be compliant 
with Article 14.2 of the Statute. In addition, Article 6(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law.  
358  For example, the ECB Governing Council may decide that a national decision to dismiss a governor is ill-
founded even when the Governor agrees to step down.  
359  (1) Articles 34(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association and Article 23(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute; 
(2) Article 14(1) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (3) Article 153(8) of the Cypriot Constitution and Article 18(4) 
of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 6(13) of the Czech NCB Statute; (5) Article 9(1) of the Danish NCB 
Statute; (6) Article 28(7) of the Estonian NCB Articles of Association; (7) Article 16(1) of the Finnish NCB 
Statute; (8) Article 24 of the Greek NCB Statute; (9) Articles 50(3) and 50(4) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; 
(10) Article 21 of the Irish NCB Statute; (11) Article 17(1) of the Italian NCB Statute; (12) Article 22(4) of the 
Latvian NCB Statute; (13) Articles 12(2), 12(3) and 12(4) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (14) Article 12(3) of 
the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (15) Articles 33(6), 33(7), 33(8) and 33(9) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (16) 
Article 7(2) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (17) Articles 39(2), 39(3), 57(1) and 57(2) of the Slovenian NCB 
Statute; (18) Chapter 2 Article 2 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
360  (1) Articles 34(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association and Article 23(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute; 
(2) Article 6(13) of the Czech NCB Statute; (3) Article 21(4) of the Irish NCB Statute; (4) Article 12(4) of the 
Lithuanian NCB Statute; (5) Article 33(5) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (6) Article 7(10) of the Slovak NCB 
Statute; (7) Article 57(1) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (8) Chapter 2 Article 2(2) of the Swedish NCB 
Statute. Conditionally also Article 16(2) of the Finnish NCB Statute belongs to this group.  
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cannot be interpreted as allowing litigants to choose a national court instead. Rather, 
the wording of Article 14.2 is to be understood as providing the opportunity to refer 
the matter to the Court of Justice. As noted above, there are substantial as well as 
procedural arguments to support the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.
361
  
However, there may also be cases in which the Governor is not formally removed 
from office, as the fact of being subject to public scrutiny would force him to resign 
voluntarily. In the personal statement of Governor Welteke,
362
 he noted that his 
integrity was ‗assailed by distorted and false statements‘,363 that he was no longer in a 
position to ‗actively participate in shaping European stability policy within the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank free of outside influence‘ and that 
the Bundesbank needed a president ‗who can implement the necessary reforms 
without constraints and above all, one who is free to advise the Federal Government 
and represent Germany in international organisations in close agreement with the 
Federal Ministry of Finance‘. Mr Welteke stepped down as Governor on 16 April 
2004.
364
  
The other, less successful, possible means of avoiding the procedures stipulated in 
Article 14.2 of the Statute is to amend the NCB Statutes so that the incumbent 
Governor would be dismissed by the legislature. Such an attempt was made in order 
to remove Governor Fazio from office by means of a draft law on the protection of 
savings. The ECB noted that any reorganisation measure affecting the term of office 
of its governor should foresee that the existing Governor can continue to perform his 
duties until the end of the term of office for which he has been appointed; since 
Governor Fazio was appointed for life, there should be a transitional regime which is 
compatible with Article 14.2 of the ESCB Statute.
365
 Governor Fazio ultimately 
                                                 
361  However, the position is not entirely clear as the Court of Justice has been referred to as the ‗final‘ arbiter; see 
the ECB Monthly Bulletin, November 2002 (p. 56). 
362  Personal statement by Bundesbank President Ernst Welteke (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2004).  
363  Governor Welteke was referring to an article by the German magazine Der Spiegel published earlier in 2004, 
which revealed that Dresdner Bank AG paid EUR 7,661 for Governor Welteke‘sstay at Berlin‘s Adlon hotel 
and that of several other people close to him. This allegation forced the Executive Board of the German NCB 
to adopt, on 8 April 2004, the same Code of Conduct as that of the ECB‘s Governing Council as there was no 
specific legal instrument for the members of the Executive Board (see Statement from the Executive Board of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2004)). At the time when the facts of which Mr Welteke 
was accused occurred, no code of conduct existed for the members of the ECB Governing Council specifying 
the standards to be complied with.  
364  Governor Welteke‘s resignation created some legal concerns since under the German NCB Statute, the 
substitution of the Governor while there is none in office is not regulated. However, this has not prevented the 
Governing Council from allowing interim governors to participate as Governors. See footnotes 67 and 325. 
365  See Paragraph 8 of the ECB Opinion CON/2004/16.  
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resigned on 19 December 2005 after a scandal over his involvement in a foreign 
takeover bid for two Italian credit institutions.
366
 
3.2.4 Financial independence 
Financial independence refers to the legal and practical arrangements relating to the 
finances of a central bank and the extent to which the bank is subject to outside 
influence in this regard.
367
 The principle of financial independence implies that an 
NCB must have sufficient means not only to perform ESCB-related tasks but also its 
own national tasks, such as financing its administration and own operations.
368
 The 
ECB usually
369
 assesses the following six aspects of financial independence: 
1) Budget determination 
2) Accounting rules; 
3) Auditing; 
4) Distribution of profits, NCB‘s capital and financial provisions; 
5) Autonomy in staff matters; and 
6) Financial liability for supervisory authorities.  
3.2.4.1 Budget determination 
The ECB is of the opinion that it is incompatible with financial independence if a 
third party has the power to determine or influence an NCB‘s budget, unless the law 
provides a safeguard clause so that such a power is without prejudice to the financial 
means necessary for carrying out the NCB‘s ESCB-related tasks.370 In 2008, the 
power of some NCBs to determine their budgets was undermined with regard to the 
                                                 
366  The allegations were that Governor Fazio had a conflict of interest as the head of the supervisory authority and 
at the same time protecting the domestic banking system from foreign competition. None of this was however 
addressed in the Italian NCB public statement (Banca d'Italia, 2005).  
367  See Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, p. 956.  
368  This would also entail the separation of budgets; for example, the ECB‘s budget is not part of the Union‘s 
annual budget under Article 314 TFEU. See also Case C-11/00, paragraph 132.  
369  From time to time, other issues may also be added. For example, in 2008 ‗Autonomy in staff matters‘ was 
included in the ECB Convergence Report (2008, p. 22) and in 2010 NCB‘s ownership rights were introduced 
(2010, p. 23).  
370  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (2010, p. 22). The same position has also been stated earlier (2008, p. 
21), (2007, p. 20), December (2006, p. 27) and May (2006, p. 66), (2004, p. 29). 
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third party determining the governance of their staff members.
371
 In 2010, the 
situation in which the Lithuanian NCB‘s immovable property was legally owned by 
the Lithuanian State triggered the creation of another element of financial 
independence.
372
  
According to most of the NCB Statutes, the budget is determined internally, as is 
revealed by Table 3-11.
373
 Contrary to this general rule, Articles 52(1) and 52(2) of 
the Portuguese NCB Statute stipulate that an operating budget shall be drawn up for 
each year and forwarded to the Minister of Finance. The Portuguese NCB Statute is 
silent with regard to the powers of the Minister of Finance, so it is unclear whether the 
purpose of this provision is just to keep the Minister informed or whether the Minister 
actually have the power to adopt the NCB budget.
374
 In fact, there are also examples 
of a third party having the official authority to approving the NCB annual budget.
375
 
Notably, in this situation neither the Spanish NCB Statute nor the Swedish NCB 
Statute contain any safeguards, while the Luxembourg NCB Statute states that 
granting discharge for the NCB bodies is taken without prejudice to ESCB-related 
                                                 
371  For example, in paragraph 2.4 of the ECB Opinion CON/2008/9 of 21 February 2008 at the request of the 
German Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Law on the Deutsche Bundesbank, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_9_f_sign.pdf. The ECB expressed its concerns about the 
German Government‘s discretionary powers to grant and withdraw the delegation and to regulate directly the 
legal relationships of the Deutsche Bundesbank with all categories of staff as well as the careers of such staff; 
the threat of withdrawing such delegated powers was considered a potential tool to influence an NCB unduly 
in fulfilling its tasks and thus limit that NCB‘s independence. A similar position was taken in ECB Opinion 
CON/2008/10 of 21 February 2008 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance on 
the Law on the State annual and pluriannual budget, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_10_f_sign.pdf.  
372  In its Convergence Report of May 2010, the ECB considered that due to this legal situation, there was a risk of 
the Lithuanian NCB being able to dispose of its property only with the approval of governmental authorities. 
This legal situation was deemed to undermine both institutional and financial independence. From an 
institutional perspective, state authorities could instruct the NCB on the assets that it holds. The NCB‘s 
financial independence would be undermined since it would no longer be entirely free to decide on the 
allocation of its resources and could be unable to secure sufficient means for the performance of its tasks. See 
(pp. 23, 248). For the background of the legal issue, see the discussion in Section 5.3.4.2 with regard to the 
Estonian NCB assets.  
373  For the Eurosystem: (1) Article 20(4) of the Belgian NCB Statute and Article 30(8) of the Belgian NCB 
Articles of Association; (2) Articles 61(1) and 61(2) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 14(1) of the 
Finnish NCB Statute; (4) Article L.142-2(4) of the French NCB Statute; (5) Article 26(4) of the German NCB 
Statute; (6) Article 31(1) of the Greek NCB Statute; (7) Article 6G of the Irish NCB Statute; (8) Article 
18(2)(2) of the Italian NCB Statute;(9) Articles 6(c) and 29(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (10) Article 
19(2) of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association; (11) Article 6(2)(b) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (12) Articles 
49(3) and 49(4) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; for the non-Eurosystem: (1) Article 48 of the Bulgarian NCB 
Statute; (2) Article 47(1) of the Czech NCB Statute; (3) Article 9(2)(6) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (4) 
Article 26(2) of the Latvian NCB Statute; (5) Article 11(1) (15) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (6) Articles 
12(2), 17(4) and 64 of the Polish NCB Statute; (7) Article 41 of the Romanian NCB Statute;  
374  However, in Ireland, where the Minister of Finance also has extensive powers, Article 6G(7) of the Irish NCB 
Statute could be interpreted as having such a safeguard clause in compliance with the principle of financial 
independence.  
375  (1) Article 4(2) and 21(1)(g) of the Spanish NCB Statute; (2) Article 30 of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (3) 
Chapter 10 Article 2 of the Swedish NCB Statute. In the case of Spain and Sweden, the national Parliament 
has the authority to approve the annual budget  
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tasks and without calling into question the obligations of the NCB within the 
framework of the ESCB.
376
 
Under Article 3(3) of the Romanian NCB Statute the NCB shall cooperate with the 
Ministry of Finance in setting the macroeconomic indicators based on which the 
annual draft budget shall be drawn up. Although the Romanian NCB adopts its budget 
independently, it is strange that there is a cooperation requirement at the begininng of 
the process. Another example, from the other end of the process concerns an NCB 
whose annual budget is subject to the jurisdiction of a National Audit Office.
377
 The 
reports on the budgeted expenditure of the Bulgarian NCB shall be examined by the 
National Audit Office, which shall prepare a special report on its examination. Then 
the report on the budgeted expenditure of the Bulgarian NCB is sent to the Bulgarian 
Parliament together with the annual report of the Bulgarian NCB. So far, the ECB 
Convergence Reports have not registered any cases in which the application of this 
provision could have violated the principle of financial independence.  
3.2.4.2 Accounting rules 
Pursuant to Article 26.1 of the Statute, the financial year of the ECB and NCBs shall 
begin on the first day of January and end on the last day of December.  
Table 3-12 shows that most of the 20 NCB Statutes that refer to the ‗financial year‘ 
also stipulate that the financial year shall be equal to the calendar year.
378
 
Article 26.2 of the Statute further stipulates that the annual accounts of the ECB shall 
be drawn up by the Executive Board in accordance with the principles established by 
the Governing Council; the accounts shall be approved by the Governing Council and 
shall thereafter be published. Under Article 26.3 of the Statute, the Executive Board 
shall draw up a consolidated balance sheet of the ESCB for analytical and operational 
purposes, comprising those assets and liabilities of the NCBs that are part of the 
                                                 
376  From the Table 3-11 it is not entirely clear to what extent the third parties could also influence the annual 
budget.  
377  Article 48(3) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute.  
378  See (1) Article 67(1) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 17 of the Danish NCB Statute and Article 35 of 
the Danish NCB By-laws; (3) Article 28 of the Estonian NCB Statute; (4) Article 19(1) of the Finnish NCB 
Statute; (5) Article 26(1) of the German NCB Statute; (6) Article 51 of the Greek NCB Statute; (7) Article 16 
of the Latvian NCB Statute; (8) Article 48 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (9) Article 28 of the Luxembourg 
NCB Statute; (10) Article 21(1) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (11) Article 19(1) of the Dutch NCB Articles of 
Association; (12) Article 68(2) of the Polish NCB Statute; (13) Article 49(1) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; 
(14) Chapter 10 Article 2 of the Swedish NCB Statute. The NCB Statutes of Belgium, Cyprus, France, Ireland, 
Italy and the United Kingdom make reference to the financial year but do not determine its length.  
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ESCB.
379
 Under Article 15.2 of the Statute, a consolidated financial statement of the 
ESCB shall be published each week.  
Article 26.4 of the Statute stipulates that the Governing Council shall establish the 
necessary rules for standardising the accounting and reporting of operations 
undertaken by the NCBs. The European Central Bank adopted on its Guideline on the 
legal framework for accounting and financial reporting in the European System of 
Central Banks on 10 November 2006 and subsequently adopted its update on 14 
December 2009,
380
 which applies to the Eurosystem Several NCB Statutes make 
reference to the Statute or Guideline and adapt their internal rules accordingly even if 
the NCB does not belong to the Eurosystem and is therefore not subject to ECB 
Guidelines.
381
 The majority of NCB Statutes refer, in various forms, to the accounting 
legal instruments adopted by the ECB.
382
 
In its Convergence Reports, the ECB has stated that (1) the accounts should be drawn 
up either in accordance with general accounting rules or in accordance with rules 
specified by an NCB‘s decision-making bodies; and (2) if, instead, such rules are 
specified by third parties, the rules must at least take into account what has been 
proposed by the NCB‘s decision-making bodies.383 It has also been suggested that 
taking into account the restrictions set by the Eurosystem as a whole, it is the NCB 
itself that determines the structure and composition of its balance sheet.
384
  
The International Financial Reporting Standards (previously known as the 
International Accounting Standards) are general accepted accounting rules and have 
                                                 
379  It should be noted that while Article 26.2 of the Statute only applies to the Eurosystem, all other paragraphs 
apply to all members of the ESCB under Article 42.1 of the Statute.  
380  Guideline of the European Central Bank of 14 December 2009 amending Guideline ECB/2006/16 on the legal 
framework for accounting and financial reporting in the European System of Central Banks (ECB/2009/28), 
OJ L 348, 29.12.2009, p. 75.  
381  See Table 3-12 referring to (1) Article 31(2) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (2) Article 49(1) of the Lithuanian 
NCB Statute; (3) Article 67 of the Polish NCB Statute; (4) Article 37(1) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (5) 
Article 3(2) of Chapter 10 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
382  See (1) Article 67(2) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 33 of the Belgian NCB Statute and Article 52 of 
the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (3) Article R.144-6 of the French NCB Statute; (4) Article 54A of 
the Greek NCB Statute; (5) Article 49(1) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (6) Article 67 of the Polish NCB 
Statute; (7) Article 37(1) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (8) Article 49(2) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (9) 
Chapter 10 Article 3 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
383  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 22); May 2008 (p. 21); May 2007 (p. 20); December 2006 (p. 27); 
May 2006 (p. 66) and 2004 (p. 29).  
384  See Paragraph 9 of ECB Opinion CON/2003/22 of 15 October 2003 at the request of the Finnish Ministry of 
Finance on a draft government proposal to amend the Suomen Pankki Act and other related acts. 
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been adopted by the European Union for large companies listed on stock exchanges 
since 2002
385
 and some of the NCB Statutes refer to them in general.
386
  
3.2.4.3 Auditing 
Pursuant to Article 27.1 of the Statute, the accounts of the ECB and NCBs shall be 
audited by independent external auditors recommended by the Governing Council and 
approved by the ECOFIN Council; the auditors shall have full power to examine all 
books and accounts of the ECB and NCBs and obtain full information about their 
transactions. The external auditors of the ECB and of the NCBs need not be identical, 
although this does not prevent the ECB‘s external auditor from carrying out some 
audit work directly at the NCB.
387
 Unlike Article 26 of the Statute which, with Article 
26.2, applies to all members of the ESCB, Article 27.1 does not apply outside the 
Eurosystem.  
On 23 October 2008 the Governing Council approved a non-binding set of principles 
known as ―Good Practices for the selection and mandate of External Auditors 
according to Article 27.1 of the ESCB/ECB Statute‖ (Good Practices).388 This 
establishes four Good Practices: 
1) Selection and evaluation conditions;389 
2) Procurement procedure;390 
3) Mandate: duration, rotation and dismissal;391 
                                                 
385  Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002 on the 
application of international accounting standards, OJ L 243, 11.9.2002, p. 1. For further information and 
related legal instruments see 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial_services_general_fra
mework/l26040_en.htm (visited on 6 September 2010).  
386  See (1) Article 67(2) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 46 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (3) Article 
20(1) of the Finnish NCB Statute; and (4) Article 3(1) of Chapter 10 of the Swedish NCB Statute refer only to 
international accounting standards in Table 3-12. 
387  See van den Berg, 2005, pp. 158, 162. The reason is that the management of the reserves of the ECB is at 
present outsourced to the NCBs, which is why the ECB external auditor either has to rely on the external 
auditors of the NCBs or carry out the audit itself.  
388  Available electronically at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/pdf/orga/practices_selection_external_auditorsen.pdf?146316f913110fbc37889376936
7f06c (visited on 29 August 2010).  
389  Good Practice No 1: External audits pursuant to Article 27.1 of the Statute shall be carried out only by auditors 
or audit firms which are independent and approved under the applicable professional regulations of an EU 
Member State. The approved auditors or audit firms are registered in a public register. All auditors and audit 
firms are subject to a system of quality assurance. 
390  Good Practice No 2: Each Eurosystem central bank is responsible for carrying out a procurement procedure for 
the selection of its auditors or audit firms which ensures that auditors are treated equally, non-discriminatorily 
and in a transparent way. A procurement procedure for the selection of auditors or audit firms should be 
carried out at least once every seven years. Their appointment should take place after their approval by the 
Ecofin Council, following the ECB Governing Council recommendation. So far, only the Slovenian NCB 
Statute foresees a public procurement procedure.  
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4) External auditor‘s independence.392  
However, as is apparent from Table 3-13, the Statutes of non-Eurosystem NCBs have 
similar provisions on auditing,
393
 except for the Swedish NCB, which is audited by 
the National Audit Office.
394
  
The Good Practices are not necessarily reflected in the NCB Statutes, which usually 
address the procedural rules regarding the appointment process and the task of the 
independent external auditors rather than issues arising from other parts of the 
legislation.  
The establishment of a multi-year mandate for independent external auditors appears 
to be a common practice (the Good Practices foresee up to seven years),
395
 although 
                                                                                                                                            
391  Good Practice No 3: The Eurosystem central banks should establish a defined multi-year mandate for the 
appointment of the external auditor or the audit firm. This will help to enhance overall effectiveness, efficiency 
and independence. The auditor or the key audit partner or alternatively the audit firm should be rotated from 
the external audit engagement at least every seven years. Any divergence of opinions on accounting treatments 
or audit procedures between the Eurosystem central bank and the external auditor should not be a ground for 
dismissal. The Governing Council shall be informed of any case of dismissal and of any case where a 
renewable mandate is not renewed, as well as of the reasons thereof. 
392  Good Practice No 4: The Eurosystem central banks should verify on an annual basis that the auditor or the 
audit firm carrying out an external audit is independent from the audited Eurosystem central bank, in particular 
that it is: not providing any non-audit services (all services that go beyond the following services: statutory 
audits, financial statement audits or interim reviews, attestation of management reports on internal controls, 
and work that is reasonably related to the performance of an audit or review and is a logical extension of the 
audit scope, is of an assurance or compliance nature and is work that the auditors must or are best placed to 
undertake. Assurance engagements performed by the Eurosystem central banks‘ external auditors at the 
request of the external auditors of the ECB are not defined as non-audit services) to the audited Eurosystem 
central bank; and not in any way involved in management decisions of the audited Eurosystem central bank. 
The auditor or the key audit partner should not be allowed to take up a key management position in the audited 
Eurosystem central bank until a period of at least two years has elapsed since she/he resigned as an auditor or 
key audit partner of the external audit team. 
393  (1) Articles 49(3) and 49(4) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 48(2) of the Czech NCB Statute; (3) 
Articles 45(3) and 59 of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (4) Article 43(2) of the Latvian NCB Statute; (5) Article 
50 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (6) Article 69(1) of the Polish NCB Statute; (7) Article 36(1) of the 
Romanian NCB Statute. Article 31(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute follows the text of Article 27.1 of the 
Statute, which is rather unusual for a non-Eurosystem NCB. The auditing regime of the UK NCB is not 
apparent from the UK NCB Statute.  
394  The annual reports of the Swedish NCB are examined by the Swedish National Audit Office (Riksrevisionen) 
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. The auditors‘ report by the Swedish National Audit 
Office is very similar to the audit reports prepared by independent external auditors of the other ESCB 
members. The annual reports of the Swedish NCB are available at http://www.riksbank.se. Under Chapter 10, 
Article 5 of the Swedish NCB Statute, the NCB shall annually report to the Swedish Parliament about the 
measures that the NCB has taken in view of the Swedish National Audit Office‘s observations.  
395  See Paragraph 2.4 of the ECB Opinion CON/2008/14 of 25 March 2008 at the request of Riigikogu on a draft 
law amending the Law on Eesti Pank. For the Eurosystem, see Article 52(1) of the Slovenian NCB Statute. For 
the non-Eurosystem, see (1) Article 49(4) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Artice 59 of the Hungarian NCB 
Statute;  
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there are several NCB Statutes requiring the appointment of independent auditors 
each year.
396
  
The ECB has stated in its Convergence Reports that if the NCB‘s operations are 
subject to the control of a state audit office or similar body charged with controlling 
the use of public finances, the scope of the control should be clearly defined by the 
legal framework and should be without prejudice to the activities of the NCB‘s 
independent external auditors.
397
 The State Audit Office (or a similar body) performs 
the functions of a financial audit in Latvia and Sweden, where it functions in parallel 
with the independent external auditors in Finland and Ireland.
398
 The powers of the 
State Audit office are limited in one NCB Statute,
399
 while in other Member States it 
can also audit the NCBs, as is shown in Table 3-13.
400
 These issues will be discussed 
further in Section 3.3.1.2.  
3.2.4.4 Distribution of profits, NCB’s capital and financial provisions 
The ECB is of the opinion that the annual accounts should be adopted by the NCB‘s 
decision-making bodies, assisted by independent accountants, and may be subject to 
ex post approval by third parties (e.g. the government or parliament) and that the 
NCB‘s decision-making bodies should be able to decide on the calculation of the 
profits independently and professionally.
401
 However, there are several NCB Statutes 
that also foresee a role for the Minister of Finance or the national Parliament in this 
regard.
402
 Moreover, the ECB has criticised the practices of the Swedish Parliament, 
                                                 
396  See (1) Article 37(1) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 15 of the Luxembourg NCB Statute. The Good 
Practices also refer to Greek law as not enabling the multi-year mandate; however, the respective NCB Statute 
appears to be silent about that matter. For non-Eurosystem NCBs: (1) Article 18 of the Danish NCB Statute; 
(2) Article 31(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute;  
397  It has also been stated that the state audit should be carried out on a non-political, independent and purely 
professional basis; see ECB Convergence Report, May 2010, (p. 22).  
398  (1) Articles 18 and 22, with the exception of Article 22(4), as well as Article 23 of the Finnish NCB Statute; 
(2) Article 6H of the Irish NCB Statute; (3) Article 43(2) of the Latvian NCB Statute; (4) Chapter 10, Article 3 
of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
399  See Article 54(6) of the Portuguese NCB Statute.  
400  (1) Article 48(3) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 60(1)(b) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 
26(3), 26(5) and 26(6) of the German NCB Statute; (4) Article 45(2) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (5) Article 
4(2) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
401  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010, (p. 22).  
402  See (1) Article 6H of the Irish NCB Statute; (2) Article 21 of the Maltese NCB Statute; (3) Article 69(3) of the 
Polish NCB Statute; (4) Article 54 of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (5) Article 4(2) of the Spanish NCB 
Statute; (6) Chapter 10, Article 4 of the Swedish NCB Statute; (7) Article 4 of the United Kingdom NCB 
Statute.  
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noting that reliance on non-binding instruments with regard to profit distribution
403
 
undermines the NCB‘s financial independence. 
With regard to profit allocation, the ECB has suggested that the NCB Statutes may 
prescribe how their profits are to be allocated.
404
 Indeed, as is apparent from Table 3-
14, there are several NCB Statutes establishing rules for profit distribution.
405
 
Furthermore, in its Convergence Reports the ECB has noted that in the absence of 
such provisions, decisions on the allocation of profits should be taken by the NCB‘s 
decision-making bodies on professional grounds,
406
 and should not be subject to the 
discretion of third parties unless there is an express safeguard clause stating that this is 
without prejudice to the financial means necessary for carrying out the NCB‘s ESCB- 
related tasks.
407
 For the sake of an NCB‘s financial independence, any amendment to 
its profit distribution rules should only be initiated and decided in cooperation with 
the NCB, which is best placed to assess its required level of reserve capital.
408
  
Usually, the NCB Statutes note the size of the NCB‘s statutory capital,409 the ability to 
create provisions and/or reserves
410
 and the mechanism of profit distribution.
411
 In 
                                                 
403  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (pp. 261-262), (2008, p. 254) and December 2006 (p. 232). 
404  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010, (p. 22). 
405  For the Eurosystem NCBs, see (1)Article 69 of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Articles 30, 31 and 32 of the 
Belgian NCB Statute and Articles 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 54 and 55 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; 
(3) Article 59 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 21 of the Finnish NCB Statute; (5) Article 27 of the 
German NCB Statute; (6) Article 71(1) of the Greek NCB Statute; (7) Article 39 of the Italian NCB Statute; 
(8) Article 31 of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (9) Article 53 of the Portugues NCB Statute; (19) Articles 50 
and 50a of the Slovenian NCB Statute. For the non-Eurosystem NCBs, see (1) Article 47(2) of the Czech NCB 
Statute; (2) Article 19 of the Danish NCB Statute; (3) Article 30 of the Estonian NCB Statute; (4) Articles 181 
and 19 of the Latvian NCB Statute; (5) Article 23(3) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (6) Article 43 of the 
Romanian NCB Statute.   
406  For example, (1) Article R 144-4 of the French NCB Statute; (2) Article 65(1) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; 
(3) Article 22 of the Maltese NCB Statute; (4) Article 22 of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association; (5) Article 
69(4) of the Polish NCB Statute; (6) Articles 39(3) and 39(4) of the Slovak NCB Statutes; (7) Article 4(2) of 
the Spanish NCB Statute; (10) Chapter 10, Article 4 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
407  See Article 6G of the Irish NCB Statute. In the United Kingdom, the Treasury and the Bank of England shall 
agree on the amount of the dividend.  
408  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010, (p. 23). See also ECB Opinion CON/2009/83 of 29 October 2009 on the 
distribution of Lietuvos bankas profits, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2009_83_f_sign.pdf and ECB Opinion CON/2009/53 of 24 June 
2009 on the distribution of Latvijas Banka‘s profits, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2009_53.pdf.  
409  For example, (1) Article 8(1) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 7 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (3) 
Article 56 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 25 of the Estonian NCB Statute; (5) Article 2 of the German 
NCB Statute; (6) Article 8(1) of the Greek NCB Statute; (7) Article 46(5) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (8) 
Article 3 of the Italian NCB Statute; (9) Article 18 of the Latvian NCB Statute; (10) Article 20 of the 
Lithuanian NCB Statute; (11) Article 4(1) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (12) Article 19(1) of the Maltese 
NCB Statute; (13) Article 5(1) of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association; (14) Article 61 of the Polish NCB 
Statute; (15) Article 4(1) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (16) Article 38(1) of the Romanian NCB Statute; 
(17) Article 5(1) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (18) Article 1 of Chapter 10 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
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very rare cases the method of distributing the NCB‘s assets in the case of its 
liquidation is also regulated.
412
  
The size of the NCB capital is an open issue – the level of statutory capital varies 
between NCBs and in most cases it appears to be more related to history, i.e. when the 
NCB was established or reorganised.
413
 From the theoretical point of view, Alex 
Cukierman suggests that positive capital constitutes a safeguard for the central bank‘s 
independence, while the presence of negative capital gives the political establishment 
tools to control the central bank‘s actions.414 For the purpose of establishing the size 
of the NCB‘s capital, Alex Cukierman proposes six different aspects that need to be 
taken into account:  
(1) the magnitude of shocks to which the monetary policy is expected to react;  
(2) the width of the NCB‘s areas of responsibility;  
(3) the expectations regarding the size of the government‘s deficit;  
(4) the NCB‘s role in the exchange rate arrangement;  
(5) the level of NCB assets held in foreign currency; and  
(6) the credibility of an NCB for being committed to the maintenance of price 
stability.
415
  
                                                                                                                                            
410  (1) Articles 67(2) and 69(4) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Articles 30 and 31 of the Belgian NCB Statute 
and Articles 46, 47, 54 and 55 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (3) Articles 8 and 36 of the 
Bulgarian NCB Statute; (4) Article 58 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (5) Article 47(2) of the Czech NCB Statute; 
(6) Article 20 of the Finnish NCB Statute; (7) Article L 142-6 of the French NCB Statute; (8) Article 26(2) of 
the German NCB Statute; (9) Article 71(1) of the Greek NCB Statute; (10) Articles 39 and 40 of the Italian 
NCB Statute; (11) Article 19 of the Latvian NCB Statute; (12) Article 23 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (13) 
Article 31 of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (14) Article 22(1) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (15) Article 19(4) 
of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association; (16) Article 53(1) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (17) Articles 
43(3) and 43(4) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (18) Article 38(1) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (19) Article 49a 
of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (20) Chapter 10, Article 4(1) of the Swedish NCB Statute. See Tables 3-12 and 
3-14 for more details. 
411  See footnote 405.   
412  (1) Article 78 of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 11 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (3) 
Article 44 of the German NCB Statute; (4) Article 74 of the Greek NCB Statute; (5) Article 17 of the Latvian 
NCB Statute. These provisions are not reflected in the Tables.  
413  However, from time to time the NCB statutory capital is adjusted and this adjustment is also reflected in the 
NCB Statutes. See Paragraph 2 of the ECB Opinion CON/2008/17 of 15 April 2008 at the request of the 
Luxembourg Minister for the Treasury and the Budget on a draft law improving the legislative framework for 
Luxembourg as a financial centre and on a draft law relating to social insurance contributions, available at 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_17_f_sign.pdf.  
414  See Cukierman (2010). However, Cukierman notes that there are some exceptions, such as Chile. A similar 
thesis was also expressed by the ECB in Paragraph 8 of ECB Opinion CON/2003/22 of 15 October 2003 at the 
request of the Finnish Ministry of Finance on a draft government proposal to amend the Suomen Pankki Act 
and other related acts, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/EN_CON_2003_22_f_sign.pdf.  
415  Cukierman (2010).   
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It follows from the above that the size of the NCB statutory capital is important and 
the financial independence of an NCB would be better protected if it is regulated by 
law. However, not regulating the size of the capital seems to be an exception; some of 
the NCB Statutes that regulate the size of the statutory capital have also provisions 
regarding loss of capital.
416
 Even when no provision is included in the NCB Statute 
regarding the size of the statutory capital, a reduction of de facto statutory capital is 
considered to be a problem. A Member State may not impose reductions of capital on 
an NCB without the ex ante agreement of the NCB‘s decision-making bodies, which 
must aim to ensure that it retains sufficient financial means to fulfil its mandate under 
Article 127(2) TFEU and Article 3 of the Statute.
417
  
Historically, the ECB has been consulted on a national legislative proposal 
containing: (i) a substantial reduction of primary capital forcing the NCB to sell part 
of its foreign reserve assets; (ii) an obligation to transfer 100% of profits to the State; 
and (iii) a strict limitation on the right to create financial provisions.
418
 The ECB was 
of the opinion that the combined effect of these measures would weaken the NCB‘s 
financial position over time, increasing the risk that it may not have sufficient 
resources in the future to carry out its ESCB-related and other tasks and making it 
dependent on the decisions of third parties in such situations.
419
 The ECB therefore 
concluded that the weakening of the financial position of an NCB forming part of the 
Eurosystem cannot be seen in isolation from the system as a whole, and that the 
legislative proposal in question would have an adverse effect on the credibility and 
financial standing of the Eurosystem as a whole.
420
  
In its Convergence Reports, the ECB has stated that profits may be distributed to the 
State budget only after any accumulated losses from previous years have been 
covered
421
 and financial provisions deemed necessary to safeguard the real value of 
the NCB‘s capital and assets have been created.422 Temporary or ad hoc legislative 
measures amounting to instructions to the NCBs in relation to the distribution of their 
                                                 
416  (1) Article 9 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 30(6) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (3) Article 51 of the 
Slovenian NCB Statute. See Table 3-14 for details. 
417  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 23). 
418  Paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion CON/2003/22.  
419  See footnote 418.  
420  See footnote 418.  
421  See paragraph 4.3 of the ECB Opinion CON/2009/85 of 27 October 2009 on Národná banka Slovenska‘s 
independence, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2009_85_f_sign.pdf.  
422  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 23).  
 123 
 
profits are not admissible.
423
 Similarly, a tax on an NCB‘s unrealised capital gains 
would also impair the principle of financial independence.
424
  
3.2.4.5 Autonomy in staff matters 
In 2008, the ECB included a new section in its Convergence Reports as a result of two 
Opinions issued on this matter.
425
 The ECB‘s policy is that Member States may not 
impair an NCB‘s ability to employ and retain the qualified staff necessary for the 
NCB to perform independently the tasks conferred on it by the Treaties and the 
Statute. In addition, an NCB may not be put into a position where it has limited 
control or no control over its staff or where the government of a Member State can 
influence its policy on staff matters.
426
 As is shown in Table 3-16, with the exception 
of the NCB Statutes of Germany
427
 and Luxembourg,
428
 the NCBs enjoy full 
autonomy. 
3.2.4.6 Financial liability for supervisory authorities 
In many Member States which have adopted supervisory models based on an 
independent financial supervisory authority, the NCB either provides members of the 
FSA decision-making body or plays an institutional role in the appointment and 
                                                 
423  See paragraphs 3.1 to 3.4 of the ECB Opinion CON/2009/26 of 24 March 2009 at the request of Lietuvos 
bankas on behalf of the Ministry of Finance of Lithuania on a draft law amending the Law on Lietuvos bankas 
as regards the rules on the distribution of the profits of Lietuvos bankas, available at 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2009_26_f_sign.pdf.  
424  See ECB Opinion CON/2009/63 of 24 July 2009 on an amended draft legislative provision on the taxation of 
the Banca d‘Italia‘s gold reserves and ECB Opinion CON/2009/59 of 14 July 2009 on the taxation of the 
Banca d‘Italia‘s gold reserves, available respectively at 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2009_63_f_sign.pdf and 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2009_59_it_taxation_of_banca_ditalias_gold.pdf.  
425  ECB Convergence Report, May 2008 (p. 22). See also ECB Opinion CON/2008/9; also ECB Opinion 
CON/2008/10.  
426  See paragraph 3.1 to 3.5 of ECB Opinion CON/2010/69 of 26 August 2010 on further measures for the 
restoration of budgetary balance, available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_opinion_con_2010_69_ro_draft_emergency_ordinance.pdf; 
paragraph 2.5 of ECB Opinion CON/2010/59 of 29 July 2010 on the careers of Deutsche Bundesbank civil 
servants, available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2010_59_f_sign.pdf; paragraphs 3.2 and 
3.5 of ECB Opinion CON/2010/56 of 12 July 2010 on amendments to the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
introducing salary reductions, available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2010_56_f_sign.pdf; paragraphs 4.3 and 4.4 of ECB Opinion 
CON2010/42 of 18 May 2010 on the legal status of Lietuvos bankas‘s assets, terms of office and remuneration 
of Board members, immunity of foreign reserves of foreign central banks and annual financial statements of 
Lietuvos bankas, available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2010_42_f_sign.pdf.  
427  See Article 31(3) of the German NCB Statute referring to the civil servants of the German NCB as indirect 
Federal civil cervants. 
428  See Article 14(3)(a) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute regarding the officials authorised to exercise public 
power.  
 124 
 
dismissal of the FSA decision-making body.
429
 However, the links between the 
financial supervisory authority and an NCB may go deeper – there are some cases in 
which the supervisory authority and an NCB are merged. The Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) has listed Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Spain, 
Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia 
as the Member States where the prudential supervision of credit institutions is 
entrusted to the NCBs; in the remaining EU Member States, the supervisory powers 
are entrusted to stand-alone integrated financial supervisors (Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Latvia, 
Malta, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom).
430,
 
431
   
With regard to such cases, the ECB has noted that: (i) an NCB being merged with a 
supervisory authority, together with the potential exposure of an NCB to liabilities 
resulting from the supervisory authority‘s activity, could be seen as a threat to the 
NCB‘s overall institutional and financial independence;432 and (ii) it is important to 
ensure that decisions adopted by such supervisory authorities do not endanger the 
finances of the NCB as a whole, in which cases, the national legislation should enable 
the NCBs to have ultimate control over any decision by the supervisory authorities 
that could affect an NCB‘s independence, in particular its financial independence.433 
The NCB Statutes reviewed in this thesis tend not to provide such safeguards, as 
shown in Table 3-15, except for the Irish NCB Statute, which provides for the 
Regulatory Authority to have a duty to act in a way that is consistent with the 
performance by the Governor and the Board of their respective functions in relation to 
the Bank; for the purpose of verifying compliance with that duty, the Regulatory 
                                                 
429  See paragraph 3.2.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/15. 
430  See Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 2009, p. 13. This is also reflected by the respective NCB 
Statutes, with the exception of Italy. See Table 4-1 for details.  
431  Another source lists NCBs performing supervisory functions in Austria (in part), Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Germany (in part), Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain, 
(Schinasi & Teixeira, The Lender of Last Resort in the European Single Financial Market, Working Paper 
Series No. 43, 2006, p. 7). Note that Bulgaria and Romania were then not members of the European Union and 
could not therefore be used in the survey. Another, more recent, source, however, lists only Spain, Italy, 
Portugal, Greece, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic as Member States in which the NCBs still have a 
supervisory role. See The European Union Committee of the House of Lords, 2009, p. 14.  
432  See Paragraph 6 of ECB Opinion CON/2002/16 of 5 June 2002 at the request of the Irish Department of 
Finance on a draft Central Bank and Financial Authority of Ireland Bill of 2002, available at 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/EN_CON_2002_16_f_sign.pdf.  
433  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 23). See also paragraph 4.1 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/16; ECB 
Opinion CON/2006/15; ECB Opinion CON/2005/24 of 15 July 2005 at the request of the Ministry of Finance 
of the Czech Republic on a draft law on the integration of financial market supervisors, available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2005_24_f_sign.pdf; ECB Opinion CON/2003/23; ECB 
Opinion CON/2002/23; ECB Opinion CON/2002/16; ECB Opinion CON/2001/10; 
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Authority shall provide the Governor or the Board with such information as the 
Governor or the Board reasonably require or as it considers appropriate.
434
  
However, when errors or omissions in the performance of the financial supervisory 
authority occur and the NCB has to pay damages, either the NCB Statute or another 
law should stipulate the State reimbursement mechanism. The ECB has criticised the 
draft reimbursement mechanism for the Finnish Financial and Insurance Supervisory 
Authority, noting that instead of using the NCB‘s budget as a buffer, the 
compensation for damage suffered by third parties as a result of errors or omissions in 
the performance of supervisory authority‘s tasks should be paid directly from the 
State budget; alternatively, the expenses relating to the supervisory authority‘s 
supervisory liability should be reimbursed immediately after such expenses have been 
incurred and presented for repayment by the NCB.
435
 In addition, the ECB has 
traditionally been concerned by national provisions establishing legal succession 
obligations for the NCBs, claiming non-compliance with the monetary financing 
prohibition under Article 123 TFEU [former Article 101 TEC].
436
  
3.3 The Eurosystem’s voice in a Member State 
3.3.1 The notion of accountability 
3.3.1.1 Material aspect of accountability 
There are no EU-wide harmonised rules on central bank accountability and the matter 
has not been addressed in the ECB Convergence Reports. The basic argument for the 
democratic accountability of NCBs is that delegation of powers to non-elected 
officials can only be acceptable in a democratic society if central banks are 
accountable to democratically elected institutions in one way or another.
437
 Lastra has 
noted that democratic legitimacy is a prerequisite for the establishment of an 
independent central bank.
438
 In her earlier work, she outlined four elements for 
accountability: 
                                                 
434  See Article 33B of the Irish NCB Statute.  
435  See paragraph 4.2(c) of ECB Opinion CON/2008/16. See also Table 3-15 for details.  
436  See paragraphs 8 to 12 of the ECB Opinion CON/2005/24, and the ECB Convergence Report of May 2010 (p. 
25).  
437  See Amtenbrink & de Haan, The European Central Bank: an Independent Specialised Organisation of 
Community Law - A Comment, 2002, p. 73. 
438  Lastra R. M., 2010, pp. 53-54.  
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1. a holder of power (the ‗accountable‘); 
2. an authority to whom accountability is owed (the ‗accountee‘);439  
3. the content of obligation; 
3.1. to give an account of his decisions or actions; 
3.2. to explain or justify the decision or the course of action taken; and 
3.3. where error is proved or harm inflicted, to own the responsibility and take 
appropriate measures of amendment or redress;  
4. criteria of assessment – accountability implies an obligation to comply with 
certain standards in the exercise of power or to achieve specific goals.
440
  
Following this line of argument, one can conclude that a central bank is the 
accountable party and that either the executive government and/or parliament are the 
parties in charge of the review.
441
 It has been suggested that to the extent that central 
banks are independent, mechanisms of democratic accountability are required in order 
to legitimise the position of the central bank within a given constitutional system as 
central banks do not operate in a constitutional vacuum.
442
 According to Lastra, 
parliamentary accountability should be exercised through a variety of procedures and 
mechanisms, including annual reports and regular appearances of public officials 
before parliament, including in emergency situations.
443
  
There is also another dimension which has not been previously addressed and which 
relates to the discussion in Sections 3.2.3.4 and 3.2.3.5 describing the beneficiaries of 
the Governor‘s duties. The main reason why the Governors (and the central banks 
                                                 
439  According to Lastra (2006) there are various types of accountability accorning to the authority that extracts it. 
Judicial accountability would occur in the context of a judicial review of administrative actions or omissions, 
when parliament is the accountee we refer to parliamentary accountability and the accountability to the public 
means that the general public is the accountee.  
440  See Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, pp. 67-68. See also ECB 
Monthly Bulletin, which breaks the accountability down into four elements: (i) whenever decisions are taken 
by a collegial body, members can be held accountable for the decisions collectively or individually; (b) 
accountability presupposes the existence of a mandate or task, for which the institution and/or its decision-
makers can be held accountable; (c) accountability can be direct, i.e. vis-à-vis the citizens for whom the 
―public good‖ is provided, or to their elected representatives, i.e. parliaments or governments; (d) 
accountability can be guaranteed in different ways – through openness about the decisions taken, through 
scrutiny of policy decisions and activities, and through other means such as dismissal procedures and judicial 
review (European Central Bank, 2002, pp. 48-49).  
441  See Amtenbrink, A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank, 1999, p. 38; Kapteyn & VerLoren van 
Themaat, 2008, p. 957.  
442  See Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, p. 957. However, it is arguable whether the conduct of monetary 
policy forms part of economic policy under the Treaties and the Statute as pursuant to Article 282(2) TFEU, 
Article 127(1) TFEU and Article 2 of the Statute the primary objective of the ESCB shall be price stability and 
the ESCB shall support, without prejudice to that objective, the general economic policies in the Union in 
order to contribute to the achievement of the latter‘s objectives.  
443  See Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 55.  
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operated by them) are made accountable appears to be because of the duty of loyalty 
(and to some extent the duty of non-competition) owed to the democratically elected 
institutions that have appointed the Governor.
444
 This theory conflicts neither with 
Amtenbrik‘s thesis445 nor the analogy with the theory of judicial legitimacy,446 but 
rather complements the studies. In this regard, accountability is to be considered as 
placing the NCB within the existing system of checks and balances in relation to the 
three branches of the State – legislative, executive and judiciary;447 this is the 
approach taken in the NCB Statutes. There is, of course, an alternative view calling 
for greater transparency and closer closer monitoring of the ECB and NCBs, which 
results in changes to the Treaties and the Statute.
448
 
3.3.1.2 Formal aspect of accountability 
Under the formal aspect of accountability central banks are to provide an ex post 
justification of its actions. As independence constitutes only one side of the coin, an 
NCB must be accountable in a democratic State.
449
 Lastra has referred to 
accountability from a legal perspective as being diversified to include parliamentary 
accountability as well as a judicial review of the [agency‘s] acts and decisions and a 
degree of cooperation with the executive to ensure consistent overall policy-
making.
450
 With the exception of judicial accountability, this diversification is also 
reflected in Table 3-17.  
In the literature, central bank accountability is explained by the fact that in societies 
based on the rule of law, central banks lie within and not outside the system of 
                                                 
444  The Governor‘s duties are similar to those of a director in a private company with regard to the company‘s 
shareholders.  
445  See Amtenbrink, A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank, 1999. The Amtenbrink‘s thesis has a 
wider scope than merely the legal aspect of accountability. Amtenbrink assesses the following: (1) the legal 
basis of the central bank; (2) the monetary policy objectives; (3) the relationship with the executive branch of 
the government; (4) the appointment and dismissal procedures; (5) the override mechanism; (6) the 
relationship with the parliament; (7) transparency; (8) budgetary accountability. However, it has been stated 
that ESCB is a central bank system whose democratic link back to the European and national government and 
parliaments is relatively weak (Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, p. 958). 
446  See Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, p. 64.   
447  Lastra has described this as ‗the lawyers‘ view‘ (Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary 
Stability, 2006, p. 69).  
448  The views presented by some authors would lead to a conclusion that the choice made in the Treaty of 
Maastricht was fundamentally wrong. (Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, pp. 958-959). They assume 
that monetary policy is subordinated to economic policy [of a Member State]; it also fails to take account of 
the decentralised nature of the Eurosystem. 
449  See Lastra, The Independence of the European System of Central Banks, 1992, p. 496; and footnote 438.  
450  See Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 55.  
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democratically organised political power.
451
 A further argument may derive from the 
fact that monetary policy has traditionally been considered to be a part of economic 
policy, and it is therefore natural to assume that the authorities entrusted with overall 
economic policy (such as the Government) and monetary policy (such as the NCB) 
should report to national parliament. Moreover, it has been said that the relationship 
between the democratically elected government and the NCB is usually referred to as 
a principal-agent relationship; this framework requires proper arrangements to be 
made for accountability.
452
 In order to hold someone accountable, an act of 
legitimisation is necessary.
453
 The methods of subjecting central banks to public 
scrutiny differ greatly – there are central banks whose decision-making bodies are to 
appear before the national parliament, while for others regular reporting on their 
activities is the means by which their accountability is assured; where central banks 
are independent, the relationship with the executive and legislative branches of the 
Government helps to foster a climate of understanding for monetary policy decisions 
and furthers the alignment of fiscal and monetary policies.
454
  
Accountability to executive bodies 
According to Lastra, in order to avoid an undemocratic ‗state within the state‘ the 
central bank should provide certain information, reports and advice to the 
Government upon demand.
455
 Against this background, the ECB President shall be 
invited to participate in Council meetings when the Council is discussing matters 
relating to the objectives and tasks of the ESCB as set forth in Article 284(2) 
TFEU[former Article 113(2) TEC]. As shown in Table 3-17, accountability (often 
also referred to as the duty to cooperate) to the Government is present in several NCB 
                                                 
451  See Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, p. 63; and Torrent, 1999, p. 
1234. 
452  See Amtenbrink & de Haan, The European Central Bank: an Independent Specialised Organisation of 
Community Law - A Comment, 2002, pp. 66-73. Amtenbrink and de Haan consider it possible for the agent to 
be assigned a specific and restricted objective, while the principal has a number of possibly conflicting 
objectives; as long as the principal decides on the objective, the agent can focus on its task without bothering 
about the principal‘s other objectives; see (p. 69). 
453  See Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, p. 63.  
454  See Smits, European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000, p. 169.  
455  See Lastra R. M., The Independence of the European System of Central Banks, 1992, p. 497.  
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Statutes.
456
 The duty to cooperate with the executive branch of the Government 
usually concerns advice on matters of economic policy, central bank functions or 
similar issues. Sometimes an NCB may be asked to comment on draft national 
legislation.
457
 In order to accomplish these tasks, an NCB Governor is often invited to 
participate in the meetings of the Government.  
This cooperation duty is subject to the exceptions described in Sections 3.2.2.2, 
3.2.2.6 and exhibited in Table 3-6.
458
 The only Member State that has copied the text 
from the ECB Convergence Reports appears to be Malta.
459
 Some of the exceptions 
have been reflected in the NCB Statutes of Austria,
460
 Cyprus,
461
 France,
462
 Ireland
463
 
and Spain.
464
 These provisions usually refer either to the NCB‘s independence or to 
professional secrecy in the context of regular reporting to the Government or 
Parliament. Most of the reviewed NCB Statutes therefore comply with the list of 
prohibitions discussed in Section 3.2.2; submission of the draft monetary policy 
guidelines to the Parliament and/or the Government is required in two cases only,
465
 
and in another two cases there is a duty to inform the Minister prior to making a 
monetary policy decision of major importance.
466
  
 
                                                 
456  For the Eurosystem, see (1) Articles 22 of the Belgian NCB Statute and Articles 41 and 42 of the Belgian NCB 
Articles of Association; (2) Articles 53(1), 53(2) and 54(1) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 4(2) of the 
Finnish NCB Statute; (4) Article L 143-1 of the French NCB Statute; (5) Article 13 of the German NCB 
Statute; (6) Articles 5B(1) and 5B(3) of the Greek NCB Statute; (7) Article 6A(3), 6A(4), 6A(5) and 6I of the 
Irish NCB Statute; (8) Article 41 of the Italian NCB Statute; (9) Article 11(2) and 30 of the Luxembourg NCB 
Statute; (10) Articles 21(2), 21(3), 25 and 29 of the Maltese NCB Statute; (11) Articles 14 and 18 of the Dutch 
NCB Statute and Article 12 of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association; (12) Articles 54(1) and 54(2) of the 
Portuguese NCB Statute; (13) Articles 12(2) and 13 of the Slovak NCB Statute; (14) Article 27 of the 
Slovenian NCB Statute; (15) Article 10(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute. For the non-Eurosystem, see (1) 
Article 3 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Articles 4(2) and 4(4) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (3) Articles 36, 
37, 41(2), 41(3) and 42 of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (4) Articles 6(1), 28(4) and 43(1) of the Latvian NCB 
Statute; (5) Article 41 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (7) Articles 21 and 23 of the Polish NCB Statute; (8) 
Articles 3(2) and 3(3) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (9) Chapter 4, Articles 1 and 2, Chapter 6, Articles 2 and 
3 of the Swedish NCB Statute; (10) Article 4, 12, 19(1) and 19(2) of the United Kongdom NCB Statute. 
457  Such national consultations do not obviate the need to consult the ECB under Article 127(4) TFEU [ former 
Articke 105(4) TEC] and Article 4 of the Statute. 
458  The compatibility criteria are: (i) the consultation does not result in interference with the independence of the 
members of the NCB‘s decision-making bodies; (ii) the special status of Governors in their capacity as 
members of the ECB‘s General Council is fully respected; and (iii) confidentiality requirements resulting from 
the Statute are observed. See ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 19).  
459  Article 29 of the Maltese NCB Statute.  
460  Article 32(5) of the Austrian NCB Statute.  
461  Article 55(2) of the Cypriot NCB Statute.  
462  Article L 143-1 of the French NCB Statute.  
463  Article 6A(5) of the Irish NCB Statute.  
464  Article 10(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
465  (1) Article 3 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 23(1) of the Polish NCB Statute.  
466  (1) Article 41(3) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (2) Chapter 6, Article 3 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
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Accountability to legislative bodies 
Reporting to parliament and to the general public ensures that they are informed of the 
NCB‘s assessment of the state of the economy, its views on the stability of prices and 
the past or intended activities to ensure the fulfilment of the NCB‘s mandate.467 
Making an NCB answerable to the legislature could mean either: (i) the NCB is 
subject to periodic and extraordinary reporting requirements; or (ii) the NCB is 
operating under the control of the national Parliament. Both these options will be 
discussed below.  
However, there is a need to clarify the reporting requirement under Union law. Article 
284(3) TFEU [former Article 113(3) TEC] and Article 15.3 of the Statute stipulate 
that the ECB shall address an annual report (‗ECB Annual Report‘) on the activities 
of the ESCB and on the monetary policy of both the previous and current year
468
 to 
the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission,
469
 and the European 
Council. The President of the European Central Bank shall present this report to the 
Council and to the European Parliament, which may hold a general debate on that 
basis. The President of the European Central Bank and the other members of the 
Executive Board may, at the request of the European Parliament or on their own 
initiative, be heard by the competent committees of the European Parliament.
470
  
Amtenbrink and de Haan argue that since the Treaties and the Statute do not require 
NCB Governors to appear before the European Parliament, there would be a problem 
as more than half of the members of the Governing Council cannot be asked to 
explain their conduct before the European Parliament and it is questionable whether 
this role can be performed by national parliaments.
471
 However, this argument does 
                                                 
467  See Smits, European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000, pp. 169-170.  
468  There has been some criticism of the fact that the ECB does not publish its forecasts. The ECB‘s explanation 
that publication of forecasts may have an adverse effect has been declared ‗not convincing‘ (Randzio-Plath, 
2000, p. 15).  
469  Against this background, it is recalled that under Article 284(1) TFEU [former Article 113(1) TEC] the 
President of the Council and a Member of the Commission may participate, without having the right to vote, in 
meetings of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. The President of the Council may submit a 
motion for deliberation to the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. Pursuant to Article 284(2) 
TFEU [former Article 113(2) TEC], the President of the European Central Bank shall be invited to participate 
in Council meetings when the Council is discussing matters relating to the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. 
470  Some authors have noted that the appearance before the European Parliament under these provisions cannot be 
concluded to amount to an obligation; a practice has been established whereby the ECB President appears 
before the European Parliament Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a quarterly basis (Kapteyn 
& VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, p. 960).  
471  See Amtenbrink & de Haan, The European Central Bank: an Independent Specialised Organisation of 
Community Law - A Comment, 2002, p. 75. 
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not take into account the decentralised nature of the Eurosystem under the last 
paragraph of Article 12.1 of the Statute; Amtenbrink and de Haan also do not take 
into account that national parliaments have no one other than the NCB Governor who 
can report to them.
472
 The Governors are appointed in accordance with their 
respective national procedures; their membership in the Governing Council is 
automatic and is not subject to an act of confirmation at the EU level. One may 
therefore assume the existence of a national reporting arrangement.  
The ECB has stated that for a Eurosystem NCB, monetary policy will no longer be 
subject to national scrutiny; in addition, an NCB Governor may still ask to be heard or 
be requested to provide information or answer any questions related to the 
implementation of the Eurosystem‘s monetary policy and decisions before a national 
parliament, provided that the NCB‘s independence and the Eurosystem‘s 
communication rules
473
 are respected.
474
 In an earlier opinion, the ECB stated that the 
Governors can report to their national Parliaments, provided that such a duty is to be 
understood as an obligation to inform ex post and that the provisions of [then Article 
38 of the Statute] on professional secrecy must be respected.
475
 Therefore, ECB 
Opinion CON/2006/23 changed the previous policy line, which assumed that NCB 
Governors should not give account of their actions as members of the Governing 
Council to their national parliaments, as national parliaments would lack the 
legitimacy to judge how NCB Governors perform their Eurosystem duties,
476
 and 
established that an NCB Governor may be heard or be requested to provide 
information or answer any questions related to the implementation of the 
Eurosystem‘s monetary policy and decisions before a national parliament, subject to 
                                                 
472  To date, the ECB President has exceptionally appeared before the German Parliament in May 2010. Usually, 
neither the ECB President nor any of the ECB Executive Board members appear before national parliaments. 
The ECB has taken the view that a system of individual accountability of the members of the Governing 
Council and the Executive Board would be inconsistent with the institutional structure and policy substance. 
As far as the NCB Governors are concerned, no EU body plays any role in their appointment and they cannot 
therefore be held accountable to the European Parliament.  
473  The Eurosystem‘s communication rules are not defined. The notion is first mentioned by Ms Sirkka 
Hämäläinen, then a member of the ECB Executive Board, in a speech delivered at ―Old Age, New Economy 
and Central Banking Conference‖ in Helsinki on 14 September 2001 (European Central Bank, 2001).  
474  See Paragraph 2.6 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/23 of 22 May 2006 at the request of the Central Bank of Malta 
concerning a draft law amending the Central Bank of Malta Act.  
475  Paragraph 10 of EMI Opinion CON/97/30 of 15 December 1997 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of 
Finance on a draft law amending the Central Bank Act and other related laws. 
476  See ECB Monthly Bulletin, November 2002 (p. 49). The NCB‘s reporting commitments to the national 
parliaments are understood in the context of Article 14.4 of the Statute for tasks which are not part of the 
functions of the ESCB-related tasks; see pp 51-52. These statements are repeated by Scheller (Scheller, 2006, 
p. 129).  
 132 
 
limitations set by the Treaties and the Statute and the Eurosystem‘s communication 
rules.  
The general duty to inform Parliament involves policy reporting
477
 (see Table 3-17) 
and financial reporting as discussed in Sections 3.2.4.2, 3.2.4.3 and 3.2.4.4 (see 
Tables 3-12 and 3-13). The traditional duty to provide information to the national 
Parliament normally takes place when the NCB has already adopted its decisions (ex 
post) and cannot therefore be regarded as ex ante consultation.
478
  
The case of Sweden is somewhat different, due to the fact that the Swedish Parliament 
is the authority that approves the accounts of the Swedish NCB, thereby becoming a 
final decision-maker. The reporting of the Swedish NCB is therefore not ex post and 
could also be interpreted as ex ante reporting. However, the Swedish NCB does also 
report ex post, regarding the measures taken in view of the Swedish National Audit 
Office‘s observations, for example.479  
Dismissal of the members of the NCB decision-making bodies is often regarded as 
included under accountability. However, such dismissals cannot be undertaken in a 
discretionary manner on the grounds of past policy performance but only in line with 
clearly stipulated circumstances as discussed earlier in Section 3.2.3.7.  
Accountability to judicial bodies 
Judicial review of the agency‘s actions and decisions (conducted by an independent 
and depoliticised judiciary) is essential to prevent and control the arbitrary and 
unreasonable exercise of discretionary powers. In addition, the accountee may be the 
judiciary, especially when a judicial review is conducted.
480
 The judiciary should 
                                                 
477  See (1) Article 32(5) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 50 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (3) Article 
55(2) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Articles 3, 3a and 45d of the Czech NCB Statute; (5) Article 31(3) of the 
Estonian NCB Statute; (6) Article 27 of the Finnish NCB Statute; (7) Article L 143-1 of the French NCB 
Statute; (8) Articles 5B(1) and (2) of the Greek NCB Statute; (9) Articles 2 and 35 of the Hungarian NCB 
Statute; (10) Articles 6(1), 28(4) and 43(1) of the Latvian NCB Statute; (11) Article 52 of the Lithuanian NCB 
Statute; (12) Article 11(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (13) Article 19 of the Dutch NCB Statute; (14) 
Articles 22 and 23 of the Polish NCB Statute; (15) Article 54(4) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (16) Article 
35(4) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (17) Article 10(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute; (18) Chapter 1, Articles 1 
and 2, Chapter 6, Article 4, Chapter 10, Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Swedish NCB Statute; (19) Articles 19(3), 
19(4) and 19(5) of the United Kingdom NCB.  
478  However, the national parliaments appear to have strong powers to ask for clarifications or a new report under 
Article 3(4) and 47(3)-(5) of the Czech NCB Statute.  
479  Article 5 Chapter 10 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
480  See Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 55.  
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control the lawfulness of the central bank‘s operations and decisions in the fulfilment 
of its functions.
481
  
Judicial accountability can be divided into two: 
1) Judicial control of the actions or omissions of central banks; 
2) Management audit performed by State Audit Offices.  
Under Article 263 TFEU, the Court of Justice shall review the legality of legislative 
acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and of the European Central Bank,
482
 
other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and 
of the European Council intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. It 
shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the 
European Parliament, the Council or the Commission on grounds of (i) lack of 
competence, (ii) infringement of an essential procedural requirement, (iii) 
infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or (iv) 
misuse of powers.  
According to settled case law of the Court of Justice, the principle of proportionality 
is one of the general principles of Union law and requires that measures implemented 
through Union law provisions be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives 
pursued by the legislation at issue and must not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve them.
483
 The principle of legal certainty expresses the fundamental premise 
that the Union legislation must be clear and predictable.
484
 According to the standard 
formula used by the Court of Justice, in order to establish whether a provision of 
Union law is consistent with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary to 
                                                 
481  See Lastra R. M., The Independence of the European System of Central Banks, 1992, p. 500.  
482  Also repeated in Article 35.1 of the Statute.  
483  See Case C-58/08 The Queen, on the application of Vodafone Ltd and Others v Secretary of State for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2010] ECR not yet reported, paragraph 51, referring also to 
Joined Cases C-453/03, C-11/04, C-12/04 and C-194/04 ABNA and Others [2005] ECR I-10423, paragraph 68 
and the case-law cited. 
484  The Court of Justice has consistently endorsed the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate 
expectations, by virtue of which the effect of Community legislation must be clear and predictable for those 
who are subject to it (Joined Cases 212/80 to 217/80 Meridionale Industria Salumi and Others [1981] ECR 
2735, paragraph 10).  
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establish whether (i) the means it employs to achieve the aim correspond to the 
importance of the aim and whether (ii) they are necessary for its achievement.
485
  
Article 264 TFEU establishes that if the action is well founded, the Court of Justice 
shall declare the act concerned to be void, which means that the institution whose act 
has been declared void
486
 shall be required to take the necessary measures to comply 
with the judgment of the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 266 TFEU.  
Pursuant to Article 35.3 of the Statute, the ECB shall be subject to the liability regime 
provided for in Article 340 TFEU while the NCBs shall be liable according to their 
respective national laws. 
Although several NCBs are entitled to issue legal instruments, the respective NCB 
Statutes are silent regarding their judicial review.
487
  
However, some NCB Statutes have addressed the accountability to the State Audit 
Office. As noted in Section 3.2.4.3, only the Swedish Riksbank is solely audited by 
the respective National Audit Office but its mandate is different from a management 
audit. The ECB has said in its Convergence Reports that where an NCB‘s operations 
are subject to the control of a state audit office or similar body charged with 
controlling the use of public finances, the scope of the control should be clearly 
defined by the legal framework and should be without prejudice to the activities of the 
NCB‘s independent external auditors.488 The ECB is of the view that National Audit 
Offices cannot be regarded as independent auditors; for example, the Irish 
Comptroller and Auditor General was nominated for recommendation as an external 
                                                 
485  See also Case 66/82 Fromançais SA v Fonds d'orientation et de régularisation des marchés agricoles 
(FORMA) [1983] ECR 395, para 8. Article 5 of Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality establishes, inter alia, that (a) ‗draft legislative acts shall be justified with 
regard to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality‘, (b) ‗any draft legislative act should contain a 
detailed statement making it possible to appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality‘, (c) ‗the reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at Union level 
shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators‘ and (d) ‗draft legislative 
acts shall take account of the need for any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, 
national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be minimised and 
commensurate with the objective to be achieved‘. 
486  For example, Decision ECB/1999/5 of 7 October 1999 on fraud prevention was annulled by the ECJ in its 
judgment of 10 July 2003, Case C-11/00. 
487  The power to issue legal instruments has been laid down in (1) Article 22(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute and 
Article 41(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (2) Article 49b(6) of the Czech NCB Statute; 
Articles 9(9) and 11(6) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (3) Article 33 of the German NCB Statute; (4) Article 
33D(3) of the Irish NCB Statute; (5) Article 42 of the Latvian NCB Statute; (6) Article 60(2) of the Hungarian 
NCB Statute; (7) Articles 53 and 54 of the Polish NCB Statute; (8) Article 56 of the Romanian NCB Statute; 
Article 34 of the Slovenian NCB Statute; and (9) Article 3(2) of the Spanish NCB Statute. See Tables 3-4 and 
3-18 for details.  
488  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 22).  
 135 
 
auditor for the Central Bank of Ireland before the start of Stage Three of EMU but 
rejected as not being an independent external auditor within the meaning of Article 
27.1 of the Statute.
489
  
The activities of a National Audit Office shall not interfere with the review of the 
ESCB-related tasks of the NCB to be undertaken by the NCB‘s independent external 
auditor and these activities may not jeopardise its independence.
490
 Similarly, in ECB 
Opinion CON/2002/22
491
 it is noted that the ECB and several Eurosystem NCBs are 
subject to additional statutory audits or controls outside the scope of Article 27.1 of 
the Statute. The ECB also issued Opinion CON/2006/33 concluding that a national 
draft law should provide safeguards including „guarantees that the Auditor General 
cannot interfere with the independent external auditor‟s control of the ESCB-related 
accounts of the CBC [Central Bank of Cyprus] and that the Auditor General may not 
jeopardise the independence of the CBC‟.492 By analogy, in the case of the ECB the 
European Court of Auditors carries out a management audit which is specifically 
limited to the operational efficiency of the management of the ECB but does not 
include an audit of the ECB accounts, under Article 284 TFEU [former Article 248 
TEC] and Article 27.2 of the Statute.  
3.3.2 Central bank transparency 
In a democratic environment, the institutional set-up of a central bank cannot be less 
transparent than the absolute minimum which is regarded acceptable by the general 
public – being transparent means that the public can better understand what the 
central bank‘s intentions are.493 The ECB describes quite extensively its policy on 
                                                 
489  This information is provided in footnote 5 of the ECB Opinion CON/2002/22 of 2 September 2002 at the 
request of the Swedish Ministry of Finance on a draft legislative proposal establishing the National Audit, 
available at https://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/EN_CON_2002_22_f_sign.pdf.  
490  See paragraphs 5 to 7 of ECB Opinion CON/2002/22; paragraph 2.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/4 of 27 
January 2006 at the request of the Central Bank of Cyprus on a draft law amending the Central Bank of Cyprus 
Laws of 2002 and 2003, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2006_4_f_sign.pdf; Paragraph 
2.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/33 of 28 June 2006 at the request of the Cypriot Ministry of Finance on a draft 
law amending the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 and 2003, available at 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2006_33_f_sign.pdf; paragraph 3.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/44 of 
25 August 2006 at the request of the Banca d‘Italia on the amended Statute of the Banca d‘Italia, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2006_44_f_sign.pdf.  
491  ECB Opinion CON/2002/22.  
492  The powers of the Cypriot Auditor General were analysed in the following ECB Opinions: CON/2006/4; 
CON/2006/33; and ECB Opinion CON/2006/50 of 26 October 2006 at the request of the Cypriot Ministry of 
Finance on a draft law amending the Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002 and 2003, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2006_50_f_sign.pdf.  
493  See Demertzis, 2007.  
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transparency,
494
 outlining the need to provide the general public and the markets with 
all relevant information on its strategy, assessments and policy decisions as well as its 
procedures in an open, clear and timely manner. Transparency requires the central 
bank to make the interpretation of its mandate clear and is consequently forthcoming 
about its policy goals – this helps the public to monitor and evaluate the central 
bank‘s performance.495  
It follows from Article 10.4. of the Statute, which sets forth that the proceedings of 
the meetings shall be confidential and that the Governing Council may decide to make 
the outcome of its deliberations public, that the ECB is statutorily barred from 
publishing minutes of the meetings of the Governing Council. Therefore, different 
opinions voiced during these hearings and the subsequent voting behaviour are not 
disclosed and the ECB also does not appear inclined to make public such information 
even after the events in question. The only possible means of detecting any patterns of 
discussion would be to follow the subsequent press releases and transcripts of the 
press conferences.
496
  
Monetary policy decisions are by their nature internal decisions regulating the price 
for money that the central banks are willing to lend to the commercial banks. The fact 
that such decisions are communicated to the general public does not provide the latter 
with any formal mechanisms to hold the ECB decision-making bodies accountable. 
One could therefore conclude that communication on monetary policy decisions does 
not form a part of central bank accountability, although it is true that accountability 
mechanisms can be used to obtain information about past monetary policy decisions. 
In this respect, one can conclude that accountability complements central bank 
independence. The ECB is therefore of the opinion that monetary policy 
communication forms part of central bank transparency. The elements of transparency 
are:  
1) political transparency, incorporating information disclosure on the central 
bank‘s goals – a formal statement of the targets and how they are prioritised; 
                                                 
494  Available at http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/orga/transparency (visited on 29 August 2010). 
495  ECB Monthly Bulletin, November (2002, pp. 59-60).  
496  For example, with references to decisions adopted ‗with an overwhelming majority‘ (European Central Bank, 
2010). Louis notes that the Governor of German NCB made public his negative vote in a series of declarations 
on the crisis that did not contribute to the authority of the ECB and to the strength of the euro (Louis, Guest 
editorial: The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages, 2010, p. 975).   
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2) economic transparency, considering the disclosure of knowledge about the 
economy which is used for monetary policy-making; 
3) procedural transparency, considering the procedures used to make monetary 
policy decisions;  
4) policy transparency, which is present when the central bank announces and 
explains its policy decisions immediately and when it indicates the future 
policy paths; 
5) operational transparency, considering openness about how the central bank 
implements its monetary policy actions by being open about mistakes or 
misjudgements.
497
  
Similarly to the discussion in Section 3.3.1, the transparency obligation seems to have 
its roots in the Governor‘s duty of loyalty. Apart from making the Governors subject 
to conflict of interest and wealth declarations, the Governors have the general duty to 
explain their activities to the other branches of the State to the extent that they are not 
regulated by the provisions on accountability as well as to the general public.  
The elements of transparency can be found in Article 15.1 of the Statute, whereby the 
ECB is required to draw up and publish reports on the activities of the ESCB at least 
quarterly. These reports are entitled ―Monthly Bulletin‖. ECB publications published 
under Article 15 of the Statute shall be made available free of charge, as stipulated in 
Article 15.4 of the Statute. A reading of Article 15 in conjunction with Article 12 of 
the Statute suggests that the reporting should cover monetary policy definitions, 
approaches, objectives and instruments.
498
 
Out of all NCB Statutes reviewed in Table 3-18, the transparency requirement is 
probably the clearest in the Romanian NCB Statute, which sets forth that the objective 
of [central bank] communication is to provide the general public, the domestic and 
international business communities, public administration and the academic 
community with a clear image of policies and the measures adopted by the Romanian 
NCB.
499
 The NCB Statutes usually require NCBs to publish: (a) balance sheets and 
                                                 
497  See van der Cruijsen & Eijffinger, January 2008.  
498  See Randzio-Plath, 2000, p. 14.  
499  Articles 3(4) and 56(3) of the Romanian NCB Statute.  
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other financial information,
500
 (b) reports on monetary developments, such as balance 
of payments (including statistics),
501
 (c) reports on financial stability
502
 and financial 
market supervision
503
 and occasionally also scientific papers.
504
 Sometimes the NCB 
Statutes also describe the format of publications, such as the content of the NCB 
journal,
505
 or stipulate that both hard copies as well as electronic copies of the 
documents should be available.
506
  
The downside of transparency appears to be that private agents tend to refrain from 
gathering their own information and rely a little too much on what the central bank 
communicates.
507
 
3.3.3 Confidentiality and professional secrecy 
Accountability and transparency are not unrestricted, although the underlying 
principle of the European Union is that its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies 
shall, in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of civil 
society, conduct their work as openly as possible under Article 15(1) TFEU.  
Pursuant to the first sub-paragraph of Article 15(3) TFEU, any citizen of the Union, 
and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member 
State, shall have a right of access to documents of the Union institutions, bodies, 
offices and agencies, whatever their medium, subject to the principles and the 
conditions to be defined in accordance with Article 15(3) TFEU. It further stipulates 
                                                 
500  (1) Article 49(1) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Articles 43, 57(3) and 61 of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) 
Articles 48(4)-(5) of the Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 31(4) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (5) Articles 19(2) 
and 19(4) of the Finnish NCB Statute; (6) Articles 53 and 54 of the Greek NCB Statute; (7) Article 41 of the 
Italian NCB Statute; (8) Articles 15 and 43(2) of the Latvian NCB Statute; (9) Article 51 of the Lithuanian 
NCB Statute; (10) Article 30 of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (11) Article 21(2) of the Maltese NCB Statute; 
(12) Article 54(1) of the Polish NCB Statute; (13) Article 54(3) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (14) Article 
56(4) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (15) Article 38(3)-(4) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (16) Article 49(6) of 
the Slovenian NCB Statute; (17) Article 18 of the United Kingdom NCB Statute.   
501  (1) Article 49b of the Czech NCB Statute; (2) Articles 2(8) and 21(5) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (3) Article 
18 of the German NCB Statute; (4) Articles 4(6), 28(2) and 41(1) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (5) Article 
5A(1)(g) of the Irish NCB Statute; (6) Article 51 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (7) Article 32(3) of the 
Luxembourg NCB Statute; (8) Article 21(1) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (9) Article 56(4) of the Romanian 
NCB Statute; (10) Article 3(2) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (11) Article 5(f) of the Spanish NCB Statute; (12) 
Chapter 6, Article 4 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
502  (1) Article 3a and 48(4) of the Czech NCB Statue; (2) Article 28(2) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (3) Article 
55 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute. 
503  (1) Article 45d of the Czech NCB Statute; (2) Article 31(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (3) Article 51 of the 
Lithuanian NCB Statute. 
504  (1) Article 59 of the Polish NCB Statute; (2) Article 56(4) of the Romanian NCB Statute. 
505  For example, Article 44 of the Slovak NCB Statute.  
506  Article 49b(8) of the Czech NCB Statute. 
507  See Demertzis (2007), referring to quotes of Messrs T. Padoa Schioppa and L. Bini Smaghi.  
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that general principles and limits on grounds of public or private interest governing 
this right of access to documents shall be determined by the European Parliament and 
the Council, by means of regulations, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure; each institution, body, office or agency shall ensure that its 
proceedings are transparent and shall elaborate its own Rules of Procedure defining 
specific provisions regarding access to its documents, in accordance with the 
regulations referred to in the second sub-paragraph of Article 15(3) TFEU; the Court 
of Justice, the European Central Bank and the European Investment Bank shall be 
subject to this paragraph only when exercising their administrative tasks.  
At the moment it is unclear how the fourth sub-paragraph of Article 15(3) TFEU 
should be interpreted with regard to the ECB. Currently, the ECB Public Access 
Decision is in force and regulates the treatment of information at the ECB vis-à-vis 
the general public. The first indent of Article 4(1)(a) of the ECB Public Access 
Decision provides that the ECB shall refuse access to a document where disclosure 
would undermine the protection of the public interests as regards the financial, 
monetary or economic policy of the Union or a Member State. Moreover, if the source 
of information is a document originating outside the ECB, Article 4(4) of the ECB 
Public Access Decision sets forth that the ECB shall consult the third party concerned 
before deciding either to disclose or not disclose the document. For sensitive 
commercial information, disclosure can be refused under the first indent of 
Article 4(2), while the third indent obliges the ECB not to disclose the purpose of 
inspections, investigations and audits;
508
 however, one has to bear in mind that these 
documents could be disclosed if there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.  
As regards possible requests by the general public to access the information which is 
to be deemed classified, a Union institution has to assess the balance between the 
interest of private individuals and its own interest.
509,
 
510
 Where the institution in 
                                                 
508  The Court of Justice of the European Union has held that, during the investigative phase, the reasoned opinion 
must be maintained as confidential (Case T-309/97 The Bavarian Lager Company Ltd v Commission of the 
European Communities [1999] ECR II-3217). This requirement of confidentiality in relation to the reasoned 
opinion has been upheld even after the matter has been brought before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (Case T-191/99 David Petrie, Victoria Jane Primhak, David Verzoni and Others v Commission of the 
European Communities [2001] ECR II 3677). In a similar fashion, the Commission can rely on Article 4(2) of 
Regulation 1049/2001 governing the ―protection of the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits‖ to 
refuse access to documents relating to infringement proceedings. 
509 Green Paper: Public Access to documents held by institutions of the European Community. A review 
COM(2007) 185 final, p. 5, 11 and 15. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/transparency, visited on 7 September 
2010.  
510 Case T-198/03 Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG v Commission, [2006] Page II-1429. 
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question refuses such access, according to well-established case law it must 
demonstrate in each individual case, on the basis of the information at its disposal, 
that the documents to which access is sought do indeed fall within the exceptions.
511
 
Under that case law, the institution which has refused access to a document therefore 
has to provide a statement of reasons from which it is possible to understand and 
ascertain, first, whether the document requested does in fact fall within the scope of 
the stated exception and, second, whether the need for protection relating to that 
exception is genuine.
512
  
Against that background, it is important to bear in mind that the duty of professional 
secrecy pursuant to Article 37.1 of the Statute [former Article 38.1 of the Statute] 
applies to the ECB and the NCBs. Therefore, one would need to explain the nature of 
professional secrecy and the conditions under which a certain document would 
qualify as classified and subject to exemption from the ECB Public Access Decision.  
Article 37.1 of the Statute sets forth that the members of the governing bodies and the 
staff of the ECB and the NCBs shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, 
not to disclose information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional 
secrecy.
513
 Article 37.1 of the Statute does not provide a definition of professional 
secrecy. As is shown in Table 3-19, the notion of ‗professional secrecy‘ in the NCB 
Statutes, usually refers to all information of which persons become aware as a 
consequence of their position in the central bank and which is not available to the 
                                                 
511 Joined Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03 Sison v Council [2005] ECR II-1429, paragraph 60, and Case 
T-93/04 Kallianos v Commission [2006] ECR II-0000, paragraph 90; regarding the 1993 Code of Conduct, see 
Joined Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P Netherlands and van der Wal v Commission [2000] ECR I-1, 
paragraph 24, and Case C-41/00 P Interporc v Commission [2003] ECR I-2125, paragraph 56. 
512 Joined cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03 Sison v Council, paragraph 61. 
513  Further limits arise from specific legal provisions, such as Articles 10.4 of the Statute, referring to the 
confidentiality of the ECB Governing Council meetings or Article 23.1 of the ECB Rules of Procedure, 
establishing that the proceedings of the decision-making bodies of the ECB and of any committee or group 
established by them shall be confidential unless the Governing Council authorises the President to make the 
outcome of their deliberations public. This Article has been often referred to in the ECB‘s press releases, for 
example ‗Statement by the President of the ECB at the public hearing at the European Parliament on the 
interception of bank transfer data from the SWIFT system by the US secret services‘, on 4 October 2006, 
available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2006/html/sp061004.en.html, or ‗Remarks by the European 
Central Bank on a resolution passed by the European Parliament relating to the operations of SWIFT‘, on 15 
February 2007, available at http://www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2007/html/pr070215.en.html; see also Bini 
Smaghi, L., remarks at the Workshop ―Financial turmoil and missing risks: new challenges for bankers and 
regulators‖, on 12 June 2008, available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2008/html/sp080612.en.html 
(visited on 7 September 2010). 
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general public.
514
 In this regard, the Court of First instance has stated that „[I]n order 
that information be of the kind to fall within the ambit of the obligation of 
professional secrecy, it is necessary, first of all, that it will be known only to a limited 
number of persons. It must then be information whose disclosure is liable to cause 
serious harm to the person who has provided it or to third parties. Finally, the 
interests liable to be harmed by disclosure must, objectively, be worthy of protection. 
The assessment as to the confidentiality of a piece of information thus requires the 
legitimate interests opposing disclosure of the information to be weighed against the 
public interest that the activities of Community institutions take place as openly as 
possible.‘515  
Pursuant to Article 10.4 of the Statute, the proceedings of the Governing Council 
meetings are confidential and the Governing Council may decide to make the 
outcome of its deliberations public. The same principle is also applicable to the ESCB 
committees.
516
  
The obligation of professional secrecy is linked to the duty of loyalty, discussed in 
Section 3.2.3.4. Several NCB Statutes have introduced the principle that the non-
disclosure of professional secrets shall be for an indefinite period.
517
 With regard to 
the NCB Statutes that do not provide for this, one could always assume the direct 
applicability of Article 37.1 of the Statute, but for the sake of legal certainty, one 
would need to codify the legal obligations deriving from the Statute. 
Professional secrecy does not mean that confidential information should never leave 
central bank – quite often there is a need to exchange information between the central 
banks, other public authorities entrusted with the oversight of payment systems, 
                                                 
514  (1) Article 45 of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 23 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (3) Article 49 of the 
Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 15 of the Danish NCB By-laws; (5) Article 35 of the Estonian NCB Statute; 
(6) Article 32 of the German NCB Statute; (7) Articles 35A(5) and 38(2) of the Greek NCB Statute; (8) Article 
54(1) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (9) Article 33AK(1) of the Irish NCB Statute; (10) Article 45 of the 
Italian NCB Statute; (11) Article 33 of the Latvian NCB Statute; (12) Article 33 of the Luxembourg NCB 
Statute; (13) Article 23 of the Dutch NCB Articles of Association; (14) Article 55 of the Polish NCB Statute; 
(15) Article 52(1) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (16) Article 40 of the Slovak NCB Statute; (17) Article 47 of 
the Slovenian NCB Statute; (18) Article 6 of the Spanish NCB Statute.  
515 See footnote 510, paragraph 71.  
516  See footnote 88.  
517  (1) Article 45 of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Articles 13(1) and 23(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (3) 
Article 25(1) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 50(1) of the Czech NCB Statute; (5) Articles 21(11) and 
35(2) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (6) Article 32 of the German NCB Statute; (7) Article 54(1) of the 
Hungarian NCB Statute; (8) Article 33 of the Latvian NCB Statute; (9) Article 33 of the Luxembourg NCB 
Statute; (10) Article 55 of the Polish NCB Statute; (11) Article 52(1) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (12) 
Article 41 of the Slovak NCB Statute; (13) Article 47(1) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (14) Article 6 of the 
Spanish NCB Statute.  
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public authorites responsible for the supervision of credit institutions, etc.
518
 
However, as is apparent from Table 3-19,
519
 very few NCB Statues list the recipients 
of classified information,
520
 although others foresee the option to disclose the 
information on an ad hoc basis.
521
 This has not prevented NCBs from becoming 
signatories to various memoranda of understanding on the exchange of confidential 
information. Since 2001 cooperation between the central banks and supervisory 
institutions in the European Union has been regulated, apart from the cooperation 
clauses stipulated in Articles 44 to 52 of Directive 2006/48/EC and numerous bilateral 
Memoranda of Understanding, by the following umbrella Memoranda of 
Understanding: 
1) Memorandum of Understanding on Co-operation between the Financial 
Supervisory Authorities, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the EU on 
Cross-Border Financial Stability of 1 June 2008;
522
 
2) Memorandum of Understanding on co-operation between the Banking 
Supervisors, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union in 
Financial Crisis situations of 18 May 2005;
523
 and 
3) Memorandum of Understanding on high-level principles of co-operation 
between the banking supervisors and central banks of the European Union in 
crisis management situations of 10 March 2003.
524
 
The 2008 Memorandum of Understanding replaced that of 2005 and provides for 
further detailed crisis management procedures and structures, including, inter alia, (a) 
common principles for cross-border financial crisis management (Article 2); (b) 
cooperation arrangements (Articles 3 and 4); (c) information exchange and 
confidentiality (Articles 5 and 8); (d) public communication (Article 6); and (e) 
                                                 
518  See for example, Agreement between the European Police Office (Europol) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB), OJ C 23, 25.1.2002, p. 9, or template agreements between ECB and the accession countries NCBs (the 
template is available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/c_16020030709en00070011.pdf (visited on 6 
September 2010).  
519  A further survey in Table 4-2 illustrates the arrangements for exchanging supervisory information by the 
NCBs. Some of the information in the Tables overlap.  
520  (1) Article 35 of the Belgian NCB Law and Article 56 of the Belgian NCB Statute; (2) Article 25(2) of the 
Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 26(2) of the Finnish NCB Statute; (4) Article 48 of the Greek NCB Statute; 
(5) Article 33 of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (6) Articles 3(6), 3(7), 3(14) and 52(2) of the Romanian NCB 
Statute; (7) Article 41 of the Slovak NCB Statute; (8) Article 47(2) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (9) Article 
6(2) of the Spanish NCB Statute. 
521  Article 50(2) of the Czech NCB Statute and Article 32 of the German NCB Statute.  
522  Published on 20 June 2008 at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/mou-financialstability2008en.pdf.  
523  See European Central Bank, 2005. 
524  See European Central Bank, 2003.  
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contingency planning (Article 7). The 2008 Memorandum of Understanding has two 
annexes: Annex 1 establishes ―Common practical guidelines for crisis management‖ 
and Annex 2 constitutes a template for voluntary specific cooperation agreements 
among the Finance Ministers, NCBs and the supervisory authorities.
525
 The 
Memoranda of 2003 and 2005 have not been published, except to the extent that was 
necessary for the respective press releases.
526
  
Memoranda of Understanding are by definition not legally binding documents. Article 
10.1 of the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding expressly provides that its 
provisions are not legally binding on the parties and may therefore not give rise to any 
legal claim on behalf of any party or parties in the course of their practical 
implementation.
527
 
The ECB has observed that virtually all Member States that have adopted supervisory 
models based on an independent financial supervisory authority have included 
provisions stipulating a duty of cooperation and authorising the exchange of 
information between central banks and supervisory authorities.
528
  
As Article 37.2 of the Statute distinguishes between professional secrecy and data 
covered by Union legislation imposing an obligation of secrecy, one may conclude 
that information covered by Article 37.1 of the Statute is separate from other 
classified information an NCB may have. The analysis of some NCB Statutes 
confirms this conclusion,
529
 whereby state secrets are expressly distinguished from 
bank secrets, securities secrets or business/official secrets.  
                                                 
525  This template has a further annex, ―Template for a systemic assessment framework‖, which provides for a 
common methodology to assess the systemic implications of a crisis.  
526  See footnotes 523 and 524.  
527  Smits is of the view that it miserably failed (Smits, Ten legal gaps Europe's regulators must close, 2010, p. 39). 
Discretionary exercise of responsibilities by national authorities has also been mentioned by Schinasi and 
Teixeira (Schinasi & Teixeira, The Lender of Last Resort in the European Single Financial Market , 2006, p. 9) 
(Schinasi & Teixeira, The Lender of Last Resort in the European Single Financial Market, Working Paper 
Series No. 43, 2006, p. 8). In a similar occasion concerning an arrangement between the CESR members, 
Avgerinos expressed his doubts whether the response to a potential emergency situation would be facilitated 
by the time-consuming procedure that is, first, informal and, second, not legally binding. He notes that 
cooperation through Memoranda of Understanding raises the questions of effective coordination of 
supervision, supervisory methods and the content of information exchange (Avgerinos, 2003, p. 187).  
528  See Bini Smaghi, Supervision and central banking: improving the exchange of information, 12 June 2008. See 
also paragraph 2.4.1 of the ECB Opinion CON/2007/33 of 5 November 2007 at the request of Austrian 
Ministry of Finance on a draft law amending the Law on banking, the Law on savings banks, the Law on the 
Financial Market Supervisory Authority and the Law on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank; paragraph 2.2.2 of 
the ECB Opinion CON/2006/15 of 9 March 2006 at the request of the Polish Minister of Finance on a draft 
law on the supervision of financial institutions.  
529  (1) Article 4(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 54(1) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (3) Articles 
19(2) and 19(3) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute.  
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Finally, there appears to be no document describing the ESCB confidentiality rules, 
although several NCB Statutes expressly provide for an option to transfer classified 
documents to the ECB but do not specify the regime governing the procedure for so 
doing.
530
 Further exceptions concern the disclosure of information in criminal 
proceedings or on other statutory grounds.
531
 A few NCB Statutes also refer to 
sanctions in case of unauthorised disclosure.
532
 
3.4 Conclusions of Chapter 3 
Functional independence is referred to in the assessed NCB Statutes and the 
maintenance of price stability is, subject to deviations by some NCBs, indeed the 
primary objective. With regard to the secondary objectives, some NCB Statutes still 
maintain a ‗national flavour‘.  
With regard to the five prohibitions under the concept of institutional independence, 
some Member States limit central bank independence to ESCB-related tasks, while 
the others do not make such a distinction. In fact, as the ESCB-related tasks are 
actually basic central bank activities, NCBs are to be independent of any third party 
while carrying out their tasks. It would be compliant with EU law for NCBs to receive 
instructions and guidelines from the ECB. 
Like any legal person, a monetary authority takes its decisions through the members 
of its decision-making bodies. In fact, no monetary authority is adequately shielded 
from outside influence if the members of its decision-making bodies are not.  
Providing an adequate protection for ‗a Governor‘ would mean that there is a need to 
define the notion first as this is not done in EU law. As a result of the review of 27 
NCB Statutes, it can be concluded that a Governor is expected to be a natural person, 
a well-educated citizen of a Member State with a high reputation, who carries out 
                                                 
530  (1) Article 45 of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 35(2) of the Belgian NCB Law and Article 56(2) of the 
Belgian NCB Statute; (3) Article 25(2)(b) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 21(11) of the Estonian NCB 
Statute; (5) Article 26(3) of the Finnish NCB Statute; (6) Article 33(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (7) 
Article 41 of the Slovak NCB Statute; (8) Article 47(1) of the Slovenian NCB Statute. 
531  (1) Article 35(2) of the Belgian NCB Law and Article 56(2) of the Belgian NCB Statute; (2) Article 25(1) of 
the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 50(2) of the Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 26(2) of the Finnish NCB 
Statute; (5) Article 32 of the German NCB Statute; (6) Article 46(2) of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (7) Article 
33(3) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (8) Article 41 of the Maltese NCB Statute; (9) Articles 3(6), 3(7), 
3(14), 3(15), 52(1), 52(2) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (10) Articles 6(2) and 6(3) of the Spanish NCB 
Statute; (11) Schedule 7 I(3) of the United Kingdom NCB Statute. 
532  (1) Article 35(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute; (2) Article 55C(5), 55C(6) and 55C(7) of the Greek NCB 
Statute; (3) Article 33(1) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (4) Article 52(3) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (5) 
Article 6(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute; (6) Schedule 7 I(4) of the United Kingdom NCB Statute.  
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executive functions on behalf of the NCB and who serves the NCB full time, 
participates in the meetings of the Governing Council and General Council and is 
accountable simultaneously to the Governing Council as well as to the national 
authorities. It is, however, arguable whether Governors fulfil these duties in their 
personal capacity; the analysis of the beneficiaries of their duties, as well as the use of 
alternates, tends to suggests that Governors act as representatives of their respective 
NCBs, which is also confirmed by the ECB‘s practice to accept alternates when the 
Governor‘s term of office is over.  
It is difficult to outline the considerations that are taken into account in the 
recruitment process in the Member States, as the NCB Statutes tend to be rather 
general as far as appointment procedures are concerned. It is true that the criteria for 
incompatibility for the office are not harmonised among the Member States and it 
remains to be studied whether there is a need for such a harmonisation. After all, the 
NCBs have largely remained national institutions and the appointment of the 
Governors is also a national matter, despite the fact that the new Governor of a 
Eurosystem NCB will also become a member of the Governing Council and the 
General Council. Therefore, it is not surprising that the appointment procedure as well 
as the eligibility criteria may differ among the Member States. Nonetheless, the term 
of office for the Governors complies with Article 14.2 of the Statute in all Member 
States. With regard to re-appointments, there appears to be no link between the length 
of the period in office and the possibility for the Governor to be re-appointed.  
During his term of office, a Governor is mostly bound by the duty of loyalty, which is 
supported by the duty of non-competition. The duty of loyalty has no time limits to 
ensure that the ESCB/NCB is protected against unfair use of confidential information 
by those who have retired from office. The duty of non-competition means that the 
Governor may be engaged outside his assignments as a Governor if there is no 
conflict of interest. Unlike the duty of loyalty, the duty of non-competition applies to 
the Governor while the latter is in the office as well as one year after retiring from 
office.  
The authority to appoint an alternate is based on the fact that a Governor in office is 
physically prevented from acting, whereby the alternate is his/her agent or 
representative and the Governor bears ultimate responsibility. From the legal point of 
view, problems would occur if the Governor‘s term of office expires, no successor has 
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been appointed and the NCB Statute contains no provisions on how to address the 
situation. In the absence of clear legal provisions on the Governor‘s substitution, any 
solution adopted ad hoc remains legally open to question.  
A Governor may be removed from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions 
required for the performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious 
misconduct. The conditions required for the performance of the Governors‘ duties are 
usually defined in national law. As the conditions required for the performance of the 
Governors‘ duties (eligibility criteria) may differ among the Member States, the 
reasoning behind the removal of a Governor is therefore also not uniform but could 
still comply with Article 14.2 of the Statute as far as non-fulfilment of the conditions 
is concerned. For the NCB Statutes that do not prescribe the conditions required for 
the performance of the Governor‘s duties but still refer to Article 14.2 of the Statute 
with regard to dismissal, the Governor can only be removed on the grounds of serious 
misconduct.  
The notion of ‗serious misconduct‘ can be explained as a ‗breach of obligations‘ to 
which the Governor was subject – such as the duty of loyalty or the duty of non-
competition or any other duty to which the Governor was subject. The notion is part 
of Union law and is not defined in national law. Where the person has duly performed 
the mission entrusted to him, he cannot be dismissed even when the outcome of the 
person‘s activities was regarded as unsatisfactory. In order to dismiss a Governor 
from office (a) ‗serious misconduct‘ actually has to have occurred; (b) there has to be 
an authority to decide that the Governor is guilty of breaching his duties; and (c) once 
the preconditions (a) and (b) have been fulfilled, a Governor can be removed from 
office. In the case of a dispute, the Court of Justice shall be competent to hear the 
case.  
Financial independence aims at securing the central bank‘s autonomy by enabling its 
decision-making bodies to determine its own budget, establish its own accounting 
rules, create clear framework for the distribution of profits from its independently 
audited accounts and prevent it from becoming subject to financial obligations from 
areas outside its mandate.  
With a few exceptions, most NCBs are in charge of adopting their budgets. The 
accounting rules appear to be greatly harmonised. For example, financial year means 
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the same in the majority of NCB Statutes. Sometimes, instead of describing the 
system in use, the NCB Statutes refer, in various ways, to the accounting legal 
instruments adopted by the ECB under Article 26.4 of the Statute. Moreover, several 
NCB Statutes refer to the Statute or Guideline and adapt their internal rules 
accordingly. Pursuant to Article 27.1 of the Statute, the accounts of the ECB and 
NCBs shall be audited by independent external auditors recommended by the 
Governing Council and approved by the ECOFIN Council; the auditors shall have full 
power to examine all books and accounts of the ECB and NCBs and obtain full 
information about their transactions. The external auditors of the ECB and of the 
NCBs need not be identical, although this does not prevent the ECB‘s external auditor 
from carrying out some audit work directly at the NCBs. It is remarkable that the 
Statutes of non-Eurosystem NCBs apply the same principle according to which that 
the external auditors have to be independent; the exception is the Swedish NCB, 
which is audited by the National Audit Office.  
The common principle in the Eurosystem/ESCB is that annual accounts should be 
adopted by the NCB‘s decision-making bodies, assisted by independent accountants, 
and may be subject to ex post approval by third parties (e.g. the government or 
parliament) and that the NCB‘s decision-making bodies should be able to decide on 
the calculation of the profits independently and professionally. Some NCB Statutes 
establish the size of their statutory capital, their ability to create provisions and/or 
reserves and the mechanism of profit distribution; in very rare cases the method of 
distributing the NCB‘s assets in case of its liquidation is also regulated. With regard 
to profit distribution, profits may be distributed to the State budget only after any 
accumulated losses from previous years have been covered and financial provisions 
deemed necessary to safeguard the real value of the NCB‘s capital and assets have 
been established. 
When the NCB is associated with a financial supervisory authority, errors or 
omissions in the performance of the financial supervisory authority occur and the 
NCB would become liable for damages, either the NCB Statute or another law should 
stipulate the mechanism for reimbursement from the State. 
There are no EU-wide harmonised rules regarding central bank accountability and the 
matter has not been addressed in the ECB Convergence Reports. The reason 
Governors (and the central banks operated by them) are made accountable is because 
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of the duty of loyalty and the duty of non-competition owed to the democratically 
elected institutions that have appointed the Governor. Accountability can take three 
forms – legislative, executive and judiciary.  
The duty to cooperate with the executive branch of the Government usually concerns 
advice in matters of economic policy, central bank functions or similar matters. 
Sometimes an NCB may be asked to comment on draft national legislation. 
Making an NCB answerable to the legislature could mean either: (i) the NCB is 
subject to periodic and extraordinary reporting requirements; or (ii) the NCB operates 
under the control of the national Parliament. The latter is not usually the case. An 
NCB Governor may be heard or requested to provide information or answer any 
questions related to the implementation of the Eurosystem‘s monetary policy and 
decisions before a national parliament, subject to limitations set by the Treaties and 
the Statute and the Eurosystem‘s communication rules. The general duty to inform 
Parliament involves policy reporting and ex post financial reporting.  
Judicial accountability can be divided into two: judicial control of the actions or 
omissions of central banks and the management audit performed by State Audit 
Offices. Several NCBs issue legal instruments and it is therefore natural for these 
legal instruments also to be subject to judicial scrutiny. If the NCB‘s operations are 
subject to the control of a State Audit Office or similar body charged with controlling 
the use of public finances, the scope of the control should be clearly defined by the 
legal framework and should be without prejudice to the activities of the NCB‘s 
independent external auditors. However, it is arguable whether it is possible, given the 
differences among the NCBs, to establish common rules for their accountability, with 
the exception of information regarding the accounts and financial reports.  
The transparency requirement is included in a few NCB Statutes and usually provides 
that its objective is to give the general public a clear image of policies and the 
measures adopted by the NCB. The NCB Statutes usually require NCBs to publish 
balance sheets and other financial information, reports on monetary developments, 
such as balance of payments (including statistics), reports on financial stability and 
financial market supervision and occasionally also scientific papers. The NCBs differ 
considerably in their approach to transparency and it is also difficult to establish 
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transparency requirements by law – a lot would depend on the general public and its 
demands on the central bank.  
Transparency and accountability are not without limitations. Article 37.1 of the 
Statute sets forth that members of the governing bodies and the staff of the ECB and 
the NCBs shall be required, even after their duties have ceased, not to disclose 
information of the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. Several 
NCB Statutes have introduced the principle according to which non-disclosure of 
professional secrets shall be for an indefinite period. The notion of ‗professional 
secrecy‘ in the NCB Statutes usually refers to all information of which persons 
become aware as a consequence of their position in the central bank and which is not 
available to the general public. Exchange of information within the ESCB is usually 
an exception, although there may also be other grounds for disclosing information. 
Unauthorised disclosure is subject to sanctions.  
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4 The stability of the financial system 
4.1 Financial stability as a central banking task and its limitations 
The purpose of this chapter is to address issues related to the stability of financial systems 
and to analyse the legal duties and obligations of NCBs in this respect.  
The chapter is divided into two main issues: ―Financial stability as an ESCB-related task‖, 
and ―Limitations to the central banks‘ role in contributing to financial stability‖. 
Regarding ―Financial stability as an ESCB-related task‖, I will analyse the legal norms 
regulating the contribution to the financial stability as far as the central banks are concerned 
(see Section 4.2.1). In this context, I will assess the role of the Eurosystem/ESCB in 
prudential supervision, the composition of the BSC and the proposed European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB).  
I will then go on to assess the role of the ECB as a supervisory authority (see Section 4.2.2), 
pointing out the legal interpretation of Article 127(6) TFEU [former Article 105(6) TEC] as 
well as of Article 25.2 of the Statute, both from the historical perspective as well as from the 
perspective of practical application. I will therefore propose an alternative to the new 
European financial supervisory architecture on the basis of Article 127(6) TFEU [former 
Article 105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of the Statute.  
Finally, in ―Limitations to the central banks‘ role in contributing to financial stability‖ I will 
discuss the role of central banks as the providers of emergency liquidity assistance (ELA, see 
Section 4.3.1) and the way in which this function is limited by the monetary financing 
prohibition (see Section 4.3.2).  
Due to limitations set on this thesis, prudential supervision of credit institutions, its purpose, 
principles and regulation, all of which naturally belongs to the discussion on financial 
stability, has not been explored. For the same reason, the interplay between ELA and State 
aid rules under EU law will not be addressed. 
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4.2 Financial stability as an ESCB-related task 
4.2.1 Financial stability and the role of central banks 
4.2.1.1 Contribution to financial stability 
Before the creation of EMU, it has already been noted that some coordination or 
centralisation of central bank operations/banking supervision for systemic stability would 
probably be needed under EMU.
533
 The ECB has traditionally favoured the involvement of 
central banks in prudential supervision, expressing the view that an institutional framework in 
which the Eurosystem‘s responsibilities for monetary policy in the euro area are coupled with 
the extensive supervisory responsibilities of NCBs in domestic markets and with enhanced 
cooperation at a euro area wide level is the most appropriate means of tackling the changes 
triggered by the introduction of the euro.
 534
 
Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 105(5) TEC], replicated in Article 3.3 of the Statute, 
sets forth that the ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 
competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the 
stability of the financial system. Neither Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 105(5) TEC] 
nor Article 3.3 of the Statute shall, however, apply to the Member States with a derogation 
under Article 139(2)(c) TFEU and Article 42.1 of the Statute.
535
 Article 65(1)(b) TFEU 
[former Article 58(1)(b) TEC] and Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 105(5) TEC] read in 
conjunction can be interpreted as the prudential supervision of financial institutions being a 
competence of the Member States, with the ECB and the Eurosystem NCBs only being 
                                                 
533  See Lastra R. M., The Independence of the European System of Central Banks, 1992, pp. 513-514, Schoenmaker, 
Banking Supervision in Stage Three of EMU, 1998, p. 585.  
534  See European Central Bank, 2001, p. 7. In paragraph 4.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/42 of 10 September 2008 at the 
request of the Banque centrale du Luxembourg on amendments to the draft law improving the legislative framework for 
Luxembourg as a financial centre and amending the Law of 23 December 1998 on monetary status and on the Banque 
centrale du Luxembourg, available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_42.pdf), it was stated that 
„In general, the ECB has consistently favoured the involvement of central banks in prudential supervision to support the 
Eurosystem‟s task of contributing to the adequate monitoring of risks to financial stability in the euro area. This is of 
particular importance in a context in which the nature and scope of these risks are affected by the introduction of the 
euro and the enhanced integration of financial markets. In this respect, adequate access of central banks to prudential 
information and cooperation between financial supervisory authorities and central banks are essential. Furthermore, the 
recent market turmoil has confirmed the importance of liquidity supervision over financial institutions and, in particular, 
the central banks‟ interest in banks‟ liquidity risk management‟. See also paragraph 2.1.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2009/89 
of 4 November 2009 on the composition of the Board of the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland 
and the membership of the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority, (available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2009_89_f_sign.pdf). 
535  Protocol No 16 on certain provisions relating to Denmark makes it clear that Denmark is to be treated as a Member State 
with a derogation. The United Kingdom is exempted under Articles 4 and 7 of Protocol No 15 on certain provisions 
relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  
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entitled to contribute to the conduct of policies of competent authorities but not to conduct 
these policies as a Eurosystem task.
536
  
Some authors have noted that there is often a separation between the tasks of central banking 
and of banking supervision,
537
 separated also in those euro area Member States in which the 
NCB is the supervisory authority (because the Eurosystem NCB no longer controls money 
creation).
538
 A Eurosystem central bank could, pursuant to Article 127(5) TFEU [former 
Article 105(5) TEC] and Article 3.3 of the Statute, ―contribute‖ to the smooth conduct of 
policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and the stability of the financial system. A non-Eurosystem NCB would need to 
rely on Article 14.4 of the Statute
539
 in order to lawfully contribute to the financial stability. 
Maintaining close involvement of central banks in prudential supervision is an important 
condition for allowing the Eurosystem to contribute adequately by monitoring the risks to 
financial stability in the euro area, in accordance with Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 
105(5) TEC] and Article 3.3 of the Statute, and to safeguard smooth cooperation between the 
central bank functions exercised at the Eurosystem level and the supervisory functions carried 
out at a national level.
540
 A majority of Member States (e.g. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, 
                                                 
536  Supervisory functions are performed on the responsibility and liability of NCBs and are not regarded as being part of the 
functions of the ESCB under Article 14.4 of the Statute (Doherty & Lenihan, 2005, pp. 214-215). In addition, Lastra has 
concluded that the provision of lender of last resort assistance to specific illiquid individual institutions is a national task 
(Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 65).  
537  This separation has been commented by Goodhart as a precondition for any financial crisis to be handled by a committee 
(Goodhart C. A., The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 2009, p. 39).  
538  Some authors find it odd that a Eurosystem NCB would be entitled to provide emergency liquidity assistance (see 
Section 4.3.1) but has no monetary policy responsibilities (Schinasi & Teixeira, The Lender of Last Resort in the 
European Single Financial Market, Working Paper Series No. 43, 2006, p. 6).  
539  Article 14.4 of the Statute sets forth that NCBs may perform functions other than those specified in the Statute unless the 
Governing Council finds, by a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast, that these interfere with the objectives and tasks 
of the ESCB. Such functions shall be performed on the responsibility and liability of NCBs and shall not be regarded as 
being part of the functions of the ESCB. 
540  See paragraph 2.1.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2009/89; paragraph 2.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/39; paragraph 2.1.2 of 
ECB Opinion CON/2006/15 of 9 March 2006 at the request of the Polish Minister of Finance on a draft law on the 
supervision of financial institutions, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2006_15_f_sign.pdf; 
paragraph 5 of ECB Opinion CON/2001/35 of 8 November 2001 at the request of the German Ministry of Finance on a 
draft law establishing an integrated financial services supervision, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/EN_CON_2001_35_f_sign.pdf; paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion CON/2001/10. 
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the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden)
541
 have 
explicit recognition of the NCB‘s financial stability role in their NCB Statutes. The situation 
is less clear regarding the other Member States.
542,
 
543
 The respective national provisions in 
English can be found in Table 4-1.  
In substance, those provisions are similar to each other; however, some NCB Statutes also 
contain elements that do not have an equivalent in other Statutes. For example, in Article 23 
of the Belgium NCB Statute, it is stated that for all decisions and transactions made in the 
context of its contribution to the stability of the financial system, the Bank shall enjoy the 
same degree of independence as that determined by Article 108 TEC [now Article 130 
TFEU]. Since Article 130 TFEU and Article 7 of the Statute, which establish the principle of 
central bank independence, provide that ‗when exercising the powers and carrying out the 
tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the Statute‘ [My emphasis, AT.], 
and given that the contribution to [the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent 
authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the 
financial system] has been set forth in Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 105(5) TEC] and 
replicated in Article 3.3 of the Statute, one can conclude that the concept of central bank 
independence applies to all tasks that the NCB would have to carry out, and that the Belgian 
NCB Statute has clearly stated what can be concluded in its interpretation of the above Treaty 
and Statute provisions. However, at the same time decisions independently made by the NCB 
in contributing to the stability of the financial system are subject to repayment.
544
 Under 
Belgian law, the State shall guarantee the NCB the repayment of any credit granted in the 
context of its contribution to the stability of the financial system and guarantee the Bank 
                                                 
541  See (1) Article 44b of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Articles 20 and 23 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; 
Articles 9 and 12 of the Belgian NCB Statute; (3) Article 2(6) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute. Note that Bulgarian law 
does not refer to financial stability but to the ‗stability of the banking system‘; (4) Article 6(2)(e) of the Cypriot NCB 
Statute; (5) Article 2(2) of the Czech NCB Statute; (6) Article 2(5) of the Estonian NCB Statute. The same principle is 
also established in Article 2(3)(3) of the new Estonian NCB Statute that enters into force upon the adoption of the euro; 
(7) Article 3(2)(3) of the Finnish NCB Statute; (8) Article 3 of the German NCB Statute; (9) Article 55A(4) of the Greek 
NCB Statute referring to the stability and effectiveness of credit system and of the financial sector in general; (10) 
Article 4(7) of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (11) Article 6A(2)(a) of the Irish NCB Statute; (12) Article 5(1)(c) of the 
Maltese NCB Statute; (13) Article 3(2) of the Dutch NCB Statute; (14) Article 3(2)(6a) of the Polish NCB Statute; (15) 
Article 12(c) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (16) Article 2(2)(b) of the Romanian NCB Statute; (17) Article 2(3) of the 
Slovak NCB Statute; (18) Article 4(3) of the Slovenian NCB Statute; (19) Article 7(5)(b) of the Spanish NCB Statute; 
(20) Chapter 4 Article 3 and Chapter 6 Article 9 of the Swedish NCB Statute. 
542  With regard to the United Kingdom, financial stability is mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding between HM 
Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority, agreed on or about 22 March 2006, available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/mou.pdf or 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2006/025.shtml (visited on 6 September 2010).  
543  With regard to the NCBs of Denmark, France, Italy and Latvia there is no information in their respective Statutes about 
whether the financial stability forms a part of their tasks or not. In Lithuania, it could be assume the task of financial 
stability is included as the Lithuanian NCB is simultaneously in charge of the supervision of credit institutions.  
544  Article 20 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; Article 9 of the Belgian NCB Statute.  
 154 
 
against any loss incurred as a result of any transaction necessary in this regard. This provision 
aims at protecting the financial independence of the NCB as well as at ensuring compliance 
with the monetary financing prohibition under Article 123 TFEU [former Article 101 TEC] 
(see also Section 4.3.2).  
In Slovenia, the objective to strive for financial stability appears to oblige the Slovenian NCB 
to take account of the principles of an open market economy and free competition.
545
 In 
Slovenia, the NCB has been expressly made responsible for the banking system‘s general 
liquidity.
546
  
The financial stability function can also cover the oversight of the payment systems. 
However, as payment systems oversight is subject to a different regulatory regime, it will not 
be discussed here.  
4.2.1.2 The role of the Eurosystem in banking supervision 
In order to determine the Eurosystem‘s role in banking supervision, one needs to establish the 
meaning of ‗contribution to the smooth conduct of policies relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system‘.  
As indicated above, neither Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 105(5) TEC] nor Article 3.3 
of the Statute shall apply to the Member States with a derogation. Therefore, in interpreting 
these legal provisions, one should only refer to the Eurosystem and not to the ESCB as a 
whole.
547
 In 2001, the ECB had already noted that it would seem appropriate for the changes 
triggered by the introduction of the euro to be tackled by an institutional framework in which 
the Eurosystem‘s responsibilities for monetary policy in the euro area are coupled with 
extensive supervisory responsibilities of NCBs in domestic markets and with reinforced 
cooperation at an area-wide level.
548
 The following key issues were put forward by the ECB: 
(1) systemic focus becoming increasingly relevant; (2) conflicts of interests and concentration 
of power are not a real concern; and (3) conglomeration arguments need to be restated.
549
 The 
ECB then concluded that, when viewed from a Eurosystem perspective, the attribution of 
                                                 
545  Article 4(3) of the Slovenian NCB Statute.  
546  The third indent of Article 11 of the Slovenian NCB Statute.   
547  Note that the title of this Section differs from the similar previously one used by Smits earlier (Smits, The role of the 
ESCB in banking supervision, 2005, p. 199).  
548  See European Central Bank, 2001, p. 7.  
549  See European Central Bank, 2001, pp. 7-8.  
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extensive supervisory responsibilities (i.e., both macro- and micro-prudential) to NCBs is 
likely to prove beneficial.
550
  
The ECB saw the following benefits: (1) it would allow the networking of supervisors within 
the Eurosystem to be exploited, with improved monitoring of risks to financial stability in the 
single currency area and closer coordination with central banking functions exercised at the 
Eurosystem level; (2) the NCBs‘ involvement might also extend beyond the banking sector, 
since systemic concerns are more and more related to the presence of large, cross-sectoral 
organisations.
551
 
Article 25.1 of the Statute provides that the ECB may offer advice and be consulted by the 
Council, the Commission and the competent authorities of the Member States on the scope 
and implementation of Union legislation relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and to the stability of the financial system.
552
 Past ECB opinions on draft national 
legislation reforming the institutional framework for prudential supervision in Member States 
have noted that:  
1. NCBs have traditionally been closely involved in the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions due to their pivotal role in the financial system, in particular regarding 
implementing monetary policy and ensuring the proper functioning of payment 
systems;
553
 or that 
2. maintaining close involvement of NCBs in prudential supervision is an important 
condition for allowing the Eurosystem to contribute adequately to monitoring the 
risks to financial stability in the euro area, and to safeguard a smooth coordination 
                                                 
550  See European Central Bank, 2001, p. 9.  
551  See European Central Bank, 2001, p. 9.  
552  While Article 25.1 of the Statute applies to all Member States, the general consultative function of the ECB in respect of 
draft legislation in its fields of competence under Article 127(4) TFEU and Article 4 of the Statute does not apply to the 
UK under Articles 4 and 7 of Protocol No 15 on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland.  
553  See paragraph 2.1.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2009/89; paragraph 2.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/16, paragraph 2.1.2 of 
ECB Opinion CON/2007/33 of 5 November 2007 at the request of the Austrian Ministry of Finance on a draft law 
amending the Law on banking, the Law on savings banks, the Law on the Financial Market Supervisory Authority and 
the Law on the Oesterreichische Nationalbank http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2007_33_f_sign.pdf, paragraph 
2.1.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/15; paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion CON/2004/24 of 19 November 2003 at the request of 
the Irish Department of Finance on a draft Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland Bill (No. 2) 2003, 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2003_24_f_sign.pdf; paragraph 6 of ECB Opinion CON/2003/23 of 24 October 
2003 at the request of the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands on a draft law on provisions concerning the merger of 
De Nederlandsche Bank and the Pensions and Insurance Supervisory Authority Foundation, 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2003_23_f_sign.pdf).  
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between the central banking functions exercised at the Eurosystem level and the 
supervisory functions carried out at national level;
554
 or that  
3. both of the above apply at the same time.555 
The de Larosière Report also called for greater cooperation between the supervisory 
authorities and the central banks, noting in Paragraph 126 that „Supervisors should act as 
early as possible in order to address the vulnerabilities identified in a given institution, and 
use all means available to them to this effect (e.g. calling on contributions from shareholders, 
fostering the acquisition of the institution concerned by a stronger one). In this respect, the 
role of central banks which are by essence well placed to observe the first signs of 
vulnerability of a bank is of crucial importance. Therefore in countries where supervision is 
not in the hands of the central bank, a close collaboration must be ensured between 
supervisors and central banks.‟556 
There are NCBs that are themselves competent national authorities regarding the prudential 
supervision of financial undertakings (the ECB‘s task of prudential supervision will be 
discussed in Section 4.2.2). As shown in Table 4-1, the Eurosystem NCB Statutes of Cyprus, 
Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain also reflect the status of 
those NCBs as supervisors and establish their rights and obligations in this regard (outside the 
Eurosystem, similar provisions can be found in the NCB Statutes of Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Lithuania and Romania).
557,
 
558
  
                                                 
554  Paragraph 2.1.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2009/89, paragraph 2.1.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2007/33, paragraph 5 of ECB 
Opinion CON/2001/35, paragraph 4 of ECB Opinion CON/2001/10 of 25 May 2001 at the request of the Austrian 
Ministry of Finance on a draft Article of the Federal law establishing and organising the financial market supervisory 
authority and amending the laws relating to banking, securities supervision, investment funds, equities funds, savings 
banks, building societies, mortgage banks, mortgage bonds, the IAPL, the stock exchange (1989), insurance supervision, 
motor vehicle third party liability insurance (1994), pension funds, capital markets, the Commercial Code, companies 
limited by shares, limited liability companies and the National Bank (1984) (available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/EN_CON_2001_10_f_sign.pdf).  
555  Paragraph 2.1.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2009/89, paragraph 2.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/16, paragraph 2.1.2 of ECB 
Opinion CON/2007/33, and paragraph 2.1.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2006/15.  
556  See de Larosière, et al., 2009.  
557  See (1) Articles 2(6) and 20(3) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 6(2)(d) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Articles 
2(2), 44, 44a, 45, 45a, 45b, 45d, and 46 to 46f of the Czech NCB Statute; (4) Articles 2(1)(d) and 55A of the Greek NCB 
Statute; (5) Articles 8(1), 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 461 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute as well as Article 8(2) of the new 
Lithuanian NCB Statute; (6) Article 4(1) of the Dutch NCB Statute; (7) Article 17 of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (8) 
Article 2(2)(b) and 25 of the Romanian NCB Statute; (9) Article 2(3) of the Slovak NCB Statute; (10) Article 12(1), 18 
and 23 of the Slovenian NCB Statute; and (11) Article 7(6) of the Spanish NCB Statute. The Czech and Lithuanian NCB 
Statutes are particularly detailed in this regard; see Table Tõrge! Ei leia viiteallikat.. CEBS also lists Italy as an NCB 
with the supervisory powers, although the Italian NCB Statute is silent about it.  
558 Doherty and Lenihan describe in great deatail the supervisory role of NCBs under national laws, noting that the 
supervision of credit and financial institutions is organised under a wide variety of legal structures, with varying degrees 
of central bank involvement and referring to all of those different cases (Doherty & Lenihan, 2005, pp. 215-218). 
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The most valuable commodity for the ECB and the NCBs (both in the Eurosystem and 
outside) is the information relevant for addressing the systemic concerns. Table 4-2 illustrates 
the arrangements for exchanging supervisory information by the NCBs, in addition to the 
provisions listed in Table 3-19 and the discussion provided in Section 3.3.3. Some non-
Eurosystem NCB Statutes express clear distinction between national and cross-border 
supervisory information sharing mechanisms.
559
 On the other hand, for the Eurosystem NCBs 
it seems that it is possible to share supervisory information without separating national and 
cross-border arrangements,
560
 especially in those cases where the NCB is also the supervisory 
authority.
561
 The third alternative is to establish in the NCB Statutes that the duty of 
confidentiality will not apply in certain situations (those NCBs all belong to the 
Eurosystem).
562
 In the opposing six cases (most of them outside the Eurosystem), however, 
the information sharing arrangement in the NCB Statutes is explicitly made subject to the 
duty of professional secrecy.
563
  
The information normally subject to confidentiality and professional secrecy requirements 
may be shared between supervisory authorities and NCBs for the purposes of the exercise of 
their respective tasks.
564
 The Eurosystem NCBs of Austria
565
 and Ireland
566
 and the non-
Eurosystem NCBs of Estonia
567
 and Latvia
568
 are statutorily entitled to receive prudential 
information from competent national authorities for further processing and analysis. It should 
be noted that in Estonia and Ireland the supervisory authority forms part of the legal 
personality of the NCB, which is not the case in Austria and Latvia. In Sweden, which is a 
                                                 
559  (1) Articles 4(2) and 5 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of Article 23 of the Polish NCB Statute; 
(3) paragraphs 5 to 19 of Article 3 of the Romanian NCB Statute;. 
560  See (1) Article 56 of the Belgian NCB Statute, Article 35 of the Belgian Organic Act; (2) Articles 4(3) and 32a(2) of the 
Slovak NCB Statute; (3) Article 48 of the Slovenian NCB Statute; and (4) Article 7(8) of the Spanish NCB Statute. See 
also Article 2(3) of the Czech NCB Statute; (5) Article 47 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute (also Articles 47 and 54(2) of 
the new Lithuanian NCB Statute). 
561  On all occasions but one listed in footnote 560; only the Belgian NCB is not a supervisory authority.  
562  See (1) Article 25(2)(b) of the Cypriot NCB Statute, which provides that the obligation to maintain professional secrecy 
shall not apply to the provision of information to the ECB in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and the 
Statute. See also (2) Article 26 of the Finnish NCB Statute; (3) Article L 144-1(2) of the French NCB Statute; (4) Article 
33(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (5) paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 41 of the Maltese NCB Statute.  
563  For the Eurosystem, see Article 56 of the Belgian NCB Statute, Article 35 of the Belgian Organic Act. For the non-
Eurosystem, see (1) Article 4(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 47 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (3) Article 
41(3) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (4) Article 23(9) of the Polish NCB Statute; and (5) paragraphs 6, 11, 14 and 16 of 
Article 3 of the Romanian NCB Statute.  
564  No specific legal framework for the exchange of information may be needed between the NCB and the national 
prudential supervision authority when both institutions are chaired by the same person. See Paragraph 2.4.2 of ECB 
Opinion CON/2006/15. 
565  See paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 44b of the Austrian NCB Statute.  
566  See Article 33C(9) of the Irish NCB Statute.  
567  See Article 2(5) of the Estonian NCB Statute.  
568  Article 6(2) of the Latvian NCB Statute. 
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Member State with a derogation, the reporting line appears to be turned the other way around, 
so that the Swedish NCB has to consult the national supervisory authority.
569
 
4.2.1.3 Banking Supervision Committee 
The BSC is an ESCB committee (see Section 2.3.2), which was established by the Governing 
Council in 1998 to take over the functions previously performed by the Banking Supervisory 
Sub-Committee, created by the Committee of Governors in 1990
570
 and subsequently 
established at the EMI in 1994.
571
  
The BSC is composed of high-level representatives from the national banking supervisory 
authorities, NCBs and the ECB, the latter also providing the Secretariat to the Committee.
572
 
The Commission and the CEBS have observer status in the BSC.
573
 Membership of the BSC 
extends to the entire European Union and is not restricted to euro area Member States only 
since financial institutions‘ activities are not necessarily confined to the euro area but may 
encompass the EU‘s single financial market as a whole.574 As was noted in Section 2.3.2, the 
ESCB committees meet in different compositions, the standard composition for the 
Eurosystem NCBs and the extended composition for the entire ESCB. The standard 
composition appears not to be the prevalent modus operendi of the BSC.
575
 
The BSC‘s mandate is not publicly available.576 According to Scheller, the BSC‘s mandate, 
which was reviewed in 2004,
577
 is to assist the Eurosystem in carrying out its statutory tasks 
in the field of the prudential supervision of credit institutions and in ensuring the stability of 
                                                 
569  See Chapter 4 Article 3 of the Swedish NCB Statute.   
570  Other sources claim that the Banking Supervisory Sub-Committee of the Committee of Governors of the European 
Community was set up in 1989 (Papademos, 2007, p. 28). 
571  See Scheller, 2006, p. 113.  
572  See Papademos, 2007, p. 28. However, Papademos refers to ‗high-level representatives from the EU banking supervisory 
authorities‘, while in fact they are national banking supervisory authorities. The Commission and CEBS are mentioned 
separately.  
573  See footnote 572.  
574  See Papademos, 2007, p. 29.  
575  See Papademos, 2007, p. 29.  
576  Apart from the ECB Rules of Procedure describing general conditions for the establishment and reporting of the ESCB 
committees, there is no ECB legal instrument describing the tasks of the BSC. Even ECB Opinion CON/2009/88 and 
ECB Opinion CON/2008/63 of 7 November 2008 on a draft Commission decision establishing the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors, OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, p. 1, are silent on this, although the division of labour between 
CEBS and BSC is mentioned. A vague reference has been made in paragraph 7 of ECB Opinion CON/2004/7 of 20 
February 2004 at the request of the Council of the European Union on a proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directives 73/239/EEC, 85/611/EEC, 91/675/EEC, 93/6/EEC and 
94/19/EC and Directives 2000/12/EC, 2002/83/EC and 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, in 
order to establish a new financial services committee organisational structure (COM(2003) 659 final), OJ C 58, 
6.3.2004, p. 23.  
577  The reason for that was the extension of the Lamfalussy approach for financial regulation and supervision to all financial 
sectors at the end of 2003. That led to the establishment of CEBS and the mandate of BSC therefore had to be revised to 
reflect these developments (Papademos, 2007, p. 29). 
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the financial system.
578
 The creation of the BSC did not imply a move in the direction of 
establishing a single supervisory authority, but rather aimed at establishing the conditions that 
would allow the national supervisors to operate as effectively as a single authority.
579
  
In accordance with its mandate, the tasks of BSC can be divided into three.
580
 The first and 
primary task of the BSC is the contribution to monitoring and assessing developments in the 
euro area and EU banking and financial sectors from a financial stability perspective. By 
analysing the financial sector from the macro-prudential perspective, the BSC contributes, 
inter alia, to the preparation of the ECB‘s Financial Stability Review.581 A second task of the 
BSC is the contribution to the design of financial regulation and supervisory tools from a 
macro-prudential perspective, thereby enforcing Article 25.1 of the Statute. The third task of 
the BSC is the promotion of cooperation between central banks and banking supervisors on 
issues of common interest, including cooperation with the CEBS, Committee of European 
Securities Regulators (CESR) and the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS).  
As an ESCB committee, the BSC has no decision-making powers of its own and reports to 
the Governing and General Councils of the ECB.  
4.2.1.4 European Systemic Risk Board 
Although there does not seem to have been any criticism of the work of BSC, the de 
Larosière Report proposed, in Paragraph 153, that „[T]he present EU supervisory 
arrangements place too much emphasis on the supervision of individual firms, and too little 
on the macro-prudential side. The fact that this failing is duplicated elsewhere in the world 
makes it a greater, not a lesser, issue. The Group believes that to be effective macro-
prudential supervision must encompass all sectors of finance and not be confined to banks, as 
well as the wider macro-economic context. This oversight also should take account of global 
issues. Macro-prudential supervision requires, in addition to the judgements made by 
individual Member States, a judgement to be taken at EU level. The Group believes that this 
requires that an Institution at EU level be entrusted with this task. It recommends that the 
                                                 
578  See footnote 571. The creation of the BSC became instrumental in fostering smooth cooperation between the 
Eurosystem and the national banking supervisory authorities after 1 January 1999 where the jurisdiction for the single 
monetary policy, which was supranational, and the jurisdiction for banking supervision, which remained national, no 
longer coincided and the BSC provided a platform to bridge this institutional asymmetry (Papademos, 2007, pp. 28-29).  
579  See Papademos, 2007, p. 29.  
580  The distribution of the BSC‘s tasks into three was provided by Papademos (2007), who also described them in detail. 
581  See European Central Bank, 2009, p. 9.  
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ECB/ESCB be explicitly and formally charged with this responsibility in the European 
Union.‟582  
The Commission has proposed that in the new European financial supervisory architecture 
macro-prudential supervision should be conferred on the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB).
583
 The proposal consisted of two elements: (1) the Commission‘s Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro-prudential 
oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board and (2) 
the Commission‘s Proposal for a Council Decision entrusting the European Central Bank 
with specific tasks concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board.
584
 The 
legal basis for the draft Council Regulation was Article 95 TEC, which is now Article 114 
TFEU, and Article 105(6) TEC, which is now Article 127(6) TFEU, for the draft Council 
Decision. ECB Opinion CON/2009/88, reflected no objections about this legal arrangement 
or the proposal as such.
585
 However, the creation of the ESRB does create matters for debate, 
not only because that there will be no EU institution formally charged with regulation, as 
proposed by De Larosière Report, but mostly because the Council appears to be regulating 
something that was already up and running as an ESCB committee.
586
  
According to the proposal, the ESRB will be established as an independent body, without 
legal personality, responsible for macro-prudential oversight across the EU financial system. 
In this regard, the ESRB differs from the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), which 
would have legal personality. The ESRB is expected to provide high quality macro-prudential 
assessments, as well as issue risk warnings and recommendations whenever potential 
imbalances may pose a threat to financial stability. 
The objectives of the ESRB are threefold. The first objective is to develop a framework for 
macro-prudential supervision in Europe so as to better address the issue of fragmented risk 
                                                 
582  See de Larosière, et al., 2009.  
583  Originally, the reference was made to the European Systemic Risk Council that was to replace the Banking Supervision 
Committee (de Larosière, et al., 2009, p. 44). Recine and Teixeira reveal that the ECOFIN Council of 9 June 2009 
renamed the proposed macro-prudential body as the European Systemic Risk Board, possibly in order to follow the 
terminology used for the setting-up of the Financial Stability Board by the G-20 in April 2009 (Recine & Teixeira, 2009, 
p. 16). 
584  See Commission's Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro-
prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, COM (2009) 499 final 
2009/0140 (COD), 2009; and Commission's Proposal for a Council Decision entrusting the European Central Bank with 
specific tasks concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board, COM(2009) 500 final, 2009/0141 
(AVC), 2009.  
585  Moreover, no reference to the legal bases was made by the ECB in its Financial Stability Review of December 2009 
(European Central Bank, 2009). 
586  A further issue is whether central bank independence would be breached or whether the proposals would violate Article 
25 of the Statute as discussed in Section 4.2.2.  
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analysis at the national level. The second objective of the ESRB is to enhance the 
effectiveness of early warning systems by improving the interaction between micro- and 
macro-prudential analyses. The final objective of the ESRB is to translate risk assessments 
into action by the relevant authorities. The objectives of the ESRB are slightly different from 
those of the BSC. For example, there is no reference to the contribution to the design of 
financial regulation and supervisory tools, which exists for the BSC.  
The ECON Reports propose that the ESRB must (a) identify and/or collect the relevant data 
from financial institutions and through the ESAs; (b) declare the existence of an emergency 
situation, where appropriate; (c) issue warnings where risks are deemed to be significant and, 
where appropriate, make them public; (d) develop a common set of quantitative and 
qualitative indicators (risk dashboard), which would serve as the basis to assign a supervisory 
rating to cross-border institutions that potentially could pose a systemic risk.
587
 Furthermore, 
a new element, not repeated in any other ECON Report, in the report on the ESRB proposes 
that in order to enhance the awareness of risks in the European economy and to prioritise 
such risks, the ERSB, in close cooperation with the European System of Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS), shall elaborate a colour-coded system corresponding to situations of 
different risk levels.
588
 
The ESRB will not have any binding powers to impose measures on Member States or 
national authorities. The powers of the ESRB consist of (1) warnings and recommendations 
and (2) information analysis. When significant risks occur, the ESRB shall provide warnings 
and, where appropriate, issue recommendations for remedial action. Recommendations may 
be either general or specific in nature and shall have an addressee (in addition, they shall also 
be transmitted to the Council and, if sent to several national supervisory authorities, to the 
ESAs). Warnings and recommendations may be made public if the General Board of the 
ESRB so decides, provided that the addressee is also made aware of this decision prior to the 
publication of a warning or recommendation. Recommendations shall include a specified 
timeline for the policy response. The addressees shall communicate the actions undertaken in 
response to the recommendations made to the ESRB or explain why they have not acted (the 
Council and, where relevant, the ESAs shall be informed). In order to fulfil its mission, the 
ESRB will be entitled to the collection and analysis of information. This will be made in 
close cooperation with the ESAs, the NCBs and the Member States and the ESRB may 
                                                 
587  Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5804642 (visited on 7 September 2010).  
588  See footnote 587. 
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request information from them. Although the principle is that the information shall be 
provided in summary or collective form so that individual financial institutions cannot be 
identified, it is also possible for the ESRB to request ESAs to provide data that are not in 
summary or collective form. 
The internal organisation of the ESRB will include (1) a General Board, (2) a Steering 
Committee and (3) a Secretariat. The General Board will be the main decision-making body 
of the ESRB and will be composed of voting and non-voting members. The voting members 
will be the Governors of the NCBs, the President and the Vice-President of the ECB, a 
member of the European Commission, and the chairpersons of the three ESAs. The non-
voting members of the General Board will be one high-level representative per Member State 
of the competent national supervisory authorities and the President of the Economic and 
Financial Committee (EFC). The composition is slightly different from that of the BSC but in 
substance as it constitutes a forum for the central bankers and the supervisors.  
Although the ESRB has no regulatory powers, its decision-making is meticulously regulated. 
The decisions will be taken by simple majority, with the exception of decisions concerning 
the publication of a warning or recommendation. In such cases, a majority of two-thirds of 
the votes is required. 
A Steering Committee will assist in the decision-making process of the ESRB by preparing 
the meetings of the General Board, reviewing the documents to be discussed and monitoring 
the progress of ongoing work The Steering Committee will be formed by the Chair and Vice-
Chair of the General Board, the chairpersons of the three ESAs, the President of the EFC, a 
member of the Commission and five members of the General Board who are also members of 
the General Council of the ECB. 
The ECB will act as the Secretariat and therefore provide analytical, statistical, logistical and 
administrative support for the ESRB.
589
 This includes, among other activities, the preparation 
of the meetings, the collection and processing of qualitative and quantitative information, and 
the conduct of analysis and assessments necessary for the fulfilment of the ESRB tasks. The 
Secretariat will also support the Advisory Technical Committee,
590
 which will, on request by 
the General Board, provide advice and assistance for the General Board on a number of 
issues that are within the scope of the ESRB. The budgetary cost related to the ESRB will be 
                                                 
589  One could observe that similar duties are performed by the ECB with regard to the BSC.  
590  Also referred to as the Advisory Scientific Committee in the ECON Report on ESRB; see footnote 587.  
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borne by the ECB and will not have any direct implication for the EU budget as the ECB will 
provide its staff and resources to fulfil the tasks of the Secretariat of the ESRB. It is 
noteworthy that the same tasks are in substance carried out by the ECB while hosting the 
BSC.  
When assessing whether the ESRB meets the core principles of the institutional framework 
for prudential supervision the following can be observed. While the ESRB‘s responsibility 
for macro-prudential supervision
591
 within the European Union is stated fairly clearly, it is 
arguable whether the ESRB is operationally independent.
592
 It is not a legal person and its 
decision-making bodies are composed of persons who are already hold positions in the 
institutions and bodies of the European Union. There is no power for the ESRB to issue 
binding rules and it does not have the ability to independently cooperate with bodies other 
than the ESFS, the Commission or the ECB. It appears to fulfil the sound governance 
principle, as it is operating through collegial decision-making bodies. However, it is arguable 
whether the decision-making bodies are too large to be efficient.
593
 It is obvious that this EU 
body does not enjoy any budgetary independence as it is dependent on the ECB‘s 
contributions and nowhere in the Commission‘s Proposal for a Council Decision entrusting 
the European Central Bank with specific tasks concerning the functioning of the European 
Systemic Risk Board or the Commission‘s Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Community macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board is the budgetary aspect of the 
ESRB addressed, except in the explanatory memorandum stating that the budgetary cost 
related to the ESRB will be borne by the ECB and will not have any direct implication for the 
Union‘s budget.594  
                                                 
591  The draft Regulation actually uses the word ‗oversight‘ in Article 3.  
592  One could even argue that in terms of operational independence, there is very little difference between the ESRB and the 
BSC, apart from the fact that the ESRB is more prominent than any other ESCB committee.  
593  Sibert claims that the structure of the ESRB is far from ideal. ‗It is to be composed of the 27 EU national central bank 
governors, the ECB President and Vice-President, a Commission member and the three chairs of the new European 
Supervisory Authorities. In addition, a representative from the national supervisory authority of each EU country and the 
President of the Economic and Financial Committee may attend meetings of the ESRB, but may not vote. This 
lumbering army of 61 central bankers and related bureaucrats is a body clearly designed for maximum inefficiency; it is 
too big, it is too homogeneous, it lacks independence, and its members are already sufficiently employed.‘ (Sibert, 
2010).  
594  See European Commission, 2009, p. 4. 
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Finally, in terms of transparency and accountability, the draft proposal recognises the right of 
the general public to have access to the ESRB‘s documents595 and provides that the ESRB 
shall report at least annually to the European Parliament and the Council. However, the 
disclosure of warnings and recommendations has been left to the discretion of the General 
Board without any guidance on the principles or criteria for the minimum disclosure of 
information. 
4.2.2 Role of the ECB as a supervisory authority 
4.2.2.1 History 
Throughout its history, the ECB has never performed a supervisory function in its traditional, 
micro-prudential sense. However, granting prudential supervision rights to the ECB had been 
an option,
596
 and Article 25.2 of the draft Statute prepared by the Committee of Governors 
provided that the ECB may formulate, interpret and implement policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit and other financial institutions for which it is designated as 
competent supervisory authority.
597
 The outcome of the fierce debate at the 
Intergovernmental Conference was a rejection of this proposal and led to an agreement in 
Maastricht to insert in TEC an enabling clause under which the political authorities of the 
Community can confer further tasks upon the ECB.
598
  
Article 105(6) TEC therefore provided that the ECOFIN Council may, acting unanimously, 
confer on the ECB specific tasks in the area of prudential supervision. It can act only on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the ECB, and the European Parliament‘s 
assent is required.  
The procedure following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is different: the European 
Parliament now needs only to be consulted together with the ECB, and so the Parliament 
                                                 
595  Interestingly, the draft Regulation refers to Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 
145, 31.5.2001, p. 43; and not to the ECB Public Access Decision, as one might have expected, since the ESRB is 
institutionally located with the ECB under the Commission‘s Proposal for a Council Decision entrusting the European 
Central Bank with specific tasks concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board.  
596  See van den Berg, 2005, pp. 271-287. 
597  See Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community, 1990, 
p. 9. In the Commentary to the draft Statute it was explained that the ability of the NCBs and other competent national 
authorities to conduct prudential supervision will not be affected. The draft Article 25.2 of the Statute offers the 
possibility of designating the ECB as a competent supervisory authority, in which case it might formulate, interpret and 
implement supervisory policies. Any future transferral of competence to the ECB should be specified by Community 
legislation for which the Treaty would have to provide an enabling clause (Committee of Governors of the Central Banks 
of the Member States of the European Economic Community, 1990, p. 26).  
598  See Smits, European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000, p. 356.  
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could no longer veto a Council‘s regulation conferring the prudential supervision task on the 
ECB.
599
  
Under the new legal regime, there is also an option not to follow this procedure but to opt for 
an ordinary procedure. The so called ‗passarelle‘ clause enables the Council to amend the 
procedure for adopting a legislative act from a special legislative procedure to the ordinary 
one under Article 48(7) TEU; there is a unanimity requirement for the Council as well as the 
European Parliament‘s involvement (while Article 48(7) TEU requires consent as a general 
rule, in a number of articles there is a consultation requirement).
600
 Sometimes other 
institutions and bodies besides the European Parliament are also consulted.
601
 In addition, 
pursuant to Article 48(7) TEU, all national parliaments must be notified and if any single one 
makes known its opposition within six months, the decision is not adopted.
602
  
4.2.2.2 Statutory provisions and applicability 
Article 127(6) TFEU [former Article 105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of the Statute set forth 
that the Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the ECB, 
confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception 
of insurance undertakings. Furthermore, this is also confirmed by Article 25.2 of the 
Statute,
603
 which provides that in accordance with any regulation of the Council under Article 
127(6) TFEU [former Article 105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of the Statute, the ECB may 
perform specific tasks concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and other financial institutions, with the exception of insurance undertakings. 
                                                 
599  Frankal, Arruga Oleaga and Coussens however do not refer to ‗regulation‘ as it is stated in TFEU but ‗decision‘ instead 
(Frankal, Arruga Oleaga, & Coussens, 2007-2008/2, p. 144). 
600  For example: (1) Article 21(3) TFEU; (2) Article 22 TFEU; (3) Article 23 TFEU; (4) Article 64(3) TFEU; (5) Article 
77(3) TFEU; (6) Article 81(3) TFEU; (7) Article 87(3) TFEU; (8) Article 89 TFEU; (9) Article 113 TFEU; (10) Article 
115 TFEU; (11) Article 118 TFEU; (12) Article 126(14) TFEU; (13) Article 127(6) TFEU; (14) Article 153(2) TFEU; 
(15) Article 182(4) TFEU; (16) Article 192(2) TFEU; (17) Article 194(3) TFEU; (18) Article 203 TFEU (19) Article 262 
TFEU: (20) Article 308 TFEU; (21) Article 311 TFEU; (22) Article 333 TFEU; and (23) Article 349 TFEU provide for 
consultation requirement. 
601  For example: (1) Article 113 TFEU; (2) Article 115 TFEU ; (3) Article 126(14) TFEU (4) Article 127(6) TFEU; (5) 
Article 153(2) TFEU; (6) Article 182(4) TFEU; (7) Article 192(2) TFEU; (8) Article 308 TFEU. 
602  See Frankal, Arruga Oleaga, & Coussens, 2007-2008/2, pp. 137-138.  
603  Remarkably, the task of prudential supervision has not been placed in Article 3 of the Statute together with other tasks of 
the ESCB. The rationale may be that this was a task foreseen for the ECB alone and not for the entire ESCB. However, 
Smits points out that Article 127(6) TFEU is not a separate article but a paragraph in an article describing the tasks of the 
ESCB (Smits, European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000, p. 355). Smits‘ 
observation is supported by the language of Article 132(1) TFEU, which stipulates, among others that „[I]n order to 
carry out the tasks entrusted to the ESCB, [...]‟, while one of the legal bases for the ECB regulations is also Article 25.2 
of the Statute. 
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It is noteworthy that under Article 139(2)(c) TFEU Article 127(6) TFEU [former Article 
105(6) TEC] shall apply to all members of the ESCB, not just the Eurosystem. In addition, 
Article 42 of the Statute, which specifies the provisions not applicable to the Member States 
with a derogation, does not list Article 25.2 of the Statute. Even Articles 4 and 7 of Protocol 
No 15 on certain provisions relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland do not exclude the applicability of Article 127(6) TFEU [former Article 105(6) TEC] 
or of Article 25.2 of the Statute to the United Kingdom.  
However, this EU-wide supervisory competence has no EU-wide regulatory backing from the 
Statute. While the first indent of Article 132(1) TFEU [former Article 110(1) TEC] and 
Article 34.1 of the Statute authorise the ECB to make regulations to the extent necessary to 
implement the tasks defined in, inter alia, Article 25.2 of the Statute, those regulations would 
only be applicable to the Member States that have adopted the euro. In particular, Article 
139(1)(e) TFEU provides that acts of the European Central Bank issued under Article 132 
TFEU [former Article 110 TEC] shall not apply to Member States with a derogation.
604
 The 
same is also true for the United Kingdom.
605
 Therefore, while being lawfully competent to 
carry out prudential supervisory tasks throughout the EU once the Council has issued its 
regulation, the ECB‘s power to issue legal acts in this field would unfortunately be limited to 
the euro area Member States.
606
  
However, even with those limitations, the issue of whether the creation of the ESRB was 
justified from the legal point of view would find some opposition.  
4.2.2.3 Scope of the ECB’s supervisory task 
From the legal point of view, the ECB would be competent, if activated by the Council by its 
regulation, to conduct the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial 
institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings of the euro area.
607
  
Lastra has described supervision in a broad sense as a process with four stages: (1) licensing, 
authorisation or chartering (entry into business); (2) supervision stricto sensu;
608
 (3) 
                                                 
604  Respectively, Article 42.1 of the Statute and Article 34 of the Statute. 
605  See Articles 4 and 7 of Protocol No 15 . 
606  Padoa-Schioppa has noted that the simplified procedure is a highly significant indication that the drafters of the Treaty 
clearly understood the anomaly of the double separation and saw the potential difficulties arising from it; it could also be 
interpreted as a ‗last resort clause‘, which might become necessary if the interaction between the Eurosystem and 
national supervisory authorities turned out not to work efficiently (Padoa-Schioppa, Regulating Finance: Balacing 
Freedom and Risk, 2004, p. 78). 
607  Some authors have suggested that the Member States could delegate their supervisory powers to the ECB by means of a 
binding agreement with the ECB (Hertig, Lee, & McCahery, 2009, pp. 11, 27). However, from the legal point of view 
such an approach is controversial.  
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sanctioning or the imposition of penalties in the case of non-compliance with the rules; and 
(4) crisis management, which comprises lender of last resort, deposit insurance, and bank 
insolvency proceedings.
609
 In simple terms, prudential supervision is needed to ensure the 
safety and soundness of the banking system.
610
 
For some reason, the supervision of insurance undertakings has been omitted from the scope 
of the ECB‘s own supervisory tasks. It is difficult to understand why, as cross-border 
financial conglomerates tend to encompass credit institutions, securities and insurance 
undertakings,
611
 and if it were indeed omitted, there would be a risk of supervisory 
fragmentation.
612
 However, throughout the history of Article 127(6) TFEU [former Article 
105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of the Statute there has been an understanding that an 
amalgamation of supervisory functions were to be considered by the governments and 
parliaments of all Member States, since such a function would require a ‗full-blown‘ Treaty 
amendment‘.613  
The Committee of Governors foresaw the supervision of not ‗all‘ credit and financial 
institutions by the ECB but only those ‗for which it is designated as competent supervisory 
                                                                                                                                                        
608  Supervision in a narrow sense refers to the oversight of financial firms‘ behaviour, in particular risk monitoring and risk 
control  (Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, p. 85). Corporate governance tools 
at the company level do not appear to contribute directly to financial stability – Wymeersh has studied the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial stability and concluded that it is an indirect one, as the stability of firms and 
markets are essential elements for maintaining financial stability (Wymeersch, Corporate Governance and Financial 
Stability, 2008). However, Mülbert is of the view that corporate governance interacts with prudential regulation 
(Mülbert, 2009), a view shared by Mullineux (Mullineux, 2006). 
609  See Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, pp. 85-90. Lastra‘s earlier work was a 
basis for Quintyn & Taylor, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability, 2002, to develop the 
principle of supervisory independence.  
610  The term ‗regulation‘ refers essentially to rulemaking, while ‗supervision‘ deals with applying the rules to a specific 
case. Supervision is naturally linked to regulation: regulators set the rules and supervisors implement and enforce such 
rules (Quinn, 1998, pp. 127-130) (Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, p. 85) 
(Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About single, twin peaks and multiple financial 
supervisors, 2006, p. 3). However, sometimes the distinction is not that clear and it may therefore be that supervision 
often implies regulation, and there is no easy differentiation between regulators and supervisors (Grunbichler & Darlap, 
2004).  
611  Similar criticism has been made by Lastra (Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006). 
Considering the historical developments as described by van den Berg, it appears that early drafts contained reference to 
the supervision of credit institutions but not of other undertakings. At some point in July 1990 the references to ‘banking 
supervision‘ were replaced by ‗prudential supervision‘, with the aim of also embracing insurance and securities 
operations, but then it was felt that the decision as to whether supervision was a central banking function should be left 
to the political authorities (van den Berg, 2005, pp. 280-281).  
612  Bini Smaghi has said, in discussing the merits of Article 127(6) TFEU [former Article 105(6) TEC], that ‗first, such 
provision would not prohibit the attribution of responsibilities to the ECB as regards the supervision of financial 
conglomerates, as the related supervisory regime (as introduced by the Financial Conglomerates Directive) is only 
supplementary with regard to the conglomerate as a whole, and does not regard the direct supervision of insurance 
undertakings. Second, this is not an argument that could support the case for the attribution of supervisory 
responsibilities to a new European entity and not to the ECB: also in the former case the Treaty would need to be 
amended‘ (Bini Smaghi, Financial crisis: Where does Europe stand?, 2009).  
613  See Smits, European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000, p. 358. Some reports 
also refer to clear political opposition to the idea of executing Article 127(6) TFEU (The European Union Committee of 
the House of Lords, 2009, p. 30). 
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authority‘.614 Article 127(6) TFEU [former Article 105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of the 
Statute make no distinction between micro- and macro-prudential supervision. It is therefore 
possible for the ECB to carry out either of them or even both. However, the exact scope of 
prudential supervision needs to be determined by the Council‘s regulation referred to in 
Article 127(6) TFEU [former Article 105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of the Statute. The first 
obstacle concerns licensing – at the moment it is a national competence and it is not clear 
whether licensing could remain national or become supranational for some financial 
undertakings. While the ECB could be supervising cross-border banking groups
615
 or, for 
example, those registered as European companies (Societas Europaea or SE),
616
 it is arguable 
whether the ECB should also license the entities that it could supervise or whether licensing 
could remain national and only supervision be supra-national. If licensing and supervision are 
conducted at a supra-national level, a practical cooperation and information sharing 
arrangement with national authorities would be needed in those Member States in which the 
supervised undertaking is operating.  
The alternative to the above would be for the ECB to carry out macro-prudential supervision 
to the extent proposed for the ESRB, which would leave micro-prudential supervision as a 
national task.
617
 The benefit of such an arrangement would be twofold: first, the ECB would 
be in charge of the prudential information and is also best placed to provide emergency 
liquidity assistance as discussed in Section 4.3.1.2; second, the ECB could issue soft law 
opinions, recommendations and warnings without being concerned about the non-
applicability of Article 132 TFEU [former Article 110 TEC] outside the Eurosystem. Once 
the subjects of the ECB‘s own supervisory task, or the content of the macro-prudential 
supervision, is/are clear the respective future Council Regulation could also stipulate 
sanctioning or imposition of penalties in the case of non-compliance with the rules.  
                                                 
614  See Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community, 1990, 
p. 9. 
615  Mr Sáinz de Vicuña has been quoted as saying that for large cross-border banks it would be desirable to have a single 
reporting structure and an interlocutor for all supervisory arrangements of their multi-jurisdictional operations rather than 
having to deal with a plurality of national supervisors that cooperate ‗in a very soft and vague manner‘ (The European 
Union Committee of the House of Lords, 2009, p. 32).  
616  The Nordea group has often been used as an example to explain how the distribution of responsibilities between national 
authorities will change. While previously all supervisors that licensed banks within a group were involved in its 
supervision, a unified group will be under the full jurisdiction and responsibility of a single national supervisor (Schinasi 
& Teixeira, The Lender of Last Resort in the European Single Financial Market, Working Paper Series No. 43, 2006, p. 
5). However, Nordea‘s transformation into an SE appears to be ongoing (Nordea, 2009). 
617  Other authors have proposed that ECB supervision could be limited to managing EU-wide prudential risks (Hertig, Lee, 
& McCahery, 2009, p. 26). 
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Yet another issue, related to the licensing and supervision competence stricto sensu, concerns 
crisis management, which comprises the lender of last resort function, deposit insurance and 
bank insolvency proceedings. The lender of last resort function both nationally and supra-
nationally will be discussed in Section 4.3, together with the monetary financing prohibition 
under EU law. Apart from emergency liquidity assistance, bailing out any financial 
undertaking at the EU level has traditionally been deemed to be close to impossible as there 
was no EU budget for financial distress and therefore rescue packages and recovery plans 
have so far had to be national in origin.
618
 However, on 26 May 2010 the European 
Commission adopted a Communication on Bank Resolution Funds that proposes that the 
European Union establish a EU network of bank resolution funds to ensure that future bank 
failures are not at the cost of the taxpayer and do not destabilise the financial system.
619
 
Deposit insurance and bank insolvency proceedings are also rooted in national law and as 
was concluded by the CEBS, there are significant differences among Member States in 
granting sanctioning powers and the powers regarding crisis management to the competent 
authorities. Therefore, if the ECB were to be granted the powers of competent authority, the 
respective future Council Regulation would need to address either the scope of the ECB‘s 
powers regarding macro-prudential supervision or the supranational aspect of licensing, the 
practical arrangements of supervision, sanctions and crisis management.  
Since Article 130 TFEU [former Article 108 TEC] and Article 7 of the Statute, which 
establish the principle of central bank independence, provide that ‗when exercising the 
powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and the 
Statute‘ [My emphasis, AT.], and taking account of the fact that the supervisory task of the 
ECB originates from Article 127(6) TFEU [former Article 105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of 
the Statute, one can conclude that the concept of central bank independence would also spill 
over to the supervisory task under these circumstances.  
The ECB is not just operationally but also institutionally independent and it serves as a role 
model in terms of institutional, personal and financial independence as discussed in Chapter 
3. As far as sound governance is concerned, the decision-making powers in this regard would 
be entrusted to the Executive Board and Governing Council under Article 129(1) TFEU 
                                                 
618  Padoa-Schioppa has noted that when assessing the existing mechanism for crisis management, the lender of last resort 
function is just one solution; the two other solutions would be (1) the provision of taxpayers‘ money with the issues 
related to State aid rules or, preferably, (2) private money should be used (Padoa-Schioppa, The Euro and Its Central 
Bank: Getting United After the Union, 2004).  
619  See Bank Resolution Funds, COM(2010) 254 final.  
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[former Article 107(1) TEC], since the General Council‘s capacity is limited to holding 
‗consultations concerning issues falling within the competence of the NCBs and affecting the 
stability of financial institutions and markets‘ as set forth in the fourth intent of Article 141(2) 
TFEU.
620
 Further, the discussion in Section 3.3 regarding transparency and accountability 
would also apply here.  
4.3 Limitations to the central banks’ role in contributing to financial stability 
4.3.1 Emergency liquidity assistance 
4.3.1.1 Definition of ELA and its terms 
Having the duty to contribute to the stability of the financial system, a central bank has to 
monitor and assess the liquidity in the system, either through the oversight of the payment 
systems or by exercising banking supervision powers (or cooperating with the supervisory 
authorities).
621
 Charles Goodhart has said that the separation between supervision and the 
central bank (providing emergency liquidity assistance) means that any financial crisis has to 
be handled by a committee rather than a single focus of power/decision.
622
 In times of crisis, 
owing to their balance sheet mismatch, credit institutions may need assistance to cover their 
liquidity positions. Against this background, it can be concluded that the first line of defence 
against a banking crisis is liquidity support.
623
 
                                                 
620  This provision is not reflected in Article 46 of the Statute, which describes the responsibilities of the General Council. 
Under Article 46.1 of the Statute however, the General Council is responsible for contributing to the advisory functions 
referred to, inter alia, in Article 25.1 of the Statute. Mr Sáinz de Vicuña has expressed his view that Article 105(6) TEC 
[now Article 127(6) TFEU] could be applied through the General Council; such a provision would therefore be 
applicable to all EU Member States, not only members of the euro area (The European Union Committee of the House 
of Lords, 2009, p. 30). 
621  Some authors have suggested that in the case of the euro area, the existing infrastructure of the ECB/Eurosystem would 
certainly play a major role as the Eurosystem committees would have an operational role in collecting local information 
(Schinasi & Teixeira, The Lender of Last Resort in the European Single Financial Market, Working Paper Series No. 43, 
2006, p. 10).  
622  See Goodhart C. A., The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 2009, p. 39.  
623  See Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 61.  
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Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA)
624
 has been defined by the ECB as as a specific tool 
available to central banks in crisis situations to provide liquidity for individual credit 
institutions against adequate collateral.
625
 According to the ECB‘s definition, the provision of 
liquidity assistance can take place:  
1) in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis; 
2) for a temporarily illiquid (but solvent) credit institution (against adequate collateral); 
3) which cannot obtain liquidity through either the market or participation in monetary 
policy operations.
626
  
The main guiding principle for the provision of ELA is that the competent NCB shall take the 
decision concerning an institution operating in its jurisdiction. ELA would therefore take 
place under the responsibility and at the cost of the NCB in question.
627
 The access to central 
bank liquidity will be exceptional and dependent on the discretion of the NCB, which will 
consider the relevant factors that may justify access to this lending of last resort (e.g. in order 
to prevent or mitigate potential systemic effects on financial institutions).
628
 Lastra has 
outlined four elements of ELA: (1) financial assistance should be made available to banks 
                                                 
624  Other authors have referred to ELA as ‗lender of last resort‘ or LOLR (Goodhart C. A., The Regulatory Response to the 
Financial Crisis, 2009, pp. 28, 34), (Lastra R. M., Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, pp. 113-
124), (Rossi & Sansonetti, 2007, p. 1356), (Lastra R. M., 2010, pp. 61-65). The name ‗lender of last resort‘ owes its 
origins to Sir Francis Barings, who used this notion while referring to the Bank of England in 1797 (Lastra R. M., Legal 
Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, p. 113). Central banks provide liquidity when no other sources of 
liquidity are readily available (or at least are not available at ‗reasonable market prices‘) (Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 61). 
Rossi and Sansonetti define LOLR as the discretionary provision of liquidity for a financial institution (or the market as 
a whole) by the central bank in reaction to an adverse shock which causes an abnormal increase in demand for liquidity 
which cannot be met from an alternative source (other than the central bank); the LOLR mechanism aims at preventing 
liquidity problems from impairing the solvency of individual banks and the stability of the banking system without, 
however, distorting the conditions of competition (the loan must be repaid) (Rossi & Sansonetti, 2007, p. 1356). Some 
authors use ‗lender of last resort‘ and ‗emergency liquidity assistance‘ interchangeably (Goodhart C. A., The Regulatory 
Response to the Financial Crisis, 2009, pp. 50, 61), (Schinasi & Teixeira, The Lender of Last Resort in the European 
Single Financial Market, Working Paper Series No. 43, 2006).  
625  See European Central Bank, 2007, p. 80.  
626  See European Central Bank, 2007, p. 80. The alternative ECB definition is that provision of liquidity assistance by 
central banks consists in giving support in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis to temporarily illiquid 
but solvent credit institutions; see paragraph 4.1 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/58 of 23 October 2008 at the request of the 
Banca d‘Italia on behalf of the Italian Ministry for Economic Affairs and Finance on two Decree-Laws containing urgent 
measures to guarantee the stability of the banking system and the continuity of the provision of credit, available at 
https://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_58_f_sign.pdf. See also ECB Opinion CON/2008/42, paragraph 4.10 
(footnote 16), and ECB Opinion CON/2008/46 of 8 October 2008 at the request of the Belgian Ministry of Finance on a 
preliminary draft law on measures promoting financial stability and in particular establishing a State guarantee for the 
provision of credit in the context of financial stability, paragraph 3.1, available at 
http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_46_f_sign.pdf. The ECB Financial Stability Review of December 2006, 
describes ELA as support given by central banks in exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case basis to temporarily 
illiquid institutions and markets and does not refer to to adequate collateral or to the third criterion (‗which cannot obtain 
liquidity through either the market or participation in monetary policy operations‘) (European Central Bank, 2006, pp. 
171-172). 
627 The ECB also noted that ELA should not be seen as a primary means of ensuring financial stability, since it bears the 
risk of moral hazard. 
628  See European Central Bank, 2007, p. 80.  
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that are illiquid but solvent; (2) the central bank should lend ‗freely‘, that is it should lend as 
much as needed, but the rate of interest charged should be high;
629
 (3) the central bank should 
accommodate anyone who can provide ‗good‘ collateral which is valued at lower than pre-
panic prices but higher than it would have been valued, had the central bank not entered the 
market; and (4) while the central bank should let it be known in advance that it will be ready 
to lend, it will also exercise discretion as to whether or not to provide ELA.
630
 
The provision of ELA is regulated neither in the Treaties nor in the Statute.
631
 Nine NCB 
Statutes
632
 out of 27 have regulated the provision of ELA as shown in Table 4-3 in addition to 
other forms of credit operations reflected in Table 4-1. All these NCB Statutes have been 
assessed in the light of six criteria: (1) central bank independence; (2) collateral requirement; 
(3) short-term nature; (4) solvency of the credit institution; (5) the credit institution as the 
eligible counterparty; and (6) exceptional circumstances.  
The central bank independence requirement is derived from discussions in Sections 4.2.1.1, 
leading to the conclusion that contribution to financial stability is a task that is also subject to 
the central bank independence requirement. The independence requirement would also 
embrace the discretionary nature of the ELA provision. From the Table 4-3 it becomes 
apparent that none of the NCB Statutes contains an explicit independence safeguard or 
reference to the fact that granting ELA will be discretionary. However, almost all of the 
reviewed NCB Statutes use the word ‗may‘ in the English language versions, which could 
interpreted as if the matter is discretionary and the central bank is making the decision 
independently.
633
 The NCB‘s pre-determined rules on the provision of ELA is referred to in 
                                                 
629  In her earlier works, Lastra has suggested that there should be a penalty rate, which has now been adjusted (Lastra R. M., 
Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability, 2006, p. 114), see also Weenink & Schulze Steinen (2008). 
Goodhart has proposed in this regard that the preferential access scheme should be created (Goodhart C. A., The 
Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 2009, p. 71), inducing all relevant banks always to be borrowing an initial 
tranche of funds from the central bank and thereby making it an additional monetary policy window.  
630  See Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 62. 
631  Smits notes that this is not surprising, as the provision of ELA is normally not spelled out openly in advance in 
legislation (Smits, European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000, p. 270). 
632  For the Eurosystem, see (1) Article 46(3) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (2) Article 17(1)(g) of the Maltese NCB Statute; 
(3) Article 24 of the Slovak NCB Statute. For the non-Eurosystem, see (1) Articles 20(2), 33 and 45 of the Bulgarian 
NCB Statute; (2) Article 29(2) of the Czech NCB Statute; (3) Article 14 of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (4) Article 42 of 
the Polish NCB Statute; (5) Article 26 of the Romanian NCB Statute; and (6) Chapter 6 Article 9 of the Swedish NCB 
Statute. The United Kingdom has been omitted since it appears that the provision of ELA is subject to  the Memorandum 
of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority, agreed on or about 
22 March 2006.  
633  See (1) Article 33(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 46((3) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 29(2) of 
the Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 14 of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (5) Article 42(1) of the Polish NCB Statute; (6) 
Article 26 of the Romanian NCB Statute; (7) Article 24 of the Slovak NCB Statute; and (8) Chapter 6 Article 9 of the 
Swedish NCB Statute. The situation is unclear with Article 17(1)(g) of the Maltese NCB Statute as the word ‗may‘ 
seems to refer to collateral but not the central bank‘s discretionary power. 
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only one NCB Statute, which would indicate that this NCB is deciding independently on the 
provision of ELA.
634
  
The requirement for collateral protects the central bank‘s financial interest and its financial 
independence. Moreover, the principle that lending shall be based on adequate collateral is 
clearly established in Article 18.1 of the Statute. The conduct of credit operations with credit 
institutions and other market participants with lending based on adequate collateral is a 
Eurosystem task under Article 18.1 of the Statute. Under Article 42 of the Statute, this 
provision does not apply to the Member States with a derogation
635
 or to the United 
Kingdom.
636
 The requirement for collateral also arises from the Settlement Finality Directive 
(SFD)
637
 and the Financial Collateral Directive (FCD).
638
 Pursuant to the second indent of 
Article 1(c) of the SFD, the provisions of the SFD will apply to collateral security provided in 
connection with operations of the NCBs
639
 in their functions as central banks. Article 9(1) of 
the SFD provides that the rights of NCBs or the ECB to collateral security with which they 
are provided shall not be affected by insolvency proceedings against the participant or 
counterparty to NCBs or the ECB which provided the collateral security. Under sub-
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 1(2) of the FCD, financial collateral arrangements assume 
that the collateral taker and the collateral provider must be, among other things, an NCB, the 
ECB or a financial institution subject to prudential supervision. 
The requirement for adequate collateral is twofold: on the one hand, there is a need to protect 
the lender from credit default risk; on the other hand, the objective is to encourage credit 
institutions to undertake safer and less risky lending. Table 4-1 reveals that the principle of 
lending based on adequate collateral has been introduced in the majority of NCB Statutes.
640
 
                                                 
634  See Articles 20(2) and 33(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute.  
635  See also Protocol No 16. 
636  See Article 7 of Protocol No 15.  
637  Directive 98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment and 
securities settlement systems OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45. 
638  Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral arrangements  
OJ L 168, 27.6.2002, p. 43. 
639  Recital 10 of the SFD describes operations of the NCBs as including the monetary policy operations. 
640  For the Eurosystem, see (1) Article 47(2) of the Austrian NCB Statute; (2) Article 16(1) of the Belgian NCB Statute and 
Article 5(1) of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association; (3) Article 39(2)(b) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (4) Article 7(1) 
of the Finnish NCB Statute, (5) Article 19(1) of the German NCB Statute; (6) Article 55(10) of the Greek NCB Statute; 
(7) Article 22(2) of the Luxembourg NCB Statute; (8) Article 17(1)(e) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (9) Article 8(1) of 
the Dutch NCB Statute; (10) Article 24(1)(c) of the Portuguese NCB Statute; (11) Article 23 of the Slovak NCB Statute; 
(12) Articles 12(1)(14) and 18 of the Slovenian NCB Statute; and (13) Article 9(1) of the Spanish NCB Statute. For the 
non-Eurosystem, see (1) Article 32 of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 29(1) of the Czech NCB Statute; (3) 
Article 14(5) of the Estonian NCB Statute and Article 14(1) of the new Estonian NCB Statute; (4) Article 7(a) of the 
Hungarian NCB Statute; (5) Article 36 of the Latvian NCB Statute; (6) Article 27 of the Lithuanian NCB Statute; (7) 
Article 50 of the Polish NCB Statute; (8) Articles 19 and 20 of the Romanian NCB Statute; (9) Chapter 6 Articles 5 and 
7 of the Swedish NCB Statute. 
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In addition, Table 4-3 shows that the requirement for ELA collateral is present in six NCB 
Statutes
641
 out of nine; in addition to regulating open market and credit operations, they also 
regulate the provision of ELA. Exceptionally, an NCB Statute permits ELA to be granted 
without collateral in one Member State.
642
 
The requirement that the lending should be short term arises from the definition of ELA, 
which includes ‗exceptional circumstances‘, and the fact that the concerned credit institution 
should be ‗temporarily illiquid‘. Indeed, in four NCB Statutes the short-term nature is one of 
the criteria for providing ELA,
643
 and two of them even set the maturity at up to three 
months.
644
 Therefore, the notion of ‗short term‘ is understood as ‗up to three months‘. 
However, it is unclear whether ELA can be subject to renewal or whether the volume of ELA 
can be increased during the period of validity of the contract. 
Similarly, solvency of the concerned credit institution is a criterion arising from the definition 
of ELA referring to ‗temporarily illiquid credit institutions‘.645 One could understand this 
status of ‗temporary illiquidity‘ as a situation where the credit institution is short of liquid 
funds (e.g. as a result of a bank run) but is not insolvent, bankrupt or in a similar legal 
situation. However, only one NCB Statute contains an explicit requirement for solvency,
646
 
and in three NCB Statutes one could also interpret references to ‗maintaining a bank‘s 
liquidity‘ or ‗support of liquidity‘ or the duty of overall assessment of the credit institution‘s 
ability to repay the loan as falling within the solvency criterion.
647
 However, it may also be 
that the requirement for adequate collateral is understood as if only solvent counterparties 
would be able to provide it, in which case six NCB Statutes
648
 would include solvency as one 
of the ELA criteria. It has to be borne in mind that the solvency requirement is present for 
                                                 
641  See (1) Article 33(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 46(3) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 29(2) of the 
Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 17(1)(g) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (5) Article 42(4) of the Polish NCB Statute; (6) 
Article 24 of the Slovak NCB Statute.   
642  See Article 26 of the Romanian NCB Statute.  
643  See (1) Article 33(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 46(3) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 29(2) of the 
Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 24 of the Slovak NCB Statute. 
644  See (1) Article 33(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 29(2) of the Czech NCB Statute. 
645  Lastra has noted that the central bank will assess whether the credit institution faces a situation of illiquidity or 
insolvency and will also consider whether the failure of the institution involved is likely to trigger contagion within the 
marketplace bringing with it the danger of other institutions (Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 63). 
646  See Article 33(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute. 
647  See (1) Article 29(2) of the Czech NCB Statute; and (2) Article 24 of the Slovak NCB Statute. Under Article 42(2) of the 
Polish NCB Statute, the NCB shall consider the capacity of the credit institution to repay the loan together with interest. 
648  See footnote 641.  
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any open market operations,
649
 as well as the fact that under the ECB‘s definition of ELA any 
provision of liquidity is associated with exceptional circumstances that prevent participation 
in monetary policy operations.
650
 
Originally, the ELA providing the central bank‘s counterparty was defined widely, with 
references to ‗institutions and markets‘651 but then narrowed to ‗credit institutions‘.652 Credit 
institutions as the only counterparties are referred to in eight NCB Statutes,
653
 while one NCB 
Statute
654
 also extends the provision to companies subject to supervision by the national 
financial supervisory authority. In the case of Poland and Slovakia, it is also possible for the 
NCB to grant ELA to the Deposit Protection/Guarantee Fund or the Investment Guarantee 
Fund.
655
 
Finally, the requirement for exceptional circumstances refers to systemic risk or a situation in 
which, for some reason, a credit institution cannot obtain liquidity through either the market 
or participation in monetary policy operations. Seven NCB Statutes have this explicit 
requirement,
656
 while one only refers to ‗purposes which the [Central] Bank may 
designate.‘657 For one NCB, exceptional circumstances constitute a ground to terminate the 
loan contract.
658
 It is noteworthy that none of the NCB Statutes makes any reference to the 
requirement for charging a higher interest rate.
659
  
                                                 
649  The solvency requirement derives from Section 2.1 of Annex I to Guideline ECB/2000/7 of 31 August 2000 on 
monetary policy instruments and procedures of the Eurosystem, OJ L 310, 11.12.2000, p.1, as amended (General 
Documentation). Lastra has also argued that lending to insolvent institutions would be a departure from the classical 
ELA principles (Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 63). 
650  However, in practice it is difficult to draw a line between illiquidity and insolvency unless a very formalistic approach is 
chosen whereby a credit institution becomes officially insolvent when declared so by the competent authorities. Lastra 
has pointed out that a situation of bank illiquidity (i.e. lack of liquid assets) can be an indicator of technical insolvency 
(i.e. value of liabilities exceeds market value of assets) or can quickly turn into insolvency if assets are sold at a loss in 
terms of their value (Lastra R. M., 2010, p. 63).  
651  See footnote 625. 
652  See footnote 626.  
653  See (1) Article 33(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 46(3) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 29(2) of the 
Czech NCB Statute; (4) Article 14 of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (5) Article 17(1) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (6) 
Article 42(1) of the Polish NCB Statute; (7) Article 26 of the Romanian NCB Statute; (8) Article 24(1) of the Slovak 
NCB Statute.  
654  See Chapter 6 Article 9 of the Swedish NCB Statute.  
655  See (1) Article 43 of the Polish NCB Statute; (2) Article 24(2) of the Slovak NCB Statute.  
656  See (1) Article 33(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 29(2) of the Czech NCB Statute; (3) Article 14 of the 
Hungarian NCB Statute; (4) Article 17(1) of the Maltese NCB Statute; (5) Article 26 of the Romanian NCB Statute; (6) 
Article 24 of the Slovak NCB Statute; (7) Chapter 6 Article 9 of the Swedish NCB Statute.   
657  See Article 46(3) of the Cypriot NCB Statute.  
658  See Article 42(6) of the Polish NCB Statute.  
659  Although Article 42(2) of the Polish NCB Statute refers to the ‗loan together with interest‘, it is not clear whether the 
reference is made to a higher rate of interest.  
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Therefore, ELA should be understood as short-term financial assistance for a solvent but 
illiquid credit institution, which is granted against adequate collateral by a central bank 
making an independent decision in a situation in which the credit institution cannot obtain 
liquidity through either the market or participation in monetary policy operations.  
4.3.1.2 Is this national or supranational task? 
The above definition of ELA can be applied to a central bank that is not in a monetary union; 
what is surprising is that the provision of ELA is also considered to be a national matter in the 
Eurosystem.
660
 Indeed, Article 14.4 of the Statute enables NCBs to perform functions other 
than those specified in the Statute, unless the Governing Council finds that these interfere 
with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB.
661
 However, one has to take into account the fact 
that a decision to provide or not provide ELA will affect the liquidity situation in the entire 
euro area, not just in one Member State, and that this will be done outside the operations for 
the single monetary policy. The provision of ELA is, in the same fashion, performed outside 
any prudential supervisory policy.
662
 
The other issue is that when extensive monetary financing of government deficits is 
considered to pose grave risks for internal price stability, and thus for the development of 
interest rates on the money capital markets (see Section 4.3.2), then it is remarkable that the 
provision of ELA is not regulated at all in the Statute (or in the Treaties) although the effects 
of the provision of ELA could be comparable to those that of monetary financing of 
government deficits and pose risks for price stability as well. 
In the light of the above, there are two alternatives for how to treat the provision of ELA. The 
first alternative assumes that the provision of ELA is a national task and, owing to the risks 
for price stability, only needs to be coordinated at the Eurosystem level. The second 
alternative assumes that the provision of ELA is a Eurosystem task and will be decided by the 
Governing Council or alternatively could be delegated to an NCB under Article 14.3 of the 
Statute. 
                                                 
660  See footnote 538 for other authors previously noting this phenomenon.  
661  Note that Article 14.4 of the Statute applies also to the Member States with a derogation under Article 42 of the Statute, 
but not to the United Kingdom under Article 7 of Protocol No 15.  
662 Goodhart notes that the central banks have been able to inject liquidity into the system but they had virtually no 
instruments to contain the prior unsustainable expansion of leverage (Goodhart C. A., The Regulatory Response to the 
Financial Crisis, 2009, p. 40). 
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The first alternative appears to be the one preferred by the Eurosystem.
663
 The latter has set 
up a non-public agreement on ELA in order to make sure that any potential liquidity impact 
can be managed in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the appropriate single 
monetary policy stance.
664
 Furthermore, the second indent of Article 4.4 of the 2008 
Memorandum of Understanding, sets forth that „without prejudice to the responsibilities of 
the supervisors of financial markets and financial infrastructures, in a crisis situation 
potentially affecting the performance of central banking functions, the relevant Central Bank 
shall coordinate actions among themselves in addressing the situation, and shall cooperate 
with Financial Supervisory Authorities and other Central Banks. Where a liquidity crisis 
could affect a cross-border financial group with the potential for systemic implications, the 
Central Bank in the home country will coordinate actions among relevant Central Banks. The 
ECB and the Eurosystem will be involved in accordance with their responsibilities. The 
Central Banks involved will cooperate closely with the banking supervisory authorities and 
are expected to inform the Finance Ministries in the case of provision of Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance at the national level in line with the existing national legal framework.‟ [My 
emphasis, AT.] However, if the provision of ELA is regarded as a national task under Article 
14.4 of the Statute, then the logical consequence is that Article 130 TFEU [former Article 
108 TEC] and Article 7 of the Statute, which establish the principle of central bank 
independence and explicitly refer to ‗exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and 
duties conferred upon them by the Treaties and this Statute‘, will not apply.[My emphasis, 
AT.] Therefore, unless there is any provision in the national law granting the NCB the same 
degree of independence, it is permissible to seek or take instructions outside the NCB; third 
parties may also lawfully influence the decision-making bodies of the NCBs. This conclusion 
appears to be correct since the ECB has advised granting the same degree of independence 
regarding the provision of emergency liquidity assistance as with respect to the performance 
of its ESCB-related tasks.
665
  
                                                 
663  This position is also shared by Doherty and Lenihan (Doherty & Lenihan, 2005, pp. 214-215), as well as Lastra (Lastra 
R. M., 2010, p. 65).  
664  See European Central Bank, 2000, p. 98. It is further stated that the ELA agreement is internal to the Eurosystem and 
therefore does not affect the existing arrangements between central banks and supervisors at the national level or 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation among supervisors and between the latter and the Eurosystem. See also European 
Central Bank, 2007, p. 81, explaining that the impact of an ELA intervention on aggregate liquidity conditions in the 
euro area can be managed by the information sharing procedures in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the 
appropriate single monetary policy stance.  
665 See paragraph 3.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/46 and paragraph 4.11 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/42, in particular 
footnote 20 of it. 
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The second alternative appears in the legal literature and was a solution first discussed by 
Smits,
666
 establishing the link between the single monetary policy and the effects of 
exercising ELA.
667
 If the provision of ELA is considered to be part of the contribution to the 
financial stability under Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 105(5) TEC] and Article 3.3 of 
the Statute, then provision of ELA is deemed to be one of the Eurosystem‘s tasks and Article 
130 TFEU [former Article 108 TEC] and Article 7 of the Statute would apply (see also 
Section 4.2.1.1 for the independence analysis). Further, the provision of ELA changes the 
liquidity situation in the money markets and such operations are not part of the monetary 
policy operations.
668
 Therefore, since monetary policy operations in the euro area fall within 
the competence of the Eurosystem, one could assume that anything that might affect the 
supranational task can no longer be at the national level.
669
 In fact, it appears that the 
Eurosystem NCBs had to make an arrangement addressing the impact of an ELA intervention 
on aggregate liquidity conditions in the euro area to be managed by the information sharing 
procedures in a manner consistent with the maintenance of the appropriate single monetary 
policy stance.
670
 Assuming that this hypothesis is true, one could also have treated the 
provision of ELA as a matter falling within the competence of the Governing Council. The 
central banks‘ lender of last resort role and the provision of ELA therefore need to be seen in 
the context of maintaining price stability. It is unclear whether the provision of ELA forms 
part of the open market operations defined in Guideline ECB/2000/7 or whether it is another, 
but similar, measure of the provision of liquidity.
671
  
Would this mean that the NCBs would not be able to provide ELA? Apparently not, as 
Article 14.3 of the Statute provides that the NCBs are an integral part of the ESCB and shall 
act in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. Under Article 14.3 of the 
Statute, the Governing Council shall take the necessary steps to ensure compliance with the 
guidelines and instructions of the ECB and shall require that it be given any necessary 
                                                 
666  See Smits, European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000, pp. 269-271.  
667  In addition, in the economic literature the ECB is assumed to provide exceptional liquidity facilities (Adler, Kavanagh, 
& Ugryumov, 2010, p. 67). The same authors also assume that financial stability is one of the Commission‘s objectives, 
thereby leaving out the role of the Euro Group and ECOFIN. 
668  See footnote 538, where Schinasi & Teixeira draw attention to this aspect.  
669  This is, for example, true with regard to the foreign reserve assets held by NCBs, where Article 31.2 of the Statute 
provides that operations in foreign reserve assets that remain with the NCBs shall be, provided they are above a certain 
limit, subject to approval by the ECB in order to ensure consistency with the exchange rate and monetary policies of the 
Union.  
670  See European Central Bank, 2007, p. 81.  
671  However, it is clear that the provision of ELA cannot take the form of bailing out the troubled credit institution without 
falling within the prohibition of monetary financing.  
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information.
672
 Therefore the Eurosystem NCBs could continue providing ELA as a task 
delegated by the Governing Council and subject to its approval.  
When assessing these two alternatives, it can be concluded that for the Eurosystem the 
provision of ELA should not be regarded as a national task. For the non-Eurosystem NCBs, 
provision of ELA remains a national task.  
4.3.1.3 Compliance with disclosure requirements 
The provision of ELA is likely to be closely monitored by the market participants and 
therefore one should consider carefully what messages are to be conveyed to the general 
public. It is arguable whether the provision of ELA should not be communicated – as a task 
carried out by an NCB the latter would need to report it through the applicable accountability 
framework and one should not forget that also the receiving end of ELA has a legal 
obligation to disclose its financial situation.
673
 There may also be statutory accountability or 
transparency requirements for the competent national supervisory authorities.
674
 
Provisions that would require the ELA recipient to disclose the receipt of funds would arise 
from the Market Abuse Directive (MAD),
675
 the Prospectus Directive,
676
 the Transparency 
Directive
677
 and other EU legal instruments.
678
  
Article 7 of the MAD specifies that the MAD ‗shall not apply to transactions carried out in 
pursuit of monetary, exchange-rate or public debt-management policy by a Member State, by 
the European System of Central Banks, by a national central bank or by any other officially 
designated body, or by any person acting on their behalf. Member States may extend this 
exemption to their federated States or similar local authorities in respect of the management 
                                                 
672 Article 14.3 of the Statute does not apply to the Member States with a derogation under Article 42 of the Statute. It is 
also not applicable to the United Kingdom under Article 7 of Protocol No 15.  
673  Sheller has pointed out that the ECB cannot be held accountable for non-Eurosystem functions that the NCBs perform 
under Article 14.4 of the Statute; the latter are therefore accountable by the national authorities under the legal provisions 
of the respective Member State (Scheller, 2006, p. 129).  
674  See Gray, 2010.  
675  Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse), OJ L 96, 12.4.2003, p. 16, as amended.  
676  Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be 
published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC (Text with 
EEA relevance) OJ L 345, 31.12.2003, p. 64, as amended. 
677  Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of 
transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated 
market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, OJ L 390, 31.12.2004, p. 38. 
678 For example, the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the 
annual accounts of certain types of companies, OJ L 222, 14.8.1978, p. 11, as amended; the Seventh Council Directive 
83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, OJ L 193, 
18.7.1983, p. 1, as amended.  
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of their public debt.
679
 Financial assistance to a solvent but illiquid credit institution which is 
granted against adequate collateral by a central bank in a situation where the credit institution 
cannot obtain liquidity elsewhere, including monetary policy operations, would mean that the 
MAD applies notwithstanding whether the task is considered to be a national or a Eurosystem 
task.  
A credit institution receiving ELA will be subject to a requirement specified in Article 6(1) of 
the MAD, obliging the company‘s management to immediately disclose (e.g. through a stock 
exchange or similar means) any ‗inside information‘ as defined in Article 1(1) of the 
MAD.
680
 The MAD cannot be interpreted as obliging the NCBs to disclose their assistance; it 
is the duty of the recipient to disclose information that has an effect, for example, on the 
share price. As the provision of ELA would be indicative of trouble with the company (such 
as the inability to raise financing from any other sources), the receipt of ELA is likely to fall 
within the concept of ‗inside information‘681 and it is therefore subject to the disclosure 
requirement. Although Article 6(2) of the MAD could enable the company to defer disclosure 
of inside information, provided that the competent authorities also agree, it is unlikely that 
ELA would be covered by secrecy indefinitely.
682
 By the time that a credit institution applies 
for ELA the problems have already started
683
 and the fact that the assistance has been 
provided or is under way could restore confidence in the circles of depositors and investors. 
Haynes has proposed that the MAD be amended, that a company be permitted to issue 
                                                 
679 Recital 32 further specifies that ‗Member States and the ESCB, NCBs or any other officially designated body, or any 
person acting on their behalf, should not be restricted in carrying out monetary, exchange-rate or public debt 
management policy‘. 
680  Inside information is understood as information of a precise nature which has not been made public, relating, directly or 
indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more financial instruments and which, if it were 
made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of 
related derivative financial instruments. In relation to derivatives on commodities, ‗inside information‘ shall mean 
information of a precise nature which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more such 
derivatives and which users of markets on which such derivatives are traded would expect to receive in accordance with 
accepted market practices on those markets. For persons charged with the execution of orders concerning financial 
instruments, ‗inside information‘ shall also mean information conveyed by a client and related to the client's pending 
orders, which is of a precise nature, which relates directly or indirectly to one or more issuers of financial instruments or 
to one or more financial instruments, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on 
the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial instruments.  
681 See also Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition of 
market manipulation (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 339, 24.12.2003, p. 70 (MAD Implementation Directive). 
682 For example, the negotiation phase could remain classified information until ELA is provided, applying by analogy 
Article 3(1)(a) of the MAD Implementation Directive.  
683 Goodhart notes that banks usually know the approximate condition of their competitors because they are constantly 
dealing with each other; any large-scale and persistent application of ELA will become known over time to a widening 
range of people (Goodhart C. A., The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 2009, p. 62). Goodhart‘s position is 
supported by the fact that, for example, a competitor of Fortis Bank operating on the Belgian market lodged two 
complaints with the Commission on 4 November 2008 concerning the aid received by Fortis. See paragraph 20 of the 
Commission Decision N 574/08 of 19 November 2008 State guarantee in favour of Fortis Bank, OJ C 38, 17.2.2009, p. 
2. 
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statements that it was receiving ELA, and that those statements be cleared by the central 
banks and regulators.
684
 In Articles 1.4.3 and 6 of the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding, 
it is foreseen that in a crisis situation the parties shall, to the maximum extent possible, 
coordinate public communications relating to the specific circumstances, make the statements 
public only after consulting the other parties and avoid making announcements to the public 
on their own, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying such a move. This 
principle is also reflected in Article 6 of the Common Practical Guidelines attached to the 
2008 Memorandum of Understanding. Furthermore, Article 1(6) of the Common Practical 
Guidelines refer to MAD and provide that „consideration should be given beforehand on how 
to deal with publicly listed financial groups and infrastructure in the context of public 
intervention. In particular, a crisis situation affecting a publicly listed financial group should 
be addressed rapidly enough to allow legally required transparency rules to be fulfilled 
[...]‟.685 
The Prospectus Directive would come into play if a credit institution receiving ELA offers 
shares or debt securities to the public, in which case it has to produce a prospectus under 
Article 3(1) of the Prospectus Directive. Pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Prospectus Directive, 
the prospectus shall contain all information which, according to the particular nature of the 
issuer and of the securities offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, 
is necessary to enable investors to make an informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, 
financial position, profit and losses, and prospects of the issuer and of any guarantor, and of 
the rights attaching to such securities. It is further specified in Article 5(1) that this 
information shall be presented in an easily analysable and comprehensible form. The short-
term provision of ELA for a company that is actively seeking new long-term capital from 
private sources seems to be information that potential investors would like to know in order 
to make an investment decision. Although under Article 8(2) of the Prospectus Directive the 
competent authority of the home Member State may authorise the omission from the 
                                                 
684  See Haynes, 2009.  The opposite has been suggested by Weenink and Schulze Steinen noting that the announcement of 
the ELA provided by the Bank of England to Northern Rock did not reassure the general public and that there is a danger 
of publishing ELA operations prematurely (Weenink & Schulze Steinen, 2008). However, Goodhart considers that the 
ELA was not the problem but rather a failure of the authorities to provide sufficient public reassurance (Goodhart C. A., 
The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 2009, p. 61). 
685 In order to assure the general public about the soundness of the institutions, CEBS has issued a press release on the state 
of play with the 2010 EU-wide stress testing exercise (CEBS, 2010), also referring to the mandate from ECOFIN 
(Council of the European Union, 2009).  
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prospectus of certain information provided for in the Prospectus Directive,
686
 it is arguable 
whether any of the grounds listed in Article 8(2) would be applicable. Against this 
background, a recent ECB Opinion advocating secrecy on the grounds of financial stability 
perhaps fails to take account of the fact that keeping some information away may mislead 
investors and the general public, which would in turn undermine the credibility of the ELA-
providing central bank.
687
  
The Transparency Directive establishes requirements in relation to the disclosure of periodic 
and ongoing information about issuers whose securities have already been admitted to trading 
on a regulated market situated or are operating within a Member State. According to Articles 
4 and 5, the companies must disclose their half-yearly and annual reports. Pursuant to Article 
4(2), the annual financial report shall comprise: (a) the audited financial statements; (b) the 
management report; and (c) statements made by the persons responsible within the issuer, 
whose names and functions shall be clearly indicated, to the effect that, to the best of their 
knowledge, the financial statements prepared in accordance with the applicable set of 
accounting standards give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and 
profit or loss of the issuer and the undertakings included in the consolidation taken as a whole 
and that the management report includes a fair review of the development and performance of 
the business and the position of the issuer and the undertakings included in the consolidation 
taken as a whole, together with a description of the principal risks and uncertainties that they 
                                                 
686 The competent authority may decide that (a) disclosure of such information would be contrary to the public interest; (b) 
disclosure of such information would be seriously detrimental to the issuer, provided that the omission is unlikely to 
mislead the public with regard to facts and circumstances essential for an informed assessment of the issuer, offeror or 
guarantor, if any, and of the rights attached to the securities to which the prospectus relates; or (c) such information is of 
minor importance only for a specific offer or admission to trading on a regulated market and is not such as will influence 
the assessment of the financial position and prospects of the issuer, offeror or guarantor, if any. 
687 The ECB has advised that a clear legal framework should be put in place in order to facilitate the smooth and rapid 
conduct of central banks‘ lending or other liquidity facilities, including in crisis situations; information on central banks‘ 
lending or other liquidity facilities provided to a particular credit institution, including ELA, needs to be kept 
confidential in order to contribute to the stability of the financial system as a whole and maintain public confidence in a 
period of crisis. [My emphasis, AT] See paragraph 2.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2010/6 of 11 January 2010 on a proposal 
for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2003/71/EC and 2004/109/EC, OJ C 
19, 26.1.2010, p. 1, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/c_01920100126en00010004.pdf. The ECB‘s position 
largely follows the position taken by Weenink & Schulze Steinen (2008). However, the European Parliament did not 
take these concerns into account, as is apparent from the ECON Report of 26 March 2010, which included the proposals 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2010-0102&language=EN) and the 
final adopted text of 17 June 2010, which no longer contains any such references 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0227&language=EN&ring=A7-
2010-0102#BKMD-3) (visited on 7 September 2010). 
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face.
688
 The half-yearly report under Article 5 contains the same elements, although they are 
of an interim nature and cover six month of the financial year.  
Furthermore, auditors have a duty under Article 53(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC to report 
promptly to the competent authorities any fact or decision concerning that credit institution of 
which they have become aware while carrying out that task which is liable to: (a) constitute a 
material breach of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions which lay down the 
conditions governing authorisation or which specifically govern pursuit of the activities of 
credit institutions; (b) affect the continuous functioning of the credit institution; or (c) lead to 
refusal to certify the accounts or to the expression of reservations. The reporting auditors are 
deemed not to have breached the duty of professional secrecy under Article 53(2) of 
Directive 2006/48/EC. Therefore, any non-disclosure of the receipt of ELA may be reported 
by the credit institutions‘ auditors. 
The provision of ELA for the credit institution whose shares are listed on a regulated market 
in one of the EU Member States is likely to be published in the company‘s annual report or, 
depending on the timing of the ELA provision, also in the half-yearly report. While the 
Prospectus Directive and MAD contained provisions that could enable transparency 
requirements to be circumvented, the Transparency Directive does not appear to have such 
clauses. 
4.3.1.4 Problems with applying the ELA criteria in real time 
While ELA is understood as short-term financial assistance given to a solvent but illiquid 
credit institution which is granted against adequate collateral by a central bank making an 
independent decision in a situation in which the credit institution cannot obtain liquidity 
through either the market or participation in monetary policy operations, the applicability of 
the criteria remains an issue for debate. 
First, the principle that the credit institution shall be solvent but illiquid is difficult to 
implement in practice. Solvency could be understood as the opposite of insolvency, but the 
changeover from one to another could take a matter of days, if not hours.
689
 Weenink and 
                                                 
688  See the Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the annual 
accounts of certain types of companies, OJ L 222, 14.8.1978, p. 11, as amended; the Seventh Council Directive 
83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, OJ L 193, 
18.7.1983, p. 1, as amended.  
689  The provision of ELA to Northern Rock was not deemed to be State aid with regard to the measures of 14 September 
2007, but it constituted State aid with regard to measures taken from 17 to 20 September as well as the measures decided 
on 9 October 2007. See Paragraph 35 of Commission Decision NN 70/07 of 5 December 2007 Rescue aid Northern 
Rock, OJ C 43, 16.2.2008, p. 1.  
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Schulze Steinen note that there is a practical difficulty, since a decision as to whether or not 
ELA needs to be provided usually needs to be taken immediately, without all the relevant 
facts being at hand to determine whether the credit institutuin is illiquid or insolvent.
690
 The 
obvious route would be to consult the competent supervisory authority about the potential 
recipient‘s solvency status, but it is debatable whether the latter would be better informed.  
Second, one may wonder what could constitute ‗adequate collateral‘ in times of crisis and 
how the value of collateral could be determined when the markets are spiralling downwards. 
Goodhart has said that central banks cannot accept credit risk and that there is a likelihood 
that they will be offered the worst risk assets within the acceptable class held by the 
borrowing commercial bank.
691
 In this context, a quick solution would be to ask for a State 
guarantee but this would lead to a potential breach of monetary financing prohibition. The 
ECB‘s criteria for State guarantees has been analysed in this respect.  
Third, there may be doubts as to whether a central bank is indeed independent in its decision-
making, especially in a crisis situation in which a central bank‘s refusal to contribute to the 
rescue measures or refusal to accept a State guarantee could lead, at least, to a negative public 
image. Failure by a central bank to act independently could raise doubts regarding monetary 
financing prohibition
692
 as well as concerns over State aid.
693
  
Fourth, if a credit institution cannot obtain liquidity through either the market or participation 
in monetary policy operations, then one may wonder whether the provision of ELA is indeed 
a general measure or not. If it is not a measure available to all participants in the market, it is 
likely to be governed by State aid rules. On the other hand, if it is a general measure, it should 
be regulated by means of legal instruments authorising the central bank to act and 
determining the criteria for the provision of ELA.
694
 
Fifth, as the notion of ‗short term‘ is defined only in a very few NCB Statutes, there seems to 
be a need to establish clearly what is understood by the term (e.g. up to three months) and 
whether the provision of ELA can be extended (e.g. to another three months or longer 
periods) so that the principle of ‗short-term lending‘ would not be undermined.  
                                                 
690  See Weenink & Schulze Steinen, 2008, p. 521.  
691  See Goodhart C. A., The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 2009, p. 88.  
692  See Section 4.3.2.  
693  See paragraphs 34 to 38 Commission Decision NN 36/08 of 31 July 2008 Roskilde Bank, OJ C 238, 17.9.2008, p. 5.  
694 This would be in line with Goodhart‘s proposal that the preferential access scheme should be created (Goodhart C. A., 
The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, 2009, p. 71). 
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Finally, if a credit institution operates in the euro area and is active in several Member States, 
the provision of ELA by a Eurosystem NCB is likely to affect the euro area money market 
and therefore influence the single monetary policy, although this falls within the competence 
of the ECB‘s Governing Council. 
4.3.2 Monetary financing prohibition 
4.3.2.1 Protection of the primary objective of monetary policy 
As noted earlier, some NCB Statutes decisions independently made by the NCB in 
contributing to the stability of the financial system are subject to repayment.
695
 At first 
glance, the idea of protecting the financial independence of the NCB may appear welcome. 
However, at the same time one may find it difficult to see the link between an NCB or the 
ECB contributing to financial stability and the monetary financing prohibition under Article 
123 TFEU [former Article 101 TEC].
696
 
The monetary financing prohibition is of essential importance to ensure that the primary 
objective of monetary policy (namely, to maintain price stability) is not impeded; 
furthermore, central bank financing of the public sector lessens the pressure for fiscal 
discipline.
697
 The monetary financing prohibition is laid down in Article 123(1) TFEU 
[former Article 101(1) TEC], replicated in Article 21.1 of the Statute, which prohibits 
overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or the NCBs in favour of 
Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other 
public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member 
States, and the purchase of debt instruments directly from these public sector entities by the 
ECB or NCBs. The precise scope of application of the monetary financing prohibition is 
further clarified by Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93. 
The Treaty contains one exception to the prohibition: it does not apply to publicly owned 
credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, must be 
given the same treatment as private credit institutions (see Article 123(2) TFEU [former 
Article 101(2) TEC]). Therefore, lending by a central bank, including the provision of ELA 
(see Section 4.3.1) for a credit institution owned by public institutions, would not normally 
                                                 
695  (1) Article 9 of the Belgian NCB Statute; (2) Article 20 of the Belgian NCB Articles of Association.  
696  Remarkably, the language of several NCB Statutes makes that connection between the ELA and monetary financing 
prohibition; see: (1) Article 45(2) of the Bulgarian NCB Statute; (2) Article 46(3) of the Cypriot NCB Statute; (3) Article 
14 of the Hungarian NCB Statute; (4) Article 24(1) of the Slovak NCB Statute. 
697  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 24).  
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fall within the prohibition of monetary financing. This is by analogy with the level playing 
field for public and private enterprises that has been laid down in Article 106 TFEU [former 
Article 86 TEC], confirming the applicability of the Treaties and, in particular, rules on 
competition for actions of the Member States in relation to undertakings in conjunction with 
Article 345 TFEU [former Article 295 TEC], establishing the principle of ownership 
neutrality. 
Moreover, Article 21.2 of the Statute provides a further exception to the prohibition on 
monetary financing to the extent that it permits the ECB and the NCBs to act as fiscal agents 
for the entities referred in Article 21.1 of the Statute. 
In accordance with Article 139 TFEU and Article 42 of the Statute and the Protocols on 
certain provisions relating to Denmark
698
 and to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland,
699
 the above provisions of TFEU and the Statute are applicable to all NCBs 
in the ESCB. 
The proposal to prohibit monetary financing was made by the Committee of Governors in its 
Draft Statute; it was considered that any kind of direct monetary financing should be ruled 
out „[…] since recourse to central bank credit could undermine the ability of the System to 
achieve its primary objective‟.700 As noted in a number of ECB Opinions, in 1993 the 
Committee of Governors of the central banks of the Member States of the European 
Economic Community had already noted that this prohibition is of essential importance to 
ensure that monetary policy is not hindered in the pursuit of its primary objective of price 
stability.
701
 Furthermore, central bank financing of the public sector lessens the pressure for 
fiscal discipline. Therefore, in ensuring compliance with the monetary financing prohibition, 
the ECB has adopted the position that the prohibition must be interpreted strictly, subject 
                                                 
698  Protocol No 16.  
699  Protocol No 15.  
700  See Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community, 1990, 
p. 25. See also Smits, European Central Bank Institutional Aspects, 1997, reprinted with corrections 2000, p. 289. The 
reasoning is that the independence of a central bank is not guaranteed when the government can force the central bank to 
finance the government‘s expenditures; it was clear that forced monetary financing could not be allowed under EMU; the 
drafters of the Treaty went one step further: they also forbid a central bank to finance the government voluntarily, in 
order to prevent situations in which the central bank might feel obliged, although not necessarily forced, to help the 
government (van den Berg, 2005, p. 145). 
701  The most important escape from an undisciplined budgetary policy is so-called monetary deficit financing through credit 
facilities afforded by the NCB. Extensive monetary financing of government deficits poses grave risks for internal price 
stability, and thus for the development of interest rates on the capital markets. For this reason, Article 123 TFEU [former 
Article 101 TEC] prescribes a general prohibition of monetary deficit financing by the public sector in the wide sense 
(Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, pp. 907-908).  
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only to certain limited exemptions contained in Article 123(2) TFEU [former Article 101(2) 
TEC] and Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93.
702
  
4.3.2.2 Link between fiscal discipline and price stability 
This position is also compliant with the views reflected in the academic literature, which 
claims that the rules for deficit financing on the basis of strictly market conditions aim to 
confront national budgetary authorities with the financial consequences of a budgetary policy 
in deficit.
703
 The financial markets will, as a rule, reflect their confidence in the authority 
concerned in the terms under which they are prepared to provide capital. However, the 
effectiveness of this corrective effect of the markets depends on the confidence that the Union 
or other Member States will not be liable for or assume the commitments of Member States 
which pursue undisciplined budgetary behaviour. The consequence of the ‗no bail-out clause‘ 
in Article 125(1) TFEU [former Article 103(1) TEC] is that weaker Member States have to 
offer higher interest rates on their government bonds.
704
 Article 125(2) TFEU [former Article 
103(2) TEC]
705
 sets forth that the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, may, as required, specify definitions for the application 
of the prohibitions referred to in Articles 123, 124 and 125 TFEU.  
When considering the wording of Article 125(2) TFEU [former Article 103(2) TEC], and 
taking account of the fact that there is no consultation requirement of the ECB while the latter 
has the authority to monitor the NCBs under Article 271(d) TFEU [former Article 237(d) 
                                                 
702  Paragraph 6 of ECB Opinion CON/2005/1 of 3 February 2005 at the request of the Italian Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Finance on a draft law amending Law Decree No 7 of 25 January 1999, as converted by Law No 74 of 25 March 
1999, concerning urgent provisions on Italian participation in the International Monetary Fund‘s interventions to 
confront severe financial crises of its member countries, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2005_1_f_sign.pdf; paragraph 11 of ECB Opinion CON/2005/50 of 1 
December 2005 at the request of Národná banka Slovenska on a draft law amending the Act No 118/1996 Coll. on the 
protection of bank deposits and on amendments to certain laws, as last amended, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2005_50_f_sign.pdf); paragraph 2.2(b) of  ECB Opinion CON/2009/59 .   
703  See also paragraph 3 of EMI Opinion CON/96/14. At that time, the EMI stated as follows: „The Treaty recognises that 
budgetary discipline will be required in Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union to ensure price stability. Starting 
from Stage Three, the Treaty prohibits to all Member States (an exception for the United Kingdom is provided for in 
Protocol No 11) excessive government deficits and includes provisions necessary to prevent and remedy excessive 
government deficits in Article 104(c). In order to safeguard the independence of the ESCB in the conduct of its monetary 
policy, with the primary objective to maintain price stability, Articles 104 and 104(a) rule out “monetary financing” of 
the public sector as well as “privileged access”, and Article 104(b) states that the Community and the Member States 
shall not be liable for or assume commitments of public entities of another Member State.‟ 
704  See Kapteyn & VerLoren van Themaat, 2008, p. 908. This provision however may be circumvented by the Member 
States agreeing on bilateral aid. As was reported by Eurointelligence.com on 12 February 2020, referring to FT 
Deutschland, one of the reasons explaining why Germany accepted the bail-out of Greece was that Hypo Real Estate, the 
German mortgage bank that had to be bailed out by the federal government and nationalised earlier last year, had an 
exposure of  EUR 4billion to Greek debt. If this exposure had to be written off, the bank, and thus the German 
government, would need to strengthen the bank‘s capital base by  EUR 100 billion. In other words, bailing out Greece 
was a cheaper alternative for the German government (A Historic Political Agreement, 2010). Bailing out would still be 
unacceptable both legally as well as economically (Issing, Europe cannot afford to rescue Greece, 2010).  
705  Note that the text of Article 125(2) TFEU is more advanced than the former Article 103(2) TEC.  
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TEC], one may conclude that Articles 123, 124 and 125 TFEU are addressed primarily to the 
executive branch of the Union and national governments and other public bodies. Indeed, 
these Articles are placed under Title VIII, Chapter 1 ―Economic policy‖ TFEU with the 
powers regarding budgetary discipline of the Member States attributed to the Commission 
and the Council, and not in Chapter 2 ―Monetary policy‖ under the same title that regulates 
the ESCB and the ECB decision-making bodies with regard to the maintenance of price 
stability.  
On the other hand, the monetary financing prohibition contained in Article 123(1) TFEU 
[former Article 101 TEC] is concerned with fiscal discipline as a pre-requisite to enable the 
ESCB to achieve its primary objective of maintaining price stability. The important link 
between budgetary discipline and the prohibition of monetary financing was already 
emphasised by the EMI, which stated that „a lack of fiscal discipline would negatively affect 
the ability of the ESCB to achieve its primary objective of price stability, both through a 
direct demand effect and through an indirect effect on inflation expectations.‟706 
It has been said that ‗[w]hen assessing the proposed structure‘s compatibility with [now] 
Article 123 TFEU [former Article 101 TEC] and Article 21.1 of the Statute, not only is a 
strict literal interpretation of relevance, but the purpose of these provisions also has to be 
considered.‘707 This stance implies that even if Article 123(1) TFEU [former Article 101(1) 
TEC] refers literally to ‗credit facilities‘, i.e. with the obligation to repay such credit, this 
prohibition may also apply a fortiori to other forms of funding, i.e. without the obligation to 
repay, since Article 123 TFEU [former Article 101 TEC] has the overall aim of ensuring 
                                                 
706  The EMI Opinion further states that „Directly, fiscal imbalances can contribute to expanding aggregate demand, thereby 
obliging the central bank to offset them in order to maintain price stability. As a result, the economy may face a sub-
optimal policy mix of higher deficits and higher interest rates. Furthermore, high and persistent fiscal imbalances 
typically raise the issue of sustainability and thereby indirectly fuel inflationary expectations. In order to prevent 
negative repercussions, fiscal policies should be geared towards achieving budgetary positions close to balance or in 
surplus and a convergence of high debt ratios to the 60% reference value or below. Fiscal discipline will be all the more 
important given that budgetary policies will have to cope with major challenges, in particular those resulting from high 
and persistent levels of unemployment and unfavourable demographic patterns. It is indeed the sustainability of 
government budgetary positions which will safeguard the Monetary Union against the risk that a situation arises in 
which an individual country is ultimately unable to service its debt from its own fiscal revenues. The fiscal convergence 
criteria are not to be seen as constraints on the conduct of national economic policies, but as an essential mechanism for 
preventing the recurrence of the experiences of several Member States in the past, when unsustainable fiscal 
developments adversely affected confidence, added risk premium to interest rates and hampered the achievement of 
long-term non-inflationary growth output and employment‟. See paragraph 4 and 5 of EMI Opinion CON/96/14.  
707 See paragraph 2.5.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2009/83; paragraph 9 of ECB Opinion CON/2003/27 of 2 December 2003 at 
the request of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance on a draft Federal law on the National Foundation for Research, 
Technology and Development, available at http://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2003_27_f_sign.pdf.  
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discipline in public finances and of prohibiting NCBs from financing the public sector 
consistent with the primary objective of price stability.
708
  
However, contrary to what was maintained by Issing,
709
 history was made in early May 2010 
with the creation of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM)
710
 and the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
711
 by the Euro Group ECOFIN Ministers on the 
basis of Article 122(2) TFEU for the EFSM and as an intergovernmental arrangement 
without any Treaty basis for the EFSF. In addition, the IMF also committed to provide up to a 
maximum of EUR 250 billion in loans to euro area Member States on a country by country 
basis.  
Article 122(2) TFEU [former Article 100(2) TEC] sets forth that where a Member State is in 
difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or 
exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, 
may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial assistance to the Member State 
concerned. The President of the Council shall inform the European Parliament of the decision 
taken. In order to avoid any conflict with Article 125 TFEU [former Article 103 TEC], the 
aid is in the form of loans or credit lines, which have to be repaid with interest, and not in the 
form of grants.
712
 
Pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010, the Member State 
seeking Union financial assistance shall discuss with the Commission, in liaison with the 
ECB, an assessment of its financial needs and submit a draft economic and financial 
adjustment programme to the Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee. 
Article 3(2) further stipulates that Union financial assistance shall be granted by a decision 
adopted by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission.  
Under Article 3(3) of the Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010, the decision to grant a loan 
shall contain: (a) the amount, the average maturity, the pricing formula, the maximum 
number of instalments, the availability period of the Union financial assistance and the other 
detailed rules needed for the implementation of the assistance; (b) the general economic 
policy conditions which are attached to the Union financial assistance with a view to re-
                                                 
708  See in this respect the eighth recital of the Council Regulation 3603/93 (see footnote 721), which speaks about the need 
to ‗not help to shield the public sector from the discipline of market mechanisms‘.  
709  See footnote 704.  
710  Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, OJ L 
118, 12.5.2010, p. 1. The facility will be providing up to  EUR 60 billion in loans or credit lines.  
711  See Eurogroup, 2010.  
712  See Articles 2 and 8(2) of the Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010.  
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establishing a sound economic or financial situation in the beneficiary Member State and to 
restoring its capacity to finance itself on the financial markets; these conditions will be 
defined by the Commission, in consultation with the ECB; and (c) an approval of the 
adjustment programme prepared by the beneficiary Member State to meet the economic 
conditions attached to the Union financial assistance. 
Under Article 3(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010, the decision to grant a credit 
line shall contain: (a) the amount, the fee for the availability of the credit line, the pricing 
formula applicable for the release of funds and the availability period of the Union financial 
assistance and the other detailed rules needed for the implementation of the assistance; (b) the 
general economic policy conditions which are attached to the Union financial assistance with 
a view to re-establishing a sound economic or financial situation in the beneficiary Member 
State; these conditions will be defined by the Commission, in consultation with the ECB; and 
(c) approval of the adjustment programme prepared by the beneficiary Member State to meet 
the economic conditions attached to the Union financial assistance. 
The Terms of Reference of the Eurogroup on the EFSF were made public on 7 June 2010.
713
 
Under the Terms of Reference, the objective of the EFSF is to collect funds and provide loans 
in conjunction with the IMF to cover the financing needs of euro area Member States in 
difficulty, subject to strict policy conditionality. Euro area Member States will provide 
guarantees for EFSF issuance up to a total of EUR 440 billion on a pro rata basis. The EFSF 
is a limited liability company established under Luxembourg law (Société Anonyme), and the 
shareholding of each Member State in the EFSF will correspond to its respective share in the 
paid-up capital of the ECB.
714
 It is foreseen that the ESFS will issue bonds guaranteed by all 
euro area Member States for each individual bond issue.
715
 
There appears to be a mismatch in the interaction of procedures under the EFSM (up to EUR 
60 billion) and the EFSF (up to a total of EUR 440 billion) and given that the legal 
framework for the two is different, one could wonder about the prospects of success for this 
arrangement. Moreover, the arrangement opens a new avenue for further interpretation of 
Article 125 TFEU [former Article 103 TEC] in those hypothetical situations in which a 
                                                 
713  See footnote 711.  
714 The shareholders‘ agreement on the subject has been made available at 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_83228/DE/Wirtschaft__und__Verwaltung/Europa/20100609-Schutzschirm-
Euro-Anlage-1-eng,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf (visited on 8 September 2010).  
715  From a legal point of view, it would be interesting to see whether these bonds will become eligible collateral under the 
General Documentation and will be part of Eurosystem operations. 
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Member State does not pay back the loan under either of the arrangements or restructures 
it.
716
  
4.3.2.3 Prohibition to finance credit institutions other than in connection with central 
banking tasks 
The monetary financing prohibition applies to national legislation conferring on central banks 
the task of financing third parties where such financing does not relate to any of the tasks and 
functions of the central bank, but is a responsibility of the State. Against this background, the 
ECB has publicly stated that „[n]ational legislation foreseeing the financing by NCBs of 
credit institutions other than in connection with central banking tasks (such as monetary 
policy, payment system or temporary liquidity support operations), in particular to support 
insolvent credit and/or other financial institutions, is not compatible with the monetary 
financing prohibition.‟717 
This would mean that in order to abide by the prohibition, an NCB is prohibited from 
financing a third person carrying out a task that is a responsibility of the State and goes 
beyond the legitimate central banking tasks.
718
  
A separate issue in the context of monetary financing has arisen with regard to the provision 
of ELA collateralised by a State guarantee. The ECB has outlined several criteria that need to 
be taken into account in this regard: (1) the NCB shall take its decision fully independently; 
(2) the supported credit institution shall remain solvent; (3) it should be ensured that the 
credit provided by the NBB is as short-term as possible; (4) there must be systemic stability 
aspects at stake; granting ELA would be part of the NCB‘s statutory contribution to the 
stability of the financial system; (5) there must be no doubts as to the legal validity and 
enforceability of the State guarantee under national law; (6) there must be no doubts as to the 
                                                 
716  Louis however is of the opinion that the ‗no-bailout rule‘ has not been violated (Louis, Guest editorial: The No-Bailout 
Clause and Rescue Packages, 2010).  
717  ECB Convergence Report, May 2010 (p. 25). See also 4.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/58; 
718  One might say that prudential supervision is an exercise of sovereign powers that are attributable to the State. However, 
there are a number of reasons for not saying that financial supervision is an area in which the State is normally active and 
in which funds are normally provided from budgetary sources: (1) the supervision of credit institutions historically 
originates with central banks; (2) in many Member States the supervision of credit institutions is either fully conducted 
by central banks, or central banks make a substantial contribution to such supervision; (3) financial supervision is not 
predominantly financed from democratically controlled budgetary sources, but rather by central banks or, increasingly, 
by the collection of fees from supervised entities; (4) the Eurosystem is under a statutory duty to contribute to the smooth 
conduct of policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system 
because of the close links between the Eurosystem‘s basic tasks to conduct monetary policy and oversee payment 
systems on the one hand, and the conduct of banking supervision and the pursuit of financial stability on the other hand. 
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economic adequacy of the State guarantee, which should cover both the principal and the 
interest on the loans, thus fully preserving the financial independence of the NCB.
719
  
Any financial contribution made by an NCB to a supervisory authority may only be justified 
to the extent that it forms an integral part of the NCB‘s overall contribution to the policy-
making and policy implementation function.
720
 If an NCB is carrying out the functions of 
prudential supervision, the financing of its own supervisory activities by NCBs (including 
autonomous bodies forming part of legal personality of the NCB) cannot be regarded as 
monetary financing since, under Article 8(2) of Council Regulation No 3603/93
721
 central 
banks do not form part of the public sector. This position was confirmed in ECB Opinion 
CON/2010/5, in which, assuming that an NCB is a competent authority for the supervision of 
credit and/or financial institutions under national law, the NCB‘s performance of this task 
cannot constitute prohibited monetary financing under Article 123 TFEU.
722
  
In the absence of any influence on the prudential supervision or financial stability policy-
making of the competent national authorities by the NCB, the latter NCB cannot provide 
funds to the independent supervisory authority; otherwise functional and financial 
independence of the ESCB would be seriously undermined and such an activity would breach 
the monetary financing prohibition.  
  
                                                 
719 See paragraph 3.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2009/49 of 27 May 2009 on measures to mitigate financial turmoil, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2009_49_f_sign.pdf; paragraph 4.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/80 of 28 
November 2008 at the request of the Polish Minister for Finance on a draft law on the provision of State Treasury 
support to financial institutions, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_80_f_sign.pdf; paragraph  
4.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/58; paragraph 4.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/48 of 15 October 2008 at the request of 
the Irish Minister for Finance on a draft Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Scheme 2008, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_48_f_sign.pdf; paragraphs 3.3, 4.1 to 4.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/46; 
paragraph 3.2 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/44 of 3 October 2008 at the request of the Irish Minister for Finance on a draft 
Credit Institutions (Financial Support) Bill 2008, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_44.pdf; 
paragraph 4.11 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/42. 
720  See paragraph 9 of ECB Opinion CON/2004/31 of 22 September 2004 at the request of Národna banka Slovenska on a 
draft law on supervision of the financial market and on amendments to certain laws, available at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2004_31_f_sign.pdf; paragraph 5 of ECB Opinion CON/2004/16. 
721 Council Regulation (EC) No 3603/93 of 13 December 1993 specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions 
referred to in Articles 104 and 104b(1) of the Treaty, OJ L 332, 21.12.1993, p. 1. 
722 See Paragraph 7 of the ECB Opinion CON/2010/5 of 8 January 2010 on three proposals for regulations of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Banking Authority, a European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority and a European Securities and Markets Authority, OJ C 13, 20.1.2010, p. 1. The ECB noted that 
‗[I]nsofar as the financing of each ESA consists, in particular, of obligatory contributions from the national authorities 
competent for the supervision of credit and/or financial institutions, it is not contrary to the prohibition of monetary 
financing for an NCB to contribute to the revenues of the ESA which, in such circumstances, would only involve the 
financing by the NCB of the performance of its own supervisory tasks‘. Rather surprisingly, the compatibility with the 
monetary financing prohibition was not addressed in ECB Opinion CON/2009/88 of 26 October 2009 on a proposal for a 
regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board and a proposal for a Council decision entrusting the European 
Central Bank with specific tasks concerning the functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board, OJ C 270, 
11.11.2009, p. 1. 
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4.4 Conclusions of Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 addresses two main issues: ―Financial stability as an ESCB-related task‖, and 
―Limitations to the central banks‘ role in contributing to financial stability‖.  
I have assessed financial stability as an ESCB-related task. A Eurosystem NCB could, 
pursuant to Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 105(5) TEC] and Article 3.3 of the Statute, 
contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities relating to 
the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. A 
non-Eurosystem NCB carrying out the same task would have to rely on Article 14.4 of the 
Statute as a legal basis. The difference between the two is that a Eurosystem NCB would also 
enjoy full independence under Article 130 TFEU and Article 7 of the Statute while the non-
Eurosystem NCB would have to rely on national arrangements for central bank 
independence.  
The role of the Eurosystem in banking supervision is rather limited and constitutes 
information sharing and the development of risk assessments. However, the BSC, which is 
composed of high-level representatives of the national banking supervisory authorities, 
NCBs, and the ECB, is in most cases meeting in its extended, and not standard, composition 
thereby making it a true ESCB exercise. Eight Eurosystem NCBs and four non-Eurosystem 
NCBs are themselves the competent national authority in their respective Member States as 
far as the prudential supervision of credit institutions is concerned. The BSC has three 
objectives: first, it is to contribute to the monitoring and assessing developments from a 
financial stability perspective; second, it is to contribute to the design of financial regulation 
and supervisory tools; third, it is to promote cooperation between central banks and banking 
supervisors. The BSC has no regulatory powers. 
In the context of the new European financial supervisory architecture the ESRB will be 
established as an independent body without legal personality. The ESRB will be composed of 
the Governors of the NCBs, the President and the vice-President of the ECB, a member of the 
European Commission, and the chairpersons of the three ESAs as the voting members with 
high-level representatives of competent national supervisory authorities and the President of 
the EFC as the non-voting members. The ESRB has also three objectives: first, it is to 
develop a framework for macro-prudential supervision at the EU level; second, it is to 
enhance the effectiveness of early warning systems; third, it is to transform the risk 
assessments into action by the relevant authorities. The ESRB has no regulatory powers. 
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One may wonder whether the proposal to establish the ESRB was indeed any different from 
the existing BSC and its activities that it conducted as an ESCB committee. In substance, the 
BSC has been institutionally re-labelled without changing its legal status or powers and the 
ECB has been given the obligation allegedly derived from Article 127(6) TFEU [former 
Article 105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of the Statute to provide analytical, statistical, logistical 
and administrative support, namely all those functions that it was carrying out as a matter 
falling under Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 105(5) TEC] and Article 3.3 of the Statute 
and without any Council legal instrument in this regard.  
Reference to Article 127(6) TFEU [former Article 105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of the 
Statute would have been justified if, for example, the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
had been allocated within the ECB. In so doing, the micro-pudential role would have 
remained with the competent national authorities and the macro-prudential role would have 
been granted to the ECB. Indeed, it might have been worth considering conferring the 
supervisory powers on the ECB. 
From the legal point of view, the ECB could have supervisory powers if Article 127(6) TFEU 
[former Article 105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of the Statute were to be executed, as the two 
legal provisions being applicable throughout the EU. The only problem with this arrangement 
would be that the ECB‘s supervisory powers would be limited to the euro area since the 
ECB‘s Regulations do not apply outside the euro area. However, even this option seems far 
better than the creation of the ESRB with no regulatory powers at all.  
However, in order to exercise the ECB‘s supervisory competence, Article 127(6) TFEU 
[former Article 105(6) TEC] and Article 25.2 of the Statute need to be activated, and in the 
Council‘s legal instrument to be used for the activation, several very important issues need to 
be addressed. First of all, the scope of the ECB‘s supervisory task needs to be clarified, with a 
list of the institutions and bodies that fall within its supervisory powers. Second, licensing, 
the practical arrangements of supervision, sanctioning as well as crisis management need to 
be regulated. This arrangement would advocate placing the EBA within the ECB instead of 
creating the ESRB. Alternatively, the ECB could be trusted with the same powers as those 
attributed to the ESRB.  
Of course, there are limitations regarding the central bank‘s role in contributing to financial 
stability. The provision of ELA, which is usually attributed to the central banks, is regulated 
neither in the Treaties nor in the Statute. However, the ECB has defined ELA and nine NCB 
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Statutes out of 27 regulate its terms and conditions. The common criteria that can be drawn 
are: (1) independence of the ELA-providing central bank; (2) requirement for collateral; (3) 
short-term or temporary nature of ELA; (4) solvency of the recipient; and (5) exceptional or 
out-of-normal circumstances. While the legal literature has also suggested applying a higher 
(or penalty) interest rate, none of the NCB Statutes contains this provision. The other problem 
is that the above critera are difficult to implement in real time.  
The provision of ELA affects the liquidity in the money market, which in turn means that 
with regard to the euro, this task should be regarded as a Eurosystem task and not a national 
task. For the non-Eurosystem NCBs, the provision of ELA continues to be a national task 
since they have retained their powers of monetary policy.  
Any provision of ELA should comply with the disclosure requirements arising from the 
MAD, the Prospectus Directive, the Transparency Directive or other EU legal instruments. 
Under these rules, the recipient would have to disclose receipt of ELA but it could also be 
pro-active if the providing central bank were to make public statements in order to calm the 
markets. As has been noted by some writers, the problems appear to be widely known by the 
time ELA is granted and in most cases secrecy over the issue would therefore be 
counterproductive. Although some discretion may be warranted, the general public needs 
public assurances from the authorities to prevent bank runs.  
It would therefore be better to regulate the provision of ELA by the central banks and have 
this facility open to all participants in the payment system. The downside of this proposal 
would be that the discretionary nature of ELA will disappear. On the positive side, it would 
enable ELA to be a provision of liquidity and not capital. 
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5 Eesti Pank Statute 
5.1 Introduction  
This Chapter is organised as follows. I will begin by briefly describing the history of Eesti 
Pank from 1919, when it was established, until the end of 2010, since Estonia will adopt the 
euro on 1 January 2011 and this represents a major change for Eesti Pank and its legal 
framework (Section 5.2). As this event is imminent, I will analyse the Estonian NCB Statute 
as a Eurosystem member and, on the basis of discussions in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, propose 
changes to the version of the law that will be in force on 1 January 2011 (see Table 5-1).  
More specifically, I will follow the structure of this thesis and assess the functional, 
institutional and fiscal independence of Eesti Pank together with the requirements for 
accountability and transparency. Furthermore, in the framework of prudential supervision and 
the stability of the financial system, the possibility of establishing legal provision for 
emergency liquidity assistance and the relationship with the Estonian Finatsinspektsioon will 
also be discussed.  
5.2 1919-2010 
Eesti Pank was established as the central bank of the Republic of Estonia on 24 February 
1919, a year after the country‘s declaration of independence. The statutory tasks at the time 
were to arrange for currency circulation and the transfer of payments within Estonia and 
abroad as well as strategic investments in the local economy. The shares of the central bank 
were owned by the State, and the bank‘s decision-making procedures were fully subordinate 
to government control. Apart from central banking functions, the Bank of Estonia conducted 
commercial banking operations and soon turned out to be the largest commercial bank in 
Estonia.  
According to the Statutes of Eesti Pank, the Estonian currency should have been on a par 
with the gold franc (1 Estonian mark = 0.29032 grams of gold). However, as the central bank 
did not have any real reserves backing the money issued, the banknotes in circulation did not 
have the gold backing. The issue was worsened by the failure of the economic policy 
orientation towards Soviet Russia, which resulted in an economic crisis, which in turn led to 
continuous devaluations of the Estonian mark.  
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The continuous devaluations were stopped by the reform of both the central bank and the 
monetary system. The League of Nations was approached for assistance and, in 1927, the 
reform was implemented. A new version of the Statutes of Eesti Pank was approved by the 
Parliament and, under the new rules, Eesti Pank became an independent banknote-issuing 
central bank.  
The main tasks of Eesti Pank were to secure the value of the currency. The Eesti Pank‘s Full 
Assembly (Shareholders‘ Meeting – at the time, the Government was not the only 
shareholder) and its Board of 10 members were established as the governing bodies of Eesti 
Pank in order to guarantee the autonomy of the central bank from the Government. The 
Governor of Eesti Pank headed the Board and, with the Executive Board, bore full 
responsibility for daily management of the bank.  
The League of Nations assisted the Republic of Estonia with obtaining a foreign loan of GBP 
1.35 million, of which Eesti Pank received GBP 1 million. The gold and foreign currency 
reserves of the State Treasury were also transferred to the central bank. Owing to the United 
Kingdom‘s decision to renounce the gold standard and the fall in the exchange rate of the 
British pound, Eesti Pank sustained severe losses and in 1934, the new currency issued in 
1927 – the Estonian kroon – had to be devalued by 35%.  
In June 1940, following the annexation of Estonia by the USSR, Eesti Pank was nationalised 
and all its assets were supposed to have been transferred to the USSR. However, most of the 
foreign reserves were retained by foreign governments, which played an important role in the 
design of the Estonia‘s breakaway from the rouble zone.  
On 15 December 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Estonia passed 
a resolution re-establishing Eesti Pank and declared its succession to the central bank 
established in 1919. Since Estonia was still using roubles issued by the USSR State Bank, 
Eesti Pank initially lacked any practical authority. The re-established central bank started to 
operate on 1 January 1990 and co-existed with the Estonian Republic Office of the USSR 
State Bank until the latter‘s merger with Eesti Pank on 1 January 1992, after Estonia had 
regained its independence on 20 August 1991.
723
 
Prior to the enactment of the first version of the Estonian NCB Statute, Eesti Pank operated 
under provisions provided by a legal instrument regulating commercial banking activities. 
                                                 
723 For further information, see Drēviņa, Laurinavičius, & Tupits, 2007.  
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The drafting of the Estonian NCB Statute started in early 1992. Two working groups
724
 were 
involved in drafting the Act, in which specialists of financial law, banking, credit and 
monetary affairs participated.  
The Estonian Parliament adopted the Estonian NCB Statute on 18 May 1993.
725
 The Estonian 
NCB Statute is a constitutional law, i.e. it is expressly mentioned in Article 104 of the 
Estonian Constitution as a law which may be passed and amended only by an absolute 
majority of the members of Parliament. In the hierarchy of Estonian laws, constitutional laws 
rank after the Constitution. 
In order to secure a line of succession with the central bank that operated between 1919 and 
1940, certain articles were inserted into the Estonian NCB Statute that may seem unusual. For 
example, Article 1(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute stipulates, inter alia, that Eesti Pank is the 
legal successor of Eesti Pank established as the central bank of the Republic of Estonia in 
1919. Another similar paragraph can be found in Article 26(3), which sets forth that 
immovable and movable property that was in the ownership of Eesti Pank established as the 
central bank of the Republic of Estonia in 1919 and that was unlawfully expropriated in 1940 
also belongs to Eesti Pank.
726
 The establishment of a clear line of succession was necessary in 
order to justify the claims for foreign reserve assets from foreign governments.
727
 
The Estonian NCB Statute has been amended several times following its entry into force in 
1993. The most significant amendments relate to the separation of supervisory powers since 
January 2002 and 2003 adjustments made necessary by Estonia‘s entry into the EU. The 
Estonian NCB Statute was further significantly amended following the critical remarks in the 
ECB Convergence Report of 2004. Further changes to the Estonian NCB Statute were 
introduced in April 2010 with the Law on the introduction of the euro.
728
 
Article 140(2) TFEU lays down the procedures for the abrogation of the derogation of the 
Member States concerned. At least once every two years, or at the request of a Member State 
with a derogation, the Commission and the ECB shall report to the Council in accordance 
                                                 
724  It is unclear, and not explained in historical documents, why there had to be two working groups. Probably it was due to 
rivalry between the newly established central bank and the Government. 
725  Eesti Panga seadus, RT I 1993, 28, 498. [RT = Riigi Teataja = State Gazette] 
726 A similar provision can be found in the Tartu University Act (Tartu Ülikooli seadus). Otherwise, declarations on 
property expropriated as of 1940 are rare in Estonian legislation. Tartu University was founded in 1632 by the Swedish 
king Gustav Adolf II and is the oldest university in Estonia. 
727  See Drēviņa, Laurinavičius, & Tupits, 2007, p. 13. 
728  RT I 2010, 22, 108. See also ECB Opinion CON/2010/20 of 5 March 2010 on amendments to the Law on and Statute of 
Eesti Pank, available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_ecb_2010_20_f_sign.pdf.  
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with the procedure laid down in Article 140(1) TFEU. The latest Commission and ECB 
regular Convergence Reports were adopted in May 2010.
729
 
Article 1 of Council Decision 2010/416/EU
730
 concluded that Estonia fulfils the necessary 
conditions for the adoption of the euro. The derogation in favour of Estonia referred to in 
Article 4 of the 2003 Act of Accession is abrogated with effect from 1 January 2011. 
Subsequently, the conversion rate between the euro and the Estonian kroon was set at 
15,6466 kroon for 1 euro, which corresponds to the current central rate of the kroon in the 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM II).
731
  
Estonia‘s changeover plan specifies that euro banknotes and coins should become legal 
tender in that Member State on the day on which the euro is introduced as its currency. 
Consequently, the euro adoption date and the cash changeover date are to be 1 January 2011 
and no ―phasing-out‖ period will apply.732 
5.3 Asessment of the Estonian NCB Statute as of 1 January 2011 
5.3.1 Functional independence 
5.3.1.1 Primary objective of Eesti Pank under the Constitution 
Description of Estonian Constitutional Acts 
The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia (hereinafter the First Act) was passed by a 
referendum on 28 June 1992. As well as the constitution itself, the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia Implementation Act (hereinafter the Second Act) was also passed in the 
referendum. The First Act has been amended only once, on 25 February 2003, when the term 
of office of local governments was extended from three years to four.
733
 This Act amending 
the constitution did not lead to an additional Act similar to the Second Act, but rather 
amended Article 156 (1) of the First Act. 
                                                 
729  See European Commission, 2010; and European Central Bank, 2010.  
730  Council Decision 2010/416/EU of 13 July 2010 in accordance with Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the adoption by 
Estonia of the euro on 1 January 2011, OJ L 196, 28.7.2010, p. 24. 
731  Council Regulation (EU) No 671/2010 of 13 July 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 2866/98 as regards the conversion 
rate to the euro for Estonia  OJ L 196, 28.7.2010, p. 4. See also ECB Opinion CON/2010/52 of 5 July 2010 on a proposal 
for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 974/98 as regards the introduction of the euro in Estonia and on a 
proposal for a Council regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2866/98 as regards the conversion rate to the euro for 
Estonia, OJ C 190, 14.7.2010, p. 1. 
732  Council Regulation (EU) No 670/2010 of 13 July 2010 amending Regulation (EC) No 974/98 as regards the introduction 
of the euro in Estonia OJ L 196, 28.7.2010, p. 1.  
733  RT I 2003, 29, 174.  
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The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Amendment Act (hereinafter the Third Act)
734
 
was passed by a referendum on 14 September 2003. The Third Act is remarkable in two 
respects: first, it is at the same level in the legislative hierarchy as the First Act; and second, 
no provisions of any previous Acts were amended with the passage of the Third Act. Instead, 
Article 2 of the Third Act sets forth that: ―As of Estonia‘s accession to the European Union, 
the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia (i.e. the First Act) applies taking account of the 
rights and obligations arising from the Accession Treaty.‖ 
Before and after its passage, the Third Act has been a subject of fierce debate in Estonian 
legal circles, both in terms of its interpretation and also in terms of the legality of its very 
existence. Further spice was added to the debate by the issue of the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. The Estonian Chancellor of Justice is of the opinion that the Third 
Act is legally unclear and that its implementation has not met the expectations prevailing at 
the time it was drafted.
735
 This view is shared by other recognised legal practitioners.
736
 On 
the other hand, the opinion has also been voiced that it is unnecessary to make specific 
reference to membership of the European Union and the procedures arising from it in the 
First Act as the possible interpretations of the Third Act include all the constitutional 
questions which could surface upon accession to the European Union.
737
 
As is clear from the above, opinions regarding the Third Act are diametrically opposed. 
People on both sides of the debate have largely used the same arguments to reach their 
differing viewpoints. As a result, the problems that have come to light in connection with the 
introduction of the single currency, the euro, need further examination. Among the 
obligations placed on the Republic of Estonia by the Act of Accession to the European Union 
is the obligation to participate, as of accession, in Economic and Monetary Union as a 
Member State with a derogation.
738
 
 
 
                                                 
734  RT I 2003, 74, 429. 
735  Vt. Jõks, 2005. 
736 Vt. Lõhmus (2005); Maruste & Albi (2003); Albi, Gallagher, Koolmeister, Mälksoo, & Roosma (2002); Albi, 
Põhiseaduse muutmine Euroopa Liitu astumiseks, 2001; Albi, Euroliit ja kaasaegne suveräänsus, 2000. 
737  Vt. Reinsalu (2005); Laffranque, Eesti põhiseaduse ja Euroopa õiguse kooselu, 2003; Laffranque, Madise, Merusk, Põld, 
& Rask, 2002. 
738  Article 4 of the  Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic 
of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the 
Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the 
European Union is founded. 
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Eesti Pank‟s tasks under the Estonian Constitution 
Article 111 of the First Act sets forth that Eesti Pank has the sole right to issue Estonian 
currency and that Eesti Pank shall regulate currency circulation and uphold the stability of the 
national currency. However, in the light of Article 2 of the Third Act, it is possible to suggest 
so many potential interpretations that the principle of legal certainty begins to be undermined. 
Some examples of possible interpretations are: 
1) the single currency, the euro, is the Estonian currency; 
2) ‗Estonian currency‘ means only the Estonian kroon; 
3) with the entry into force of the Third Act, Article 111 of the First Act has been 
rendered invalid. 
These interpretations are examined in more detail below.
 739
 
The euro as the Estonian currency in the meaning of Article 111 of the First Act 
However, this interpretation neither takes account of the provisions of Union law in this field 
nor clarifies the concept of ―Estonian currency‖ and thus only the fact that the Currency 
Act
740
 prescribes that the only legal tender in Estonia is the Estonian kroon makes it possible 
to claim that ‗Estonian currency‘ means the Estonian kroon. 
The abrogation of the Estonian derogation would mean that European Union regulations 
granting euro banknotes and coins the status of sole legal tender would enter into force in 
Estonia. Whether that provides the basis for claiming that, from that moment on, the Estonian 
currency is the euro is doubtful. 
Article 111 of the First Act prescribes that the right to issue Estonian currency is the 
exclusive competence of Eesti Pank. However, this contradicts Article 128 TFEU [former 
Article 106 TEC) and Article 16 of the Statute. The euro banknotes are identical in terms of 
design and it makes no difference to the general public whether the notes in their hands have 
been issued by Suomen Pankki, Eesti Pank or any other member of the ESCB. The phrase 
‗Eesti Pank has the sole right to issue Estonian currency‘ is essentially wrong because it does 
not take account of the functioning of the Eurosystem. Similarly, the statement that ‗Eesti 
Pank shall regulate currency circulation and shall uphold the stability of the national 
                                                 
739  The discussion here is based on an earlier article produced by the author in the Estonian language (Tupits, Ühisraha euro 
kasutuselvõtu riigiõiguslikud aspektid, 2005).  
740  RT 1992, 21, 299; I 2002, 63, 387. 
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currency‘ is incorrect, as Articles 2  and 3 of the Statute of the ESCB set out duties for Eesti 
Pank which are worded quite differently. 
Once the euro has been adopted, Eesti Pank will no longer conduct an independent monetary 
policy, but rather it will participate in the conduct and implementation of monetary policy in 
the Eurosystem. The Governor of Eesti Pank will become a member of the highest decision-
making body of the European Central Bank – the Governing Council. Eesti Pank will 
continue to manage currency circulation in Estonia but its sole right to issue currency will 
disappear. Eesti Pank will issue euro banknotes with the permission of the ECB and together 
with the other members of the Eusosystem. Eesti Pank will retain the sole right to issue euro 
coins in the Republic of Estonia but the volume of coins issued will have to be approved in 
advance by the ECB. The foreign exchange reserves for the Estonian kroon will become the 
foreign exchange reserves for the euro and the latter should be maintained and managed on 
the basis of the rules established by the ECB. Eesti Pank‘s accounts will also be subject to 
ECB rules and auditing will take place pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 27.1 of the Statute 
of the ESCB. 
The term „Estonian currency‟ can only mean the Estonian kroon  
This interpretation is also based on the claim that Article 111 of the First Act does not define 
the term ‗Estonian currency‘. However, contrary to the previous case this interpretation leads 
to two possible claims. 
Any reference to the Estonian currency cannot in any way be a reference to the euro, as euro 
banknotes and coins are issued by the members of the Eurosystem and the euro is a common 
currency, of which the Estonian coins would make up just a tiny fraction. The Estonian 
aspect would be visible primarily by the existence of euro coins with an Estonian national 
side. 
Any reference to the Estonian currency is, in fact, a reference to the Estonian kroon, but as 
the right to issue the Estonian kroon has been rescinded (following Council Decision 
2010/416/EU, Council Regulation (EU) No 671/2010 and Council Regulation (EU) 
No 670/2010 and assuming that the Currency Act has been repealed), this is an  ‗empty‘ right 
which may, after a certain time, be reasserted – for example if the use of the euro is 
renounced. 
In the light of Union law, this interpretation is even more radical as it is, in effect, both a 
breach of the obligation of loyalty set out in Article 4(3) TEU [former Article 10 TEC] and a 
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public declaration of that breach. As already mentioned, the Republic of Estonia is under 
obligation to adopt the euro, pursuant to Article 4 of the Act of Accession. National 
legislation in the Member States including the statutes of the national central banks is to be 
adapted as necessary with a view to ensuring compatibility with Articles 130 and 131 TFEU 
and the Statute. As a Member State with a derogation, Estonia must meet all the conformity 
requirements and is under the obligation to prepare national legislation for the adoption of the 
euro. If at the same time some provisions concerning the right to issue another currency were 
to be retained ‗just in case‘, that would be in clear contradiction with Union law. Moreover, 
that contradiction would not be eliminated by the fact that, irrespective of national legislation 
that prescribes otherwise, a Member State is to act in accordance with Union law. After all, it 
is well established in the case law of the Court of Justice that Union law is supreme over the 
national law of the Member States, including the fundamental norms of their national 
constitutions.
741
 Furthermore, the ECB is of the opinion that neither the supremacy of the 
Treaties and the Statute over national legislation, nor the nature of the incompatibility, affects 
the need to comply with this obligation.
742
 The decisions in cases C-167/73 and C-185/96 
clearly stress the importance of the principle of legal certainty and the obligation of the 
Member States to bring their national legislation into conformity with Union law. 
The remaining wording of Article 111 of the First Act is again a problem as far as this 
interpretation is concerned. The claim that ‗Eesti Pank shall regulate currency circulation and 
shall uphold the stability of the national currency‘ is entirely inappropriate here, as it does not 
take into account the primary objective of the ESCB under Article 127(1) TFEU [former 
Article 105(1) TEC] as well as Article 282(2) TFEU and Article 2 of the Statute, which shall 
be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB 
shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 TEU. 
Article 111 of the First Act became invalid with the passage of the Third Act 
This is an interpretation where the material approach prevails: proceeding from Article 2 of 
the Third Act, the Republic of Estonia has no legal grounds for declining to adopt the euro, as 
                                                 
741  Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] 
ECR 1125, at pararaph 1134. 
742  The primacy of Union law does not affect the obligation to adapt national legislation. This general requirement derives 
not only from Article 109 of the Treaty but also from the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 
such as Case 167/73 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [1974] ECR 359. This approach has 
been further affirmed in the Case C-185/96 Commission of the European Communities v the Hellenic Republic. – ECR 
[1998] I-6601, paragraphs 30 and 32. 
 204 
 
a result of which it is no longer possible to apply Article 111 of the First Act. In this 
interpretation, the only parts of the constitution which are valid are those which conform to or 
are not governed by Union law. Therefore, Article 111 of the First Act was rendered invalid 
when the Third Act was passed. 
In order for the euro to be adopted in this case, amendments would need to be made to the 
Estonian NCB Statute, the Currency Act and other Acts containing references to the kroon as 
the legal tender of Estonia. However, the question of legal certainty remains a problem – as 
the text of Article 111 of the First Act is still there, the possibility exists that any attempts to 
bring the constitutional Acts (such as the Estonian NCB Statute) or other Acts into 
conformity with the Treaties or the Statute of the ESCB could be blocked as unconstitutional. 
Even if the necessary package of Acts for the euro to be adopted is passed, the formal 
contradiction between the text of Article 111 of the First Act and the Treaties and the Statute 
will remain. 
Interpretation given by the Estonian Supreme Court 
In order to obtain legal clarity, as was suggested in the Convergence Reports of 2004 by the 
ECB and the Commission,
743
 the Estonian Parliament, in the context of preparing 
amendments to the Estonian NCB Statute, requested a constitutional review by the Supreme 
Court
744
 of the draft Amending Law.  
On 11 May 2006 the Estonian Supreme Court declared Article 111 of the Constitution to be 
inapplicable
745
 and thus provided legal clarity in the matter. The Supreme Court found that 
the Draft Act Amending the Estonian NCB Statute, which made preparatory arrangements for 
the eventual adoption of the euro, was compatible with the Constitution. In addition, the 
Supreme Court directly addressed the position of the Third Act in the context of supremacy 
of Union law: it stated that the text of the First Act should be read together with the Third Act 
and that those parts of the Constitution that are incompatible with Union law shall not be 
applied. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court appears to have granted unconditional 
                                                 
743 According to the Commission, Article 111 of the Constitution is in conflict with EU law; the opinion does not mention 
the Third Act (European Commission, 2004, p. 12). The ECB, however, refers in its assessment to both the Constitution 
and the Third Act, but urged that Article 111 should be amended with regard to legal certainty (European Central Bank, 
2004, p. 221). 
744 The Supreme Court is the highest court in Estonia. It functions as the cassation stage in civil, criminal and administrative 
matters and is also the court of constitutional review.  
745  Opinion 3-4-1-3-06, 11 May 2006, RT III 2006, 19, 176. 
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supremacy to Union law.
746
 This interpretation has been used in commentaries on the 
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia, for example.
747
 
A possible way forward 
Viewed formally, Article 111 of the First Act contravenes Union law because it does not set 
out the competence of the European Central Bank and the Council to issue the common 
currency. Viewed materially, Article 111 of the First Act has lost its original meaning as, 
proceeding from Article 2 of the Third Act, the Republic of Estonia has no legal grounds for 
declining to adopt the euro. Therefore, Article 111 of the First Act has lost its meaning both 
formally and materially, as was in fact acknowledged by the Estonian Supreme Court in its 
decision of 11 May 2006. 
The text of such a provision is legally void and the search for interpretations in the context of 
Union law leads to the conclusion that, as a result of Article 2 of the Third Act, it is no longer 
possible to apply Article 111 of the First Act. Leaving Article 111 of the First Act in the text 
of the constitution would contradict both Union law and the practice of the Court of Justice. 
Therefore, proceeding from the principle of legal certainty, it would be correct with regard to 
the rule of law to omit the text of Article 111 from the First Act, by amending the Estonian 
Constitution, for example.
748
 
5.3.1.2 Primary objective of Eesti Pank under its Statute 
Following the recent amendments in April 2010, Article 2(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute 
sets forth that the primary objective of Eesti Pank is to maintain price stability. Eesti Pank 
also supports the achievement of other economic policy objectives in accordance with the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
For the achevement of these objectives, the following tasks have been foreseen: 
1) to help to define the monetary policy of the European Union and to implement the 
monetary policy determined by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank; 
2) to hold and manage the official foreign exchange reserves; 
                                                 
746  See Albi, Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States: Bringing Parliaments into the Equation of 'Co-operative 
Constitutionalism', 2007, p. 45.  
747  Vt. Truuväli, et al., 2008, lk 563. 
748  In cases such as this it is usually claimed that any such change to the constitution would contradict the Constitution 
Amendment Act and open the door for precisely all those legal problems that the passage of the Constitution 
Amendment Act was meant to prevent, and that it is unnecessary and dangerous to amend the constitution because of the 
euro (Madise, 2005). 
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3) to promote the smooth operation of the payment systems and the stability of the 
financial system; 
4) to participate in the development of the payment systems and the financial system; 
5) to regulate currency circulation, contribute to the issuance of euro banknotes and the 
issue of euro coins; 
6) to compile the balance of payments of Estonia; 
7) to collect and publish statistics necessary for the performance of its functions;  
8) any other activity that complies with the above. 
References to the currency board arrangement and the stability of the national currency have 
been repealed. In this new capacity, it might be worth considering whether or not to introduce 
a provision, within the limits set by Article 14.4 of the Statute, on the ELA (see Table 5-1). 
Assuming that the ELA in the euro area will remain a national task as was discussed in 
Section 4.3.1, one would need a clear legal basis for that kind of activity. Against this 
background, the issue whether Eesti Pank could provide ELA against State guarantee would 
have to be left open. Howevever, as was noted in Section 4.3.1, it is arguable whether the 
provision of ELA in the euro area is a national task, which would suggest that such a 
provision should not be introduced in the law. However, for the sake of completenetess a 
drafting proposal has been made in Table 5-1.  
5.3.2 Institutional independence 
Under Estonian law, Eesti Pank is qualified as a public legal person, as it operates under its 
own law. Pursuant to Article 112 of the First Act, Eesti Pank shall operate under its own law 
and report to the Estonian Parliament. Article 1(6) of the Estonian NCB Statute further 
stipulates that Eesti Pank shall be registered in the state register of state and local government 
agencies. Under Article 3(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute, Eesti Pank operates independently 
of other state agencies. Eesti Pank shall report on its activities to the Estonian Parliament and 
it is not subordinated to the Government of the Republic, to any other executive state agency 
or to any third person. 
Furthermore, Eesti Pank is subject to the guidelines and instructions of the ECB pursuant to 
Article 3(1
1
) of the Estonian NCB Statute.
749
 This function is to be understood as primarily 
falling within Article 14.3 of the Statute, although other aspects are covered elsewhere, as in 
                                                 
749 Article 3(11) of the Estonian NCB Statute sets forth that as part of the European System of Central Banks, Eesti Pank and 
members of its directing bodies may apply for and receive instructions to be carried out only from the European Central 
Bank.  
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the last paragraph of Article 12.1 of the Statute referring to the fact that the ECB shall have 
recourse to the NCBs to carry out operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB. 
Even though the Supervisory Board is not in charge of the daily management of Eesti Pank, 
under Article 9(5) of the Estonian NCB Statute the Minister of Finance can participate in the 
meetings, with account being taken of Article 130 TFEU (which also embraces Article 7 of 
the Statute). The above provisions aim to address the list of prohibitions discussed in Section 
3.2.2.  
5.3.3 Personal independence 
5.3.3.1 Overview 
The Estonian NCB Statute provides three types of decision-making bodies for Eesti Pank: the 
Supervisory Board, the Executive Board and the Governor.  
The Supervisory Board consists of a Chairman and seven members who are appointed by the 
Estonian Parliament. The Supervisory Board of the Estonian NCB is entitled to supervise all 
activities of the NCB. 
The daily management of the NCB is vested in the Governor and the Executive Board. The 
Executive Board is composed of the Governor and the Deputy Governors; none of them can 
be a member of the Supervisory Board.  
The Executive Board is in charge of planning and organising the Estonian NCB‘s activities. 
However, certain competences, such as ESCB-related tasks, are allocated to the Governor 
exclusively.  
5.3.3.2 Supervisory Board 
The Supervisory Board was originally designed to be the decision-making organ adopting, 
inter alia, monetary policy decisions. Between 1993 and 2006, the Governor of Eesti Pank 
was an ex officio member of the Supervisory Board, albeit not as the Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board but as an ordinary member. This composition created a legal problem as 
the Supervisory Board was authorised to supervise the Governor, i.e. the Governor was a 
member of a supervisory organ that was supervising the Governor.
750
 The Supervisory Board 
                                                 
750 The historical background to this legal anomaly has been a matter for discussion (Aare, 2002). Aare describes, inter alia, 
the conflicts and opposition between the newly established central bank and the government that attempted to 
subordinate it.   
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was released from competence in monetary policy matters as of 1 May 2004 when Estonia 
acceded to the European Union.  
With the amendments of 6 June 2006 the Governor of Eesti Pank ceased to be a member of 
the Supervisory Board. As a result, the legislator eliminated the dual function of the Governor 
of Eesti Pank as a supervisor and as one being supervised; left the supervisory functions 
solely to the Supervisory Board; and enabled the Governor of Eesti Pank to focus on carrying 
out the executive functions together with the Executive Board.  
The following issues are within the exclusive competence of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank: 
1) making a proposal to the President of the Republic for appointment of the Governor 
of Eesti Pank; 
2) appointment to office and release of Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank, the heads of the 
independent divisions and representative offices of Eesti Pank, and the head of the 
internal audit department of Eesti Pank and the appointment and removal of members 
of the Supervisory Board of the Financial Supervision Authority on the proposal of 
the Governor of Eesti Pank; 
3) approval of the statute of Eesti Pank, the statutes of the independent divisions and 
representative offices of Eesti Pank and the statutes of the internal audit department; 
4) supervision of the implementation of the budget of Eesti Pank; 
5) appointment of internal auditors of Eesti Pank and approval of the work schedule for 
internal audits; 
6) appointment of the independent auditors of Eesti Pank; 
7) approval of Eesti Pank‘s annual report on the proposal of the Governor; 
8) decision on the design of the national side of Estonian euro coins751 and on the 
nominal value and design of collector coins; 
9) deciding, on the proposal of the Governor of Eesti Pank, on the establishment, 
reorganisation and liquidation of independent divisions of Eesti Pank; 
                                                 
751 However, the first version of the design of the national side of Estonian euro coins was decided by the Estonian public. 
A competition was announced in June 2004 and 134 designs were submitted by the deadline of 19 October 2004. A jury 
of experts convened by Eesti Pank selected the 10 best designs, which were then given a total of 45,453 votes during a 
one-week telephone voting procedure. The jury, which had made the decision on the ten designs in the national round in 
early November 2004, approved the results of the telephone voting procedure. The winning design features the outline of 
Estonia and the word ―Eesti‖. The winner of the design competition of the national side of the Estonian euro coin was 
Mr Lembit Lõhmus. Further information in English is available at 
http://euro.eesti.ee/EU/Euroveeb_edit/Main_Page/index.jsp (visited on 5 September 2010).  
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10) review and approval of written proposals and other documents submitted to the 
Riigikogu in the name of Eesti Pank. 
Pursuant to Articles 9(2
1
) and 11(4) of the Estonian NCB Statute, the Governor of Eesti Pank 
shall report regularly on his or her activities to the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, 
concerning Estonia‘s economy and monetary policy, the situation in the financial sector and 
the implementation of Eesti Pank‘s budget.  
The requirements for the position as the Chairman of the Supervisory Board are that he or she 
must have Estonian citizenship and a university degree as provided in Article 7(2) of the 
Estonian NCB Statute. The education requirements for the Chairman have been harmonised 
with the ordinary members of the Supervisory Board under Article 8(2) of the Estonian NCB 
Statute who are required to have a university degree in addition to Estonian citizenship.
752
 In 
addition, the Supervisory Board members have to pass the security vetting required under 
Article 11
2
 of the Estonian NCB Statute before they can be formally appointed. 
Pursuant to Subsections 7 and 9 of Article 65 of the First Act, the Estonian Parliament shall 
appoint the Chairman of the Supervisory Board as well as its members. Subsections 11 and 
12 of Article 78 of the First Act specify that the proposal to appoint the Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board and the appointment of the Governor of Eesti Pank shall fall within the 
powers of the President of the Republic.  
Further provisions on the Supervisory Board can be found in the Estonian NCB Statute. The 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board shall be appointed for a term of five years by the 
Estonian Parliament upon proposal by the President of the Republic as set forth in Article 
7(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute. The ordinary members of the Supervisory Board shall be 
appointed by the Estonian Parliament upon proposal by the Chairman of the Supervisory 
Board pursuant to Article 8 of the Estonian NCB Statute. The term of office is established as 
five years under Article 8(5) of the Estonian NCB Statute. A shorter term of office is possible 
                                                 
752 The education requirements were relaxed for the Chairman of the Supervisory Board in the first half of 2008. As of 8 
July  2008, the educational requirement which previously required a university degree in economics or law was reduced 
to a ‗university degree‘.   
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under Articles 8(7) and 8(8) of the Estonian NCB Statute,
753
 but this can be justified by the 
fact that the Supervisory Board is not involved in ESCB-related decisions. 
The Estonian NCB Statute also lists the grounds for termination of membership of the 
Supervisory Board. Article 8(6) sets fort that these grounds shall be: (1) the expiry of his or 
her term of office, (2) upon his or her own resignation or, (3) upon the entry into force of a 
judgment of conviction, (4) dismissal; or (5) in the event of his or her death. It should be 
noted that the grounds for dismissal differ from those listed in Article 14.2 of the Statute as 
the Supervisory Board is not involved in Eurosystem-related decisions. The resignation 
procedure of the Chairman of the Supervisory Board foresees an obligation to give four 
months notification to the President of the Republic under Article 7(1
1
) of the Estonian NCB 
Statute. A similar obligation is imposed on the ordinary members of the Supervisory Board 
pursuant to Article 8(6
1
).
754
 Pursuant to Article 12(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute, the 
Chairman and members of the Supervisory Board may be dismissed on the entry into force of 
a judgement of conviction.  
The membership of the Supervisory Board is incompatible with any other position at Eesti 
Pank
755
 or a position in the Government pursuant to Articles 7(2) and 8(3) of the Estonian 
NCB Statute; Article 8(4) further stipulates that a member of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank shall not be an employee of any management institution, investment fund, investment 
company, credit institution, insurance company or other subject of financial supervision, nor 
be a member of the decision-making body of any such institution. 
The Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall organise the activities of the 
Supervisory Board under Article 7(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute, chair the meetings of the 
Supervisory Board, monitor the implementation of the Supervisory Board‘s decisions, 
represent the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank and respond to interpellations concerning the 
activities of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank submitted to him or her in the Estonian 
Parliament. 
                                                 
753 Article 8(7) of the Estonian NCB Statute sets forth that when a member of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank is 
appointed as a member of the Government of the Republic or commences work at Eesti Pank, the Riigikogu shall, on the 
proposal of the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, appoint an alternate member of the Supervisory Board 
whose authority terminates when the member of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank leaves the office which precludes 
his or her membership of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank or when he or she ceases to be employed at Eesti Pank. 
Article 8(8) of the Estonian NCB Statute provides that the authority of members appointed to the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank at a later time terminates at the same time as the authority of the given composition of the Supervisory Board 
of Eesti Pank. 
754 Other persons under an obligation to given four months notification of their resignation include, for example, the 
Governor of Eesti Pank, the Legal Chancellor and the State Auditor.  
755 For example, because of his appointment to the office of Governor of Eesti Pank on 7 June 2005, Mr Andres Lipstok‘s 
membership of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank was discontinued.  
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The meetings of the Supervisory Board are, as a rule, closed to the public. Article 9(5) of the 
Estonian NCB Statute lists the Governor of Eesti Pank and the Deputy Governors as those 
who can attend the meetings with a right to speak.
756
 Supervisory Board meetings have a 
quorum requirement, which under Article 9(7) of the Estonian NCB Statute is five members; 
in the absence of the Chairman, a member of the Supervisory Board elected from among 
those present is to chair the meeting. A majority vote of the members of the Supervisory 
Board pursuant to Article 9(8) of the Estonian NCB Statute is required for decisions on: 
1) making a proposal to the President of the Republic for appointment of the Governor 
of Eesti Pank 
2) approving the statute of Eesti Pank, the statutes of the independent divisions and 
representative offices of Eesti Pank and the statutes of the internal audit department; 
3) supervising of the implementation of the budget of Eesti Pank; and 
4) approving Eesti Pank‘s annual report on the proposal of the Governor. 
In the case of a tie, the Chairman‘s vote shall be decisive.  
5.3.3.3 Governor 
Article 9(6) of the Estonian NCB Statute sets forth that the Governor of Eesti Pank shall be 
responsible for the implementation of decisions of the Supervisory Board. The monetary 
policy competence has been assigned solely to the Governor of Eesti Pank since 1 May 2003. 
Article 11(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute addresses the issues that are within the exclusive 
competence of the Governor of Eesti Pank: 
1) designing of banking policies, general management of Eesti Pank‘s activities and 
organisation of the performance of the tasks of the European System of Central 
Banks; 
2) organisation of the implementation of decisions of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank and the application of measures (including sanctions) necessary to ensure their 
implementation; 
3) representation of Eesti Pank without special authorisation in all matters and instances 
both in Estonia and abroad; 
4) grant of authorisation to represent Eesti Pank in certain cases or in certain matters; 
5) making proposals to the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank for the appointment to 
office and release of the Deputy Governors and the head of the internal audit 
                                                 
756 This right also concerns the Minister of Finance; see Section 5.3.2.  
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department of Eesti Pank and the heads of the independent divisions of Eesti Pank, 
and for the appointment and removal of members of the Supervisory Board of the 
Financial Supervision Authority; 
6) approval of Eesti Pank‘s budget. 
The Governor shall report to the Supervisory Board and the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) 
pursuant to Articles 11(2) and 11(4) of the Estonian NCB Statute.  
In order to execute his tasks, the Governor is entitled to issue regulations and decrees under 
Article 11(5) of the Estonian NCB Statute; Eesti Pank Governor‘s Regulations are subject to 
publication in Riigi Teataja (State Gazette) pursuant to Article 11(6) of the Estonian NCB 
Statute.
757
  
The Governor of Eesti Pank is appointed for a non-renewable term of seven years by the 
President of the Republic upon proposal by the Supervisory Board as set forth in Article 
10(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute. The eligibility criteria for the Governor are that he or she 
must be an Estonian citizen and have a university degree.
758
 In addition, he or she must pass 
the security vetting required under Article 11
2
 of the Estonian NCB Statute before he or she 
can be formally appointed. In order to reflect the findings in Section 3.2.3, several 
suggestions have been made in Table 5-1.  
With regard to the Governor‘s dismissal, Article 12(2) of the Estonian NCB Statute provides 
that the Governor and a Deputy Governor of Eesti Pank may be dismissed only on the basis 
specified in Article 14.2 of the Statute. In this case,  the conditions that the Governor and 
Deputy Governors have to meet would need to be clarified (see Table 5-1).  
Reflecting what occurred in the period May-June 2000, when a newly appointed Governor 
Vello Vensel refused to take office and the term of office of the former Governor Vahur Kraft 
had expired, Articles 10(4) and 11
3
 of the Estonian NCB Statute now foresee a complex 
substitution mechanism in case of the Governor‘s absence. First, Article 10(4) of the Estonian 
NCB Statute provides that:  
(1) in the absence of the Governor, he or she shall be replaced by a Deputy Governor and the 
Governor shall transfer the authority to a Deputy Governor by a Regulation;  
                                                 
757 Eesti Pank Governor‘s Regulations are published in the section set aside for ministerial decrees, administrative 
agreements or accounting guidelines. Eesti Pank Governor‘s Regulations will enter into force on the third day after their 
publication in Riigi Teataja.  
758  As of 8 July 2008, the educational requirement which previously required a university degree in economics or law was 
reduced to a ‗university degree‘.  
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(2) if it is not possible to transfer the authority to a Deputy Governor, the Supervisory Board 
shall designate the person to replace the Governor from among the Deputy Governors;
759
  
(3) if the Supervisory Board has not designated a person to replace the Governor, the Deputy 
Governor who is senor in age shall replace the Governor.
760
  
Article 11
3
 of the Estonian NCB Statute further specifies that if a new Governor of Eesti Pank 
or a new Chairman or member of the Supervisory Board has not been appointed by the due 
date of termination of their office, their authority shall be extended until the entry into force 
of a corresponding decision on appointment to office. 
Personal independence is established in Article 10(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute, which 
stipulates that the Governor and Deputy Governors shall be independent in the performance 
of their functions; they shall not hold any other office, be in service or be party to any 
activities which, by their nature, restrict or may restrict the autonomy of Eesti Pank or 
adversely affect or may adversely affect Eesti Pank in the achievement of its objectives or the 
performance of its functions. This obligation also constitutes the duty of loyalty and the duty 
of non-competition.  
5.3.3.4 Executive Board 
As a formal body, the Executive Board is a relatively new establishment, although a 
committee assisting the Governor in daily activities has apparently been in existence since the 
re-establishment of Eesti Pank.
761
  
The Chairman of the Executive Board is the Governor of Eesti Pank by virtue of office as 
stipulated in Article 13(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute. The Statute is very brief regarding 
the powers of the Executive Board. Article 13(1
1
) of the Estonian NCB Statute provides that 
                                                 
759  This provision reflects the temporary appointment by the Supervisory Board of Mr Peter Lõhmus as Acting Governor for 
the period of 28 April – 9 July 2000. At that time, such appointment was arguable from the legal point of view and the 
Estonian NCB Statute was subsequently amended accordingly. Interestingly, in ECB Opinion CON/2005/59 of 30 
December 2005, the ECB requested clarification as to whether the Supervisory Board may designate a substitute for the 
Governor only from among the Deputy Governors, implying that there may be a danger of a third person being 
appointed. See Paragraph 8 of ECB Opinion CON/2005/59 of 30 December 2005 at the request of the Estonian 
Parliament on a draft law amending the Eesti Pank Act, available at 
https://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2005_59_f_sign.pdf.  
760  Unfortunately, it was not recorded at the time why seniority in age was the preferred option. The alternative was to use 
the length of the term of office, but it was not favoured as all Deputy Governors were appointed at the same time for the 
same period and there was therefore no seniority with regard to the term of office. 
761  Former legal counsel of Eesti Pank, Mr Urmas Kaju, recalls that two vice-governors, the legal counsel, heads of the 
Central Banking Policy Department as well as the Personnel Department, the Chief Accountant and the Counsel on 
Banking Supervision formed a more or less stable advisory group for the Governor (Kaju, 2003, lk 7). 
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the Executive Board shall be responsible for planning and organising Eesti Pank‘s activities; 
the Governor of Eesti Pank may assign additional functions to the Executive Board.  
In practice, the tasks of the Executive Board are divided between two Deputy Governors, 
who are accountable to the Governor of Eesti Pank. Apart from the Internal Audit 
Department, which reports both to the Supervisory Board and the Governor of Eesti Pank, all 
other departments report to the Deputy Governors, each of them being assigned management 
powers with regard to different departments.  
The eligibility criteria for the Deputy Governors are that the persons have to be Estonian 
citizens and have a university degree. There is no security vetting requirement foreseen in the 
Estonian NCB Statute, although the members of the Executive Board are treated on an equal 
basis with the Governor with regard to personal independence and have to replace the 
Governor if the latter is absent.  
Apart from the Governor, all other members of the Executive Board are appointed by the 
Supervisory Board for five years
762
 upon proposal by the Governor of Eesti Pank as set forth 
in Article 10(2
1
) of the Estonian NCB Statute. The position was originally an ordinary 
employment relationship with no security of tenure
763
 but was changed with the amendments 
that entered into force on 8 July 2006. The Deputy Governors who were in office at that time 
benefited from a grandfathering clause, which started their five-year term of office from the 
date of entry into force of the amending law.  
Similarly, the members of the Executive Board must be independent in the performance of 
their functions; they are not to hold any other office, be in service or be party to any activities 
which, by their nature, restrict or may restrict the autonomy of Eesti Pank or adversely affect 
or may adversely affect Eesti Pank in the achievement of its objectives or the performance of 
its functions. However, in order to enhance the scope of the Deputy Governors, a set of 
suggestions have been made in Table 5-1, subjecting the Executive Board members to the 
same conditions as applicable to the Governor (except for the tenure of office).  
                                                 
762  The Deputy Governor‘s five-year term was launched at the entry into force of the amendments of the Estonian NCB 
Statute on 8 July 2006. This was originally criticised by the ECB, noting that the regime whereby all Deputy Governors 
are appointed at the same time would raise some concerns with regard to the stability of the governance system, as their 
terms of office also expire at the same time; the ECB noted that under Article 50 of the Statute, the members of the ECB 
Executive Board were initially appointed for less than a full term as a transitional measure and suggested the Estonian 
legislator to draw some inspiration from that. See Paragraph 9 of the ECB Opinion CON/2005/59. However, none of this 
criticism was repeated in the ECB Convergence Report of December 2006. 
763  See ECB Convergence Report, December 2006 (p. 213).  
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5.3.4 Financial independence 
5.3.4.1 Determination of budget 
While the supervision of the implementation of the budget of Eesti Pank falls within the 
competence of the Supervisory Board under Article 9(2)(6) of the Estonian NCB Statute, it is 
the Governor of Eesti Pank who approves the budget as set forth in Article 11(1)(7) of the 
Estonian NCB Statute.  
5.3.4.2 Accounting rules 
Pursuant to Article 28 of the Estonian NCB Statute, Eesti Pank‘s financial year begins on 1 
January and ends on 31 December. Since Article 31(2) provides that Eesti Pank‘s annual 
report shall be prepared pursuant to the rules established on the basis of Article 26.4 of the 
Statute, one can assume that the ECB legal instruments referred to in Section 3.2.4.2 apply. 
Under Articles 17(3), 42 and 59 of the Accounting Act, the Governor of Eesti Pank is entitled 
to adopt internal Eesti Pank rules on accounting in conformity with the respective ECB legal 
instruments; Eesti Pank is therefore entitled to deviate from the usual accounting rules.  
5.3.4.3 Capital 
The legal provisions on Eesti Pank‘s capital reflect the fact that the central bank‘s capital was 
built up over the years and Article 25(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute foresaw a procedure for 
building up the capital.  
The cornerstone of Eesti Pank‘s financial independence is, however, not the provision on the 
central bank‘s capital but Article 26(2) of the Estonian NCB Statute, which provides that 
Eesti Pank shall possess, use and dispose of its assets independently. Historically, this 
provision was an exception clause to now repealed Article 26(1), which established that the 
assets of Eesti Pank belonged to the State. From the legal perspective, however, it would 
make no sense if the assets of one legal person could belong to another, a legal construction 
that was perfectly acceptable under the Soviet legal system, which had an administrative law 
approach. This understanding would be understandable within a company in which different 
departments also use the company‘s assets without being owners themselves. Article 26(1) 
was subsequently repealed and, as a result, the Estonian NCB Statute now contains a 
declaration of the central bank‘s financial independence.  
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Eesti Pank‘s own capital consists of statutory capital, reserve capital and other funds as set 
forth in Article 25(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute. The size of the statutory capital is set at 
100,000,000 Estonian kroons (EUR 6,391,164.85). With the amendments of April 2010, the 
size of the statutory capital was raised to EUR 100,000,000 (an increase of approximately 
15.6 times the original amount) and Article 25(2) of the Estonian NCB Statute was 
subsequently amended.  
With regard to reserve capital, foundation capital and funds for specific purposes, Article 
27(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute provides that these shall be established from the profits of 
Eesti Pank and from other revenue intended for specific purposes and prescribed by Eesti 
Pank‘s internal order.764 The Estonian NCB Statute limits the size of other funds to the size of 
the statutory capital; Article 27(2) provides that when reserve capital becomes equal to 
statutory capital, the Riigikogu shall decide whether the size of reserve capital shall be 
increased further or not.
765
 The issue as to whether any losses should be covered from the 
statutory capital and whether it should be replenished afterwards will be discussed in Section 
5.3.4.5. 
5.3.4.4 Auditing 
The appointment of independent auditors for Eesti Pank is one of the exclusive competences 
of the Supervisory Board under Article 9(2)(7
1
) of the Estonian NCB Statute. 
Correspondingly, the approval of the Eesti Pank annual report is also one of the exclusive 
competences of the Supervisory Board as stipulated in Article 9(2)(8) of the Estonian NCB 
Statute.  
Article 31(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute, which regulates the appointment procedure of 
external auditors, actually consists of two different parts. The first part follows the example 
of Article 27.1 of the Statute and provides that for each financial year, the Supervisory Board 
of Eesti Pank shall appoint independent auditors recommended by the Governing Council of 
the European Central Bank and approved by the Council of the European Union to monitor 
Eesti Pank‘s activities during the financial year and to attest to the accuracy of the annual 
                                                 
764  The same document also prescribes the procedure for the establishment and use of reserve capital, foundation capital and 
funds for specific purposes pursuant to Article 27(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute. 
765  No such decision has been adopted by Riigikogu.  
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report prepared by Eesti Pank.
766
 This provision entered into force on 8 July 2006 and not on 
the day of the adoption of the euro – apparently as a result of an administrative error by the 
legislator;
767
 however, in practice the provision has been interpreted as providing guidance on 
the kind of auditors that should be deemed suitable in the selection of independent external 
auditors. The second part of Article 31(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute sets forth that Eesti 
Pank‘s activities may be examined further if the Riigikogu passes a corresponding resolution. 
Although at the first glance it may seem that the provision enables the Riigikogu to request a 
second audit from the independent external auditor, there has been no such second or 
additional audit mission by the independent external auditor. Instead, this provision was used 
once by the Riigikogu, on 5 March 1996, to invite the National Audit Office to examine Eesti 
Pank‘s activities between 1993 and 1995.768 An attempt to request an audit for financial years 
1998 to 2000 was made on 25 January 2001
769
 but was dropped due to lack of political 
support.  
No similar attempt has been made since the adoption of the new National Audit Office Act on 
29 January 2002, which granted the National Audit Office independence in exercising 
economic control over public sector institutions and bodies. Pursuant to Article 37(1) of the 
National Audit Office Act, the National Audit Office shall independently decide on the 
conduct of audits and the time and nature thereof. Article 37(2) of the National Audit Office 
Act expressly provides that mandatory audit duties shall not be assigned to the National Audit 
Office. Furthermore, Article 37(3) of the National Audit Office Act stipulates that the work 
of the National Audit Office shall be based on the annual work schedule approved by the 
Auditor General.  
Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the National Audit Office Act, Eesti Pank is one of the public 
sector institutions and bodies over which the National Audit Office can exercise its economic 
audit functions. As stipulated in Article 14, the National Audit Office shall not assess 
political goals.  
                                                 
766  With the amendments in 2008, Article 31(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute was amended in order to enable a multi-year 
mandate for the independent external auditor instead of yearly mandates. The ECB welcomed the amendment to the 
procedure for appointing independent auditors in line with the ESCB good practices. See Paragraph 2.4 of ECB Opinion 
CON/2008/14 of 25 March 2008 at the request of Riigikogu on a draft law amending the Law on Eesti Pank, available at 
https://www.ecb.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2008_14.pdf.  
767  The provision on independent auditors was missing from the original consultation presented to the ECB in 2005 and this 
fact was criticised in Paragraph 15 of ECB Opinion CON/2005/59. 
768  The summary of the audit was published in the annex to the State Gazette, RTL 1997,99,591.  
769 Draft Riigikogu decision No 666 OE, available at http://web.riigikogu.ee/ems/saros-
bin/mgetdoc?login=proov&password=&op=ems&system=ems&server=ragne11&itemid=010250011 (visited on 15 
January 2009). 
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Article 31(2) of the Estonian NCB Statute provides that Eesti Pank‘s annual report shall be 
prepared pursuant to the rules established on the basis of Article 26.4 of the Statute. Further, 
Article 31(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute stipulates that the annual report shall be approved 
and submitted together with the auditor‘s report to the Riigikogu by the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank;
770
 the Riigikogu shall hear a presentation by the Governor of Eesti Pank 
concerning Eesti Pank‘s annual report. Finally, the annual report shall be published in the 
Riigi Teataja and in Eesti Pank‘s Yearbook as set forth in Article 31(4) of the Estonian NCB 
Statute. 
5.3.4.5 Distribution of profits 
The Estonian NCB Statute foresees very clear and precise rules on profit distribution. First, 
Article 30(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute defines profit or loss as a difference between the 
NCB‘s revenue and expenditure.  
There is a pre-determined scheme for profit distribution. Pursuant to Article 30(2) of the 
Estonian NCB Statute, at least 25 per cent of the annual profits shall be used to increase 
statutory capital up to the amount determined by the Riigikogu. Then, under Article 30(3), at 
least 25 per cent of the annual profits shall be used to increase reserve capital pursuant to a 
decision of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. After these allocations have been made, 
Article 30(4) enables the Supervisory Board to decide whether there should be allocations to 
any other reserves at Eesti Pank. Finally, once all these allocations have been made, any 
remaining profit is transferred to the State as set forth in Article 30(5) of the Estonian NCB 
Statute. 
With regard to losses, Article 30(6) of the Estonian NCB Statute establishes that any loss 
incurred by Eesti Pank shall be covered from the reserve capital; if the reserve capital is 
insufficient, losses may be covered from the statutory capital with the permission of the 
Riigikogu. In this regard, it would need to be clarified whether the Riigikogu should 
subsequently also decide on the method of replenishing the statutory capital, for example by 
means of Article 30(2) of the Estonian NCB Statute or by an instalment from the State 
Budget (adoption of which is also a prerogative of the Riigikogu under Estonian law). 
The profits of Eesti Pank are not subject to any taxes. Article 30(7) of the Estonian NCB 
Statute provides that Eesti Pank, being the central bank of the state, does not pay income tax 
                                                 
770  The annual report of the Financial Supervision Authority approved by the Supervisory Board of the Financial 
Supervision Authority shall be submitted to the Riigikogu at the same time as Eesti Pank‘s annual report. 
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or any other taxes related to its economic activity into the state budget or local budgets, 
except taxes related to natural persons. Furthermore, the Government of the Republic has the 
right, under Article 30(7) to release Eesti Pank from the payment of other state taxes in 
exceptional circumstances. In practice, the import of technical equipment necessary for the 
performance of the Eesti Pank‘s tasks has been exempted from value added tax.  
5.3.4.6 Autonomy in staff matters 
The Estonian NCB Statute is generally silent on staff-related issues. The NCB staff members 
are only mentioned with regard to the Eesti Pank‘s right to grant loans to its employees in 
Article 33 of the Estonian NCB Statute. 
5.3.5 Accountability and transparency 
5.3.5.1 Relations with the Government  
Article 4(2) of the Estonian NCB Statute provides that Eesti Pank shall advise the 
Government of the Republic in matters relating to economic policy; the Government of the 
Republic shall not take any important economic policy decisions without hearing the opinion 
of Eesti Pank. Historically, Article 4(4) of the earlier Estonian NCB Statute also provided that 
Eesti Pank shall, within the limits of its authority, support the economic policy of the 
Government of the Republic provided that this policy is not in conflict with the objectives 
and functions of Eesti Pank provided by Article 2 of this Act and does not prevent Eesti Pank 
from performing them. However, this particular provision was repealed with the amendments 
of April 2010 and replaced by a reference to the objectives set forth in the Treaties and the 
Statute. 
5.3.5.2 Reporting 
Pursuant to Article 112 of the First Act, Eesti Pank shall operate under its own law and report 
to the Estonian Parliament.  
The extent of reporting varies depends on whether the reporting is done by the Chairman of 
the Supervisory Board or by the Governor of Eesti Pank. Pursuant to Article 8 of the Estonian 
NCB Statute, the Chairman of the Supervisory Board shall reply to the questions posed by the 
Estonian Parliament with regard to the activities of the Supervisory Board. However, the 
Governor of Eesti Pank shall report to the Estonian Parliament about the activities of Eesti 
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Pank and respond to the questions posed by the Members of the Estonian Parliament as set 
forth in Article 11(2) of the Estonian NCB Statute.  
The Governor of Eesti Pank has been given special interpellation rights under Article 11(3) of 
the Estonian NCB Statute: when the Governor of Eesti Pank does not agree with a decision of 
the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, he or she shall report to the President of the Riigikogu 
not later than within three working days and make a proposal to submit an interpellation in 
the matter to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank.  
5.3.6 Confidentiality and transparency 
Article 21(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute sets forth that Eesti Pank shall ensure the 
confidentiality of information which contains banking secrets. Under Article 21(1
1
) of the 
Estonian NCB Statute, Eesti Pank has the right to restrict access to information if it concerns 
risk to price or financial stability and if the information is subject to restrictions on access as 
specified by the ESCB.
771
 
Pursuant to Article 35(1) of the Estonian NCB Statute, members of the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank and persons employed by Eesti Pank are required to maintain the confidentiality 
of information pertaining to Eesti Pank, all credit institutions and other legal persons if the 
disclosure of such information could result in damage to the Estonian economy or to the 
economic interests of credit institutions or their clients. This duty shall apply even after the 
persons have left the employment of Eesti Pank as set forth in Article 35(2) of the Estonian 
NCB Statute and Article 37.1 of the Statute. 
Article 35(3) of the Estonian NCB Statute is one of the few NCB Statutes under Table 3-19 
that foresees punishment under disciplinary or criminal procedure pursuant to law. 
The Estonian NCB Statute lacks provisions regulating the exchange of confidential 
information and a suggestion has therefore been made in Table 5-1.  
Under Article 21(5) of the Estonian NCB Statute, Eesti Pank shall periodically publish 
information concerning its activities and the economy of Estonia and the European Union.  
5.3.7 Contribution to financial stability 
As noted earlier, pursuant to Article 127(5) TFEU [former Article 105(5) TEC] and Article 3.3 of 
the Statute, an Eurosystem NCB could contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by 
                                                 
771  See Paragraph 2.3 of ECB Opinion CON/2008/14. 
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the competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the 
stability of the financial system. Finantsinspektsioon, the Estonian FSA,
772
 is an agency with 
autonomous competence and a separate budget, which operates at Eesti Pank.
773
 In the 
conduct of financial supervision, the FSA shall be independent as set forth in Article 4 (3) of 
the Estonian FSA Act. From a legal point of view, there is clear separation of the tasks and 
accountability of the FSA from the tasks and accountability of Eesti Pank and its governing 
bodies. Unfortunately, with the amendments to the Estonian NCB Statute in April 2010, the 
cooperation and information exchange clauses were largely repealed from the Estonian NCB 
Statute, leaving only the right of the Estonian FSA to obtain information from Eesti Pank 
under Article 4
1
 of the Estonian NCB Statute.  
However, there are elements suggesting that, in this case, Eesti Pank – and in particular the 
Governor of Eesti Pank as the central bank‘s decision-maker for ESCB-related matters – has 
a sufficiently meaningful degree of control over the activities of the FSA. Of the six members 
of the Estonian FSA supervisory board, the Governor is an ex officio member and two of the 
remaining five members are appointed and removed by the Executive Board of the Eesti Pank 
on the proposal of the Governor. It is of particular significance that a resolution of the 
supervisory board can only be adopted if at least four members of the supervisory board vote 
in its favour. This means that no resolution may be adopted by the supervisory board over the 
objections of the Governor and the two Eesti Pank appointees.  
The organisational structure of the Estonian FSA was designed for a separate legal entity but 
left unchanged when the FSA was attached to Eesti Pank. There are two governing bodies for 
the Estonian FSA: the Supervisory Board and the Management Board. The governing bodies 
are different from those of Eesti Pank.  
From an institutional point of view, the FSA Supervisory Board appoints the members of the 
FSA Management Board, elects the chairman of the FSA Management Board from among 
the members and removes members of the Management Board from office. The Supervisory 
Board also approves the annual report of the Estonian FSA submitted by the FSA 
Management Board. Also, the supervisory board decides on the terms and conditions 
(including remuneration) of the service contracts with the chairman and members of the 
Management Board.  
                                                 
772  The Estonian FSA hosts a website at www.fi.ee (visited on 7 February 2010).   
773  Originally designed to become a separate legal entity, it was attached to Eesti Pank as a political compromise. Therefore, 
the Estonian FSA forms part of the legal personality of Eesti Pank. 
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From a financial point of view, the Supervisory Board approves, on the proposal of the 
Management Board, the budget, supplementary budget and operating strategy of the FSA and 
approves, on the proposal of the Management Board, the bases for developing the structure of 
the FSA and for the payment of remuneration. In addition, insofar as the FSA is financed by 
the financial institutions subject to its supervision,
774
 the Estonian FSA makes proposals to 
the Estonian Minister of Finance concerning the rate of the share of the supervision fee 
calculated on the basis of assets for the following budgetary year. 
While Eesti Pank thus has significant control over the FSA, the FSA, together with its 
Management Board, is accountable for supervisory failures. While Eesti Pank has a potential 
exposure to liabilities resulting from supervisory decisions taken by the FSA‘s management 
board, the above institutional, financial and financial stability legal safeguards could, taken 
together, be regarded as sufficiently protecting the independence of Eesti Pank and, in 
particular, the independence of the Governor of Eesti Pank in the discharge of his ESCB-
related tasks. Article 35 (1) of the Estonian FSA Act stipulates that the expenses of the FSA 
shall be covered from the compulsory payments made by the subjects of financial supervision 
pursuant to the provisions of that Act and, in the case provided for in Article 45 
(supplementary budget), from the funds prescribed in the budget of Eesti Pank and 
appropriations prescribed in the State budget. If the budgetary funds are not sufficient to 
cover the extraordinary expenses incurred by the FSA during a budgetary year, a 
supplementary budget shall be drawn up as set forth in Article 45 of the Estonian FSA Act. 
The peculiarity of the supplementary budget is that although the budget is to be drawn up by 
the Management Board and approved by the Supervisory Board, Eesti Pank and the 
Government of the Republic of Estonia are required to make the contributions to the 
supplementary budget (see Article 35 (1) above).  
The financial relationship between the FSA and Eesti Pank/the Ministry of Finance has to be 
interpreted in the light of the fact that Eesti Pank currently operates under a currency board 
system. The currency board arrangement is based on the Act on the Security of the Estonian 
Kroon, which will, of course, be repealed on adoption of the euro as the currency of Estonia. 
Under the currency board arrangement, Eesti Pank is able to provide only a fraction of its 
assets for financial assistance because Eesti Pank has the capacity to provide liquidity only 
within the limitation of its excess foreign exchange reserves. This implies that any further 
                                                 
774  The supervision fee consists of the capital share and the share calculated on the basis of assets. The supervision fee is 
paid into the account of the FSA at Eesti Pank.  
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financial assistance would have to be paid from the State budget until Estonia adopts the 
euro.  
However, following the adoption of the euro, the issue is whether there would be any 
violation of the monetary financing prohibition. As has been noted earlier in Section 4.3.2.3, 
any financial contribution made by an NCB to a supervisory authority may be justified only 
to the extent that it forms an integral part of the NCB‘s overall contribution to the policy-
making and policy implementation function. If an NCB carries out the functions of prudential 
supervision, the financing of its own supervisory activities by NCBs (including autonomous 
bodies forming part of legal personality of the NCB) cannot be regarded as monetary 
financing since under Article 8(2) of Council Regulation No 3603/93 central banks do not 
form part of the public sector. In the absence of any influence on prudential supervisory or 
financial stability policy-making of the competent national authorities by the NCB, this NCB 
cannot provide funds to the independent supervisory authority; otherwise, the functional and 
financial independence of the ESCB would be seriously undermined, and such an activity 
would breach the monetary financing prohibition. Following the above, one would need to 
consider how to strengthen the role of Eesti Pank with regard to the Estonian FSA. At this 
stage, there are no drafting suggestions made in Table 5-1.  
The Estonian FSA Act is silent on how the supervisory board would obtain funds from the 
Eesti Pank budget or the State budget, which might become a more relevant issue when Eesti 
Pank no longer operates under a currency board system. As the Estonian FSA has no means 
to impose an obligation to Eesti Pank and/or the Government of the Republic, Eesti Pank and 
the Government would have to come to a conclusion on how the contributions to the 
supplementary budget shall be made. If the State declined to contribute, then it is likely that 
Eesti Pank would be under a legal obligation to make whatever financial contributions are 
necessary to ensure that an agency within Eesti Pank (i.e. the FSA) is in a position to meet its 
financial obligations. Article 4(2) of the Estonian FSA Act sets forth that the FSA conducts 
financial supervision in the name of the State; accordingly, it follows from Article 58(1) of 
the Estonian FSA Act that the liability of the FSA for rights violated or damage caused in the 
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conduct of financial supervision, the bases and procedure for the restoration of violated rights 
and the payment of compensation for damage shall be provided by law.
775
  
If the damage is not related to the conduct of financial supervision, then provisions of private 
law apply and, as set forth in Article 58(2) of the Estonian FSA Act, the FSA shall be liable 
within the limits of the funds prescribed in its budget. If the funds prescribed in the budget of 
the FSA are not sufficient, Eesti Pank shall compensate for the damage. This is because the 
FSA does not have legal personality and all its assets therefore belong to Eesti Pank. 
5.4 Conclusions of Chapter 5 
On the basis of the discussions in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and subsequent conclusions, a legal 
framework for the Eurosystem NCB can be drawn. Leaving out the provisions in the Treaties 
and the Statute that would apply directly, most of the issues that need to be regulated concern 
procedural matters that are necessary in a situation where monetary policy is delegated to the 
supranational level. As has been shown throughout the discussions, although there is some 
harmonisation, the NCB Statutes are not standardised in this regard and they tend to address 
issues in accordance with their respective national legal system.  
Against this background, the Estonian NCB Statute appears to be rather accommodative after 
all the changes that have been made since its adoption in 1993. It needs to be borne in mind 
that the Estonian NCB Statute is a constitutional law and cannot therefore be changed so 
easily.  
Apart from Article 111 of the First Act, which remains problematic from the functional 
independence point of view, the Estonian NCB Statute adequately addresses the functional, 
institutional and fiscal independence of Eesti Pank together with the requirements on 
accountability and transparency. Furthermore, within the framework of prudential 
supervision and the stability of the financial system, Eesti Pank appears to be sufficiently 
established to carry out its tasks, but would still need some strengthening in order to avoid 
any monetary financing in this regard. As this would require further analysis, no drafting 
suggestions have been put forward.   
                                                 
775  The law in question is Riigivastutuse seadus (State Liability Act), which covers the entire public sector, including the 
FSA as far as financial supervision is concerned. Article 12 (1) of the State Liability Act stipulates that the public 
authority whose activities caused damage is required to compensate the injured person for damage. If the FSA budget is 
insufficient, the procedures of Articles 35 and 45 of Estonian FSA Act apply. This would imply that if the State declined 
to contribute, then it is likely that Eesti Pank would be under a legal obligation to make whatever financial contributions 
are necessary to ensure that an agency within Eesti Pank (i.e. the FSA) is in a position to meet its financial obligations. 
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Therefore, the changes that have been proposed in Table 5-1 represent either those parts of 
legislation that require further clarification or issues for which a clear legal basis needs to be 
established.  
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Annex: Postscript 
In this postscript, I will address the period between 1 September 2010 (when I substantially 
completed the manuscript) and the end of the year in order to supplement my thesis with the 
most recent developments.  
I will fist address the general issues, among others the financial crisis and the sovereign debt 
market turmoil. Second, I will provide an update on the developments regarding the central 
bank independence. Third, I will address the European Union‘s new supervisory structure as 
of 1 January 2011. A conclusion will summarise the postscript.  
General issues 
The year 2010 will be remembered by the financial crisis and the turmoil in sovereign debt 
markets. This has highlighted challenges to the supervisory arrangements at the supranational 
level as well as the need to address the European Union‘s (and the euro area‘s in particular) 
economic governance.  
The EFSM, which was established by Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 
2010
776
 constitutes according to the Commission ‗an important pillar of the European 
framework for addressing the current exceptional circumstances‘.777 However, the creation of 
the EFSM has also been met with the opposition, arguing that the financing provided under 
Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 would infringe the prohibition under Article 125 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and that it is not covered by the 
enabling provision of Article 122 TFEU.
778
  
On 20 September 2010, Moody's Investors Service Inc., Standard & Poor's Corp., and Fitch 
Ratings informd that they will all assign the highest available credit rating to debt issued by 
the EFSF, a Luxembourg-based private-law vehicle that will issue guaranteed debt to raise 
money for euro-zone member countries that can't borrow on the markets.
779
 A few days later, 
                                                 
776  Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism, OJ L 
118, 12.5.2010, p. 1. See also Decision ECB/2010/17 of 14 October 2010 concerning the administration of the 
borrowing and lending operations concluded by the Union under the European financial stabilisation mechanism, OJ L 
275, 20.10.2010, p. 10.  
777 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Economic and Financial Committee on the European 
Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, 30.11.2010, COM(2010) 713 final, p. 2. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0713:FIN:EN:PDF (visited on 7 December 2010).  
778  For example, Case T-259/10: Action brought on 8 June 2010 – Ax v Council.  
779  See Brown, 2010.  
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an idea of making the EFSF a permanent EU body was floated.
780
 Euro-area finance 
ministers agreed on 28 November 2010 the future European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to 
replace the current EFSF as of mid-2013, if the anticipated Treaty amendments will enter into 
force.
781
  
This agreement coincided with the crisis in Ireland. Further to the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
in spring, on 1 September 2010 the revelation of colossal losses by the Anglo Irish Bank
782
 
started a process which culminated with the Irish Government submitting a request for 
financial assistance on 22 November 2010
783
 and lead to financial markets doubts on the 
budgetary sustainability of Spain and Portugal. 
On 29 September 2010 the Commission introduced its response to the challenges in the 
European Union‘s economic governance, by introducing six legislative initiatives: 
1) COM (2010) 522 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 
1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure; 
2) COM (2010) 523 Proposal for a Council directive on requirements for budgetary 
frameworks of the Member States; 
3) COM (2010) 524 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area; 
4) COM (2010) 525 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in 
the euro area; 
5) COM (2010) 526 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies; 
                                                 
780  See Bofinger, Enderlein, Padoa-Schioppa, & Sapir, 2010.  
781 See Statement by the Eurogroup, 28 November 2010, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/118050.pdf (visited on 9 December 2010).  
782 See Noonan, 2010.  
783 Council approves aid to Ireland, sets out conditions, Press release, Brussels, 7 December 2010, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/118260.pdf (visited on 7 December 2010). 
See also Commission Staff Working Paper ‗Ireland financial assistance programme documents‘, 3 December 2010, 
SEC(2010) 1516 final, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SEC:2010:1516:FIN:EN:PDF (visited on 7 December 2010). See also 
statement by the Eurogroup on 28 November 2010, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/118050.pdf (visited on 7 December 2010), 
statement by the Eurogroup and ECOFIN Ministers on 28 November 2010, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/118051.pdf (visited on 7 December 2010). 
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6) COM (2010) 527 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 
However, the Commission did not produce any legal drafting regarding the conditionality of 
the Cohesion Fund or Structural Funds
784
 nor the legal statistical framework.  
The proposals are based on Article 121(6) TFEU‘ [see COM (2010) 526, COM (2010) 527], 
the second subparagraph of Article 126(14) TFEU [see COM (2010) 522], the third 
subparagraph of Article 126(14) TFEU [see COM (2010) 523], and Article 136 in 
combination with Article 126(6) TFEU [see COM (2010) 524, COM (2010) 525].  
Procedurally, Article 121(6) TFEU foresees that the European Parliament and the Council, 
acting by means of regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure may 
adopt detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance. The second subparagraph of Article 
126(14) foresees an adoption of ‗appropriate legal provisions‘ by the Council after consulting 
the European Parliament and the ECB; the third subparagraph of Article 126(14) TFEU 
foresees adoption of detailed rules and definitions by the Council after consulting the 
European Parliament. Article 136(1) TFEU provides that the Council shall, in accordance 
with the relevant procedure from among those referred to in Articles 121 and 126 TFEU, with 
the exception of the procedure set out in Article 126(14) TFEU, adopt measures specific to 
those Member States whose currency is the euro: (a) to strengthen the coordination and 
surveillance of their budgetary discipline; (b) to set out economic policy guidelines for them, 
while ensuring that they are compatible with those adopted for the whole Union and are kept 
under surveillance. Legal implications concerning the choice of legal basis have been 
addressed in the enclosed annex.  
The Commission introduced a ‗reversed qualified majority voting‘ procedure in COM (2010) 
524 and COM (2010) 525, making at the same time no change in the decision-making 
process in COM (2010) 522 (excessive deficit procedure), COM (2010) 526 (multilateral 
                                                 
784  Under Article 175 TFEU Structural Funds are referred to as including (1) European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section; (2) European Social Fund; (3) European Regional Development Fund). The 
Cohesion Fund is referred to in Article 177 TFEU. A short summary of the funds is available at 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/structural_cohesion_fund_en.htm (visited on 7 September 2010).  
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surveillance). Against this background, the ‗reversed qualified majority voting‘ procedure is 
regulated neither in Article 121 nor 126 TFEU.
785
  
For the euro area Member States, a new set of sanctions had been introduced. In the 
preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact, an interest-bearing-deposit is required in 
COM (2010) 524. In the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact, a non-interest 
bearing deposit and a fine have been introduced in COM (2010) 524 in order to grant 
effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area. A yearly fine of 0.1% of 
GDP may be imposed in COM (2010) 525 for not complying with the successive deadlines 
set in COM (2010) 527. There is another fine up to 0.5% of a Member State‘s GDP under 
COM (2010) 522 for the excessive deficits.  
With the exception of the excessive deficit procedure, the sanctioning regime however is 
softened by the options to reduce or terminate the non-interest bearing deposits or fines on 
the grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following a reasoned request by a 
Member State.  
On 21 October 2010, the Task Force to the European Council, also known as the Van 
Rompuy Task Force that was established by the European Council of 25-26 March 2010 
finalised its proposals regarding the strengthening of the economic governance in the EU.
786
  
State aid to the financial sector continued to be an issue. On 4 October 2010, EU 
Commissioner Joaquín Almunia indicated to the press that that EU governments will be 
allowed to continue providing support to banks and businesses for another year.
787
 The 
Commission maintains a constantly updated overview of national measures adopted as a 
response to the financial/economic crisis on its website.
788
   
 
 
                                                 
785  This procedure however bears some similarities with the procedure described in Articles 9(4), 13(3) and 14(4) of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not 
members of the European Community (Codified version), OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51, as well as Articles 15(1), 23(4) 
and 24(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidised imports from 
countries not members of the European Community, OJ L 188, 18.7.2009, p. 93, whereby the Council, acting on a 
proposal submitted by the Commission after consultation of the Advisory Committee, would adopt the proposal unless 
the it decides by a simple majority to reject it, within a period of one month after its submission by the Commission. 
786  European Council. Strengthening economic governance in the EU – Final Report of the Task Force to the European 
Council, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117236.pdf (visited on 6 
December 2010).  
787 See Tait, EU nations win a year's reprive on state aid, 2010.  
788  Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/ (visited on 10 December 2010).  
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Central Bank Independence 
In the field of central bank independence, three events need to be addressed. First, contrary 
what was expected in the thesis, Article 14.2 of the Statute and the grounds of removal did 
not materialise in September. Second, national measures cutting salaries of central bankers 
reached a new level by the European Commission initiating infringement proceedings under 
Article 258 TFEU. Third, the central bank for Ireland was significantly reformed.  
A Bundesbank Executive Board member Mr. Thilo Sarrazin who caused outrage with 
remarks about Muslim immigrants and Jews submitted his resignation on 9 September 
2010.
789
 As a side effect, his resignation did not make it possible to test the scope of 
application of Article 14.2 of the Statute, especially the grounds of removal ([..] relieved 
from office only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his 
duties or if he has been guilty of serious misconduct).  
In June 2010, the Hungarian authorities announced an austerity plan, part of which also 
affecting the salaries of the Hungarian NCB. In response to the ECB Opinion CON/2010/56, 
where the ECB rather clearly stated that the Hungarian authorities have an obligation under 
Article 130 TFEU to ensure that any amendment to the legislative provisions on the 
remuneration of the Hungarian NCB‘s staff is decided in cooperation with the NCB, taking 
due account of the Hungarian NCB‘s views,790 the respective authorities decided not to do so. 
In July 2010, the law was passed capping the salary of public employees at 2m forints, 
requiring Andras Simor, the Governor of the Hungarian NCB, to accept a 75% pay cut.
791
 By 
8 September 2010, the EU authorities, this time the European Commission, warned Hungary 
that it must amend a law clapping the pay of NCB employees to avoid infringing the 
independence of the NCB, indicating its willingness to launch an infringement procedure.
792
  
Salary cuts of central bankers have remained an issue also elsewhere, and austerity measures 
adopted by the Member States tend also to address NCBs.
793
  
The Irish Central Bank Reform Act of 2010 created a new single unitary body – the Central 
Bank of Ireland - responsible for both central banking and financial regulation. The new 
                                                 
789  See Ternieden, 2010; Breidhart, 2010.  
790  See paragraph 3.4 of ECB Opinion CON/2010/56 of 12 July 2010 on amendments to the Law on the Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank introducing salary reductions, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2010_56_f_sign.pdf.  
791 See Bryant, 2010.  
792 See Simon, 2010.  
793 See, for example, ECB Opinion CON/2010/80 of 12 November 2010 on Banco de Portugal‘s staff remuneration and the 
budget, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2010_80_f.pdf.  
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structure replaces the previous related entities, the Central Bank and the Financial Services 
Authority of Ireland and the Financial Regulator. The Act commenced on 1 October 2010.
794
  
Financial Stability 
With regard to financial stability, there are also several developments that merit further 
attention. First, there will be the reform of financial supervision, establishing four new 
authorities. Second, state aid to financial sector continues to be an issue. Third, in addition to 
the credit and financial institutions in trouble, sovereign debt crisis emerged which lead to the 
establishment of new bodies to tackle the issues.  
On 1 September 2010, the public learned about a long-awaited agreement on reform of 
financial supervision, paving the way for the establishment of three pan-EU watchdogs to 
oversee controls on banks and insurers in the region from next year.
795
 The Council adopted 
legal texts establishing the ESRB, the EBA, the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) on 
17 November 2010.
796
 EBA, EIPA and ESMA are also commonly referred to as ESAs. All 
four new bodies will constitute the ESFS.  
The ESRB‘s role will be macro-prudential oversight. Within this task, it is assigned to 
monitor and assess potential threats to the stability of the financial system. Where necessary, 
it will issue warnings and recommendations for remedial action and will monitor their 
implementation. 
The ESRB will be chaired by the President of the ECB for an initial term of five years. For 
subsequent terms, the ESRB‘s president will be designated in accordance with modalities to 
be determined following a review. 
A Steering Committee will set the ESRB‘s work agenda and prepare decisions. It will 
comprise the board's chairperson and first vice-chairperson, the vice-president of the ECB, 
four other members of the general board who are also members of the ECB‘s General 
Council, the chairpersons of the three ESAs, a member of the Commission, the chairpersons 
of two advisory committees and the president of the EFC. The Steering Committee will be 
                                                 
794 See also ECB Opinion CON/2010/48 of 17 June 2010 on a draft law relating to the restructuring of the Central Bank and 
Financial Services Authority of Ireland, available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/legal/pdf/en_con_2010_48_fsign.pdf.  
795 See Tait, Deal paves way for pan-EU financial watchdogs, 2010.  
796 Council of the European Union, Brussels, 17 November 2010, 16452/10 (Presse 303), available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/117747.pdf (visited on 10 December 2010). 
The ESRB and the EIOPA will be sited in Frankfurt, the EBA in London and the ESMA in Paris. 
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supported by the Advisory Scientific Committee, composed of the Chair and 15 independent 
experts, the Advisory Technical Committee, and the ESRB Secretariat.  
The General Board will comprise the president and vice-president of the ECB, the governors 
of the central banks of the Member States, the chairpersons of the three ESAs, a member of 
the Commission, chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of two advisory committees and (as 
non-voting members) the president of the EFC and representatives of each of the national 
supervisory authorities. 
ESAs will replace three existing committees of supervisors at EU level, namely the CEBS, 
the CEIOPS and the CESR and will have legal personality under EU law. 
The ESAs will comprise high-level representatives of all of the Member States' supervisory 
authorities under permanent chairmanships. National authorities will remain responsible for 
the day-to-day supervision of individual firms, and a joint committee will be set up to ensure 
cooperation and to coordinate the sharing of information between the ESAs and the ESRB. 
The ESAs will be responsible for ensuring that a single set of harmonised rules and consistent 
supervisory practices are applied by supervisory authorities of the Member States. 
According to the texts adopted by the Council, the ESAs will have the authority in three main 
areas: 
1. to investigate alleged breaches of EU law and, if necessary take an individual decision 
addressed to a financial institution; 
2. in emergency situations adopt individual decisions requiring the competent authorities 
to take the necessary measures;
797
  
3. in the event of disagreements between competent authorities of different Member 
States, and where mediation by the ESA has failed, to take binding decisions 
requiring them to take specific action in order to settle the matter, in order to ensure 
compliance with EU law.  
Preliminary assessment of the texts adopted by the Council, however relieves, that the fiscal 
responsibilities of Member States for financial supervision cannot be affected by decisions 
taken by the ESAs, and that mainly their activities are concentrating on standard-setting, 
coordination and information-sharing. The legal nature of guidelines and recommendations 
issued by ESAs is at the moment unclear and could be subject to a further review.
798
  
                                                 
797 However, it would be for the Council, in consultation with the Commission and the ESRB (and where appropriate the 
ESAs), to determine the existence of an emergency situation. 
798  The case of the ECB issuing guidelines could set an example here, see footnote 54.  
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With regard to the supervision of credit rating agencies, the Belgian Presidency introduced on 
3 December 2010 a compromise,
799
 with the idea that ESMA should be responsible for the 
registration and on-going supervision of credit rating agencies; however it should not be 
responsible for the oversight of the users of credit ratings.  
In terms of governance, each of the ESAs shall have the Board of Supervisors, the 
Management Board, the Chairperson as well as the Executive Director and the Board of 
Appeal. Further, there will be a Joint Committee of European Supervisory Authorities.  
 
Conclusions 
The legal framework for Eurosystem NCB is constantly changing and affecting the 
functioning of the EMU. In 2010, the need to reform the Euro area governance was made 
clear to everybody. It remains to be seen whether the legislative initiatives reforming the 
Stability and Growth Pact will have the desired effect. De facto governance reform for the 
Euro area was carried out during 2010 by Union secondary legislation and the Member States 
establishing additional mechanisms outside the Treaties. While these developments were 
applauded by many, there have also been criticisms towards the steps made and the legality 
of the measures as such.  
The austerity measures carried out by the EU Member States have also affected the NCBs, 
undermining their financial independence. The year 2010 was also significant for the concept 
of ‗personal independence‘, although the grounds of removal under Article 14.2 of the Statute 
have not been formally exercised.  
On the positive side, the year 2010 will probably be remembered by the reform process of the 
European supervisory architecture, the creation of four supervisory bodies at the EU level.  
 
Andres Tupits 
10.12.2010 
 
                                                 
799 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 
on credit rating agencies - Presidency compromise, 2010/0160 (COD) 3 December 2010, available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st17/st17374.en10.pdf (visited on 7 December 2010).  
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Annex: List of Tables 
Table 2-1 NCB decision-making bodies 
Member State Article Text Responsibility for 
ESCB-related/ 
basic central 
banking tasks 
Membership in 
the Governing 
Council 
Membership in 
the General 
Council 
Austria 16 The General Meeting shall be entitled: 
1. to receive the report of the General Council on the 
conduct of business during the previous financial year; 
2. to approve the annual accounts and discharge the General 
Council and the Governing Board from liability for the 
financial period after hearing the report of the Auditors; 
No   
20(1) The General Council shall be charged with the supervision of 
all business not falling within the remit of the ESCB 
No   
20(2) The General Council shall advise the Governing Board in the 
conduct of the Bank‘s business and in matters of monetary 
policy. These joint meetings of the General Council and the 
Governing Board shall take place at least once every quarter 
   
21(1) The approval of the General Council shall be 
required to: 
1. start and discontinue lines of business, with the exception 
of those set out in Chapter X; 
2. establish and close down branch offices; 
3. acquire and sell participating interests; 
4. purchase, sell and mortgage real property; 
5. appoint members of supervisory boards and executive 
bodies of companies in which the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank is a shareholder; 
6. appoint officers of the second executive tier of the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank itself. 
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Member State Article Text Responsibility for 
ESCB-related/ 
basic central 
banking tasks 
Membership in 
the Governing 
Council 
Membership in 
the General 
Council 
21(2) The General Council shall have exclusive right of 
decision on the following matters: 
1. drawing up nonbinding tripartite proposals to the Federal 
Government for appointments to the Governing Board by the 
Federal President; 
2. passing resolutions with regard to the conditions of 
employment applicable to the members of the Governing 
Board and the other employees of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank as well as with regard to the provisions 
governing remuneration and pensions of the foregoing, and 
concluding employment contracts with the members of the 
Governing Board; 
3. defining general operational principles in matters relating 
to Article 4; 
4. authorizing items of expenditure not provided for in the 
cost estimates for the year in question; 
5. approving the annual accounts for submission to the 
General Meeting and approving the cost estimates for the 
next financial year; 
6. laying down rules of procedure for the General Council 
and the Governing Board. 
   
21(5) The power of the General Council to take and approve 
decisions on matters set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be 
restricted to the extent that decisions it takes shall not 
interfere with the performance of the tasks of the ESCB 
   
32(1) The Governing Board shall be responsible for the overall 
running of the Bank and shall conduct the business of the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank. In pursuing the objectives 
and tasks of the ESCB the Governing Board shall act in 
accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB. 
In matters other than those covered by the remit of the ESCB 
Yes   
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Member State Article Text Responsibility for 
ESCB-related/ 
basic central 
banking tasks 
Membership in 
the Governing 
Council 
Membership in 
the General 
Council 
the Governing Board shall take decisions independently, 
insofar as these do not relate to matters on which the General 
Council has exclusive right of decision, or to matters which 
require the approval of the General Council. 
32(4) The Governing Board shall represent the Bank both in courts 
of law and extra judicially. 
   
33(1) The Governing Board shall comprise the Governor, the Vice 
Governor and two further members. 
   
34(1) The Governor shall be a member of the Governing Council 
of the ECB (Article 109a paragraph 1 of the Treaty, Article 
10 of the ESCB/ECB Statute) and of the General Council of 
the ECB (Article 45 of the ESCB/ECB Statute). The 
Governor and his deputy shall not be bound, in performing 
these functions, either by the decisions of the Governing 
Board or by those of the General Council, nor shall they be 
subject to any other instructions. 
Yes Yes  Yes 
36(1) The Governing Board shall be convened by the Governor 
whenever necessary and shall meet under his chairmanship. 
The President and the Vice President of the General Council 
shall have the right to attend these meetings in an advisory 
capacity. 
   
36(3) Each of the Executive Directors or, in the absence of an 
Executive Director, his deputy (Article 35 paragraph 3) shall 
have one vote each where votes are to be taken. Decisions 
shall be taken by simple majority vote. In case of a tie, the 
chair shall have the casting vote. Apart from his own vote, an 
Executive Director may have one additional vote as deputy. 
   
Belgium 17 
27 Articles of 
Association 
The organs of the Bank shall be the Governor, the Board of 
Directors, the Council of Regency and the Board of Censors. 
   
18(1) The Governor shall direct the Bank and preside over the Yes   
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Member State Article Text Responsibility for 
ESCB-related/ 
basic central 
banking tasks 
Membership in 
the Governing 
Council 
Membership in 
the General 
Council 
Board of Directors and the Council of Regency. 
19(1) In addition to the Governor, who presides, the Board of 
Directors shall be composed of at least five but not more than 
seven directors, one of whom shall bear the title of Vice-
Governor, conferred on him by the King. The Board of 
Directors shall include an equal number of French and Dutch 
speakers, with, possibly, the exception of the Governor. 
   
20(1) 
30(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Council of Regency shall be composed of the Governor, 
the directors and ten regents. It shall include an equal number 
of French- and Dutch-speaking regents.  
   
28(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Governor shall direct the Bank; he shall preside over the 
Board of Directors and the Council of Regency. He shall 
have their decisions implemented. He shall be required to 
reside in Brussels. 
   
29(2); (3); 
(4); (5) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Board shall be responsible for the administration and 
management of the Bank and shall decide on the direction of 
its policy. It shall appoint and dismiss members of staff, fix 
their salaries and the allocation of the profit share assigned to 
the staff or to institutions in its favour. It shall have the right 
to make settlements and compromises. It shall exercise 
regulatory power in the cases laid down by law. It shall 
decide on the investment of the capital, reserves and 
depreciation accounts after consultation with the Council of 
Regency and without prejudice to the rules adopted by the 
ECB. It shall pronounce upon all matters which are not 
expressly reserved for another organ by law, the Statutes or 
the internal regulations. 
Yes   
30(2)-(9) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Council shall exchange views on general questions 
concerning the Bank, monetary policy and the economic 
situation of the country and the European Community. It 
N/A   
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Member State Article Text Responsibility for 
ESCB-related/ 
basic central 
banking tasks 
Membership in 
the Governing 
Council 
Membership in 
the General 
Council 
shall take cognisance every month of the situation of the 
institution. On a proposal from the Board of Directors it shall 
lay down the internal regulations, containing the basic rules 
for the operation of the Bank's organs and the organisation of 
its departments, services and outside offices. It shall make 
proposals for the appointment of agents of the State Cashier 
and shall set the amount of their sureties. It shall approve the 
report to be presented annually by the Governor to the 
General Meeting on the company's operations. It may 
specially delegate some of the above-mentioned powers to 
the Board of Directors. The Council shall fix the individual 
salaries and pensions of the members of the Board of 
Directors. These salaries and pensions may not include a 
share in the profits, and no remuneration whatsoever may be 
added thereto by the Bank, either directly or indirectly. The 
Bank shall, however, meet the governor's housing and 
furniture expenses. The Council shall approve the 
expenditure budget and the annual accounts submitted by the 
Board of Directors. It shall finally determine the distribution 
of profits proposed by the Board. The regents shall receive 
attendance fees and, if appropriate, a travel allowance. The 
amount of such remunerations shall be fixed by the Council 
of Regency. 
32(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Board of Censors shall be composed of ten members. It 
shall include an equal number of French and Dutch speakers. 
The members of the Board of Censors must be Belgian. The 
Board shall choose its chairman and its secretary from among 
its members. 
   
32(2) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Board of Censors' task shall be to supervise the 
preparation and implementation of the budget. The censors 
shall receive an allowance, the amount of which shall be set 
No   
 239 
 
Member State Article Text Responsibility for 
ESCB-related/ 
basic central 
banking tasks 
Membership in 
the Governing 
Council 
Membership in 
the General 
Council 
by the Council of Regency. 
57(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The General Meeting shall represent the totality of the 
shareholders. It shall be presided over by the Governor. 
   
65 Articles of 
Association 
The General Meeting shall deliberate : 
1° concerning the matters mentioned in the convening 
notices and concerning those submitted to it either by the 
Council of Regency or by the Board of Censors; 
2° concerning proposals, signed by five members, which 
have been brought to the attention of the Council of Regency 
at least ten days before the meeting for inclusion in the 
agenda. 
If the meeting acknowledges the urgency of other proposals 
made by the 
Council of Regency, these shall be included in the 
deliberations. 
No    
71(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Governor shall sign agreements, settlements and 
documents of all kinds without being required to furnish 
proof of any power whatsoever vis-à-vis third parties. He 
may delegate this authority. 
   
Bulgaria 10 The management of the Bulgarian National Bank shall be 
carried out by the Governing Council, the Governor and the 
three Deputy Governors elected to directly manage the basic 
departments referred to in Article 19. 
   
11(1) The Governing Council shall consist of seven members: the 
Governor of the Bank, the three Deputy Governors, and three 
other members. 
   
16 The Governing Council shall: 
1. consider and adopt major guidelines for its activity; 
2. adopt legislative acts concerning the Bank‘s activity; 
3. fix interest rates for this Bank‘s operations; 
Yes   
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4. fix the percentage of the minimum reserves to be held by 
banks and approve the conditions and requirements for their 
fulfilment; 
5. set rules and requirements regulating bank activities; 
6. adopt rules of procedure for this Bank‘s activities; 
7. pass upon the introduction and discontinuance of particular 
activities of the Bank; 
8. open and close down branches and representative offices 
of the Bank; 
9. take decisions for issuing new banknotes and coins, and set 
the time limits after which the banknotes and coins cease to 
be legal tender and within which banknotes and coins called 
in have to be exchanged; 
10. regularly consider reports on the activities of the Bank‘s 
basic departments; 
11. define the way and competences for the charge-off of un-
collectable receivables of the Bulgarian National Bank as a 
loss; 
12. adopt decisions for participation of the Bulgarian 
National Bank in international organizations and in initiatives 
and activities undertaken by such organizations; 
13. approve the annual budget, the annual balance sheet and 
the report under Article 51 as presented by the Governor; 
14. be responsible for establishing and maintaining an 
efficient internal control system at the Bulgarian National 
Bank and its subsidiaries adequate to the inherent risks to its 
activities; 
15. consider and resolve any other issues concerning the 
Bank‘s activity. 
17(1) The Governing Council may hold a session if more than one 
half of its members are present. 
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17(2) Decisions of the Governing Council shall be adopted by a 
majority of the members present but shall require the 
affirmative vote of no less than four votes. 
   
17(3) Abstention from voting shall not be permitted except in the 
cases under paragraph 4. 
   
17(4) Members of the Governing Council shall not participate in 
the deliberation and shall abstain from decision-making on 
issues in which they or members of their families may have 
interest. They must notify the Governing Council in advance 
of any such interests. 
   
18(1) The Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank shall organize, 
direct and supervise the activities of the Bank, other than 
those mandated by this or another law exclusively to the 
Deputy Governors, and shall represent the Bank at home and 
abroad. He may delegate some of his competences to other 
officials. 
Yes   
18(2) The Governor may establish consultative councils in support 
of his functions. 
   
Cyprus 8 The organs of the Bank shall be the Board of Directors, the 
Governor and the Deputy Governor 
   
12 The Board of Directors of the Bank (hereinafter referred to as 
―the Board‖) shall consist of the Governor, the Deputy 
Governor and five directors 
   
15(1) The Board shall have the following main tasks: 
(a) to supervise the administration of the Bank; 
(b) to define and implement the policy of the Bank, in 
accordance with sections 5 and 6, on all matters which 
concern the Bank, save for the matters which fall within the 
fields of competence of the European System of Central 
Banks. 
No   
15(2) For the achievement of the main tasks provided in subsection    
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(1), the Board may perform all other tasks incidental thereto. 
17(4) When exercising the duties and tasks in pursuance of the 
objectives laid down in section 5, the members of the Board 
shall take due account of the Governor‘s capacity as a 
member of the Governing Council and General Council of 
the European Central Bank. 
 Yes Yes 
20(1) Subject to Article 119 of the Constitution, the Governor as 
the chief executive officer of the Bank, shall have the 
following tasks:  
(a) to carry out the policy of the Bank; (b) to manage and 
control the business of the Bank; (c) to act in connection with 
the conduct of the business of the Bank, in all matters which 
are not reserved for the Board; (d) to appoint, suspend or 
dismiss any employees of the Bank. 
Yes   
20(3) (a) The Governor shall seat, ex officio, as an independent 
personality, in the General Council and the Governing 
Council of the European Central Bank and shall have the 
exclusive competence to (i) carry out the tasks and exercise 
the powers conferred upon the Bank by or in accordance with 
the provisions of the Treaty or the Statute; and to (ii) oversee 
the of payment and/or clearing and settlement systems. 
(b) Without prejudice to the powers of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank and 
subject to the provisions of the Treaty and of the Statute, the 
Governor may issue directives for the achievement of the 
tasks referred to in paragraph (a). 
Yes   
20(4) The Governor, as the chief representative of the Bank, shall 
have the following tasks: (a) to represent the Bank in all its 
relations with other persons, including the Government; (b) 
to represent the Bank, either personally or through counsel, 
in all legal proceedings to which the Bank is a party; (c) to 
Yes   
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sign contracts, concluded by the Bank, and the annual 
reports, financial statements, correspondence and other 
documents of the Bank; (d) to delegate the exercise of any of 
his powers provided for in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) to other 
employees of the Bank upon his own responsibility. 
20(5) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (2) and 
subject to the provisions of the Treaty and of the Statute, the 
Governor shall keep the Board informed on all current 
matters which require its attention and shall, as far as 
practicable, provide it with such data and information as will 
facilitate it in the formulation of its decisions and policies. 
Provided that the Governor shall, furthermore, submit to the 
Board, for adoption, draft measures or resolutions which in 
his view are necessary to make the objectives and policies of 
the Board effective. 
Yes   
The Czech 
Republic 
5(1) The supreme governing body of the Czech National Bank 
shall be the Bank Board of the Czech National Bank 
(hereinafter referred to as the ―Bank Board‖). The Bank 
Board shall set monetary policy and the instruments for 
implementing this policy, and shall decide upon the 
fundamental monetary policy measures of the Czech 
National Bank. 
   
5(2) Furthermore, the Bank Board shall, in particular: 
a) set forth the principles for the activities and transactions of 
the Czech National Bank; 
b) approve the budget of the Czech National Bank, 
c) set forth the organisational structure and fields of 
competence of the organisational units of the 
Czech National Bank; 
d) define the types, amounts and uses of the funds of the 
Czech National Bank; 
Yes   
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e) execute the rights and duties arising from labour-law 
relations in respect of the staff of the 
Czech National Bank. The Bank Board may delegate these 
activities to other members of staff; 
f) grant its consent to the entrepreneurial activities of the staff 
of the CNB. 
g) fix the salary and other emoluments of the Governor; the 
salaries and other emoluments of 
Vice-Governors and other members of the Bank Board shall 
be fixed by the Governor. 
6(1) The Bank Board shall consist of seven members, comprising 
the Governor of the Czech National Bank, two Vice-
Governors of the Czech National Bank and four other 
members of the Bank Board of the Czech National Bank. 
   
7(1) The Governor, or, in his absence, a Vice-Governor 
nominated by him, shall chair the meetings of the Bank 
Board. The Bank Board shall act by a simple majority of the 
votes cast. The Bank Board shall have a quorum if the 
Governor, or his nominee, and at least three other members 
of the Bank Board are present. In the event of a tie, the 
chairperson shall have the casting vote. 
   
8 The Governor shall represent the Czech National Bank 
externally. In his absence, a Vice-Governor nominated by 
him shall act on his behalf. 
Yes   
Denmark 3(1) The management of the Bank shall be committed to a Board 
of Directors, a Committee of Directors and a Board of 
Governors.  
   
4 By-laws All matters of special importance which may be considered 
to be outside the domain of daily management shall to the 
greatest extent possible be submitted to the Board of 
Directors. However, if the case be so urgent, that in the 
Yes   
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opinion of the Board of Governors the decision cannot 
prudently be postponed until such submission, the Board of 
Governors shall act, if possible after preceding deliberation 
with the Committee of Directors, and shall see to it that the 
case as soon as possible be submitted to the Board of 
Directors. 
The Board of Directors shall supervise that the rules 
governing the functions of the Bank as laid down in the 
National Bank of Denmark Act and in these present By-laws 
be observed, thereunder that notes are not issued in violation 
of the rules prescribed. 
After the expiration of every three months the Board of 
Governors shall submit to the Board of Directors balance 
sheets from the ledgers of the Bank, and a statement on the 
funding of the note circulation. Moreover, at the quarterly 
meeting the Board of Governors shall report on the more 
important business done in the Bank since the latest quarterly 
meeting. 
It shall be the duty of the Board of Directors: 
1) To elect on the recommendation of the Committee 
of Directors 2 of the 3 Governors of the Bank. A majority of 
all the Directors shall be required to validate the election of a 
Governor. 
2) To draw up the By-laws governing the functions of 
the Bank under § 26 of the National Bank of Denmark Act, 
and submit the said By-laws to the Royal Bank-
Commissioner for confirmation. 
3) To decide on the establishment and closing of 
branches. 
4) To make regulations for the salaries and old age 
pensions of all the officials of the Bank inclusive of the 
Governors. 
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5) To elect every three months 2 directors, who 
together with a member of the Committee of Directors are to 
examine the holdings and engagements of the Bank from 
samples of these drawn at random. The said directors shall in 
each single case be free to determine what departments of the 
Bank they wish to examine. 
6) On the basis of the report of the Board of Governors 
and the Committee of Directors to go through the annual 
accounts of the Bank, to decide upon writings-off and allo-
cations etc., to determine the application of the annual profit 
and to submit the annual accounts to the Royal Bank-
Commissioner for approbation. 
7) To make decisions pursuant to § 13 of the National 
Bank of Denmark Act concerning permission to deviate from 
the funding rules laid down in the said Act. 
7 By-laws The Committee of Directors shall keep itself informed as 
regards the more important sides of the functions of the 
Bank. 
It may at any time demand from the Board of Governors such 
information as it might consider necessary in order to comply 
with the duties laid upon it. 
The Committee of Directors and the Board of Governors 
should mutually enter into negotiation and deliberation on 
cases and matters which are of a more general importance for 
the functions of the Bank, thereunder the rules governing the 
granting of advances, even though a submission to the Board 
of Directors be not required. 
All matters placed before the Board of Directors shall first be 
submitted to the Committee of Directors. The Committee 
reports to the Board of Directors on the matter; the report 
may be accompanied by the recommendations of the Board 
Yes   
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of Governors. Cases which due to their urgent character 
cannot be postponed until the submission to the Board of 
Directors has taken place, shall as far as possible be 
submitted to the Committee of Directors. 
At least once every year the Committee of Directors shall 
examine the more important liabilities of the Bank and have 
all the assets of the Bank checked in order to ascertain their 
existence. A report concerning these examinations shall be 
sent to the Board of Directors. 
It shall rest with the Committee of Directors to see to it, that 
the annual accounts under careful consideration of existing 
assets and liabilities, and with the undertaking of necessary 
writings-off and allocations have been rendered as proper and 
cautious business practice dictates. Before the Committee of 
Directors reports to the Board of Directors, it shall negotiate 
with the Royal Bank-Commissioner concerning the 
application of the profit of the year on the basis of the 
recommendation of the Board of Governors. 
The Committee of Directors shall see that the daily audit 
provided for in § 36 is properly organized. 
Furthermore the Committee of Directors appoints and dis-
misses on the recommendation of the Board of Governors the 
officials of the Bank with a higher charge than that of senior 
clerk, confer § 14, while the other officials are appointed by 
the Board of Governors. 
10 By-laws The Board of Governors shall meet as often as it is deemed 
necessary. Decisions shall be passed by a majority of votes. 
In the case of an equality of votes the Governor nominated 
by the King shall have the casting vote. 
The Governors shall divide the duties laid upon them by 
mutual agreement and determine what may be left to a single 
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Governor for decision. 
12 By-laws The daily management of the Bank shall be vested in the 
Board of Governors. It shall particularly be the duty of the 
Board of Governors: 
1) To see that all the transactions of the Bank be 
properly entered into the accounts, and that the staff of the 
Bank on the whole discharge the duties laid upon them, 
2) To watch the safe-keeping of all the assets of the 
Bank and the valuables entrusted to the Bank, 
3) To supervise the printing of the bank-notes and the 
safekeeping and destruction of cancelled notes, 
4) To see that the management of the business of the 
branches be properly supervised, 
5) To report every month to the Royal Bank-
Commissioner, the Chairman of the Board of Directors and 
to the Committee of Directors on the funding of the notes in 
circulation. 
Yes   
Estonia 6 The highest body of Eesti Pank is the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank, which consists of a Chairman and seven members 
No   
7(1) The Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank is 
appointed to office for a term of five years by the Riigikogu 
on the proposal of the President of the Republic 
   
8(1) The members of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank are 
appointed by the Riigikogu on the proposal of the Chairman 
of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. 
   
8(3) Members of the Government of the Republic and employees 
of Eesti Pank shall not be members of the Supervisory Board 
of Eesti Pank 
   
9(1) The Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall exercise 
supervision over all the activities of Eesti Pank. 
   
9(2) The following issues are within the exclusive competence of    
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the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank: 
1) (Repealed) 
2) making a proposal to the President of the Republic for 
appointment of the Governor of Eesti Pank;  
3) (Repealed)  
4) appointment to office and release of Deputy Governors of 
Eesti Pank, the heads of the independent divisions and 
representative offices of Eesti Pank, and the head of the 
internal audit department of Eesti Pank and for the 
appointment and removal of members of the Supervisory 
Board of the Financial Supervision Authority on the proposal 
of the Governor of Eesti Pank;  
5) approval of the statute of Eesti Pank, the statutes of the 
independent divisions and representative offices of Eesti 
Pank and the statutes of the internal audit department;  
6) supervision of the implementation of the budget of Eesti 
Pank;  
7) appointment of internal auditors of Eesti Pank and 
approval of the work schedule for internal audits.  
7
1
) appointment of the independent auditors of Eesti Pank 
pursuant to the procedure provided in subsection 31 (1) of 
this Act;  
8) approval of Eesti Pank's annual report on the proposal of 
the Governor; 
9) making of decisions concerning the denomination and 
design of new banknotes and coins; 
10) deciding, on the proposal of the Governor of Eesti Pank, 
on the establishment, reorganisation and liquidation of 
independent divisions of Eesti Pank;  
11) review and approval of written proposals and other 
documents submitted to the Riigikogu in the name of Eesti 
Pank. 
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9(6) The Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall pass decisions and 
issue statements. The Governor of Eesti Pank shall be 
responsible for the implementation of decisions of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
   
11(1) The following issues are within the exclusive competence of 
the Governor of Eesti Pank:  
1) designing of banking policies, general management of 
Eesti Pank's activities and organisation of the performance of 
the tasks of the European System of Central Banks;  
2) organisation of the implementation of decisions of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank and the application of 
measures (including sanctions) necessary to ensure their 
implementation;  
3) (Repealed)  
4) representation of Eesti Pank without special authorisation 
in all matters and instances both in Estonia and abroad;  
5) grant of authorisation to represent Eesti Pank in certain 
cases or in certain matters; 
6) making proposals to the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
for the appointment to office and release of the Deputy 
Governors and the head of the internal audit department of 
Eesti Pank and the heads of the independent divisions of 
Eesti Pank, and for the appointment and removal of members 
of the Supervisory Board of the Financial Supervision 
Authority;  
7) approval of Eesti Pank's budget; 
Yes   
13(1) Eesti Pank's activities are managed by the Executive Board 
of Eesti Pank, the Chairman of which by virtue of office shall 
be the Governor of Eesti Pank.The Executive Board of Eesti 
Pank is composed of the Governor of Eesti Pank and the 
Deputy Governors. 
Yes   
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13(1
1
) The Executive Board shall be responsible for planning and 
organising Eesti Pank's activities.The Governor of Eesti Pank 
may assign additional functions to the Executive Board. The 
Executive Board passes decisions for performance of the 
functions thereof. 
   
13(2) The division of tasks and bases for the organisation of work 
of the Executive Board of Eesti Pank shall be provided for in 
the statute of Eesti Pank 
   
Finland 9 The Bank of Finland‘s governing bodies are the 
Parliamentary Supervisory Council and the Board. 
   
10(1) The Parliamentary Supervisory Council, which shall consist 
of nine members elected by Parliament, shall elect a 
chairman and a deputy chairman from among its members. 
No   
10(2) A member of the Parliamentary Supervisory Council is 
obliged to resign if he is appointed as a member of the 
Council of State or a member of the Board, or if he has 
undertaken an occupation that, according to a unanimous 
decision of the Parliamentary Supervisory Council, is 
incompatible with membership on the Parliamentary 
Supervisory Council. 
   
11(1) As a body supervising the administration and activities of the 
Bank of Finland, the Parliamentary Supervisory Council shall 
perform the following tasks: 
1) confirm, upon proposal of the Board, the basic principles 
applied in drawing up the annual accounts of the Bank of 
Finland; 
2) decide, on the basis of the auditors‘ report, on the 
confirmation of the Bank‘s balance sheet and profit and loss 
account; 
3) decide, upon proposal of the Board, on measures 
concerning the Bank‘s profit or loss for the financial year; 
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4) report annually to Parliament on the Bank‘s activities and 
administration and on the main issues dealt with by the 
Parliamentary Supervisory Council; and 
5) as necessary, submit to Parliament reports on the 
execution 
of monetary policy and the other activities of the Bank of 
Finland. 
11(2) In respect of the Bank‘s administration, the Parliamentary 
Supervisory Council shall: 
1) make proposals to the Council of State on the filling of 
positions as members of the Board; 
2) decide on the principles for determining salaries, leaves of 
absence and annual leaves of members of the Board as well 
as on the execution of their duties during leaves of absence 
exceeding one week; 
3) decide on the issuance of warnings to members of the 
Board and settle other issues related to their service; 
4) appoint, upon proposal of the Board, directors of the Bank 
of Finland; 
5) appoint the Deputy Chairman of the Board; 
6) confirm the Bank of Finland‘s Pension and Survivors‘ 
Pension Regulations and issue regulations concerning the 
management of the Bank‘s pension liability, upon proposal 
of the Board, and 
7) issue, upon proposal of the Board, regulations concerning 
the language skills required of officials of the Bank of 
Finland. 
   
11(3) In addition, the Parliamentary Supervisory Council shall: 
1) decide on motions to be put before Parliament; 
2) decide on proposals to be submitted to the Council of 
State in highly important matters of principle; 
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3) confirm the bases for fees and remunerations to be paid to 
auditors elected by Parliament and their secretary; 
4) confirm, upon proposal of the Board, the Bank of 
Finland‘s 
rules referred to in paragraph 3 of section 15; and 
5) order payment of compensation for appointment of an 
employee of the Bank for a fixed term without statutory 
grounds. 
11(4) The Parliamentary Supervisory Council shall have the right 
to obtain any information necessary for carrying out its tasks 
laid down in this section. 
   
14(1) The Board shall be responsible for the administration of the 
Bank of Finland and for ensuring that all tasks assigned to 
the Bank are duly executed, except for statutory tasks of the 
Parliamentary Supervisory Council and matters that are 
otherwise provided for in the Act on the Financial 
Supervision Authority (503/1993). 
Yes   
14(4) The Governor and the other members of the Board shall be 
obliged to provide the Parliamentary Supervisory Council 
with information on a regular basis concerning the execution 
of monetary policy and other activities of the Bank of 
Finland. 
Yes   
France L. 142-2 The Monetary Policy Council shall examine monetary trends 
and analyse the implications of the monetary policy 
formulated within the framework of the European System of 
Central Banks. In accordance with the guidelines and 
instructions of the European Central Bank, the Monetary 
Policy Council shall specify the terms and conditions for 
buying or selling, outright or under repurchase or resale 
agreements, lending or borrowing, discounting or taking as 
collateral claims, and issuing interest-bearing bills, as well as 
No   
 254 
 
Member State Article Text Responsibility for 
ESCB-related/ 
basic central 
banking tasks 
Membership in 
the Governing 
Council 
Membership in 
the General 
Council 
the nature and scope of the collateral to be attached to the 
loans granted by the Banque de France. It may delegate 
temporary powers to the Governor. 
L. 142-3(1) The Monetary Policy Council shall comprise the Governor, 
the two Deputy Governors of the Banque de France and four 
other members. 
   
L 142-6 The General Council shall administer the Banque de France. 
The Council shall decide on issues related to the conduct of 
the Banque de France‘s activities other than those deriving 
from the tasks of the European System of Central Banks. It 
shall decide on questions relating to the terms of employment 
of Banque de France staff. These terms shall be submitted by 
the Governor of the Banque de France for the approval of the 
relevant ministers. The General Council shall also decide on 
the allocation of the Bank‘s own funds. It shall draw up the 
Bank‘s expenditure estimates and amendments thereto, make 
up the Bank‘s balance sheet and accounts, and propose the 
appropriation of net profit and the dividend to be paid to the 
State. The General Council shall appoint two statutory 
auditors to review the accounts of the Banque de France. 
They shall be invited to attend the meeting of the General 
Council that approves the accounts for the year just ended. 
No   
L. 142-7(1) The General Council shall comprise the members of the 
Monetary Policy Council and a representative of the Banque 
de France staff elected for a six-year term. 
   
L. 142-8(1); 
(2); (3) 
The Banque de France shall be managed by the Governor of 
the Banque de France. The Governor shall preside over the 
Monetary Policy Council and the General Council of the 
Banque de France. He shall prepare and implement the 
decisions taken by these Councils. 
Yes   
Germany 7(1) The governing body of the Deutsche Bundesbank shall be the Yes   
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Executive Board (Vorstand). It shall govern and manage the 
Bank. It shall adopt an organisational statute which 
establishes the responsibilities of the members of the 
Executive Board and the tasks which may be delegated to the 
Regional Offices (Hauptverwaltungen). The Executive Board 
may allocate responsibility for dealing with specific matters 
to one of its members. 
7(2) The Executive Board shall comprise the President, the Vice-
President and six other members. Members of the Executive 
Board must have relevant professional qualifications. 
   
11(1) first 
sentence 
The Deutsche Bundesbank shall be represented in and out of 
court by the Executive Board. 
   
41(4) The President of the Deutsche Bundesbank shall be the 
supreme institutional authority for the persons to whom the 
provisions of subsections (1) and (2) above apply. In this 
capacity he shall represent the Bank in and out of court. He 
shall be entitled to delegate his tasks and powers pursuant to 
the first and second sentences to a member of the Executive 
Board. In the cases under subsection (1) above, he shall take 
the place of the Federal Ministry of Finance insofar as the 
participation of that Ministry is prescribed in the Act 
specified therein and in the provisions of the legislation 
relating to civil servants applicable under that Act. 
   
Greece 11 The General Meeting of Shareholders, as constituted by the 
provisions of this Statute, is the supreme organ of the Bank 
and represents the whole body of shareholders. Its decisions 
are binding upon all shareholders, including those absent or 
disqualified from attending a meeting or disagreeing with the 
decisions taken thereat. 
No   
19 The Annual General Meeting of Shareholders shall be the 
only competent organ to deal with the following matters: (a) 
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approval of the annual report; (b) approval of the Balance 
Sheet following the report of the Auditors; (c) appropriations 
to reserve and other special funds; the fixing of dividends, 
and any other disposal of net profits; (d) election or removal 
of members of the General Council and of the Auditors and 
the fixing of their fees and travelling expenses; (e) discharge 
from all personal responsibility of members of the General 
Council and of the Auditors. The voting on this issue shall be 
conducted by show ballot and by roll-call; (f) proposals to 
amend this Statute, except the increase of capital (Article 9); 
such proposals to be submitted to the Parliament through the 
Government; (g) proposals on any other matter submitted to 
the Meeting by the General Council. Subject to the 
provisions of this Statute, the General Meeting with reference 
to its works will decide upon the method of procedure. 
20 The general management of the affairs of the Bank shall be 
entrusted to the General Council, responsible to the General 
Meeting of Shareholders. The General Council, within the 
limits of the Statute, shall be entitled to take all decisions and 
exercise all powers which are not specifically reserved to the 
General Meeting of Shareholders or to the Monetary Policy 
Council or, as provided for in Article 31, last paragraph, and 
Article 55A hereof, to the Governor of the Bank. 
No   
21(1) The General Council shall consist of the Governor, the two 
Deputy Governors and the other members of the Monetary 
Policy Council as well as of six Councillors. Three, at least, 
of the General Council members shall be elected amongst 
those specifically engaged in the fields of industry, 
commerce and agriculture. 
   
22(2) Upon the establishment of the European System of Central 
Banks (ESCB the Governor shall participate, ex officio, as an 
Yes   
 257 
 
Member State Article Text Responsibility for 
ESCB-related/ 
basic central 
banking tasks 
Membership in 
the Governing 
Council 
Membership in 
the General 
Council 
independent personality in the Board of Directors and the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), in 
accordance with the Statute of the ESCB 
27 The General Council shall decide on the following matters: 
(b) general conditions and the extent of business conducted 
by the Bank outside the scope of ESCB related tasks; (c) 
eligibility of applicants for accommodation by way of 
discount or advances and the sanctioning of the credit limits 
proposed by the Governor for such accommodation, unless 
these matters fall within the field of competence of the 
Monetary Policy Council; (d) the sanctioning of renewal 
bills, the renewal of advances for fixed periods, and the 
periodical review (not less than once every six months) of all 
credits, discount, and advances, unless these matters fall 
within the field of competence of the Monetary Policy 
Council; (f) the appointment or dismissal of Directors, on the 
proposal of the Governor, and the general internal 
organisation of the Bank; (i) matters connected with the 
acquisition of immovable property required for the business 
of the Bank and the temporary acquisition and sale of similar 
property under Article 58; (j) the depreciation of the Bank‘s 
assets; (k) without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 30 
and 31 of the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks, the appointment of foreign correspondents and the 
fixing of the maximum amounts of the funds which may be 
held with them for account of the Bank, as well as the limit 
of credit facilities by way of discounts or loans to be granted 
to them; (l) questions concerning the design, text, material, 
denominations, and supply of banknotes denominated in 
drachmae, their withdrawal and cancellation, and the terms 
on which mutilated banknotes denominated in drachmae may 
No   
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be paid; the design, text, and denominations shall, however, 
be fixed in agreement with the Minister of Finance; (m) 
questions regarding the liquidation of bankrupt enterprises 
and of debts due to the Bank; (n) the opening or closing of 
Branches and Agencies of the Bank; (o) the agenda for 
General Meetings;(p) the signatures binding upon the Bank; 
(q) the approval of the annual report and balance sheet to be 
submitted to the Annual General Meeting. 
31(1);(2); 
 
The Governor shall, on behalf of the General Council, be in 
permanent control of the management of the Bank‘s assets 
and general business, taking decisions in all cases not 
specifically reserved to the General Council or the Monetary 
Policy Council or governed by regulations which the said 
Councils have issued. Except for matters assigned to the 
Monetary Policy Council, the Governor shall decide on all 
other matters falling within the duties of the ESCB 
Yes   
35A(1); (2); 
 
The Monetary Policy Council shall be responsible for 
decisions pertaining to monetary policy definition and 
implementation and to the conduct of exchange rate policy, 
the operation of payment systems and the issue of banknotes. 
These tasks shall be exercised by virtue of Acts of the said 
Council. As from the adoption of the euro as the currency of 
Greece, the responsibilities of the Council directly related to 
monetary policy shall be restricted as follows: 
The Monetary Policy Council shall examine economic and 
monetary developments and discuss the implications of the 
monetary policy formulated within the framework of the 
ESCB without prejudice to the Governor‘s independence 
from instructions as provided for in Article 22 hereof. In the 
execution of the ESCB related tasks, the Council shall act in 
accordance with the guidelines and instructions issued by the 
No   
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ECB. 
35A(6) first 
sentence 
 
The Governor and Deputy Governors are members of the 
Monetary Policy Council as long as they retain their position. 
   
36(1) A Management Council shall be established to ensure the 
singleness of policy and procedure throughout the various 
Departments of the Bank. The Management Council shall 
consist of the Governor, the Deputy Governors and the 
Directors. 
   
37 The Management Council shall submit to the General 
Council a detailed report every month regarding the business 
and the position of the Bank, in particular those issues 
relevant to the discounts and advances, and shall deliver its 
opinion on all matters referred to it by the General Council. 
   
Hungary 47 The organs of the MNB shall be the General Meeting, the 
Monetary Council, the Board of Directors and the 
Supervisory Board. 
   
48 The tasks of the General Meeting shall be: (a) to establish 
and amend the Statutes; (c) to establish the balance sheet and 
profit and loss statement of the MNB; d) to elect and dismiss 
the auditor; and (e) to establish the remuneration of the 
auditor. 
No   
49(1) In respect of the tasks described in Article 4, Article 11, 
paragraph (2) and Article 14, the supreme decision making 
organ of the MNB shall be the Monetary Council. 
   
49(4) The members of the Monetary Council shall be: (a) the 
President of the MNB, as the Chairperson of the Monetary 
Council; (b) one Vice-President appointed by the President of 
the MNB; and (c) other members, who shall be appointed by 
the President of the Republic for a term of six years. 
Yes    
50(1) The head of the MNB shall be the President.    
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52(1) The Board of Directors shall be responsible for the 
implementation of the decisions of the Monetary Council and 
the operations of the MNB. 
Yes   
52(2) The Board of Directors shall consist of at least four and at 
most six members, who shall be (a) the President of the MNB 
as the Chairperson of the Board of Directors; (b) the Vice-
Presidents of the MNB. 
   
52(4) The scope of responsibility of the Board of Directors shall 
be: (a) to guide the implementation of the tasks described in 
Article 4; (b) to prepare the proposal to be submitted to the 
General Meeting in respect of the balance sheet and profit 
and loss statement of the MNB and the allocation of profits, 
furthermore, to approve the draft report submitted to the 
General Meeting in respect of the business management, the 
financial situation of the MNB and the business policy; (c) to 
approve issues related to the organisation and internal 
management of the MNB; (d) to approve professional plans 
and programmes related to the operations of the MNB or the 
performance of its tasks, including development and 
operational budgets; (e) in matters outside the Supervisory 
Board‘s competence, to manage the MNB‘s internal audit 
system and to discuss the results of internal auditing and 
plans related to internal auditing; (f) to approve any major 
amendments to the collective bargaining agreement; and (g) 
to attend to any other issues proposed with the approval of 
the Chairperson. 
Yes   
52A(1) The Supervisory Board is the body responsible for the 
continuous supervision of the MNB on behalf of the owner. 
No   
52A(3) The competence of the Supervisory Board shall not extend to 
the tasks described in Article 4 (1)-(7), and the impact of 
such on the profit and loss of the MNB. The Supervisory 
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Board shall prepare the report, specified in paragraph (3) of 
Article 32 of the Act on Business Associations, in accordance 
with these restrictions. 
52A(4) The members of the Supervisory Board shall be: (a) the 
Chairman, elected by Parliament, (b) three other members, 
elected by Parliament, (c) a representative of the Minister of 
Finance, (d) a consultant commissioned by the Minister of 
Finance. 
   
Ireland 6A(3) The Minister may, from time to time, request the Governor, 
the Board or the Regulatory Authority to consult with the 
Minister, in relation to their respective functions, as regards 
the performance by the Bank of any function of the Bank 
(other than one imposed on it by the Rome Treaty or the 
ESCB Statute) 
   
18B (1) The Board of Directors of the Bank comprises the 
following persons: 
(a) the Governor; 
(b) the Director General of the Bank; 
(c) the Secretary General of the Department of 
Finance; 
(d) the Chairperson of the Regulatory Authority; 
(e) the Chief Executive of that Authority; 
(f) 7 other Directors appointed by the Minister. 
 
(2) Of the other Directors, 4 are to be members of the 
Regulatory Authority. 
   
19A(2) The Governor has sole responsibility for the performance of 
the functions imposed, and the exercise of powers conferred, 
on the Bank by or under the Rome Treaty or the ESCB 
Statute 
Yes   
Italy 5 The central decision-making bodies of the Bank are: (a) the    
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shareholders‘ meeting; (b) the Board of Directors; (c) the 
Board of Auditors; (d) the Directorate; (e) the Governor; (f) 
the Director General and the Deputy Directors General. 
6(1) Shareholders‘ meetings shall be ordinary or extraordinary. 
Extraordinary shareholders‘ meetings shall decide on 
amendments to this statute; ordinary shareholders‘ meetings 
shall decide on all the matters specified by the statute. 
No   
15(1) The Board of Directors shall consist of the Governor and 
thirteen directors elected by shareholders‘ meetings held at 
the main branches of the Bank. 
   
18(1) The Board of Directors shall be charged with the general 
administration, management supervision and internal control 
of the Bank. 
   
18(2) In conformity with legislative and regulatory provisions and, 
in the case of resolutions referred to in points 9) and 10), in 
compliance with the statute of the ESCB and the provisions 
adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB), the Board 
shall: 
1) examine and approve, acting on a proposal from the 
Directorate, the draft annual accounts and resolve to submit 
them to the Board of Auditors and the shareholders‘ meeting 
for final approval. After consulting the Board of Auditors, it 
shall decide on the dividend to be paid to shareholders; 
2) approve the annual expenditure budget; 
3) authorize contracts involving the disposal of real estate for 
a consideration exceeding €1 million and settlements, 
compositions with creditors and assignments in respect of 
claims exceeding €200,000, and express its opinion on all 
other contracts and legal actions which, because of their 
importance, the Governor considers should be submitted to it 
for approval; 
Yes   
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4) approve the Bank‘s internal regulations; 
5) determine the staffing levels, recruit and dismiss 
employees; 
6) approve agreements negotiated with trade unions; 
7) adopt resolutions regarding the geographical configuration 
and general organizational structure of the Bank; 
8) appoint and remove from office regents at the main 
branches and councillors at the local branches and determine 
their number and which of them are to act as examiners; 
9) appoint the Bank‘s foreign correspondents; 
10) determine the rules and terms and conditions for the 
Bank‘s operations; 
11) set the annual limit on donations to charity and 
contributions to initiatives of public interest; 
12) decide upon all other matters concerning the general 
administration of the Bank not specifically entrusted to the 
shareholders‘ meeting which the Governor considers should 
be submitted to it. 
19(1) The Board of Auditors shall consist of five auditors, 
including the chairman; there shall be two alternates. The 
members of the Board of Auditors shall remain in office for 
three years and may be re-elected not more than three times. 
No   
19(2) The Board of Auditors shall perform, directly at the Head 
Office and either directly or through examiners at the main 
branches and the local branches, checks on the administration 
of the Bank with regard to observance of the law, this statute 
and the Bank‘s general regulations. It shall carry out 
accounting checks, without prejudice to the activity of the 
external auditors referred to in Article 38, examine the annual 
accounts and express its opinion on the distribution of the 
annual dividend. 
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21(1) The Directorate shall consist of the Governor, the Director 
General and three Deputy Directors General. 
   
21(2) The Directorate shall have authority to adopt measures of 
external significance regarding the exercise of the public 
functions entrusted by law to the Bank or to the Governor in 
pursuit of the Bank‘s institutional aims, other than decisions 
falling under the authority of the ESCB 
N/A   
24(1) The Governor shall represent the Bank of Italy vis-à-vis third 
parties in all acts and contracts and in legal actions. 
   
24(2) He shall have the duties and powers reserved to the position 
by the Treaty, the statute of the ESCB and the related 
Community and Italian implementing provisions. 
Yes   
24(5) All matters not expressly reserved to the Board of Directors 
or the Directorate by law or this statute shall be entrusted to 
the Governor. 
   
25(3) The Director General shall assist the Governor in the 
performance of his duties and shall stand in for the Governor 
in the event of the latter‘s absence or inability to act; the 
signature of the Director General shall be full proof thereof 
vis-à-vis third parties. 
   
26(1) The Deputy Directors General shall assist the Director 
General in the performance of his duties and shall stand in 
for him in the event of his absence or inability to act. Each of 
them may stand in for the Governor and the Director General 
in the event of their simultaneous absence or inability to act. 
   
Latvia 21(1) The Bank of Latvia shall be administered by a Council of the 
Bank of Latvia and a Board of the Bank of Latvia. The 
Council of the Bank of Latvia shall consist of eight persons: 
the Governor, the Deputy Governor and six members of the 
Council 
   
21(2) The Council of the Bank of Latvia shall be chaired by the    
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Governor or Deputy Governor. 
23(1) To execute the practical work and ensure the efficient 
management of the Bank of Latvia, the Council of the Bank 
of Latvia shall establish a permanent Board of the Bank of 
Latvia consisting of six persons 
   
26(1) The Council of the Bank of Latvia shall make decisions on 
behalf of the Bank of Latvia. The Council shall determine the 
general monetary policy, set interest rates for Bank of Latvia 
asset and liability operations, and make all decisions that are 
necessary to ensure the implementation of monetary policy in 
accordance with this Law 
Yes   
26(2) The Council of the Bank of Latvia shall review and approve 
the annual budget of the Bank, determining that all expenses 
of the Bank shall be financed from the Bank's revenue 
Yes   
27(1) The Board of the Bank of Latvia shall manage the Bank's 
work implementing the resolutions of the Council of the 
Bank of Latvia concerning monetary policy and other areas 
of the Bank's activity 
Yes   
28(3) The Governor of the Bank shall represent the Bank of Latvia 
in relations with other banks, with State and local 
government institutions of Latvia, as well as with 
international financial and credit organisations 
   
29(1) first 
sentence 
The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Latvia shall 
organise and direct the Bank of Latvia's practical work by 
implementing decisions adopted by the Council of the Bank 
of Latvia and the Board of the Bank. 
Yes   
Lithuania 10(1) The Bank of Lithuania shall be governed by the Board of the 
Bank of Lithuania. The Board shall be comprised of a 
Chairperson, two Deputy Chairpersons, and two Members of 
the Board 
   
10(3) The Chairperson, Deputy Chairpersons and Members of the    
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Board of the Bank of Lithuania may participate in the 
management of international financial institutions of which 
the Republic of Lithuania or the Bank of Lithuania is a 
member. 
11(1) The Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall: 
1) develop the monetary  policy programme of the Bank of 
Lithuania; 
2) establish procedures for rediscount, loans, deposits, open 
market operations carried out at the Bank of Lithuania, and 
the procedures for the formation and holding of  required 
reserves of credit institutions with the Bank of Lithuania, as 
well as for the application of other monetary policy 
instruments; 
3) establish the Litas exchange rate regulation system and the 
procedure for the  calculation of the official Litas exchange 
rate;  
4) establish the procedures and principles for the 
management, use and disposal of  foreign reserves of the 
Bank of Lithuania; 
5) establish procedures for the issue of and trading in debt 
securities issued by the Bank of Lithuania; 
6) establish prudential requirements for credit institutions, as 
well as their ratios and  methods for calculation; 
7) adopt resolutions; 
8) decide on issues concerning the participation of the Bank 
of Lithuania in international banks and other international 
financial institutions, provided this is related to the  functions 
of the Bank of Lithuania; 
9) decide on matters of issue and withdrawal from circulation 
of the currency and other issues related thereto, laid down in 
Article 6 of this Law; 
Yes   
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10) establish branches, representative offices, enterprises and 
institutions of the Bank of Lithuania for carrying out its 
functions and decide on the acquisition of shares of (stakes 
in) enterprises and institutions related to the functions of the 
Bank of Lithuania; 
11) approve the structure of the Bank of Lithuania; 
12) establish  the principles of service (work) and the status 
of the staff of the Bank of Lithuania; approve the rules of 
procedure of the Board; 
13) apply enforcement measures established by laws to credit 
institutions; 
14) decide on issues regarding initiation of bankruptcy 
proceedings against credit institutions; 
15) approve the Bank of Lithuania budget;   
16) establish the financial accounting policy, approve annual 
financial statements and the allocation of profit for the 
financial year; 
17) establish procedures for the management, use, and 
disposal of the assets of the Bank of Lithuania, as well as 
procurement procedure; 
18) resolve issues pertaining to the issuance and revocation 
of licenses, permits, consents to credit institutions; and 
19) perform other activities related to the implementation of 
the primary objective of the Bank of Lithuania. 
11(2) The Board may authorise the Chairperson of the Board of the 
Bank of Lithuania to carry out a part of its functions, except 
the functions provided for by items 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 16, 18 and 19 of Paragraph 1 of this Article 
   
11(1) The Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall: 
1) (Repealed); 
2) (Repealed); 
Yes   
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3) (Repealed);  
4) establish the principles and procedures for the 
management, use and disposal of foreign reserves that in 
accordance with the legal acts of the European Union have 
not been transferred to the European Central Bank, in 
compliance with the requirements of the European Central 
Bank applicable to foreign reserves of the national central 
banks; 
6) establish prudential requirements for credit institutions, as 
well as their ratios and methods for calculation; 
7) adopt resolutions; 
8) upon the consent of the European Central Bank, decide on 
issues concerning the participation of the Bank of Lithuania 
in international monetary institutions; 
9) decide on matters of issue and withdrawal of the 
banknotes and coins and other issues related thereto in 
compliance with the requirements of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community; 
10) establish branches, representative offices, enterprises and 
institutions of the Bank of Lithuania for carrying out its 
functions and decide on the acquisition of shares of (stakes 
in) enterprises and institutions related to the functions of the 
Bank of Lithuania; 
11) approve the structure of the Bank of Lithuania; 
12) establish the principles of service (work) and the status of 
the staff of the Bank of Lithuania; approve the rules of 
procedure of the Board; 
13) apply enforcement measures established by laws to credit 
institutions; 
14) decide on issues regarding initiation of bankruptcy 
proceedings against credit institutions; 
15) approve the Bank of Lithuania budget;   
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16) in compliance with the requirements of the legal acts of 
the European Central Bank, establish the financial accounting 
policy of the Bank of Lithuania, approve annual financial 
statements and the allocation of profit for the financial year, 
as established in Paragraph 3 of Article 23 of this Law; 
17) establish procedures for the management, use and 
disposal of the assets of the Bank of Lithuania, following the 
main principle of achieving the objectives and carrying out 
the tasks of the European System of Central Banks using the 
most economical, effective and productive means, and 
establish the procurement procedures; 
18) resolve issues pertaining to the issuance and revocation 
of licenses, permits, consents to credit institutions; and 
19) perform other activities related to the implementation of 
the primary objective of the Bank of Lithuania. 
New 11(2) The Board of the Bank of Lithuania may authorise the 
Chairperson of the Board to carry out a part of its functions, 
except the functions provided for by Items 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 
13, 14, 15, 16, 18 and 19 of Paragraph 1 of this Article 
   
17(1) The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall: 
1) organise the work of the Bank of Lithuania; 
2) represent the Bank of Lithuania in the Republic of 
Lithuania and abroad without any special power of attorney; 
3) conclude employment contracts with staff members and 
heads of the branches, representative offices, institutions and 
enterprises of the Bank of Lithuania, provide incentives for 
distinguished employees and impose disciplinary penalties; 
4) approve the distribution of duties between the 
Chairperson, Deputy  Chairpersons and members of the 
Board; 
5) issue powers of attorney; 
Yes   
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6) approve regulations of the structural divisions of the Bank 
of Lithuania; and 
7) perform other functions delegated by the Board of the 
Bank of Lithuania. 
Luxembourg 5(1) The bodies of the Central Bank shall be the Council and the 
Board of Directors 
   
6 The remit of the Central Bank Council shall be: 
(a)  To discuss the implications of monetary policy, 
without prejudice to its President‘s independence of all 
instructions in his capacity as member of the Governing 
Council of the ECB and without prejudice to the provisions 
relating to professional secrecy applicable to the ESCB 
(b) To determine the business policy of the Central 
Bank and draft guidelines relating to the financial situation of 
the Central Bank. 
(c) Each year, to approve the budget, the financial 
accounts and the report of the Board of Directors. 
(d) To give its consent prior to the use of the Central 
Bank‘s reserve fund. 
(e) To assist in the drafting of the Central Bank‘s 
business reports as referred to in Article 11. 
(f) To propose to the Government the appointment of 
the Central Bank‘s auditor. 
(g) To approve the internal rules of procedure of the 
Board of Directors. 
(h) To deliver its opinion prior to any decision to 
dismiss a Director. 
(i) To deliver an opinion on any Grand-Ducal 
regulation adopted pursuant to Article 14 of the present law 
concerning the agents of the Central Bank. 
(j) To give its assent prior to the application of any 
No   
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disciplinary action against an agent of the Central Bank, 
when the preliminary opinion of the civil service disciplinary 
board has been requested. 
7(1) In addition to the Directors, who are its members ex officio, 
the Council shall comprise six members appointed by the 
Government in Cabinet 
   
8(1) The Council shall be presided by the Director-General of the 
Central Bank or, in his absence, by the oldest member of 
Board of Directors present. 
   
11(1) The Board of Directors is the superior executive authority of 
the Central Bank. 
   
11(2) It shall draw up the measures and take the decisions required 
for the fulfilment of the tasks of the Central Bank. The 
Central Bank shall report annually to the Government and to 
the Chamber of Deputies on its activities and on the 
monetary policy of the previous year and current year 
   
12(1) The Board of Directors shall comprise a Director-General 
and two Directors. 
   
13(1) Without prejudice to the independence of its president with 
regard to all instructions in his capacity as member of the 
Governing Council of the ECB and without prejudice to 
provisions relating to professional secrecy applicable to the 
ESCB the decisions of the Board of Directors shall be taken 
collectively 
Yes   
Malta 7(1) There shall be a Board of Directors which shall be 
responsible for the policy and general administration of the 
affairs and business of the Bank, except in relation to the 
functions imposed, and the exercise of powers conferred, on 
the Bank by or under the Treaty or the Statute 
   
7(2) The members of the Board shall be the Governor, the Deputy 
Governor and the three other directors appointed under 
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article 9 
8(2)a The Governor has the sole responsibility for the performance 
of the functions imposed, and the exercise of powers 
conferred, on the Bank by or under the Treaty and the Statute 
Yes   
8(2)b Without prejudice to sub-article (2)(a), the Governor shall be 
in charge of the day-to-day management and operations of 
the Bank in accordance with the policy of the Board and shall 
be answerable to the Board for his acts and decisions in this 
respect. The representation of the Bank in judicial 
proceedings shall be vested in the Governor 
   
8(3) The Deputy Governor shall perform such duties as the 
Governor may direct and, in the event of the absence of, or a 
vacancy in the office of, the Governor, the Deputy Governor 
shall perform the duties of the Governor and shall have and 
may exercise the powers and perform the functions of the 
Governor 
   
9(1) For the purposes of this article, the term director shall 
exclude the Governor and the Deputy Governor 
   
12(3) The Governor shall preside as chairman at the meetings of 
the Board and, in his absence from any meeting, the Deputy 
Governor shall preside; and no decision shall be valid which 
is taken at a meeting of the Board at which neither the 
Governor nor the Deputy Governor is present 
   
The Netherlands 12(1) The Bank‘s Governing Board shall be responsible for 
managing the Bank. The Governing Board shall consist of a 
President and at least three and at most five Executive 
Directors. 
Yes   
12(4) With regard to the tasks and activities performed in order to 
achieve the objective referred to in section 2(1), the 
Governing Board shall acknowledge the President‘s capacity 
as member of both the Governing Council and the General 
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Council. 
13(1);  
11(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Supervisory Board shall consist of at least nine and at 
most twelve members. 
No   
13(4) The Supervisory Board shall supervise the management of 
the Bank‘s affairs and adopt the annual accounts. The annual 
accounts thus adopted shall require the approval of the 
shareholders. 
   
15(1);  
17(1) 
Articles of 
Assocition 
There shall be a Bank Council, consisting of at least eleven 
and at most thirteen members, namely: 
a. the member of the Supervisory Board referred to in section 
13(2); 
b. member appointed by the Supervisory Board from among 
its own members; 
c. at least nine and at most eleven members each of whom is 
appointed for a term of four years by the Bank Council. 
No   
15(5);  
17(5) 
Articles of 
Association 
The President of the Bank shall report to the Bank Council 
on the general economic and financial situation and shall 
discuss the policy conducted by the Bank with the Bank 
Council. Other matters raised by one or more of the members 
in connection with the Bank‘s objectives, tasks and activities 
may also be discussed. 
Yes   
6(1) Articles 
of 
Association 
The Bank‘s Governing Board shall be responsible for 
managing the Bank. 
   
6(2) Articles 
of 
Association 
The Governing Board shall consist of a President and at least 
three and at most five Executive Directors. 
   
6(4) Articles 
of 
The President is a member of the Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank. With due observance of Article 10.2 
Yes Yes  
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Association of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks, he 
may appoint an alternate as a member of the Governing 
Council of the European Central Bank. 
7(1) Articles 
of 
Association  
The Governing Board represents the Bank. This power is also 
vested in the President and in each of the Executive Directors 
individually. 
   
11(4) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Supervisory Board shall supervise the management of 
the Bank‘s affairs. Without prejudice to the provisions of the 
Treaty and the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks, the Supervisory Board shall also supervise the general 
affairs of the company and its business. It shall advise the 
Governing Board. In the performance of their task, the 
members of the Supervisory Board shall be guided by the 
interests of the company and its business 
   
16(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The general meetings of shareholders shall be held in 
Amsterdam. 
   
16(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
The agenda for the meeting referred to in paragraph (2) shall 
include the following topics: 
a. annual report; 
b. approval of the annual accounts as adopted. 
   
Poland 6 The directing bodies of the NBP shall be: 
1) the President of the NBP, 
2) the Monetary Policy Council, 
3) the NBP Management Board 
   
11(2) The President of the NBP shall chair the Monetary Policy 
Council, the NBP Management Board and the Commission 
for Banking Supervision, and shall represent the NBP in its 
external contacts 
Yes   
11(3) The President of the NBP shall represent the interests of the 
Republic of Poland within international banking institutions, 
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and, unless the Council of Ministers decides otherwise, 
within international financial institutions 
12(1) The Monetary Policy Council, hereinafter referred to as 
"Council", shall determine the annual monetary policy 
guidelines and submit these to the Sejm, for the information 
thereof, together with the submission by the Council of 
Ministers of the draft Budget. The Council shall present a 
report to the Sejm on the performance of monetary policy 
guidelines within five months of the end of the budget year 
Yes   
12(2) In consideration of monetary policy guidelines, the Council 
shall, in particular: 
1) set NBP interest rates, 
2) determine the required reserve ratio for banks and set the 
remuneration of required reserve holdings, 
3) set ceilings on the liabilities arising from loans and 
advances drawn by the NBP from foreign banking and 
financial institutions, 
4) approve the NBP financial plan and the report on the 
activity of the NBP, 
5) accept the annual accounts of the NBP, 
6) determine the principles applicable to open market 
operations. 
Yes   
13(1) The Council shall be composed of: 
1) the President of the NBP as the Chairperson of the 
Council, 
2) nine members appointed in equal numbers by the 
President of the Republic of Poland, the Sejm and the Senate, 
from among the specialists in the field of finance. 
   
17(1) The activity of the NBP shall be directed by its Management 
Board 
   
17(2) The NBP Management Board shall be composed of: the    
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President of the NBP - as Chairperson, and six to eight Board 
members, including two Vice-Presidents of the NBP 
17(3) The NBP Management Board shall: 
1) implement the resolutions of the Council, 
2) adopt resolutions on matters not reserved by the present 
Act for the exclusive competence of other bodies of the NBP 
Yes   
17(4) The scope of activities of the NBP Management Board shall 
include, in particular: 
1) [repealed], 
2) performing tasks concerning the exchange rate policies, 
3) performing periodic assessments of the circulation of 
currency, monetary clearing and foreign exchange 
operations, 
4) supervising open market operations, 
5) assessing the operation of the banking system, 
6) adopting the NBP plan of activity and financial plan, 
7) determining the commissions and banking fees to be 
charged by the NBP and 
specifying their amounts, 
8) specifying the principles applicable in NBP funds 
management, 
9) determining the organisational structure and division of 
responsibilities within the NBP, 
10) determining NBP personnel and staff compensation 
policies, 
11) adopting the annual report on the activity of the NBP, 
12) drawing up the annual financial report of the NBP, 
13) drawing up accounts of the national balance of payments, 
14) preparing and examining draft resolutions and other 
materials to be submitted to the Council 
   
Portugal 26 The organs of the Bank shall be the Governor, the Board of    
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Directors, the Board of Auditors, and the Advisory Board. 
28(1) It shall be incumbent upon the Governor: 
a) To carry out the tasks of member of the Governing 
Council and of the General Council of the ECB, pursuant to 
the provisions laid down in the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and in the ESCBECB Statute; 
b) To represent the Bank; 
c) To act on behalf of the Bank with foreign or international 
institutions; 
d) To supervise the co-ordination and dynamization of the 
activity of the Board of Directors and to call the meetings 
thereof; 
e) To preside any meeting of committees set up by the Board 
of Directors; 
f) To initial the general books, for which purpose a facsimile 
of his signature may be used; 
g) To exercise all other powers legally entrusted to him. 
Yes   
33(1) The Board of Directors shall consist of the Governor, who 
shall be the Chairman, of one or two Vice-governors, and of 
three to five Directors. 
   
34(1) The Board of Directors shall be responsible for all the acts 
required to achieve the purposes assigned to the Bank which 
do not fall within the exclusive competence of other bodies. 
Yes   
41(1) The Board of Auditors shall consist of four members, three 
of them appointed by the Finance Minister and one by the 
staff of the Bank. 
   
43(1) The Board of Auditors shall be responsible for: 
a) Monitoring the business of the Bank and the observance of 
the laws and regulations applicable thereto; 
b) Examining the periodic statements submitted by the Board 
of Directors during its term of office; 
No   
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c) Issuing its opinion on the budget, the balance sheet, and 
the annual accounts; 
d) Examining the books, vaults, and safes of the Bank 
whenever it deems convenient, subject to the appropriate 
security measures; 
e) Drawing the attention of the Governor or of the Board of 
Directors to any matter which it deems should be considered, 
and giving its opinion on any subject submitted to it by those 
bodies. 
47(1) The Advisory Board shall consist of the Governor of the 
Bank, 
who shall be the Chairman, and the following members: 
a) The Vice-governors; 
b) The former Governors; 
c) Four personalities of a recognised competence in 
economic, 
financial and business matters; 
d) The Chairman of the Portuguese Association of Banks; 
e) The Chairman of the Public Credit Management Institute; 
 f) A representative of each of the Autonomous Regions of 
the Azores and Madeira, to be appointed by the competent 
self-government bodies; 
g) The Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Bank. 
No   
48 It shall be incumbent on the Advisory Board to issue its non-
binding opinion on: 
a) The annual report of the Bank, before its release; 
b) The measures taken by Bank within the scope of its 
functions; 
c) The matters referred thereto by the Governor or by the 
Board of Directors. 
   
Romania 32(1) The National Bank of Romania is managed by a Board.    
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32(2) The executive management of the National Bank of 
Romania, within the Monetary Policy Committee and the 
Supervision Committee, shall be performed by the Governor, 
the Senior Deputy Governor and two Deputy Governors, 
under the terms stipulated in the bylaw approved by the 
Board. 
   
33(1) By law, the National Bank of Romania‘s Board decides on: 
a) the monetary and exchange rate policies, monitoring their 
implementation; 
b) the measures for authorisation, regulation and prudential 
supervision of the credit institutions and oversight of the 
authorised payment systems; 
c) the guidelines for managing the operations and the 
responsibilities incumbent on the National Bank of 
Romania‘s staff; 
d) the internal organisational structure, indemnities, salaries 
and other pecuniary rights granted to the staff; 
e) the tasks and composition of the Monetary Policy 
Committee, the Supervision Committee, the Foreign 
Reserves Management Committee and the Audit Committee 
operating within the National Bank of Romania; 
f) temporary delegation of its powers to the executive 
management, when special situations require such a solution. 
Yes   
33(2) The National Bank of Romania‘s Board is made up of nine 
members, as follows: 
a) the chairman – the Governor of the National Bank of 
Romania; 
b) the vice-chairman – the Senior Deputy Governor; 
c) seven members, of whom two are Deputy Governors and 
the other five are not the National Bank of Romania‘s 
employees. 
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35(1) The National Bank of Romania‘s Governor shall take 
measures to enforce legal provisions, the Board‘s decisions 
and other regulations concerning the National Bank of 
Romania. The Governor may delegate some of his powers to 
the Senior Deputy Governor and to the Deputy Governors, 
under the terms established by the Board. 
   
35(3) The Governor shall issue orders and decisions and shall 
represent the National Bank of Romania in its relations with 
third parties, and shall sign directly or by way of the persons 
mandated by her/him, all the treaties and conventions 
concluded. 
   
Slovakia 6(1) The Bank Board of Národná banka Slovenska (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Bank Board") is the supreme governing 
body of Národná banka Slovenska. The Bank Board shall 
determine 
a) monetary policy and instruments for its 
implementation, and shall decide on monetary policy 
measures of Národná banka Slovenska. 
b) the principles for performing and organisation of the 
performance of financial market supervision and shall decide 
in the scope and manner laid down pursuant to a separate 
regulation. 
Yes   
6(2) Furthermore, the Bank Board shall in particular: 
a) set guiding principles for the activities and operations of 
Národná banka Slovenska, 
b) approve the budget of Národná banka Slovenska (§ 38), 
approve Národná banka Slovenska‘s final accounts, annual 
reports on the result of managing Národná banka Slovenska 
and Národná banka Slovenska‘s annual reports, shall decide 
on the use of profit or covering of losses of Národná banka 
Slovenska and shall determine the types of funds of Národná 
Yes   
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banka Slovenska, their level and application, 
c) set up the organizational structure of Národná banka 
Slovenska, 
d) determine pursuant to a separate regulation
 
the amount of 
annual contributions to be paid by financial market agents 
subject to supervision  
e) decide on the issue of banknotes and coins, 
f) set the salary and other emoluments of the Governor, Vice-
Governors and other Bank Board members, 
g) decide on the performance of activities entrusted to 
Národná banka Slovenska under this Act and separate laws,
 
h) approve the rules of procedure of the Bank Board, 
i) set up coordinating and other bodies of Národná banka 
Slovenska, and organizational units of Národná banka 
Slovenska, 
j) approve generally binding legal acts adopted by Národná 
banka Slovenska pursuant to this Act or separate regulation,
,
 
k) approve draft agreements on mutual cooperation, 
collaboration and provision of information and documents 
between Národná banka Slovenska and foreign supervisory 
bodies in the area of the financial market or between Národná 
banka Slovenska and the public authorities in the Slovak 
Republic which perform supervision or oversight pursuant to 
separate regulations 
7(1) The Bank Board shall have 11 members. The members of the 
Bank Board shall be the Governor, two Vice-Governors and 
eight other members, of whom at least five shall be in an 
employment relationship with Národná banka Slovenska. For 
employment law purposes, performance of the office of a 
member of the Bank Board is the performance of a public 
office, in respect of which leave shall be granted 
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9(1) The Governor shall represent Národná banka Slovenska vis-
à-vis third parties; when he is not present, he will be 
represented by a vice-governor delegated by him, or, if none 
of the vice-governors is present, by another member of the 
Bank Board delegated by the Governor. When the 
Governor‘s office has terminated and before a new Governor 
has been appointed, the competences of the Governor of 
Národná banka Slovenska shall transfer to the Vice-Governor 
on the basis of authority delegated by the Bank Board; if no 
Vice-Governors are appointed, these competences shall 
transfer to another member of the Bank Board on the basis of 
authority delegated by the Bank Board 
   
Slovenia 28 The decision making bodies of the Bank of Slovenia are the 
Governor of the Bank of Slovenia and the Governing Board 
of the Bank of Slovenia 
   
29(1) The Governor of the Bank of Slovenia shall conduct 
operations and organise activities and represent the Bank of 
Slovenia 
Yes   
29(2) The Governor of the Bank of Slovenia shall implement the 
decisions of the Governing Board of the Bank of Slovenia 
and issue individual and general legal acts of the Bank of 
Slovenia that are not in the competence of the Governing 
Board of the Bank of Slovenia 
Yes   
29(3) The Governor of the Bank of Slovenia may issue instructions 
for the implementation of decisions of the Governing Board 
of the Bank of Slovenia 
Yes   
30(1) The Governing Board of the Bank of Slovenia is composed 
of nine members. The members of the Governing Board of 
the Bank of Slovenia are: the Governor, four vice-governors 
and four members 
   
30(2) The Governor of the Bank of Slovenia is the President of the    
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Governing Board of the Bank of Slovenia 
30(3) The Governor of the Bank of Slovenia shall empower one of 
the vice-governors to act in the capacity of a deputy 
   
31(1) The Governing Board of the Bank of Slovenia shall decide 
on all issues that on the basis of this Act or other laws fall 
within the scope of responsibility of the Bank of Slovenia 
Yes   
32(1) The Governing Board of the Bank of Slovenia shall take 
decisions also on other matters that fall within the scope of 
operations of the Bank of Slovenia, and shall:  
1. propose the external auditor,  
2. regulate rights and duties arising from employment for the 
members of the Governing Board of the Bank of Slovenia, 
3. establish whether there is an incompatibility of  office of 
the members of the Governing Board of the Bank of 
Slovenia, 
4. decide on other issues in connection with the 
administrative issues of the Bank of Slovenia 
   
Spain 17 The governing bodies of the Bank shall be: 
a. The Governor. 
b. The Deputy Governor. 
c. The Governing Council. 
d. The Executive Commission. 
   
18 The Governor of the Bank shall be empowered to: 
a. Manage the Bank and preside over the Governing Council 
and the Executive Commission. 
b. Act as legal representative of the Bank whenever 
necessary and especially in Courts of 
Justice, as well as authorising contracts and documents and 
carrying out all other activities 
necessary in the pursuit of the functions assigned to the 
Bank. 
Yes   
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c. Represent the Bank in the international institutions and 
organisations in which its 
participation may be envisaged. 
d. Sit on the Governing Council and the General Council of 
the European Central Bank. 
19 The Deputy Governor shall substitute for the Governor when 
the post becomes vacant or in the event of absence or illness, 
in performing managing or representative functions for the 
Bank. In addition, the Deputy Governor shall have the 
powers assigned to him by internal Bank rules and delegated 
to him by the Governor. 
Yes   
20(1) The Governing Council shall be composed of: 
a. The Governor. 
b. The Deputy Governor. 
c. Six elected Council members. 
d. The Director-General of the Treasury and Financial Policy. 
e. The Vice-president of the National Securities Market 
Commission. 
   
21(1) The Governing Council shall: 
a. Approve general guidelines for Bank action to fulfil its 
assigned functions. 
b. Observing the guidelines and instructions of the ECB, and 
the Governor's independence and obligation of secrecy as a 
member of the governing bodies of the ECB, it shall debate 
the issues relating to monetary policy and shall supervise the 
Bank's contribution to the implementation of the ESCB's 
monetary policy carried out by the Executive Commission. 
c. Approve, at the proposal of the Executive Commission, the 
annual report of the Bank and, as relevant, any other reports 
which the Bank must submit to Parliament, to the 
government or to the Economy and Finance Minister. 
N/A   
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d. Approve the Bank's «Circulares monetarias» and 
«Circulares». 
e. Submit to the government the separation proposals referred 
to in letter d) of number 4 of Article 25. In these decisions, 
the member of the Council to which the proposal of 
separation refers will have no vote. 
f. Approve the internal rules of the Bank at the proposal of 
the Executive Commission. 
g. Approve proposed Bank budgets and formulate its annual 
accounts and the proposal for distribution of profits. 
h. Approve guidelines on personnel policy and ratify the 
appointment of Directors-General. 
i. Impose sanctions whose adoption is the responsibility of 
the Bank. 
j. Approve proposals for sanctions which the Bank must 
submit to the Minister of Economy and Finance. 
k. Settle appeals to or claims filed against Bank resolutions 
when the authority to do so corresponds to the latter. 
l. Adopt any other necessary agreements to carry out the 
functions entrusted to the Bank under this law which are not 
the exclusive responsibility of the Executive Commission, 
with the power of delegating to the Governor, the Deputy 
Governor, or the Executive Commission the responsibilities 
or tasks that it deems appropriate. It shall determine 
explicitly in which cases subdelegation is possible 
22(1) The Executive Commission shall be made up of: 
a. The Governor, who shall act as President. 
b. The Deputy Governor. 
c. Two elected Council members. 
   
23(1) The Executive Commission shall be responsible for the 
following, subject to the guidelines of the Governing 
Yes   
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Council: 
a. To contribute to the implementation of the monetary policy 
formulated by the ESCB in accordance with the terms of 
article 21.1 b). 
b. To decide upon the administrative authorisations to be 
granted by the Bank. 
c. To organise the Bank and appoint Directors-General and 
personnel, fixing their salaries in line with internal rules and 
the general guidelines approved by the Governing Council. 
The Council will in all cases ratify appointments of 
Directors-General. 
d. Submit to the Governing Council the proposals which the 
Council is responsible for resolving or approving. 
e. Carry out the tasks expressly delegated to it by the 
Governing Council. 
f. Formulate necessary recommendations and requirements 
for credit institutions and, with regard to the latter, their 
Board of Directors and management, agree to initiate 
sanctioning procedures and intervention measures, replace 
Directors, or take any other precautionary measures set out in 
legal regulations and entrusted to the Bank. Any 
precautionary measures taken by the Executive Commission 
in the fulfilment of its responsibilities will be immediately 
reported to the Governing Council. 
g. Administer the Bank in the area of private law and manage 
its assets. 
h. Agree on any other operations or transactions which the 
Bank must perform to carry out its responsibilities, 
delegating these to the commissions or individuals that it 
deems appropriate. 
Sweden Chapter 1, Pursuant to Chapter 9, Article 13 of the Instrument of No   
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Article 3 Government, the Riksbank has a General Council of eleven 
members, appointed by the Riksdag 
Chapter 1, 
Article 4 
Pursuant to Chapter 9, Article 13 of the Instrument of 
Government, the activities of the Riksbank are managed by 
an Executive Board, consisting of six members, who are 
appointed by the General Council for a period of six years. 
The General Council appoints the Chairman of the Executive 
Board, who at the same time shall be the Governor of the 
Riksbank, and at least one Vice-Chairman, who at the same 
time shall serve as Deputy Governor of the Riksbank. When 
required, in the absence or incapacity of the Governor, the 
General Council shall determine in which order the Deputy 
Governors shall serve in his place 
Yes   
Chapter 1, 
Article 5 
Matters which are not to be decided by the General Council 
are determined by the Executive Board. The Executive Board 
may decide that matters may be determined by the Governor 
of the Riksbank or by another official at the Riksbank 
   
The United 
Kingdom 
1(2) The court shall consist of a Governor, 2 Deputy Governors 
and 16 directors of the Bank, all of whom shall be appointed 
by Her Majesty. 
   
2(1) The court of directors of the Bank shall manage the Bank‘s 
affairs, other than the formulation of monetary policy. 
   
3(1) The functions mentioned in subsection (2) shall stand 
delegated to a sub-committee of the court of directors of the 
Bank consisting of the directors of the Bank. 
   
15(1) There shall be a committee of the Bank, to be known as the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, which 
shall have responsibility within the Bank for formulating 
monetary policy. 
Yes   
16(1) The court of directors of the Bank shall keep the procedures 
followed by the Monetary Policy Committee under review 
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Table 3-1 Functional independence 
Member State Article Text 
Austria 2(2) The Oesterreichische Nationalbank shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of the Treaty, the Protocol on the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and the European Central 
Bank, the directly applicable Community legislation adopted 
there under, and this federal act, be obliged to work towards 
the achievement of the objectives and fulfillment of the tasks 
of the ESCB Within the framework of Community law, in 
particular Articles 2 and 105 of the Treaty, the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank shall use all the means at its 
disposal to maintain the objective of price stability. To the 
extent that this does not interfere with the objective of price 
stability, the needs of the national economy with regard to 
economic growth and employment trends shall be taken into 
account and the general economic policies in the Community 
shall be supported. 
Belgium 12  
(Articles of 
Association) 
The Bank shall participate in achieving the objectives of the 
ESCB which shall be : 
- primarily, to maintain price stability; 
- without prejudice to the objective of price stability to support 
the general economic policies in the European Community 
with a view to contributing to the achievement of the 
objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the Bank shall act in 
accordance with the principles laid down in Article 3A of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community. 
Bulgaria 2(1) The primary objective of the Bulgarian National Bank shall be 
to maintain price stability through ensuring the stability of the 
national currency and implementing monetary policy as 
provided for by this Law. 
2(2) The Bulgarian National Bank shall act in accordance with the 
principle of the open market economy with free competition, 
favouring an efficient allocation of resources. 
From the date of accession of the Republic of Bulgaria to the 
European Union and without prejudice to the primary objective 
of price stability, the Bulgarian National Bank shall support the 
general economic policies in the European Community with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the 
European Community as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. 
2(3) Without prejudice to the objectives under paras. 1 and 2, the 
Bulgarian National Bank shall support the policy of sustainable 
and non-inflationary growth. 
Cyprus 5(1) The primary objective of the Bank shall be to ensure price 
stability. 
5(2) Without prejudice to this primary objective and subject to the 
fulfilment of its obligations under Article 105 paragraph (1) of 
the Treaty, the Bank shall support the general economic policy 
of the State. 
5A(1) The Bank is an integral part of the European System of Central 
Banks and shall act, within the fields of competence of the 
System, in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of 
the European Central Bank. 
5A(2) The Bank shall contribute, as an integral part of the European 
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System of Central Banks, to the performance of the tasks and 
the exercise of the competences entrusted to or conferred upon 
the latter in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty or of 
the Statute. 
The Czech 
Republic 
2(1) The primary objective of the Czech National Bank shall be to 
maintain price stability. Without prejudice to its primary 
objective, the Czech National Bank shall support the general 
economic policies of the Government leading to sustainable 
economic growth. The Czech National Bank shall act in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy. 
Article 1, 
Section II of 
Act No. 
442/2000 
Coll. 
a) the Czech National Bank shall, without prejudice to its 
primary objective, support the general economic policies in the 
European Community with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the European Community; 
Article 1, 
Section II of 
Act No. 
442/2000 
Coll. 
(b) the Czech National Bank shall be a part of the European 
System of Central Banks in accordance with the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and in accordance with 
the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter referred 
to as the ―Statute‖) and shall observe the provisions of the 
Statute to the extent of the requirements for Member States of 
the European Union that have not yet introduced the euro as 
their national currency. In performing the tasks ensuing from 
this position, the Czech National Bank shall act in accordance 
with the legal acts of the European Central Bank; 
Denmark 1 "Danmarks Nationalbank" (The National Bank of Denmark) 
which, at the coming into force of this Act, confer § 33, takes 
over the "Nationalbanken i Kjøbenhavn" (The National Bank 
in Copenhagen) shall as the Central Bank of this country have 
the object in conformity with this Act and the regulations given 
under this Act to maintain a safe and secure currency system in 
this country, and to facilitate and regulate the traffic in money 
and the extension of credit. 
Estonia 2(1) The primary objective of Eesti Pank is to ensure price stability. 
Eesti Pank shall regulate currency circulation both in Estonia 
and with other countries and seek to uphold the stability of the 
national currency 
New 2(1) The primary objective of Eesti Pank is to maintain price 
stability. Eesti Pank also supports the achievement of other 
economic policy objectives in accordance with the Treaty 
establishing the European Community. 
4(4) Eesti Pank shall, within the limits of its authority, support the 
economic policy of the Government of the Republic provided 
that this policy is not in conflict with the objectives and 
functions of Eesti Pank provided by § 2 of this Act and does 
not prevent Eesti Pank from performing them 
Finland 2(1) In accordance with the Treaty, the primary objective of the 
Bank of Finland shall be to maintain price stability. 
2(2) Without prejudice to the objective laid down in paragraph 1, 
the Bank of Finland shall also support the achievement of other 
economic policy objectives in accordance with the Treaty. 
France L 141-1 The Banque de France shall be an integral part of the European 
System of Central Banks, instituted by Article 8 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, and shall participate in 
carrying out the tasks, and complying with the objectives, 
assigned to the European System of Central Banks by the 
Treaty. 
Within this framework, and without prejudice to the primary 
objective of price stability, the Banque de France shall support 
 290 
 
the Government‘s general economic policy. 
In performing the tasks arising from its participation in the 
European System of Central Banks, the Banque de France, as 
represented by its Governor or its Deputy Governors, shall 
neither seek nor accept instructions from the Government or 
any other person or body 
Germany 3 The Deutsche Bundesbank, being the central bank of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, is an integral part of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). It shall participate 
in the performance of the ESCB's tasks with the primary 
objective of maintaining price stability, shall hold and manage 
the foreign reserves of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall 
arrange for the execution of domestic and crossborder 
payments and shall contribute to the stability of payment and 
clearing systems. In addition, it shall fulfil the tasks assigned to 
it under this Act or other legislation. 
12 In exercising the powers conferred on it by this Act, the 
Deutsche Bundesbank shall be independent of and not subject 
to instructions from the Federal Government. As far as is 
possible without prejudice to its tasks as part of the European 
System of Central Banks, it shall support the general economic 
policy of the Federal Government. 
Greece 4(1) The primary objective of the Bank of Greece shall be to ensure 
price stability. 
4(2) Without prejudice to this primary objective, the Bank shall 
support the general economic policy of the government. 
4(3) As from the adoption of the single European currency (euro) as 
the national currency of Greece, the Bank of Greece, as an 
integral part of the ESCB and in accordance with the terms set 
out in Article 105 paragraph 1 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community shall pursue the primary objective of 
maintaining price stability. 
Hungary 3(1) The primary objective of the MNB shall be to achieve and 
maintain price stability. 
3(2) Without prejudice to its primary objective, the MNB shall 
support the economic policy of the Government, using the 
monetary policy instruments at its disposal. 
Ireland 6A(1) In discharging its functions and exercising its powers as part of 
the European System of Central Banks, the primary objective 
of the Bank is to maintain price stability. 
Italy 1(3) As the central bank of the Italian Republic, the Bank of Italy is 
an integral part of the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB). It shall perform the tasks and functions entrusted to it 
in that capacity in compliance with the statute of the ESCB. It 
shall pursue the objectives assigned to the ESCB under Article 
105(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(Treaty). 
Latvia 3 The main objective of the Bank of Latvia shall be to maintain 
price stability in the country. 
Lithuania 7(1) The primary objective of the Bank of Lithuania shall be to 
maintain price stability. 
7(2) The Bank of Lithuania shall, within the range of its 
competence, support the economic policy carried out by the 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania, without prejudice to 
the primary objective of the Bank of Lithuania. 
New 7(1) In accordance with the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, the primary objective of the Bank of Lithuania 
shall be to maintain price stability. 
New 7(2) Without prejudice to its primary objective, the Bank of 
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Lithuania shall, within the range of its competence, support the 
general economic policies in the European Community with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the 
European Community established in the Treaty establishing 
the European Community, and support the economic policy 
carried out by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, 
without prejudice to the primary objective of the Bank of 
Lithuania and to the extent this meets the objectives of the 
European Central Bank and of the European System of Central 
Banks. 
Luxembourg 2(2) The main task of the Central Bank shall be to participate in the 
execution of the tasks of the ESCB with a view to achieving its 
objectives. 
2(3) Subject to their compatibility with its main task and in 
accordance with the Treaty establishing the European 
Community and with the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, 
the Central Bank shall perform such duties falling outside the 
functions of the ESCB as are assigned to it by this law or by 
other legislative, regulatory or conventional texts. 
Malta 4 In accordance with the Treaty and the Statute, the primary 
objective of the Bank shall be to maintain price stability. 
Without prejudice to its primary objective, the Bank shall 
support the general economic policies in the Community with 
a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the Community as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty and 
shall act in accordance with the principles set out in Article 4 
of the Treaty. 
The Netherlands 2(1) In implementation of the Treaty, the Bank‘s objective shall be 
to maintain price stability. 
2(2) In implementation of the Treaty, the Bank shall, without 
prejudice to the objective of price stability, support the general 
economic policies in the European Community with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the 
Community as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty. 
Poland 3(1) The basic objective of the activity of the NBP shall be to 
maintain price stability, while supporting the economic 
policies of the Government, insofar as this does not constrain 
the pursuit of the basic objective of the NBP. 
Portugal 3(1) The Bank, as the central bank of the Portuguese Republic, shall 
be an integral part of the European System of Central Banks, 
hereinafter called ―ESCB‖. 
3(2) The Bank shall pursue the objectives and shall participate in 
the performance of the tasks entrusted to the ESCB and shall 
be subject to the provisions of the Statute of the ESCB and of 
the European Central Bank, hereinafter called ―ESCB/ECB 
Statute‖, acting in accordance with the guidelines and 
instructions of the European Central Bank, hereinafter called 
―ECB‖, pursuant to the same Statute. 
Romania 2(1) The primary objective of Banca Naţională a României shall be 
to ensure and maintain price stability. 
2(3) Without prejudice to its primary objective of ensuring and 
maintaining price stability, Banca Naţională a României shall 
support the State‘s general economic policy. 
Slovakia 2(1) The primary objective of the National Bank of Slovakia shall 
be to maintain price stability. To this end, the National Bank of 
Slovakia shall: 
a) participate in the common monetary policy which the 
European Central Bank determines for the euro area 
(hereinafter the "common European monetary policy"); 
b) issue euro banknotes and euro coins in accordance with the 
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separate legal provisions applicable in the euro area to the 
issuance of euro banknotes and coins; 
c) support the smooth functioning of payment systems and 
settlement systems, control, coordinate and ensure the 
circulation of money, payments and settlement between banks 
within the scope established by this Law and a separate law, 
and ensure the efficient and economic performance of these 
operations;  
d) maintain foreign reserve assets, use these reserve assets, and 
conduct foreign exchange operations; as of the euro 
introduction date, it shall, in conducting operations within the 
Eurosystem, proceed in accordance with the separate legal 
provisions applicable to Eurosystem operations, 
e) perform other activities pursuant to this Law and separate 
laws. 
2(2) With a view to accomplishing its primary objective pursuant to 
paragraph 1, the National Bank of Slovakia shall also perform 
authority, activities, tasks, rights and obligations arising from 
its participation and objectives in the European System of 
Central Banks, where the National Bank of Slovakia, as a 
member of the European System of Central Banks, shall 
proceed in accordance with the rules governing the European 
System of Central Banks, and as a member of the Eurosystem 
as of the euro introduction date shall also proceed in 
accordance with the rules applicable solely to the Eurosystem. 
2(3) In the area of the financial market, the National Bank of 
Slovakia shall contribute to the stability of the financial system 
as a whole, as well as to the secure and sound functioning of 
the financial market for the sake of maintaining its credibility, 
client protection and out of respect for the rules of economic 
competition; whereby the National Bank of Slovakia shall 
perform  
a) financial market supervision pursuant to this Law and 
separate legal provisions; 
b) other activities in the area of the financial market pursuant 
to this Law and separate legal provisions 
Slovenia 4(1) The primary objective of Banka Slovenije shall be to maintain 
price stability. 
4(2) Without prejudice to the objective of ensuring price stability, 
Banka Slovenije shall support general economic policy in 
accordance with the objectives set in the Treaty establishing 
the European Community (Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Slovenia – International Treaties, No. 7/04). 
4(3) In pursuing the primary objective specified in the first 
paragraph of this Article and the objective specified in the 
second paragraph of this Article, Banka Slovenije shall strive 
for financial stability, while taking into account the principles 
of an open market economy and free competition. 
Spain 7(2) Without prejudice to its main objective of maintaining price 
stability and fulfilling its duties as a member of the ESCB in 
accordance with the terms of article 105.1 of the Treaty, the 
Bank shall support the general economic policy of the 
government. 
Sweden Chapter 1, 
Article 2(2) 
The objective of the Riksbank's activities shall be to maintain 
price stability. 
The United 
Kingdom 
11 In relation to monetary policy, the objectives of the Bank of 
England shall be – 
(a) to maintain price stability, and 
(b) subject to that, to support the economic policy of Her 
Majesty‘s Government, including its objectives for growth and 
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employment. 
12(1) The Treasury may by notice in writing to the Bank specify for 
the purposes of section 11 – 
(a) what price stability is to be taken to consist of, or 
(b) what the economic policy of Her Majesty‘s Government is 
to be taken to be. 
12(2) The Treasury shall specify under subsection (1) both of the 
matters mentioned there – 
(a) before the end of the period of 7 days beginning with the 
day on which this Act comes into force, and 
(b) at least once in every period of 12 months beginning on the 
anniversary of the day on which this Act comes into force. 
12(3) Where the Treasury give notice under this section they shall – 
(a) publish the notice in such manner as they think fit, and 
(b) lay a copy of it before Parliament. 
 
Table 3-2 Prohibition on giving instructions 
Member State Article Text 
Austria 2(5) In pursuing the objectives and performing the tasks set out in 
paragraphs 2 to 4, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank shall act in 
accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB 
pursuant to Article 14.3 of the ESCB/ECB Statute; in doing so, 
neither the Oesterreichische Nationalbank nor any member of its 
decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from 
Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a 
Member State of the European Community, or from any other 
body. 
Belgium 15 Articles 
of 
Association 
When carrying out the tasks and duties referred to in this section, 
neither the Bank nor any members of its decision-making bodies 
shall seek or take instructions from institutions or bodies of the 
European Community, from any government of a Member State 
of the Community or from any other body. 
22 1. Except as regards the tasks and transactions within the domain 
of the ESCB, the Minister of Finance, through his representative, 
shall have the right to supervise the Bank's transactions and to 
oppose the implementation of any measure which is contrary to 
the law, the Statutes or the interests of the State.  
2. The representative of the Minister of Finance shall, ex officio, 
attend the meetings of the Council of Regency and the Board of 
Censors. Except as regards the functions and transactions within 
the domain of the ESCB, he shall supervise the Bank's 
transactions and suspend and bring to the attention of the 
Minister of Finance any decision which is contrary to the law, 
the Statutes or the interests of the State.  
If the Minister of Finance has not given a decision within eight 
days on the suspension, the decision may be implemented. 
Bulgaria 44 When exercising their powers and carrying out their duties under 
this Law, the BNB, the Governor and the members of the 
Governing Council shall be independent, and neither the BNB, 
nor the Governor, nor the members of the Governing Council 
shall seek or take instructions from the Council of Ministers or 
from any other body or institution. The Council of Ministers and 
other bodies and institutions shall not give instructions to the 
BNB, the Governor or the members of the Governing Council. 
Cyprus 7 When carrying out the tasks conferred upon them under this 
Law, neither the Bank nor any member of its decision-making 
bodies shall seek or take instructions from the Community 
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institutions or bodies, from the Government or any government 
of a Member State or from any other body. 
The Czech 
Republic 
3(1) The Czech National Bank shall submit a report on monetary 
development to the Chamber of Deputies of Parliament at least 
twice a year for review. If the Chamber of Deputies so resolves, 
the Czech National Bank shall submit an extraordinary report on 
monetary development within thirty days. The resolution of the 
Chamber of Deputies must state what the extraordinary report 
should contain. 
3(2) The report on monetary development shall be submitted to the 
Chamber of Deputies by the Governor of the Czech National 
Bank, who in such an event shall be entitled to attend the session 
of the Chamber of Deputies and must be called upon to speak. 
3(4) If the Chamber of Deputies asks for a revised report, the Czech 
National Bank shall within six weeks submit a revised report 
that complies with the requirements of the Chamber of Deputies. 
9(1) When providing for the primary objective of the Czech National 
Bank and when carrying out other activities, neither the Czech 
National Bank nor the Bank Board shall seek or take instructions 
from the President of the Republic, from Parliament, from the 
Government, from administrative authorities or from any other 
body. 
47(3) Within three months of the end of the calendar year, the Czech 
National Bank shall submit its annual financial report to the 
Chamber of Deputies for review. This report shall include 
information on the salaries of the members of the Bank Board of 
the Czech National Bank. 
47(5) If the Chamber of Deputies rejects the financial report of the 
Czech National Bank, the Czech National Bank shall within six 
weeks submit a revised report that complies with the 
requirements of the Chamber of Deputies. 
Denmark N/A  
Estonia 3(1)  Eesti Pank operates independently of other state agencies. Eesti 
Pank shall report on its activities to the Riigikogu and it is not 
subordinated to the Government of the Republic or any other 
executive state agency or any third person 
3(1
1
) As part of the European System of Central Banks, Eesti Pank 
and members of its directing bodies may apply for and receive 
instructions to be carried out only from the European Central 
Bank. 
10(3) The Governor and Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank shall be 
independent in the performance of their functions. They shall not 
hold any office, be in service or be party to any activities which, 
by their nature, restrict or may restrict the autonomy of Eesti 
Pank or adversely affect or may adversely affect Eesti Pank in 
the achievement of its objectives or the performance of its 
functions. 
Finland 4(1)  In performing tasks of the European System of Central Banks, 
neither the Bank of Finland nor members of its governing bodies 
shall seek or take instructions concerning such tasks from 
entities other than the European Central Bank. 
15(2)  The independence and the powers of the Governor of the Bank 
of Finland in respect to the performance of his duties in the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank are laid down 
in the Treaty and the Statute. 
France L 141-1 The Banque de France shall be an integral part of the European 
System of Central Banks, instituted by Article 8 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, and shall participate in 
carrying out the tasks, and complying with the objectives, 
assigned to the European System of Central Banks by the Treaty. 
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Within this framework, and without prejudice to the primary 
objective of price stability, the Banque de France shall support 
the Government‘s general economic policy. 
 
In performing the tasks arising from its participation in the 
European System of Central Banks, the Banque de France, as 
represented by its Governor or its Deputy Governors, shall 
neither seek nor accept instructions from the Government or any 
other person or body. 
Germany 12 In exercising the powers conferred on it by this Act, the 
Deutsche Bundesbank shall be independent of and not subject to 
instructions from the Federal Government. As far as is possible 
without prejudice to its tasks as part of the European System of 
Central Banks, it shall support the general economic policy of 
the Federal Government. 
Greece 5A When carrying out the tasks conferred upon them, neither the 
Bank of Greece nor any member of its decision-making bodies 
shall seek or take instructions from the government or any 
organisation. Neither the government nor any other political 
authority shall seek to influence the decision-making organs of 
the Bank in the performance of their duties. 
Hungary 1(2) The MNB and the members of its decision-making bodies shall 
be independent in carrying out the tasks and meeting their 
obligations conferred upon them by this Act, and shall neither 
seek nor take instructions from the Government, the institutions 
and bodies of the European Union, the governments of its 
Member States and any other bodies, except from the European 
Central Bank 
38 The Government may not instruct the MNB in relation to its 
scope of tasks as set forth in this Act. 
Ireland 5A(4) 
 
The Bank is required to perform its functions and exercise its 
powers in a manner consistent with the Rome Treaty and the 
ESCB Statute. 
19A(2) The Governor has sole responsibility for the performance of the 
functions imposed, and the exercise of powers conferred, on the 
Bank by or under the Rome Treaty or the ESCB Statute 
Italy 1(2) In performing their functions, the Bank of Italy and the members 
of its decision-making bodies shall act autonomously and 
independently in observance of the principle of transparency and 
may not seek or accept instructions from other public or private-
sector entities. 
Latvia 13(1) In fulfilling its tasks and performing supervision in accordance 
with the Republic of Latvia Law "On Credit Institutions" and 
this Law, the Bank of Latvia shall neither seek nor take 
instructions from the Government or any other institution and 
shall not be subject to the decisions and regulations adopted by 
the Government or any other institution. 
13(2) The Bank of Latvia shall be independent in the adoption of its 
decisions and in their practical implementation. 
Lithuania 3(2) When implementing the objectives and performing its functions 
as well as pursuing the activities necessary for that, neither the 
Bank of Lithuania, nor the Chairperson of the Board of the Bank 
of Lithuania, the Deputy Chairpersons, the Board members nor 
other members of the staff of the Bank of Lithuania (hereinafter 
referred to as the ―Bank of Lithuania staff‖) must seek and take 
instructions from the institutions and bodies of the European 
Union, the governments of the Member States of the European 
Union or any other institutions or bodies. The Government of the 
Republic of Lithuania and State institutions must respect the 
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independence of the Bank of Lithuania and must not seek to 
influence the Bank of Lithuania and its staff in discharge of their 
duties. 
Luxembourg 5(2) In the exercise of the powers and in the fulfilment of the tasks 
and duties entrusted to them within the domain of the ESCB, 
neither the Central Bank nor any member of its bodies may seek 
or accept instructions from institutions or bodies of the European 
Community, governments of Member States or any other body 
Malta 5(2) In accordance with the Treaty and the Statute, neither the Bank 
nor any member of the Board or any official of the Bank, when 
exercising any function, duty or power under this Act, shall seek 
or take instructions from the Government or any other body. 
The Netherlands 3.3  In implementation of the Treaty, the Bank may, in carrying out 
its tasks and duties under subsections (1) and (2), seek and take 
instructions exclusively from the ECB 
Poland 11(3) The President of the NBP shall represent the interests of the 
Republic of Poland within international banking institutions, 
and, unless the Council of Ministers decides otherwise, within 
international financial institutions. 
12(1) The Monetary Policy Council shall determine the annual 
monetary policy guidelines and submit these to the Sejm, for the 
information thereof, together with the submission by the Council 
of Ministers of the draft Budget. The Council shall present a 
report to the Sejm on the performance of monetary policy 
guidelines within five months of the end of the budget year 
21  In performing its tasks, the NBP shall collaborate with the 
competent State bodies in developing and implementing national 
economic policy, in so doing striving to ensure the proper 
performance of monetary policy guidelines, and in particular 
shall: 
1) submit the monetary policy guidelines as well as reports on 
the performance of monetary policy and on the situation within 
the banking system to State bodies, 
(…) 
23(1) Acting on behalf of the Council, the President of the NBP shall: 
1) submit to the Sejm and Council of Ministers: 
a) quarterly reports on the balance of payments, 
b) annual survey of the international investment position, 
2) forward to the Council of Ministers and Minister of Finance 
draft monetary policy guidelines, opinions on the draft law on 
budget, balance of payments forecasts and the rulings of the 
Council, 
3) draw up periodic reports on transfers of (payments from) 
profit. 
Portugal 27(2) The Governor and the other members of the Board of Directors 
shall be independent in accordance with the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the Central Bank 
(ESCB/ECB) and shall not seek or take instructions from 
Community institutions, the State sovereign bodies or any other 
institutions. 
Romania 3(1) When carrying out their tasks, Banca Naţională a României and 
the members of its decision-making bodies shall not seek or take 
instructions from public authorities or from any other institution 
or authority. 
Slovakia 7(7) In connection with the performance of their functions or with 
activities of the National Bank of Slovakia, members of the 
Bank Board may not seek or take instructions from state 
authorities, self-government bodies, any other public bodies, or 
any legal persons or natural persons; state authorities, self-
government bodies, any other public bodies, or any legal persons 
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or natural persons may not influence the National Bank of 
Slovakia or members of the Bank Board in connection with the 
performance of their function and the operations of the National 
Bank of Slovakia. The Bank Board shall not exercise influence 
over the Governor, and the Governor of the National Bank of 
Slovakia may not seek or take instructions from the Bank Board 
in connection with the performance of his function in bodies of 
the European System of Central Banks and the European Central 
Bank; the same shall apply to a person acting for the Governor 
of the National Bank of Slovakia in these bodies. 
12(1) The National Bank of Slovakia shall fulfil its tasks 
independently of instructions from state authorities, self-
government bodies, any other public bodies and from legal 
persons and natural persons. 
Slovenia 2 Banka Slovenije and members of its decision-making bodies 
shall be independent, and in performing the tasks pursuant to this 
Act shall not be bound by any decisions, positions or instructions 
issued by the State or any other authorities, nor shall they seek 
any instructions or guidelines from them. 
26 (1) Notwithstanding other laws, Banka Slovenije shall report on 
its work exclusively to the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Slovenia. Banka Slovenije shall report on its work at least bi-
annually. 
(2) Notwithstanding the previous paragraph Banka Slovenije 
shall also report to the decision-making bodies of the European 
System of Central Banks to the extent defined by Article 14.3 of 
the ESCB and ECB Statute. 
54(2) Banka Slovenije shall act in accordance with the instructions and 
guidelines of the European Central Bank and implement the 
decisions of the European System of Central Banks‘ decision-
making bodies in accordance with its status under the ESCB and 
ECB Statute. 
Spain 7(4) Without prejudice to the terms of article 1.3, in carrying out the 
functions envisaged in point three of this article, specified in 
sections 1, 2 and 4 of chapter II, but in these latter cases only 
when it addresses matters resulting from the functions of the 
ESCB, neither the government nor any other national or 
Community body shall give instructions to the Bank, and nor 
may the latter request or accept them. 
Sweden Chapter 3  
Article 2 
Members of the Executive Board may neither seek nor take 
instructions when fulfilling their monetary policy duties.  
The United 
Kingdom 
19(1) The Treasury, after consultation with the Governor of the Bank, 
may by order give the Bank directions with respect to monetary 
policy if they are satisfied that the directions are required in the 
public interest and by extreme economic circumstances. 
 
Table 3-3 Prohibition on approving, suspending, annulling or deferring decisions 
Member State Article Text 
Austria N/A  
Belgium 22(1); 
41 Articles of 
Association 
Except as regards the tasks and transactions within the domain 
of the ESCB, the Minister of Finance, through his 
representative, shall have the right to supervise the Bank's 
transactions and to oppose the implementation of any measure 
which is contrary to the law, the Statutes or the interests of the 
State. 
22(2); 
41 Articles of 
The representative of the Minister of Finance shall, ex officio, 
attend the meetings of the Council of Regency and the Board 
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Association of Censors. Except as regards the functions and transactions 
within the domain of the ESCB, he shall supervise the Bank's 
transactions and suspend and bring to the attention of the 
Minister of Finance any decision which is contrary to the law, 
the Statutes or the interests of the State.  
If the Minister of Finance has not given a decision within eight 
days on the suspension, the decision may be implemented.  
22(3) 
41 Articles of 
Association 
The salary of the representative of the Minister of Finance 
shall be fixed by the Minister of Finance in consultation with 
the management of the Bank and shall be borne by the latter. 
The representative of the Minister shall report to the Minister 
of Finance each year on the performance of his task 
Bulgaria N/A  
Cyprus N/A  
The Czech 
Republic 
3(4) If the Chamber of Deputies asks for a revised report [on 
monetary development], the Czech National Bank shall within 
six weeks submit a revised report that complies with the 
requirements of the Chamber of Deputies. 
47(5) If the Chamber of Deputies rejects the financial report of the 
Czech National Bank, the Czech National Bank shall within 
six weeks submit a revised report that complies with the 
requirements of the Chamber of Deputies. 
Denmark N/A  
Estonia 3(1) Eesti Pank operates independently of other state agencies. 
Eesti Pank shall report on its activities to the Riigikogu and it 
is not subordinated to the Government of the Republic or any 
other executive state agency or any third person. 
11(3)  If the Governor of Eesti Pank does not agree with a decision of 
the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, he or she shall report to 
the President of the Riigikogu not later than within three 
working days and make a proposal to submit an interpellation 
in the matter to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank. 
Finland N/A  
France Article 
L.142-3, II 
(4-5) 
An observer, or their alternate, appointed by the Minister for 
Economic Affairs, shall attend the meetings of the General 
Council and may submit draft resolutions for the General 
Council‘s consideration. 
Decisions adopted by the General Council shall be final, unless 
an objection is lodged by the observer or the observer‘s 
alternate. 
Germany N/A  
Greece 47(1) The Minister of Finance may nominate a Government 
Commissioner who shall have the right to attend all General 
Meetings of Shareholders and meetings of the General 
Council, but would not have the right to vote. The 
remuneration of the Government Commissioner shall be paid 
by the State. 
47(2) The Commissioner shall have the right to protest against any 
decision of either the General Meeting of Shareholders or the 
General Council, which he considers in conflict to this Statute 
or other laws of the State. Any such protest, if adopted by the 
Minister of Finance within two days, shall have the force of a 
suspensive veto until the question in dispute has been resolved 
by a Committee consisting of three persons, to be named 
within seven days on a request to that effect being made either 
by the Bank or the Government Commissioner; the Committee 
should report within seven days from nomination. The 
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Committee shall consist of one representative of the 
Government, one representative of the General Council, and a 
Chairman, to be elected upon a mutual agreement of the 
Government and the Bank. Failing an agreement, Chairman 
shall be the President of the Supreme Court. 
49 Any other question in dispute between the Government and the 
Bank, other than those leading to a suspensive veto of the 
Government Commissioner, shall also be settled by arbitration 
in the same manner as is laid down in Article 47. 
Hungary N/A  
Ireland N/A  
Italy N/A  
Latvia N/A  
Lithuania N/A  
Luxembourg N/A  
Malta N/A  
The Netherlands N/A  
Poland N/A  
Portugal N/A  
Romania N/A  
Slovakia N/A  
Slovenia N/A  
Spain N/A  
Sweden Sveriges 
Riksbank 
Act, Chapter 
1 Art. 1. 
The Riksbank (the Swedish Central Bank), which pursuant to 
Chapter 9, Article 13 of the Instrument of Government is the 
country's central bank and a public authority under the Riksdag 
(the Swedish Parliament), may only conduct, or participate in, 
such activities for which it has been authorised by Swedish 
law. 
The 
Instrument of 
Government, 
Chapter 9,  
Art. 13 
The Riksbank is the central bank of Sweden and is an authority 
under the Riksdag. The Riksbank is responsible for monetary 
policy. No authority may determine the decisions made by the 
Riksbank on issues relating to monetary policy. […] 
The United 
Kingdom 
N/A  
 
Table 3-4 Prohibition on censoring decisions on legal grounds 
Member State Article Text 
Austria N/A  
Belgium 22(1); 
41(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
Except as regards the tasks and transactions within the domain of 
the ESCB, the Minister of Finance, through his representative, 
shall have the right to supervise the Bank's transactions and to 
oppose the implementation of any measure which is contrary to 
the law, the Statutes or the interests of the State. 
Bulgaria N/A  
Cyprus N/A  
The Czech 
Republic 
N/A  
Denmark N/A  
Estonia N/A  
Finland N/A  
France N/A  
Germany N/A  
Greece N/A  
Hungary 60(4) The Minister responsible for justice affairs need not be consulted 
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in the case of a decree of the Governor of the MNB. 
Ireland N/A  
Italy N/A  
Latvia N/A  
Lithuania N/A  
Luxembourg N/A  
Malta N/A  
The Netherlands N/A  
Poland N/A  
Portugal N/A  
Romania N/A  
Slovakia N/A  
Slovenia N/A  
Spain N/A  
Sweden N/A  
The United 
Kingdom 
N/A  
 
Table 3-5 Prohibition on participation in decision-making bodies of an NCB with 
a right to vote 
Member State Article Text 
Austria 40 The Federal Minister of Finance shall appoint a State 
Commissioner and a Deputy State Commissioner, who shall 
be entitled to participate in an advisory capacity in the 
General Meetings and the meetings of the General Council. 
The State Commissioner and his deputy shall receive no 
remuneration for their services. 
Belgium 22(2) 
Statute 
41(2) 
22(3) 
Statute 
41(3) 
The representative of the Minister of Finance shall, ex 
officio, attend the meetings of the Council of Regency and 
the Board of Censors. Except as regards the functions and 
transactions within the domain of the ESCB, he shall 
supervise the Bank's transactions and suspend and bring to 
the attention of the Minister of Finance any decision which is 
contrary to the law, the Statutes or the interests of the State.  
If the Minister of Finance has not given a decision within 
eight days on the suspension, the decision may be 
implemented. The salary of the representative of the Minister 
of Finance shall be fixed by the Minister of Finance in 
consultation with the management of the Bank and shall be 
borne by the latter. 
The representative of the Minister shall report to the Minister 
of Finance each year on the performance of his task.  
Bulgaria N/A  
Cyprus N/A  
The Czech 
Republic 
11(1) The Minister of Finance or another nominated member of the 
Government may attend the meetings of the Bank Board in 
an advisory capacity and may submit motions for discussion.  
Denmark 7 The Minister of Economic Affairs in his capacity of Royal 
Bank- Commissioner shall supervise that the Bank fulfils its 
obligations under this present Act and under the ordinances 
and provisions given pursuant to this present Act. 
The Minister of Economic Affairs presides at the meetings of 
the Board of Directors. He shall have admission to the 
meetings of the Committee of Directors and to be supplied 
with information concerning the Bank to the extent he might 
desire. 
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Decisions of particularly far-reaching character cannot be 
taken at a meeting of the Committee of Directors when the 
Minister of Economic Affairs is not present, unless he has 
been informed in advance that the case will be dealt with at 
the meeting. 
6 By Laws The Committee of Directors shall meet once every month 
unless other decision be made, and otherwise as often as the 
Chairman deems it necessary, or when the Royal Bank-
Commissioner or 3 members demand it. The Committee of 
Directors forms a quorum when 4 members are present. 
When none of the members mentioned in § 1 b) is present, 
no decision can be made without the consent of the Royal 
Bank-Commissioner. 
Decisions shall be taken by a majority of votes; in the case 
of an equality of votes the Chairman shall have the casting 
vote. 
The Royal Bank-Commissioner shall have admission to the 
meetings of the Committee of Directors. 
Decisions of particularly far-reaching character cannot be 
taken at a meeting of the Committee of Directors when the 
Royal Bank-Commissioner is not present, unless he has been 
informed in advance that the case will be dealt with at the 
meeting. 
25 By-
laws 
The Board of Governors shall fix the rate of discount and the 
rate of interest for advances. 
When the Board of Governors wishes to alter the rate of 
discount (the Bank Rate) it shall notify the Royal Bank-
Commissioner and the [Minister of Finance?] to that effect. 
The Royal Bank-Commissioner and the [Minister of 
Finance?] shall be entitled personally or by deputy to take 
part in the negotiations, but they shall have no right of 
voting. When a decision has been taken the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors and of the Committee of Directors shall 
immediately be notified. 
Estonia 9(5)  Meetings of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall be 
closed unless otherwise decided by the Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. The Minister of Finance, 
the Governor and Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank 
participate in the meetings with the right to speak 
Finland 12(2) The members of the Board shall have the right to be present 
and to be heard at meetings of the Parliamentary Supervisory 
Council. 
France Article 
L.142-2 (1-
2) 
The General Council shall administer the Banque de France. 
It shall consider matters relating to the management of the 
Banque de France‘s activities other than those which are tasks of 
the European System of Central Banks. 
Article 
L.142-3, II 
(4-5) 
An observer, or their alternate, appointed by the Minister for 
Economic Affairs, shall attend the meetings of the General 
Council and may submit draft resolutions for the General 
Council‘s consideration. 
Decisions adopted by the General Council shall be final, unless 
an objection is lodged by the observer or the observer‘s 
alternate. 
Germany N/A  
Greece 47(1) The Minister of Finance may nominate a Government 
Commissioner who shall have the right to attend all General 
Meetings of Shareholders and meetings of the General Council, 
but would not have the right to vote. The remuneration of the 
Government Commissioner shall be paid by the State. 
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47(2) The Commissioner shall have the right to protest against any 
decision of either the General Meeting of Shareholders or the 
General Council, which he considers in conflict to this 
Statute or other laws of the State. Any such protest, if 
adopted by the Minister of Finance within two days, shall 
have the force of a suspensive veto until the question in 
dispute has been resolved by a Committee consisting of three 
persons, to be named within seven days on a request to that 
effect being made either by the Bank or the Government 
Commissioner; the Committee should report within seven 
days from nomination. The Committee shall consist of one 
representative of the Government, one representative of the 
General Council, and a Chairman, to be elected upon a 
mutual agreement of the Government and the Bank. Failing 
an agreement, Chairman shall be the President of the 
Supreme Court. 
Hungary 39(1) The agenda of the meetings of the Monetary Council (Article 
49) shall be submitted to the Government.  
39(2) The Government shall be represented without voting rights 
by the Minister or a person duly authorised by the Minister 
at the meetings of the Monetary Council. 
Ireland N/A  
Italy N/A  
Latvia N/A  
Lithuania N/A  
Luxembourg 9(5) The Minister responsible for relations with the Central Bank 
or his representative shall be invited to attend Council 
meetings. He may participate without having the right to 
vote. 
Malta N/A  
The Netherlands 14(1) On behalf of Our Minister, the person appointed to the 
Supervisory Board pursuant to the provisions of section 
13(2) may, at the request of Our Minister or on his own 
initiative, and with due observance of Article 1071 of the 
Treaty, obtain from the Governing Board of the Bank data 
and information about the manner in which the Bank 
performs its tasks. At the request of Our Minister or on his 
own initiative, and with due observance of Article 1071 of 
the Treaty, he may communicate his findings to Our 
Minister. 
14(2) The Governing Board of the Bank shall be obliged at all 
times to provide the person referred to in subsection (1) at 
his request with all such data and information as he may 
deem necessary for the proper performance of his task as 
referred to in subsection (1), with the exception of data and 
information which, pursuant to the Treaty or the statutory 
regulations referred to in section 4, are secret.  
15(4) The Governing Board of the Bank and the Treasurer-General 
or his alternate shall attend the meetings of the Bank Council 
and may take part in the deliberations. 
Poland 15 The Vice-Presidents of the NBP shall participate at the 
meetings of the [Monetary Policy] Council without right to 
vote. 
Portugal N/A  
Romania 33(10) The Minister of Public Finance and one of the State 
Secretaries in the Ministry of Public Finance may 
participate, without voting rights, in the meetings of Banca 
Naţională a României‘s Board. 
Slovakia 8(4) Bank Board meetings shall not be open to the public. Apart 
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from its members, Bank Board meetings may be attended by 
a Government member authorized by the Government, 
persons designated in the Band Board's rules of procedure, 
and other persons invited by the Bank Board. The Bank 
Board may decide to publish the conclusions and materials 
from of its meetings; however, information about approved 
documents of meetings of the Bank Board or other body of 
the National Bank of Slovakia shall be published as required 
by this Law. 
Slovenia 33(1) The representative of the committee of the National 
Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in charge of finance 
and monetary policy, and the minister in charge of finance, 
may participate in meetings of the Governing Board of 
Banka Slovenije, but shall have no right to vote. 
33(2) Depending on the nature of the particular subject under 
consideration, the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije may 
also invite experts for such matters to participate in 
meetings. 
Spain 20(3) The Director-General of the Treasury and Financial Policy 
and the Vice-president of the National Securities Market 
Commission shall not be permitted to vote when the Council 
makes decisions on issues related to the matters regulated 
under section 1 and under sections 2 and 4 of chapter II of 
this Law, but in the case of the latter two sections only when 
decisions are made on issues arising from the functions of 
the ESCB. 
20(4) The Economy and Finance Minister or the Secretary of State 
for Economy may attend the meetings of the Council, as 
participating but non-voting members, when they consider it 
necessary in the light of the importance of the matters under 
consideration. They may also submit a motion for 
consideration by the Governing Council.  
Sweden Chapter 3 
Article 3(3) 
The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the General Council 
have the right to be present at the Executive Board's 
meetings with the right to speak, but without the right to 
make proposals and vote 
The United 
Kingdom 
N/A  
 
Table 3-6 Prohibition on ex ante consultation relating to an NCB’s decision 
Member State Article Text 
Austria 32(5) The Governor and the Vice Governor shall report to the Finance 
Committee of the Nationalrat at least twice a year on the measures 
taken in the field of monetary policy, while observing the 
obligation of professional secrecy laid down in Article 38 of the 
ESCB/ECB Statute. 
Belgium 28  The Governor shall send to the Chairmen of the Chamber of 
Representatives and the Senate the annual report referred to in 
Article 109 B(3) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. The Governor may be heard by the competent 
committees of the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate at 
the request of these committees or on his own initiative.  
Bulgaria 3 The BNB and the Council of Ministers shall keep each other 
informed about the formulation of the general outlines of 
monetary policy. 
Cyprus 53(1) The Bank may render advice to the Government and to the 
Minister on any matter which in its opinion is likely to affect the 
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attainment of the objectives of the Bank as defined in section 5. 
53(2) The Government and the Minister may request from the Bank to 
provide them with data on the prevailing economic conditions or 
advice on any particular measures which may be taken and 
information on the general conditions of money and the banking 
system. 
54(1) Without prejudice to section 7, the Governor may be invited and 
may attend meetings of the Council of Ministers or competent 
committees of the Council of Ministers whenever the issues 
discussed pertain to the objectives and tasks of the Bank. 
54(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 105 paragraph 4 of 
the Treaty, the Bank shall be consulted on any draft legislative 
provision concerning its tasks: 
Provided that, the Bank may submit proposals to the Government 
on matters in its fields of competence. 
55(1) Subject to paragraph 5 of Article 119 of the Constitution, the 
Bank shall lay before the President of the Republic and the House 
of Representatives an annual report on the monetary policy of the 
previous and the current year. 
55(2) Subject to the provisions of Article 108 of the Treaty and Articles 
10.4 and 38 of the Statute, the Governor, when duly asked in this 
respect, shall appear before the committees of the House of 
Representatives to report on matters relating to the fields of 
competence of the Bank.  
The Czech 
Republic 
9(2) The Czech National Bank and the Government shall inform each 
other on matters concerning the principles and measures of 
monetary and economic policy. 
10(1) The Czech National Bank shall take a position on proposals 
presented to the Government for consideration that concern the 
fields of competence of the Czech National Bank. 
10(2) The Czech National Bank shall act in an advisory capacity vis-à-
vis the Government in matters of monetary policy and the 
financial market. 
Denmark 7 The Minister of Economic Affairs in his capacity of Royal Bank- 
Commissioner shall supervise that the Bank fulfils its obligations 
under this present Act and under the ordinances and provisions 
given pursuant to this present Act. 
The Minister of Economic Affairs presides at the meetings of the 
Board of Directors. He shall have admission to the meetings of 
the Committee of Directors and to be supplied with information 
concerning the Bank to the extent he might desire. 
Decisions of particularly far-reaching character cannot be taken at 
a meeting of the Committee of Directors when the Minister of 
Economic Affairs is not present, unless he has been informed in 
advance that the case will be dealt with at the meeting. 
Estonia 3(1) Eesti Pank operates independently of other state agencies. Eesti 
Pank shall report on its activities to the Riigikogu and it is not 
subordinated to the Government of the Republic or any other 
executive state agency or any third person 
Finland 4(1) In performing tasks of the European System of Central Banks, 
neither Suomen Pankki nor members of its governing bodies shall 
seek or take instructions concerning such tasks from entities other 
than the European Central Bank. 
4(2) Suomen Pankki shall cooperate as necessary with the Council of 
State and other authorities. 
27 Suomen Pankki shall be obliged to provide any concerned 
committee of Parliament with all information that is necessary for 
the performance of the Committee‘s tasks. 
France L 141-1 The Banque de France shall be an integral part of the European 
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System of Central Banks, instituted by Article 8 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, and shall participate in 
carrying out the tasks, and complying with the objectives, 
assigned to the European System of Central Banks by the Treaty. 
 
Within this framework, and without prejudice to the primary 
objective of price stability, the Banque de France shall support the 
Government‘s general economic policy. 
 
In performing the tasks arising from its participation in the 
European System of Central Banks, the Banque de France, as 
represented by its Governor or its Deputy Governors, shall neither 
seek nor accept instructions from the Government or any other 
person or body. 
L 143-1 At least once a year, the Banque de France‘s Governor shall send 
the President of the Republic and the Parliament a report on the 
Banque de France‘s transactions, on the monetary policy it 
implements within the framework of the European System of 
Central Banks and on its forecasts. 
 
In accordance with Article 108 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and the European Central Bank‘s 
confidentiality rules, the Banque de France‘s Governor is asked to 
appear before the finance committees of the two chambers of 
Parliament and the Governor may ask to appear before them. 
 
The Banque de France‘s accounts and the auditors‘ report shall be 
sent to the finance committees of the National Assembly and the 
Senate. 
Germany 13(1) The Deutsche Bundesbank shall advise the Federal Government 
on monetary policy issues of major importance and shall furnish it 
with information on request. 
13(2) The Federal Government should invite the President of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank to attend its deliberations on important 
monetary policy issues. 
Greece 5B(3) Without prejudice to the previous article, the Governor of the 
Bank of Greece shall be invited and may attend meetings of the 
Council of Ministers or of competent committees thereof 
whenever the issues discussed pertain to the objectives and tasks 
of the Bank of Greece. 
Hungary 2 The Governor of the MNB shall report to the Parliament 
35 The Governor of the MNB shall report to the Parliament in 
respect of the activities and monetary policy of the MNB on an 
annual basis. The Parliament may also request information on an 
ad hoc basis.  
36 The MNB shall be consulted regarding the drafts of decisions and 
legislative provisions related to the tasks of the MNB and the 
operation of the financial system. 
37 The Minister shall provide the MNB with preliminary information 
regarding the budget proposal. The MNB may express its opinion 
on the budget proposal to the Government and to the competent 
parliamentary committee following submission of the budget draft 
to the Parliament. 
38 The Government may not instruct the MNB in relation to its 
scope of tasks as set forth in this Act. 
40 The Government shall invite the Governor of the MNB to attend 
its meetings for items of the agenda pertaining to the MNB‘s 
scope of tasks. 
41(2) Upon request, the MNB shall provide information to the 
Government and the ministries on an ad hoc basis in respect of 
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monetary developments and other important issues related to its 
basic tasks. 
41(3) The Governor of the MNB shall notify the Minister of his 
decisions relating to the management of the operation of the MNB 
and of high priority in respect of the operations of the MNB made 
under his powers pursuant to Article 50, paragraph 1 after such 
decisions have been taken. The MNB shall report to the Minister 
on foreign exchange transactions performed as well as on the gold 
and foreign exchange reserves on a weekly basis. Each year, the 
Minister and the Governor of the MNB shall agree in writing on 
the scope of additional information to be made available by the 
MNB. 
Ireland 6A(3) The Minister may, from time to time, request the Governor, the 
Board or the Regulatory Authority to consult with the Minister, in 
relation to their respective functions, as regards the performance 
by the Bank of any function of the Bank (other than one imposed 
on it by the Rome Treaty or the ESCB Statute) 
6A(4) The Minister may, from time to time, request the Governor to 
inform the Minister with respect to the pursuit of the primary 
objective of the Bank. 
6A(5) The Governor, or the Board, shall comply with a request made to 
the Governor or the Board under this section in so far as the 
request is consistent with the Rome Treaty, the ESCB Statute or 
any law of the State. 
Italy N/A  
Latvia 6(1) The Bank of Latvia shall advise the Saeima and the Cabinet of 
Ministers on monetary policy and other matters pertaining to the 
execution of its tasks 
Lithuania 41 The Bank of Lithuania may consult and give proposals to the 
Government on the issues related to financial markets and State 
Treasury policy 
Luxembourg 11(2) The Central Bank shall report annually to the Government and to 
the Chamber of Deputies on its activities and on the monetary 
policy of the previous year and current year. 
Malta 29 The Bank shall keep the Minister informed of the policy of the 
Bank: 
Provided that: 
(a) this does not result in interference with the independence of 
the members of the Bank‘s decision making bodies; 
(b) the special status of the Governor in his capacity as member of 
the Governing Council and General Council of the European 
Central Bank is fully respected; and 
(c) confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute are 
observed. 
The Netherlands N/A  
Poland 12(1) The Monetary Policy Council shall determine the annual 
monetary policy guidelines and submit these to the Sejm, for the 
information thereof, together with the submission by the Council 
of Ministers of the draft Budget. The Council shall present a 
report to the Sejm on the performance of monetary policy 
guidelines within five months of the end of the budget year 
21  In performing its tasks, the NBP shall collaborate with the 
competent State bodies in developing and implementing national 
economic policy, in so doing striving to ensure the proper 
performance of monetary policy guidelines, and in particular 
shall: 
1) submit the monetary policy guidelines as well as reports on the 
performance of monetary policy and on the situation within the 
banking system to State bodies, 
(…) 
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23(1) Acting on behalf of the Council, the President of the NBP shall: 
1) submit to the Sejm and Council of Ministers: 
a) quarterly reports on the balance of payments, 
b) annual survey of the international investment position, 
2) forward to the Council of Ministers and Minister of Finance 
draft monetary policy guidelines, opinions on the draft law on 
budget, balance of payments forecasts and the rulings of the 
Council, 
3) draw up periodic reports on transfers of (payments from) profit. 
Portugal N/A  
Romania 3(3) Banca Naţională a României shall cooperate with the Ministry of 
Public Finance in setting the macroeconomic indicators based on 
which the annual draft budget shall be drawn up. 
3(5) To fulfil the commitments arising from agreements, treaties and 
conventions to which Romania is party, Banca Naţională a 
României shall cooperate with domestic and foreign authorities 
by providing information, by adopting appropriate measures or in 
any other way consistent with this Law. 
Slovakia 12(2) The Governor or a member of the Bank Board delegated by the 
Governor shall inform the Government of the conclusions from 
meetings of the Bank Board and on the adopted decisions. 
13(2) The National Bank of Slovakia shall perform advisory functions 
vis-á-vis the Government in areas falling within the scope of its 
authority. 
Slovenia 26(1) Notwithstanding other laws, Banka Slovenije shall report on its 
work exclusively to the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Slovenia. Banka Slovenije shall report on its work at least bi-
annually. 
26(2) Notwithstanding the previous paragraph Banka Slovenije shall 
also report to the decision-making bodies of the European System 
of Central Banks to the extent defined by Article 14.3 of the 
Statute of the ESCB and ECB. 
27 Banka Slovenije and the ministry in charge of finance shall by 
virtue of an agreement set out the type, scope, conditions and 
manner of conducting of operations that Banka Slovenije 
performs for the Republic of Slovenia on the basis of points 3, 4 
and 7 of Article 12(1) of this Act. 
Spain 10(1) The Bank shall regularly inform Parliament and the government 
of the objectives and the implementation of monetary policy, 
without prejudice to the terms of article 107 of the Treaty and the 
ECB rules on professional secrecy. 
To this end, the Governor of the Bank may be asked to appear, in 
accordance with Parliamentary regulations, before any Congress 
or Senate committee or joint committee of both chambers, or be 
asked to attend for this purpose cabinet meetings or meetings of 
its Commission for Economic Affairs. 
10(2) In addition, the Governor of the Bank may be asked to attend the 
meetings of the «Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera de las 
Comunidades Autónomas» referred to in article 3 of Organic Law 
8/1980, of September 22, on Financing of Comunidades 
Autónomas and to report on issues within the scope of the Bank's 
authority, with a view to facilitating the tasks of financial 
coordination of the above-mentioned Consejo. 
Sweden Chapter 6 
Article 3 
Prior to the Riksbank making a monetary policy decision of major 
importance, the minister appointed by the Government shall be 
informed.  
The United 
Kingdom 
N/A  
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Table 3-7 The conditions required for the performance of the Governor 
Member 
State 
Article Text Assessment 
Age 
limit 
Citizen-
ship 
Full 
legal 
capacity 
Higher 
education 
Sound 
back-
ground 
Full-
time 
position 
Austria 33(3) Members of the Governing Board may only perform their function as 
their chief occupation and may only be persons who hold Austrian 
citizenship and whose right to vote in elections has not been 
suspended. No person who is in the active service of the Bund or of a 
Land or one of the bodies of the European Community or who is a 
member of the Nationalrat, Bundesrat, a Landtag or the European 
Parliament, the Federal Government or the government of a Land, or 
the European Commission may be a member of the Governing Board. 
Furthermore, the members of the Governing Board may not be 
involved in any other activity which might interfere with their 
independence.  
 YES YES  YES
800
 YES 
Belgium 29(1)  
Articles of 
association 
In addition to the Governor, who presides, the Board of Directors 
shall be composed of at least five but not more than seven directors, 
one of whom shall bear the title of Vice-Governor, conferred on him 
by the King. The Board of Directors shall include an equal number of 
French and Dutch speakers, with, possibly, the exception of the 
Governor. The members of the Board of Directors must be Belgian. 
 YES     
28(6) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Governor may not, during his term of office, receive any pension 
payable by the State. 
     YES 
20(3); 
30(7) 
Articles of 
The Council [of Regency] shall fix the individual salaries and 
pensions of the members of the Board of Directors. These salaries 
and pensions may not include a share in the profits and no 
      
                                                 
800 The assessment is implicit as the provision aims at the prevention of conflict of interest. Under normal circumstances, the Governor‘s post can not be held simultaneously with another 
position outside the NCB. However, the list of positions creating a conflict of interest is rather high-ranking; this would mean that a person who qualifies to the position of a Governor could 
also potentially qualify for other positions having the same criteria for the position.  
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Member 
State 
Article Text Assessment 
Age 
limit 
Citizen-
ship 
Full 
legal 
capacity 
Higher 
education 
Sound 
back-
ground 
Full-
time 
position 
Association remuneration whatsoever may be added thereto by the Bank, either 
directly or indirectly. 
25; 
37 
Articles of 
association 
Members of the Legislative Chambers, the European Parliament, the 
Councils of the Communities and the Regions, persons who hold the 
position of minister or secretary of state or of member of the 
Government of a Community or Region and members of the staff of a 
member of the Federal Government or of the Government of a 
Community or Region may not hold the office of Governor, Vice-
Governor, member of the Board of Directors, regent or censor. The 
last-mentioned functions shall automatically cease when their holder 
takes the oath of office for exercise of the abovementioned offices or 
performs such functions.. 
    YES
801
 YES 
26(1) 
38(1) 
Articles of 
association 
The Governor, Vice-Governor and the other members of the Board of 
Directors may not hold any office in a commercial company or a 
company which is commercial in form or in any public body which 
carries on an industrial, commercial or financial activity; subject to 
the approval of the Minister of Finance they may however hold office 
in (1) international financial institutions established under agreements 
to which Belgium is a party, (2) the Securities Regulation Fund, the 
Fund for the Protection of Deposits and Financial Instruments, the 
Rediscount and Guarantee Institute and (3) the entities to which the 
Bank is allowed under the Law to entrust the performance of tasks 
that do not fall within the domain of the ESCB. 
     Yes 
The prohibitions referred to in the first paragraph shall continue to 
apply for one year after the Governor, Vice-Governor or other 
members of the Board of Directors have relinquished their office; this 
term shall be extended to two years in the case of an office to be held 
in a credit institution. 
     YES 
26(3);  Members of the Board of Directors and members of the Bank‘s staff       
                                                 
801 See footnote 800.  
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Member 
State 
Article Text Assessment 
Age 
limit 
Citizen-
ship 
Full 
legal 
capacity 
Higher 
education 
Sound 
back-
ground 
Full-
time 
position 
38(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
must respect the code of ethics drawn up by the Council of Regency 
on the proposal of the Board of Directors. Persons responsible for 
supervising compliance with that code must maintain professional 
secrecy as provided for in Article 458 of the Penal Code. 
27(1) 
40(1) 
Articles of 
association;  
The terms of the members of the Board of Directors, the Council of 
Regency and the Board of Censors shall expire no later than when 
they reach the age of sixty-seven years. 
YES      
27(2) 
40(2); 
Articles of 
Association 
However, subject to authorisation by the Minister of Finance, they 
may complete their current term. The terms of the members of the 
Board of Directors may after while still be extended by one year, 
which term may be renewed. In the case of the Governor's term of 
office, the authorisation to complete the current term or its extension 
shall be granted by Royal Decree deliberated in the Council of 
Ministers. 
YES      
27(3) 
40(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
On no account may the office-holders referred to above remain in 
office beyond the age of seventy years 
YES      
Bulgaria 11(2) Members of the Governing Council shall only be Bulgarian citizens.   YES     
11(3) Members of the Governing Council shall be elected and appointed 
only [amongst] persons of the highest integrity and prominent 
qualifications in economics, finance or banking. 
    YES  
11(4) Member of the Governing Council shall not be a person: (1) 
sentenced to imprisonment for a premeditated crime; (2) adjudicated 
in bankruptcy in a capacity as a sole proprietor or general partner in a 
commercial company; (3) who has been a member of a managing or 
supervisory body of a company or cooperative in the last two years 
prior to adjudicating the said company or cooperative in insolvency.  
    YES  
 311 
 
Member 
State 
Article Text Assessment 
Age 
limit 
Citizen-
ship 
Full 
legal 
capacity 
Higher 
education 
Sound 
back-
ground 
Full-
time 
position 
12(5) The Governor and the Deputy Governors shall not engage in any 
activity, other than teaching, or as members of the bodies in 
companies where the Bulgarian National Bank participates or in 
international organizations related to Bulgarian National Bank 
activities. They may perform a non-remunerative activity following a 
unanimous decision of the Governing Council insofar as there is no 
conflict of interest. 
   YES
802
  YES 
12(9) The Governor, Deputy Governors and other members of the 
Governing Council shall file with the body that elects or appoints 
them the declarations under Article 12, items 1, 2 and 3 of the Law 
on Prevention and Disclosure of Conflict of Interests. The declaration 
under Article 12, item 4 of the Law on Prevention and Disclosure of 
Conflict of Interests shall be submitted to the Governing Council in 
accordance with the procedure under Article 17, paragraph 4. 
      
 Members of the Governing Council shall not participate in the 
deliberation and shall abstain from decision-making on issues in 
which they or members of their families may have interest. They 
must notify the Governing Council in advance of any such interests. 
      
Cyprus 13(5) A director who has a personal interest in a matter under discussion 
shall not take part in the discussion or vote on it: 
Provided that, in such case, the director shall be under a duty to 
disclose if he has any such interest. 
      
13(6) The remuneration of directors shall be determined by the Council of 
Ministers on their appointment for their whole five-year term. 
      
                                                 
802 That can be deemed implicitly as holding a teaching post in a university or an equivalent usually implies that the holder has to have a higher education as well.  
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14 first part A person shall not be qualified to be a director if he holds any 
position which may create a conflict of interest between his duties as 
director and that position and in particular if he: 
(a) is a Minister, or a member of the House of Representatives; 
(b) is a member of a Municipal Council, including a Mayor; 
(c) is a member of the armed or security forces of the Republic; 
(d) is the holder of a public office or office in a municipal authority 
or he is acting as a deputy in such post: Provided that, ―public office‖ 
means any office with financial benefit in the service of the Republic, 
the emoluments of which are under the control of the Republic and 
includes any office in any public corporation or public utility body: 
    YES
803
 YES 
14 second 
part 
Provided further that, no person shall be disqualified under this 
paragraph if he – 
(i) is a holder of a teaching post in a university or an equivalent 
educational institution in the Republic; 
(ii) is acting, without being a member of the public service, as 
representative of the Republic in an international monetary or 
financial organisation of which the Republic is a member;. 
   YES
804
  YES 
14 third part (e) has been declared bankrupt and has not been discharged or 
against whom a receiving order has been made or who has made an 
arrangement or composition with his creditors; 
(f) is a person certified to be insane or otherwise declared to be 
of unsound mind; 
(g) is a director, officer or employee of any other bank or 
financial institution or their subsidiary or has as a shareholder a 
controlling interest in any other banking or financial institution or 
their subsidiary operating in the Republic, or controlled by an 
organisation operating in the Republic. 
  YES    
                                                 
803 See footnote 800.  
804 See footnote 802.  
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18(1) The Governor and the Deputy Governor shall be citizens of the 
Republic and shall be fit and proper persons of recognised experience 
in economic and financial matters. 
 YES   YES  
19(1) The Governor and the Deputy Governor shall, while in office, devote 
their entire time exclusively to the service of the Bank and shall not 
engage in any other business, profession or undertaking 
     YES 
19(2) The Governor and Deputy Governor shall not take in the Republic 
any office or accept interest in any banking or other financial 
institution or their subsidiary operating in the Republic or controlled 
by an organisation operating in the Republic and which is supervised 
by the Bank or receive therefrom any remuneration whatsoever for a 
period of two years after the termination of their appointment. 
     YES 
The Czech 
Republic 
6(6) 
 
Membership of the Bank Board shall be incompatible with the 
position of a member of a legislative body, member of the 
Government and membership of the governing, supervisory or 
inspection bodies of other banks or commercial undertakings, and the 
performance of any independent gainful occupation, except for 
scientific, literary, journalistic, artistic and pedagogical activities and 
except for management of own assets; membership of the Bank 
Board shall be incompatible with any activity which might cause any 
conflict of interest between the performance of this activity and 
membership of the Bank Board. 
     YES 
6(7); 
6(8) 
Any citizen of the Czech Republic who (a) is fully competent to 
perform legal acts, (b) has completed a university education, (c) has 
not been lawfully convicted of a criminal offence, (d) is a person of 
recognized standing and professional experience in monetary matters 
and in the area of the financial market, may be appointed as a 
member of the Bank Board. 
 YES YES YES YES  
Denmark 3(2) The members of the Board of Directors, the Committee of Directors 
and the Board of Governors shall be Danish subjects with domicile in 
Denmark, besides they shall be of age, in possession of the civil 
YES YES YES    
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rights and not be deprived of the right to dispose of their estate.  
6(2);  
8(2) By-laws 
The Governors shall reside in Copenhagen or in places closely 
connected with Copenhagen. They shall not have a seat in the 
management of trade organisations or companies nor carry on or take 
part in the working of private trading activities. The Governors shall 
be under the obligation to send in their resignation before the 
expiration of the month in which they complete their 70th year. 
YES     YES 
15 By-laws A member of the Board of Directors or the Committee of Directors 
shall have no vote in cases concerning agreements between the Bank 
and such member or relating to actions brought against such member 
nor in case of agreements with or actions brought against third party 
in so far as such member has a considerable interest therein, which 
may be in conflict with that of the Bank. 
The Directors are under the obligation to keep secret what they learn 
through their work in the Bank. 
A Governor shall not make nor take part in decisions which concern 
himself in a similar manner. 
      
16 By-laws It shall rest with the Committee of Directors and the Board of 
Governors to watch the justifiableness of and the security for the 
engagements which the Bank makes with the single members of the 
Committee of Directors or the Board of Directors or with companies 
of which these members are managers or directors. 
The same shall hold good of engagements which might be contracted 
with the Bank by persons attached to the Governors through 
marriage, relationship or affinity in lineal ascent and descent or as 
brothers and sisters, or by companies of which such persons are 
managers. 
      
17 By-laws If a member of the Committee of Directors or Board of Governors of 
the Bank, a branch manager or other member of the staff of the Bank 
on behalf of the Bank supervises an undertaking in which the Bank is 
interested economically, any remuneration of the person in question 
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will have to be defrayed by the Bank. The amount of the 
remuneration shall be fixed by the Committee of Directors. 
18 By-laws Governors, branch managers or other members of the staff of the 
Bank must not in any form make or join in speculative transactions. 
      
19 By-laws Governors, branch managers and auditors must not raise loans in the 
Bank, obtain the guarantee of the Bank for loans or enter into 
contracts of suretyship for debts due to the Bank. 
      
Estonia 10(2) first 
sentence 
The Governor of Eesti Pank must be an Estonian citizen and have a 
university degree. Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank must be Estonian 
citizens and have a university degree. 
 YES  YES   
10(3) The Governor and Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank shall be 
independent in the performance of their functions. They shall not 
hold any other office, be in service or be party to any activities which, 
by their nature, restrict or may restrict the autonomy of Eesti Pank or 
adversely affect or may adversely affect Eesti Pank in the 
achievement of its objectives or the performance of its functions 
     YES 
Finland 10(2) A member of the Parliamentary Supervisory Council is obliged to 
resign if he is appointed as a member of the Council of State or a 
member of the Board, or if he has undertaken an occupation that, 
according to a unanimous decision of the Parliamentary Supervisory 
Council, is incompatible with membership on the Parliamentary 
Supervisory Council. 
      
13(1) last 
sentence 
A member of the Board must possess the expertise required for the 
tasks involved.  
     YES  
17(1) A member of the Board shall neither accept nor carry on a secondary 
occupation unless the Parliamentary Supervisory Council, upon 
application, grants him a permit to do so. Such a permit can also be 
granted for a fixed term or with restrictions. A permit for a secondary 
occupation can also be withdrawn for justifiable reasons. 
     YES 
17(2) When considering the granting of a permit for a secondary 
occupation, the Parliamentary Supervisory Council shall ensure that 
     YES 
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the secondary occupation does not disqualify the member of the 
Board from his position. Nor shall the secondary occupation 
jeopardize confidence in the member of the Board in respect of his 
performance of tasks of the European System of Central Banks or 
other tasks or otherwise impede the appropriate performance of his 
duties. 
17(3) For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 above, secondary occupation 
shall mean a position, paid or unpaid work, or a duty that the member 
of the Board is entitled to refuse, or a profession, trade or business. 
     YES 
France L. 142-3(3), 
third 
sentence 
The names on the list shall be chosen from among persons of 
recognized standing and professional experience in monetary, 
financial and economic matters.  
    YES  
L. 142-5(2) The Governor, Deputy Governors and other members of the 
Monetary Policy Council may not engage in any other public or 
private professional occupation, gainful or not, except the exercise of 
a term of office as a member of the Economic and Social Council. 
Exemptions may be granted by the Council of Monetary Policy for 
teaching activities or positions in international organizations. They 
may not hold elected offices.  
   YES
805
  YES 
L. 142-8 The Governor and the two Deputy Governors shall be appointed by 
an Order made in the Council of Ministers for a six-year term of 
office, which may be renewed once. The age limit for holding these 
offices shall be sixty-five. 
YES      
L 142-8 (9) 
(10) 
The Governor and the two Deputy Governors may not engage in any 
other public or private professional activity, whether or not 
remunerated, except, where applicable and with the consent of the 
General Council, teaching activities or duties within international 
organisations. They may not hold elected office. If they are civil 
servants, they shall be seconded and shall not be eligible for 
     YES 
                                                 
805 See footnote 802.  
 317 
 
Member 
State 
Article Text Assessment 
Age 
limit 
Citizen-
ship 
Full 
legal 
capacity 
Higher 
education 
Sound 
back-
ground 
Full-
time 
position 
discretionary promotion. 
 
If the Governor or a Deputy Governor relinquishes office for any 
reason other than dismissal for serious misconduct, they shall 
continue to receive their basic salary for three years. During that 
period, unless authorised by the General Council, they may not 
undertake any professional activities other than elected public office 
or as members of the Government. If the General Council authorises 
their undertaking a professional activity, or if they hold non-national 
elected public office, the General Council shall determine the 
conditions under which all or part of their salary may continue to be 
paid. 
Germany 7(2) last 
sentence 
Members of the Executive Board must have relevant professional 
qualifications. 
    YES  
Greece 14 The following persons shall not be entitled to exercise the rights of 
shareholders at the General Meetings, individually or by proxy: 
(a) persons not having the Greek citizenship; 
(b) persons declared bankrupt, during the period of the limitation of 
their rights; 
(c) persons who have not fulfilled their obligations towards the Bank, 
or whose bills, kept by the Bank, have been protested and remain 
unpaid; 
(d) persons whose civil or political rights have been curtailed or 
withdrawn, as a result of conviction for a criminal offence, so long as 
such curtailment or withdrawal remains in force. 
      
22(1) Persons belonging to the following categories cannot be elected 
Councillors: 
(1) members of the Government, or civil servants, or employees of 
 YES
806
 YES
807
    
                                                 
806 The implicit evidence under Articles 22(1) and 14 of the Greek NCB Statute suggests that there is a requirement for Greek citizenship.  
807 The implicit evidence under Articles 22(1) and 14 of the Greek NCB Statute suggests that there is a full legal capacity.   
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public institutions  and enterprises; 
(2) members of Parliament; 
(3) counsels or employees of other Banks; 
(4) any person whose status comes within the definitions of Article 
14 
22(4) Persons who are associated in a business or who are relatives up to 
the third degree inclusive may not serve at one and the same time as 
Governors or Councillors of the Bank 
      
29(1) The Governor and the Deputy Governors shall be appointed for a six-
year term by a Presidential Decree on a proposal of the Council of 
Ministers following a proposal by the Bank‘s General Council. They 
shall devote their whole time to the affairs of the Bank, except in 
cases where, by law, they are members of the Board of Directors of 
legal entities in public law, public enterprises or state advisory 
bodies. 
     YES 
29(2) University professors of Law and Economics may be appointed to the 
positions of Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank, while 
retaining the right to exercise their university duties. 
   YES
808
  Partly 
35 The Governor and Deputy Governors shall not engage in any 
business for their own account. No bills or notes signed by them shall 
be accepted for discount or as guarantee for an advance granted by 
the Bank. 
      
                                                 
808 See footnote 802.  
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35A(4) The members of the Monetary Policy Council shall be appointed 
from among persons of recognized standing and professional 
experience in monetary and banking matters, and shall perform their 
duties on a full-time basis. Civil servants and employees of legal 
entities in public or private law shall not have the right to retain their 
position once they have accepted their appointment as members of 
the Monetary Policy Council. However, university professors 
appointed members of the Monetary Policy Council retain the right to 
exercise their university duties as well.  
   YES
809
 YES YES; 
Partly 
Hungary 49(18)  Members of the Monetary Council, including the Governor and the 
Deputy Governors of the MNB, and of the Supervisory Board shall 
not be nominated for membership of the Monetary Council within 
three years of the termination of their office. 
      
49(5) Hungarian citizens with outstanding theoretical and/or practical 
professional knowledge on issues related to monetary, financial and 
banking activities may be appointed as members of the Monetary 
Council.  
 YES   YES  
50(9) The provisions of Paragraphs (5)–(10) of Article 49 shall also apply 
in respect of the Governor of the MNB. 
      
58(1) Members of the Monetary Council of the MNB may only carry out 
other activities which are compatible with their central bank decision 
making duties. Such members may not hold office in political parties, 
may not carry out public activities on behalf of or in the interest of 
political parties, may not be representatives in Parliament or in local 
governments and may not be senior officers or public officials in the 
national or local government. 
    YES
810
 YES 
58(2) Members of the Monetary Council of the MNB may not be executive 
officers or supervisory board members of a business organisation. 
     YES 
                                                 
809 See footnote 802.  
810 See footnote 800.  
 320 
 
Member 
State 
Article Text Assessment 
Age 
limit 
Citizen-
ship 
Full 
legal 
capacity 
Higher 
education 
Sound 
back-
ground 
Full-
time 
position 
58(3) The Governor and Deputy Governors of the MNB may not establish 
any other employment relationships or other legal relationships for 
the performance of work. 
     YES 
58(5) Members of the Monetary Council may establish other legal 
relationships for the performance of work related to scientific, 
educational, artistic, proof-reading and editorial activities, as well as 
intellectual activities protected by copyright. Such relationships shall 
be reported prior to being established. 
   YES
811
  YES; 
Partly 
58(7) In respect of members of the Monetary Council of the MNB the 
conflict of interest provisions set forth in Article 57, paragraph (1) 
shall also apply for a period of six months following termination of 
the employment relationship. 
      
58A(1) The Governor and Deputy Governors of the MNB, as well as the 
members of the Monetary Council defined in Article 49, paragraph 
(4), point c) and the members of the Supervisory Board shall declare 
their wealth in the same way, with the same data contents and 
frequency as members of parliament. The annual declaration of 
wealth shall reflect the status on December 31 preceding the year 
when the obligation falls due. The declaration of wealth due upon 
appointment or dismissal shall reflect the status on the day of the 
appointment or dismissal. The person obliged to make this 
declaration shall enclose the declaration of his/her spouse or 
common-law spouse living in the same household, as well that of 
his/her children (dependents), with the same contents as the 
declaration of wealth of members of parliament. The declaration of 
wealth – except that of the dependents – is public, and an exact copy 
of it shall be made public by the Speaker of Parliament on the website 
of the Parliament. 
      
Ireland 19(2) (2) A person is not eligible for appointment as Governor if the      YES 
                                                 
811 See footnote 802.  
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person— 
(a) is a member of either House of the Oireachtas or is, with the 
person‘s consent, nominated as a candidate for election as such a 
member or is nominated as a member of Seanad Éireann, or 
(b) is a member of the European Parliament or is, with the person‘s 
consent, nominated as a candidate for election as such a member or to 
fill a vacancy in the membership of that Parliament, or 
(c) is a member of a local authority or is, with the person‘s consent, 
nominated as a candidate for election as such a member. 
19(5) A person holding office as Governor is disqualified from being a 
director of a credit institution, financial institution or insurance 
undertaking. 
     YES 
19(6) If a person who is appointed to the office of Governor is a director of 
a credit institution, financial institution or insurance undertaking, the 
person ceases to hold that office at the end of 10 days after the date of 
the appointment unless, within that period, the person ceases to be 
such a director. 
      
20(1) Every person appointed to be Governor shall within three months 
after his appointment absolutely sell or otherwise dispose of all 
shares in any financial institution which he shall, at the time of his 
appointment, own or be interested in for his own benefit. 
      
20(2) If and whenever any shares in a financial institution shall come to or 
vest in the Governor by will or succession for his own benefit, he 
shall, within three months after the same shall have so come to or 
vested in him, absolutely sell or otherwise dispose of the same or his 
interest therein. 
      
20(3) The Governor shall not purchase, take or become interested in for his 
own benefit any shares in any financial institution. 
      
20(4) If the Governor shall retain, purchase, take, or become or remain 
interested in any shares in any financial institution in contravention of 
this section he shall forthwith become and be disqualified from 
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holding the office of Governor. 
20(4A) This section does not prohibit the Governor from 
(a) entering into a policy of insurance, or 
(b) purchasing units of, or participating in, a collective investment 
scheme whose funds are invested in bonds or equities generally 
(including the bonds or shares of a financial institution), or 
(c) establishing and maintaining an ordinary savings account with a 
building society or a friendly society. 
      
20(5) In this section 
‗bank‘ includes a bank incorporated outside the State as well as a 
bank incorporated in the State; 
‗financial institution‘ includes a credit institution and an insurance 
undertaking;  
‗shares‘, in relation to a bank, include stock, shares, debentures, 
debenture stock, bonds and other securities of the bank. 
      
Italy 42(1) Neither the members of the Directorate nor any employee of the Bank 
may perform activities in the interest of banks, financial 
intermediaries or other entities subject to supervision, engage in 
commerce, be a director, agent or member of the board of auditors of 
any company, participate in a general partnership, or, as a general 
partner, in a limited partnership. 
     YES 
42(2) The Board of Directors may nevertheless allow directorships of 
companies or other entities to be accepted, where this is recognized to 
be in the interest of the Bank. 
     YES 
42(3) On the same grounds it may also allow employees having a grade not 
higher than that of head of department or a comparable grade to be 
members of boards of auditors. 
      
43(1) Senators and Deputies and other persons holding political office may 
not be members of the boards of the Bank. 
      
43(2) In addition, employees of banks and other entities operating in the 
field of financial intermediation and persons performing 
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administrative, managerial or control functions therein, managers and 
employees of the public administration and all persons having a 
conflict of interest with the Bank in view of their personal situation or 
professional positions shall be excluded from membership of the 
Board of Directors of the Bank. 
43(3) The provisions of the preceding paragraphs shall also be observed for 
the appointments entrusted to the Board of Directors under point 8 of 
Article 18 of this statute. 
      
Latvia 31 Restrictions on holding more than one position by the Bank of 
Latvia's Governor, Deputy Governor, members of the Council of the 
Bank of Latvia and the Board and their responsibilities regarding the 
prevention of the conflict of interest shall be as laid down by the Law 
"On the Prevention of the Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public 
Officials" 
 YES
812
    YES 
32 Members of the Board of the Bank of Latvia and managers of the 
organisational units of the Bank of Latvia shall be prohibited from 
engaging either directly, or indirectly in any commercial activity. 
      
Lithuania 10(2) Only citizens of the Republic of Lithuania may be the Chairperson, 
Deputy Chairpersons, and Members of the Board of the Bank of 
Lithuania, provided they have not reached the age of 65 by the date 
of their appointment.  
YES YES     
15 Where an issue considered during a meeting of the Board is related to 
the private interests of a Member of the Board, involving the conflict 
between public and private interests, the Member of the Board 
concerned shall, prior to the discussion of the above issue, present a 
written notice thereon and shall not have the right to participate in the 
discussion of the said issue and in the adoption of a decision thereon. 
      
16(1) The Chairperson, Deputy Chairpersons and Members of the Board of    YES
813
  YES 
                                                 
812 The assessment is implicit as the provision aims at the prevention of conflict of interest. Since the Law ―On the Prevention of the Conflict of Interest in Activities of Public Officials‖ aims at 
public official, who as a rule are to be citizens, we can deem that there is a citizenship requirement.  
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the Bank of Lithuania may only be employed at the Bank of 
Lithuania and may not engage in any other activities that would cause 
a conflict of private and public interests. The Board of the Bank of 
Lithuania may give them consent to engage in research and 
pedagogical activities 
16(2) The Chairperson, Deputy Chairpersons, and Members of the Board of 
the Bank of Lithuania must, during the first year after their duties 
have ceased, avoid any conflict of private and public interests that 
would be caused by their new activities. When intending to engage in 
the activities that the above-mentioned persons consider might cause 
a conflict of private and public interests, they shall inform in writing 
the Board of the Bank of Lithuania and shall seek its opinion before 
committing themselves. 
      
16(3) Upon the expiration of the term of office, the Chairperson, Deputy 
Chairpersons, and Members of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania 
shall be paid a severance pay. The pay shall amount to the number of 
the average monthly salaries, paid to them, corresponding to the years 
of their uninterrupted term of office at the Bank of Lithuania, but 
shall not exceed six average monthly salaries. The severance pay 
shall not be paid if they have stopped performing their duties because 
they have been found guilty of serious misconduct. 
      
Luxembourg 5(2) In the exercise of the powers and in the fulfilment of the tasks and 
duties entrusted to them within the domain of the ESCB, neither the 
Central Bank nor any member of its bodies may seek or accept 
instructions from institutions or bodies of the European Community, 
governments of Member States or any other body 
      
7(3) No person shall appointed to or remain a member of the Council 
whilst holding any office outside the Central Bank in conflict with the 
requirements of Article 5 (2) or with the professional secrecy 
     YES 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
813 See footnote 802.  
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provisions applicable to the ESCB 
Malta 8(1) first 
sentence 
The Governor and the Deputy Governor shall be persons of 
recognised standing and experience in economic, financial or banking 
matters and shall each be appointed by the President of Malta, acting 
on the advice of the Prime Minister. They shall be appointed for a 
term of five years but shall be eligible for re-appointment.  
    YES  
8(4) The Governor and the Deputy Governor shall devote the whole of 
their professional time to the service of the Bank and while holding 
that office shall not occupy any other office or employment whether 
remunerated or not: 
Provided that they may be appointed in their capacity as Governor or 
Deputy Governor of the Bank, as the case may be, to sit on any 
board, commission or committee, by whatever name called, whether 
in Malta or outside Malta and provided further that such activity is 
not in the opinion of the Board in conflict with the performance of 
their duties under this Act 
     YES 
The 
Netherlands 
24(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Governing Board shall ensure that, without prejudice to the 
provisions of the law, the President, the Executive Directors, the 
employees of the Bank and those who perform activities for the Bank 
shall be bound towards the Bank by rules aimed at preventing insider 
trading. 
     YES 
24(2) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Supervisory Board shall ensure that, without prejudice to the 
provisions of the law, the members of the Supervisory Board shall be 
bound towards the Bank by rules aimed at preventing insider trading, 
to be drawn up by the Supervisory Board on the recommendation of 
the Governing Board. 
      
24(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
The rules referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be made generally 
available. 
      
25(1) 
Articles of 
The Governing Board shall ensure that there are rules specifying that, 
without prejudice to the provisions of law, employees have the 
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Association opportunity, without jeopardising their legal position, to report to the 
President, or to an officer appointed by him, any supposed 
irregularities of a general, operational or financial nature within the 
Bank. 
25(2) 
Articles of 
Association 
Supposed irregularities relating to the functions of the President and 
the Executive Directors shall be reported to the Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board. 
      
25(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
The rules referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made generally 
available. 
      
26(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The joint meeting of the Governing Board and the Supervisory Board 
shall ensure that the members of the Supervisory Board, the President 
and the Executive Directors are each individually bound towards the 
Bank by rules, to be drawn up on the recommendation of the 
Governing Board, aimed at preventing the performance of jobs or 
activities which, considering the objective, the tasks and the activities 
of the Bank, are incompatible with the membership or former 
membership of the Supervisory Board or the Governing Board, 
respectively. 
     YES 
26(2) 
Articles of 
Association 
The principles underlying the rules referred to in paragraph (1) shall 
be included in the rules of procedure referred to in article 28. 
      
26(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
The rules referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made generally 
available. 
      
27(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The joint meeting of the Governing Board and the Supervisory Board 
shall, acting on a recommendation of the Governing Board, lay down 
rules for the Supervisory Board on dealing with conflicts of interest, 
which shall include potential conflicts of interest in relation to the 
Bank in the case of Governing Board Members, Supervisory Board 
members and the expert referred to in article 20 of the Articles of 
     YES 
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Association. These rules shall in any event state the transactions for 
which Supervisory Board approval is necessary. 
27(2) 
Articles of 
Association 
The basic principles underlying the rules referred to in paragraph 1 
shall be included in the rules of procedure referred to in article 28. 
      
27(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
On request by the Supervisory Board or Governing Board member 
concerned, or by the expert referred to in article 20 of the Articles of 
Association, the joint meeting referred to in paragraph 1 may, giving 
reasons therefore, deviate from the conditions specified in that 
paragraph, whether or not under more detailed conditions. 
      
27(4) 
Articles of 
Association 
The rules referred to in paragraph 1 shall be made generally 
available. 
      
Poland 14(1) During his/her term of office, a Monetary Policy Council member 
shall not hold any other positions nor engage in profit-gaining or 
public activity other than academic work, teaching or writing, 
although the Council may adopt a resolution (without the 
participation of the person concerned) expressing its consent to a 
member engaging in activity in international organisations. 
   YES
814
  YES 
14(2) A Monetary Policy Council member being a member of a political 
party or trade union is required to suspend activity in that party or 
union for his/her term of office, on pain of dismissal from the 
Council. 
     YES 
14(3) Members of the Monetary Policy Council shall be entitled to 
remuneration equivalent to that of the Vice-Presidents of the NBP. 
Such remuneration shall also be due for a period of three months 
following the expiry of their term of office, except if this is the result 
of a member being dismissed due to a conviction for a criminal 
offence under a legally binding court verdict. 
      
                                                 
814 See footnote 802.  
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18 Members of the NBP Management Board shall not hold any other 
positions nor engage in profit-gaining or public activity other than 
academic work, teaching or writing. The provisions of Art. 14, para. 
2, shall apply accordingly. 
   YES
815
  YES 
Portugal 61(1) The members of the Board of Directors and the staff shall neither be 
members of the supervisory and managing bodies of other credit 
institutions, financial companies or any other institution subject to the 
Bank‘s supervision, nor perform any other duties therein unless when 
representing the Bank or its staff.  
      
61(2) Without prejudice to other legally envisaged incompatibilities or 
preventions, the members of the Board of Directors shall not perform 
any remunerated duties outside the Bank, except lecturing at 
Universities, or be members of the supervisory and managing bodies 
of any company, unless when representing the Bank‘s interests and 
when duly authorized by the Board of Directors. 
   YES
816
  YES 
Romania 34(1) Members of the National Bank of Romania‘s Board may not be 
deputies, senators, or politically affiliated and may not belong either 
to the judicial authority or to the public administration. 
    YES
817
 YES 
34(2) Upon Romania‘s accession to the Eurosystem, the members of the 
National Bank of Romania‘s board involved in the performance of 
ESCB-related tasks may not hold other positions, which would 
conflict with their duties as members of the Board.  
     YES 
34(3) Members of the Board and the executives of Banca Naţională a 
României shall observe the legal provisions on the incompatibilities 
and conflict of interest regime. 
      
34(4) Members of the Board shall perform their duties on a full-time basis, 
while being allowed to perform teaching and research activities.  
     YES; 
Partial 
                                                 
815 See footnote 802.  
816 See footnote 802.  
817 See footnote 800.  
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Slovakia 7(4) third, 
fourth and 
fifth 
sentence 
To be appointed a member of the Bank Board a natural person must 
have appropriate professional knowledge and experience in the field 
of monetary policy or finance, and have full legal capacity and moral 
integrity. Deemed as appropriate professional knowledge and 
experience shall be completed university education and at least five 
years of experience in a management, scientific, or academic position 
in the monetary or finance areas. Deemed as a person with moral 
integrity shall be a natural person who has never been lawfully 
convicted of an intentional criminal offence; such integrity is to be 
proven by an extract from the criminal records register.  
  YES YES YES  
7(5) A member of the Bank Board shall be required to exercise his office 
with due professional care, in accordance with legal provisions and in 
line with the objectives, interests and tasks of the National Bank of 
Slovakia and the European System of Central Banks; in doing so, the 
member shall exploit and take into account the available information 
relating to the exercise of his powers and authority and preserve 
confidentiality in relation to facts, the divulgence of which could 
jeopardize the due and efficient performance of the activities, or the 
objectives and interests of the National Bank of Slovakia or the 
European System of Central Banks. When performing his function, a 
member of the Bank Board must not place his personal interests over 
the public interest and must abstain from all acts that might be in 
conflict with the performance of his function as a Bank Board 
member. 
 
     YES 
7(6) Membership of the Bank Board shall be incompatible with the post of 
President of the Slovak Republic, Deputy of the National Council of 
the Slovak Republic, Member of the Government, judge, public 
prosecutor, and any other function, office or employment in state 
    YES
818
 YES 
                                                 
818 See footnote 800.  
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authorities, self-government bodies or any other public bodies, 
position in the management or supervisory body of a legal person 
doing business, performing entrepreneurial or other economic or 
income-earning activities which may create conflict of interest. A 
member of the Bank Board may not perform any other function or 
non-income-earning activity which may create the conflict of interest 
between duties of the member of the Bank Board and that function or 
activity. If, at the time of his appointment, a member of the Bank 
Board holds a position or pursues an occupation, employment, or 
activity that is incompatible with membership of the Bank Board, he 
shall be obligated to take, without delay, demonstrable legal action 
aimed at terminating such office, profession, employment or activity 
and shall be obligated without delay to give up such office, 
profession, employment or activity. 
7(7) In connection with the performance of their functions or with 
activities of Národná banka Slovenska, members of the Bank Board 
may not seek or take instructions from state authorities, self-
government bodies, any other public bodies, or any legal persons or 
natural persons; state authorities, self-government bodies, any other 
public bodies, or any legal persons or natural persons may not 
influence Národná banka Slovenska or members of the Bank Board 
in connection with the performance of their function and the 
operations of Národná banka Slovenska. The Governor of Národná 
banka Slovenska may not seek or take instructions from the Bank 
Board in connection with the performance of his function in bodies of 
the European System of Central Banks and the European Central 
Bank; the same shall apply to a person acting for the Governor of 
Národná banka Slovenska in these bodies. 
      
Slovenia 38(1) Members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall carry out 
their functions on the basis of full-time employment at Banka 
Slovenije. 
     YES 
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38(2) The function of a member of the Governing Board of Banka 
Slovenije shall be incompatible with: 
1. functions in State bodies, bodies of local communities, bodies of 
political parties and trade unions bodies, 
2. work in State bodies, bodies of local communities, and in bodies 
entrusted with public authorities, 
3. membership in management or supervisory bodies of banks, 
savings banks or other commercial companies, institutes and 
cooperatives, 
4. other gainful activity, except scientific and research work that does 
not conflict with Banka Slovenije‘s interests, 
5. other work or activities that might affect their independence or 
could conflict with Banka Slovenije‘s interests. 
     YES 
38(3) Following their appointment, the member of the Governing Board of 
Banka Slovenije may begin performing the function only after they 
have brought their status into line with the provisions of this Article. 
The compatibility and taking up the function shall be established by 
the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije following a proposal by the 
Governor of Banka Slovenije. Members of the Governing Board of 
Banka Slovenije shall bring their status into line with the provisions 
of this Article within three months following their appointment at the 
latest, otherwise the decree of appointment shall cease to be valid 
from the day of expiry of this time-limit. 
     YES 
38(4) The function of a member of the Governing Board of the Bank of 
Slovenia is incompatible with: (1) functions in state bodies, statutory 
authorities of local communities, bodies of political and trade unions, 
(2) work in state bodies, in statutory authorities of local authorities of 
local communities and in other public entities, (3) membership in 
boards of management or supervisory boards of banks, savings banks 
or other corporations, institutes and co-operatives, (4) other gainful 
employment, scientific and research work excepted as long as it does 
     YES; 
Partial 
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not conflict with the interest of the Bank of Slovenia, (5) other work 
or activities, which might affect their independence or could be in 
conflict with the interest of the Bank of Slovenia.  
39a The provisions of the law governing the prevention of corruption and 
the law governing the incompatibility of holding public office with 
gainful activity, respectively, that provide for the sanction of early 
termination of the term of office, shall not apply to the members of 
the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije. 
      
Spain 24(1) second 
sentence 
Nominees shall be Spanish and will have recognised competence in 
monetary or banking matters.  
 YES   YES  
25(4) The Governor, the Deputy Governor and elected Council members 
shall leave office for the following reasons: 
a. Expiration of their terms of office. 
b. Resignation, which will take effect once the government is notified 
or, in the case of a member of the Executive Commission, when the 
Governing Council is notified. 
c. Reaching seventy years of age. 
d. Dismissal decided by the government, due to permanent incapacity 
to perform their functions, serious lack of compliance with their 
obligations, incompatibility that may have arisen during the term of 
office, or prosecution for deliberate crimes. In these cases, the order 
opening the oral hearing in the proceeding referred to in Title III of 
book IV of the Law of Criminal Justice shall be deemed to be 
equivalent to the bill of indictment. With the exception of cases of 
prosecution for deliberate crimes, the separation decision shall be 
adopted following a proposal by the Bank's Governing Council, after 
a hearing with the individual in question.  
YES      
26(1) The Governor and the Deputy Governor shall be subject to the system 
of incompatibilities applicable to senior officials. Their posts shall 
also be incompatible with the exercise of any public or private 
profession or activity, unless these are inherent to their status or are 
     YES 
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imposed as part of their role as representatives of the Bank. Once 
their term of office ends, over the next two years they may not 
engage in any professional activity linked to credit institutions or 
securities markets. During this period, they shall be entitled to a 
monthly economic compensation equivalent to 80% of the total salary 
assigned to that post during the indicated period. This compensation 
may not be received if the individual holds a paying job, post or 
activity in the public or private sector, except for teaching, or when 
the dismissal has occurred due to a separation decided by the 
government. 
28(1) Members of the Governing Council shall refrain from acquiring or 
owning goods or rights and from engaging in any activities that might 
compromise their independence and impartiality in the exercise of 
their responsibilities, cause conflicts of interest, or permit them to use 
privileged information. In particular, they must contractually entrust 
to a financial institution registered with the National Securities 
Market Commission the administration of any tradable securities or 
financial assets of which they, their non-separated spouses or 
dependent children are owners. The said institution shall administer 
these assets subject only to the general indications of profitability and 
risk established in the contract, and may not request nor receive 
investment instructions from the interested parties. It may not inform 
the parties of the composition of their investments, except in the case 
of mutual funds or when, for a justified cause, authorisation by the 
National Securities Market Commission may have been granted. 
Without prejudice to the responsibility of the interested parties, 
failure of the said institution to comply with these requirements shall 
be considered a very serious offence under the system of sanctions 
applicable to it as a financial institution. 
     YES 
28(2) In the three months following their taking of office and the end of 
their terms, and on an annual basis, the members of the Governing 
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Council must file a statement on their activities and their net worth 
situation, and those of their non-separated spouses and their 
dependent children. The statement shall be submitted to the Ministry 
of Public Administration, which may verify the information included 
and determine whether the interests revealed in the statement infringe 
the conditions set out in the previous paragraph. The statement shall 
be inscribed in the Registro de Intereses de Altos Cargos 
Sweden Chapter 3 
Article 1(1) 
A member of the Executive Board may not: (1) be a member of the 
Riksdag, (2) be a Cabinet minister; (3) be employed at the 
Government Offices, (4) be employed by the central administration 
of a political party; (5) be a member or deputy member of a board of 
directors of a bank or any other company subject to supervision by 
the Financial Supervisory Authority, or (6) hold any other 
employment or assignment which makes him unsuitable as member 
of the Executive Board.  
     YES 
Chapter 3 
Article 1(2) 
Nor may a member of the Executive Board be a minor, or a declared 
bankrupt, or be subject to a prohibition against carrying on a 
business, or have a trustee in accordance with Chapter 11, Article 7, 
of the Code relating to Parents, Guardians and Children. 
  YES    
Chapter 3 
Article 1(3) 
If a member takes an employment or assignment which can come into 
conflict with the provisions of the first paragraph, he shall 
immediately notify the General Council.  
     YES 
Chapter 3 
Article 1(4) 
For a period of one year after a member has ceased to serve on the 
Executive Board, he may not hold such employment or carry out such 
assignments as are referred to in the first paragraph (5) and (6), 
without the consent of the General Council.  
      
Chapter 4 
Article 4 
The Chairman and the Vice-Chairman of the General Council and the 
members of the Executive Board shall notify the Riksdag in writing 
1. holdings of financial instruments as stipulated in Chapter 1, 
Article 1, of the Financial Instruments Trading Act 
(1991:980), 
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2. holdings of shares in a partnership or an 
economic association except tenant-ownership 
associations, and shares in similar foreign legal entities, 
3. ownership, wholly or partly, of business premises pursuant 
to Chapter 2, Article 14, of the Income Tax Act 
(1999:1229), 
4. agreements of a financial nature with previous employers, 
such as agreements on wage and pension benefits, which are 
paid during the period covered by the assignment on the 
General Council or the employment on the Executive Board, 
and 
5. credits and other liabilities and the conditions for these. 
Notification of assets and agreements according to the 
first paragraph 2-4 need not be made if they together 
do not exceed a market value of SEK 500,000. The 
same applies to credits and other liabilities according 
to the first paragraph 5 if these together are less than 
SEK 500,000. 
Notification according to the first paragraph shall be 
made when the assignment or employment is 
commenced. If, according to the second paragraph, 
notification of assets and agreements or credits and 
other liabilities needs not be made at this time, 
notification shall be made at the latest within four 
weeks of exceeding the threshold stipulated in the 
second paragraph. 
Notification shall thereafter be made for every change 
that entails that 
1. an asset as stipulated in the first paragraph 1 has been 
acquired, 
2. the total value of assets and agreements pursuant to the first 
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paragraph 2-4 or the total value of credits and other 
liabilities pursuant to the first paragraph 5 has changed by 
more than SEK 100,000 since notification was last made on 
condition that the total value or amount after the change is 
not less than SEK 500,000, or 
a change in conditions has taken place with respect to credits and 
other liabilities that have been notified. 
 
.  
The United 
Kingdom 
Schedule 1 
1(2) 
A person appointed as Governor or Deputy Governor of the Bank 
shall work exclusively for the Bank. 
     YES 
 
Schedule 1 
5(1) 
A person is disqualified for appointment as Governor, Deputy 
Governor or director of the Bank if he is a Minister of the Crown or a 
person serving in a government department in employment in respect 
of which remuneration is payable out of money provided by 
Parliament. 
     YES 
Schedule 1 
5(2) 
A person is disqualified for appointment as director of the Bank if he 
is a servant of the Bank. 
     YES 
 
Table 3-8 Appointment procedure and the term of office 
Member 
State 
Article Text Appointed by  Proposed  
by 
Term of 
five years 
or more 
Re-appoint-
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possible 
Head of 
State 
Govern-
ment 
Parlia-
ment 
Austria 33(2) Members of the Governing Board shall be appointed by the 
Federal President on the basis of a proposal from the Federal 
Government. Each appointment shall be made for a term of 
five years. Persons holding office may be reappointed. 
YES   Federal 
Govern-
ment 
5 years YES 
Belgium 23(1); The Governor shall be appointed by the King for a renewable YES   N/A 5 years YES 
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34(1) 
Articles 
of 
Associati
on  
term of five years. He may be relieved from office by the King 
only if he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the 
performance of his duties or if he has been guilty of serious 
misconduct. With regard to this decision, he shall have the 
right of appeal as provided in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the 
ESCB. 
23(2); 
34(2) 
Articles 
of 
Associati
on;  
The other members of the Board of Directors shall be 
appointed by the King, on the proposal of the Council of 
Regency, for a renewable term of six years. They may be 
relieved from office by the King only if they no longer fulfil 
the conditions required for the performance of their duties or if 
they have been guilty of serious misconduct. 
      
27; 
40 
Articles 
of 
Associati
on 
The terms of the members of the Board of Directors, the 
Council of Regency and the Board of Censors shall expire no 
later than when they reach the age of sixty-seven years. 
However, subject to authorisation by the Minister of Finance, 
they may complete their current term. The terms of the 
members of the Board of Directors may afterwhile still be 
extended by one year, which term may be renewed. In the case 
of the Governor's term of office, the authorisation to complete 
the current term or its extension shall be granted by Royal 
Decree deliberated in the Council of Ministers.  
On no account may the office-holders referred to above remain 
in office beyond the age of seventy years. 
      
34 Within the month following their assumption of office, the 
Governor must provide evidence of ownership of 50 registered 
shares and each of the directors of 25 registered shares. 
They may not dispose of or pledge these shares before the 
expiry of their terms of office. 
      
Bulgaria 12(1) The Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank shall be elected 
by the National Assembly. 
  YES N/A   
12(2) The National Assembly shall elect the Deputy Governors –       
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heads of the basic departments under Article 19 – on a 
proposal by the Governor 
13(1) At entering into office, the Governor, the Deputy Governors 
and the other three members of the Governing Council shall be 
sworn in to abide by law, to contribute to the performance of 
the functions entrusted to the Bank, as well as to keep 
professional, bank, commercial and another secrecy protected 
by law even after their duties have ceased. 
      
13(2) The Governor and the Deputy Governors shall swear an oath 
to the National Assembly, and the other three members of the 
Governing Council to the President.  
      
12(4) The term of office of the members of the Governing Council 
shall be six years. Election/appointment of a new member of 
the Governing Council shall be made not earlier than three 
months and not later than two months before the end of the 
term of office of the current member. If the 
election/appointment is not made until the end of the term of 
office, the member of the Governing Council whose term of 
office has expired shall continue to perform his duties until the 
new election/appointment. 
    6 years N/A 
12(7) When a member of the Governing Council resigns, the duties 
of this member shall cease after a period of three months if a 
new member of the Governing Council is not 
elected/appointed within this period 
      
12(8) Relationships between the Bulgarian National Bank and the 
Governor and Deputy Governors shall be regulated by 
managing contracts according to rules determined by the 
Governing Council. 
      
14(2) Where the duties of a member of the Governing Council cease 
before the expiry of the term of office, another person shall be 
elected/appointed for the outstanding period of the term of 
office. 
    Less than 
6 years 
N/A 
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Cyprus 13(1) The directors shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers 
and shall be citizens of the Republic of recognised professional 
qualifications, and / or recognised economic and business 
experience who are not disqualified for appointment under 
section 14. 
      
13(2) Each director shall be appointed for a term of office of five 
years which shall be renewable, and may be relieved from 
office by decision of the Council of Ministers, on a 
recommendation from the Minister and after hearing the views 
of the Governor, provided he no longer fulfils the conditions 
required for the performance of his duties or is guilty of 
serious misconduct: 
Provided that, a person who holds at the date that this Law 
shall enter into force, the post of director, shall continue to 
hold such post, under the same conditions until the expiry of 
his term of office, unless otherwise provided by a subsequent 
law. 
      
13(3) When a person ceases to be a director before the expiry of the 
period of his appointment, the Council of Ministers shall 
appoint as director a person having the qualifications provided 
in subsection (1), for a term of five years. 
      
18(1) Subject to paragraph 1 of Article 118 of the Constitution, the 
Governor and the Deputy Governor shall be appointed by the 
President and the Vice-President of the Republic 
YES   N/A   
118(1)
819
 The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall 
appoint jointly two fit and proper persons one to be the 
Governor and the other to be the Deputy Governor of the 
Issuing Bank of the Republic: Provided that the Governor and 
the Deputy Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall 
not belong to the same Community.  
      
                                                 
819 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.  
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18(3) The Governor and the Deputy Governor shall be appointed for 
a renewable term of office of five years: Provided that, a 
person who holds at the date that this Law shall enter into 
force, the post of Governor or Deputy Governor, shall 
continue to hold such post, under the same conditions until the 
expiry of his term of office, unless otherwise provided by a 
subsequent law 
    5 years YES 
26 Every person shall, before assuming the duties of Governor, 
Deputy Governor, director or employee of the Bank, subscribe 
and take the oath provided in the Schedule.
820
  
      
The Czech 
Republic 
6(2) The Governor, Vice-Governors and other members shall be 
appointed and relieved from office by the President of the 
Republic. 
YES   N/A   
6(4) No person shall be allowed to hold the position of member of 
the Bank Board more than twice. 
     YES 
6(5) The members of the Bank Board shall be appointed for a term 
of six years. 
    6 years  
Denmark 6(1); 8(1) 
By-laws 
The Board of Governors shall consist of 3 members. One of 
the Governors shall be nominated by the King, and the other 
Governors appointed by the Board of Directors on the 
recommendation of the Committee of Directors. The first 
mentioned Governor shall be chairman of the Board of 
Governors 
YES   Com-
mittee of 
Directors 
  
9(1) By-
laws 
The Governor nominated by the King as well as the Governors 
elected by the Board of Directors shall be appointed for an 
unlimited time, but may be dismissed by the King and the 
    Unlimited N/A 
                                                 
820 ―I, ……………………, from……………………………… do solemnly swear that I will faithfully, truly and to the best of my judgement, skill and ability, execute and perform the duties 
required of me as a Governor, Deputy Governor, director, or employee, as the case may be, of the Central Bank of Cyprus and which properly relate to the office or employment in the said 
Bank held by me. I further solemnly swear that I will not communicate or allow to be communicated to any person not legally entitled thereto any information relating to the affairs and tasks 
in general of the Bank, nor will I allow any such person to inspect or have access to any books or documents belonging to or in the possession of the Bank and relating to the business and 
tasks in general of the Bank.‖ 
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Board of Directors respectively. A majority of 2/3 of the whole 
Board of Directors shall be required in the latter case 
Estonia 10(1) The Governor of Eesti Pank is appointed to office for a term of 
seven years by the President of the Republic on the proposal of 
the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. The Governor of Eesti 
Pank shall not be appointed to office for more than one 
consecutive term. 
YES   Super-
visory 
Board 
7 years No 
10(1
1
) The Governor of Eesti Pank shall notify the Supervisory Board 
of Eesti Pank of his or her resignation at least four months in 
advance. 
      
11
2
(1) Candidates for Governor of Eesti Pank and for Chairman and 
member of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall pass a 
security check before being appointed Governor of Eesti Pank 
or Chairman or a member of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank, unless they have a valid access permit in order to access 
state secrets classified as "top secret". 
      
11
2
(2) The status of candidate for Chairman of the Supervisory Board 
of Eesti Pank is acquired by a person to whom the President of 
the Republic makes a proposal to apply for the office and who 
agrees thereto in writing. The status of candidate for member 
of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank is acquired by a person 
to whom the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
makes a proposal to apply for the office and who agrees 
thereto in writing. The status of candidate for Governor of 
Eesti Pank is acquired by a person to whom the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank makes a proposal to apply for the office 
and who agrees thereto in writing. 
      
11
2
(3) The security check of candidates for Governor of Eesti Pank 
and for Chairman and member of the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank shall be performed by the Security Police Board 
pursuant to the procedure provided for in the Surveillance Act 
      
11
2
(4) In order to pass the security check, candidates for Governor of       
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Eesti Pank and for member of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank shall submit through Eesti Pank and candidates for 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall submit 
through the Office of the President of the Republic a 
completed application form for a permit to access state secrets 
classified as "top secret" to the Security Police Board, and also 
written consent which permits the agency performing security 
checks to obtain information concerning the person from 
natural and legal persons and from state and local government 
agencies and bodies during the performance of the security 
check. 
11
2
(5) Within three months as of receipt of the documents specified 
in subsection (4) of this section, the Security Police Board 
shall present the information gathered as a result of the 
security check on a candidate for Governor of Eesti Pank to the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, the information gathered as a 
result of the security check on a candidate for Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank to the President of the 
Republic and the information gathered as a result of the 
security check on a candidate for member of the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board 
of Eesti Pank and shall provide an opinion concerning the 
compliance of the candidate with the conditions for the issue 
of a permit for access to state secrets. 
      
11
2
(6) If the authority of the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank or the Governor of Eesti Pank terminates 
prematurely, a security check on the candidate for Chairman of 
the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank or for Governor of Eesti 
Pank shall be performed within one month as of receipt of the 
documents specified in subsection (4) of this section. With the 
permission of the Committee for the Protection of State 
Secrets, the term for performing the security check may be 
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extended by one month if circumstances specified in clause 30 
(2
1
) 1) or 2) of the State Secrets Act arise or if it is possible 
that circumstances specified in clause 30 (2
1
) 3) or 4) of the 
State Secrets Act may arise within one month. 
11
3
 If a new Governor of Eesti Pank or a new Chairman or 
member of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank has not been 
appointed by the due date for termination of the authority of 
the Governor of Eesti Pank or the Chairman or a member of 
the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, the authority of the 
person in office shall extend until the entry into force of a 
corresponding decision on appointment to office. 
      
Finland 13(1) The Board shall consist of the Chairman and a maximum of 
five other members, as appointed by the President of the 
Republic without public announcement of vacancies. The 
Chairman of the Board is appointed for a seven-year term and 
the other members of the Board each for a five-year term. A 
member of the Board must possess the expertise required for 
the tasks involved. 
YES   Council of 
State;
821
 
Super-
visory 
Board 
7 years  
13(2) The Chairman of the Board shall be the Governor of the Bank 
of Finland. 
      
13(3) One and the same person can be appointed as a member of the 
Board for a maximum of three terms. However, one and the 
same person can be appointed Chairman of the Board for two 
terms even if the said person has previously been a member of 
the Board. 
     YES 
France L. 142-8 The Governor and the two Deputy Governors shall be 
appointed by an Order made in the Council of Ministers for a 
six-year term of office, which may be renewed once. The age 
limit for holding these offices shall be sixty-five. 
 YES  N/A 6 years YES 
Germany 7(3) The members of the Executive Board shall be appointed by the YES   Federal 5 - 8 years N/A 
                                                 
821 Under Article 11(2) of the Finnish NCB Statute, the Parliamentary Supervisory Council shall make proposals to the Council of State on the filling of positions as members of the Board.  
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President of the Federal Republic of Germany. The President, 
the Vice-President and two other members shall be nominated 
by the Federal Government; the other four members shall be 
nominated by the Bundesrat (the upper house of Parliament 
representing the federal states) in agreement with the Federal 
Government. The Federal Government and the Bundesrat shall 
consult the Executive Board with regard to their nominations. 
Members shall be appointed for eight years or in exceptional 
cases for a shorter term of office, but not for less than five 
years. Appointments and retirements shall be published in the 
Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger). 
Govern-
ment 
Greece 5(3)
822
 The Governor and the Deputy Governors shall be appointed 
for a renewable six year term by presidential decree on a 
recommendation from the Council of Ministers following a 
proposal by the Bank‘s General Council. The Governor and 
the Deputy Governors may be relieved from office, in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in the Statute of the 
Bank, only if they are no longer capable of performing their 
duties or are guilty of serious misconduct. Except for matters 
hereby assigned to the Monetary Policy Council, the Governor 
shall be responsible for all other matters falling within the 
duties of the ESCB and shall retain the responsibilities 
conferred upon him by the Statute of the Bank and the 
legislation in force. From the establishment of the ESCB, the 
Governor shall participate ex officio as an independent 
personality in the General Council and the Governing Council 
of the ECB, in accordance with the Statute of the ESCB. 
YES   Council of 
Ministers; 
General 
Council 
6 years N/A 
21(2) The Governor and Deputy Governors shall be appointed as 
provided for in Article 29, while the other members of the 
Monetary Policy Council as provided for in Article 35A. 
      
                                                 
822 Law No. 2548 "Provisions relating to the Bank of Greece" 
 345 
 
Member 
State 
Article Text Appointed by  Proposed  
by 
Term of 
five years 
or more 
Re-appoint-
ment 
possible 
Head of 
State 
Govern-
ment 
Parlia-
ment 
22(5) The Governor, Deputy Governors, and Councillors shall, on 
taking up office, take oath to strictly and faithfully observe the 
provisions of this Statute, to promote the welfare of the Bank 
in all respects, to devote themselves, honourably and 
assiduously, to the administration of the Bank‘s business, and 
be pledged to secrecy with regard to the Bank‘s transactions. 
The Governor and Deputy Governors shall take oath before 
[the President of the Republic], and the Councillors before the 
Governor at a meeting of the General Council 
      
29(1) The Governor and the Deputy Governors shall be appointed 
for a six-year term by a Presidential Decree on a proposal of 
the Council of Ministers following a proposal by the Bank‘s 
General Council. They shall devote their whole time to the 
affairs of the Bank, except in cases where, by law, they are 
members of the Board of Directors of legal entities in public 
law, public enterprises or state advisory bodies. 
YES   Council of 
Ministers; 
General 
Council 
6 years N/A 
29(2) University professors of Law and Economics may be 
appointed to the positions of Governor and Deputy Governor 
of the Bank, while retaining the right to exercise their 
university duties. 
      
35A(6) 
first 
sentence 
The Governor and Deputy Governors are members of the 
Monetary Policy Council as long as they retain their position. 
      
Hungary 50(3) The President of the MNB shall be appointed by the President 
of the Republic for a term of six years, at the proposal of the 
Prime Minister. 
YES   Prime 
Minister 
6 years N/A 
49(6) Candidates for the Monetary Council shall be heard by the 
competent parliamentary committee. 
      
49(7) The members of the Monetary Council shall enter into office 
on the day specified in their respective appointments or, in the 
absence of such date, when appointed. The member of the 
Monetary Council shall make an oath or a solemn promise and 
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sign a document before the President of the Republic, with the 
words stipulated in the Act on the Oath and Solemn Promise of 
Certain Public Officials. 
Ireland 19(1) The Governor shall be appointed by the President on the 
advice of the Government and shall receive such remuneration 
and allowances and be subject to such conditions of service as 
the Board shall from time to time determine. 
YES      
19(3) A person appointed as Governor holds office for 7 years from 
the date of the person‘s appointment, unless the person 
previously ceases to hold that office as provided by this Part. 
    7 years  
19(4) The President, on the advice of the Government, may appoint a 
person holding office as Governor for a further period of 7 
years to take effect at the end of the person‘s current period of 
appointment. This subsection applies whether the person was 
appointed under subsection (1) or this subsection. 
     YES 
Italy 17(1) Pursuant to Articles 19(7) and 19(8) of Law no. 262 of 28 
December 2005, the appointment of the Governor, his 
reappointment and his removal from office in the cases 
provided for by Article 14(2) of the Statute of the ESCB shall 
be enacted by means of a decree issued by the President of the 
Republic, acting on a proposal from the President of the 
Council of Ministers following the adoption of a resolution by 
the Council of Ministers after hearing the opinion of the Bank 
of Italy‘s Board of Directors. 
YES   Prime 
Minister; 
Board of 
Directors 
  
17(2) In order to express the opinion referred to in the previous 
paragraph, the Board of Directors shall be convened and 
chaired by the senior member in terms of appointment or, if 
this is the same, of age. The opinion, approved by a qualified 
majority of two thirds of the members of the Board, shall be 
issued for the purposes of the resolution of the Council of 
Ministers. 
      
24(6) The Governor‘s term of office shall be six years; it may be     6 years YES 
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renewed only once. 
Latvia 22(1) The Governor of the Bank of Latvia shall be appointed through 
a secret ballot by the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia upon 
the recommendation of at least ten members of the Saeima of 
the Republic of Latvia. 
  YES 10 
members 
of the 
Saeima 
  
22(3) The Governor of the Bank of Latvia, the Deputy Governor, 
and members of the Council shall hold office for six years. In 
case any member of the Council resigns before his/her term of 
office has expired, a new member of the Council of the Bank 
of Latvia shall be appointed. 
    6 years N/A 
Lithuania 10(4) The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall be 
appointed for a term of five years and dismissed prior to the 
expiration of his or her term of office by the Seimas on the 
recommendation of the President of the Republic. 
  YES President 
of the 
Republic 
5 years  
10(6) The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania may be 
appointed to his position for unlimited number of terms of 
office. The Deputy Chairpersons and Members of the Board 
may be appointed to their respective positions for no more than 
two consecutive terms. 
     YES 
Luxembourg 7(2) Appointments shall be made for a six-year period and shall be 
renewable. 
     TES 
12(2) Board members shall be appointed by the Grand Duke on a 
proposal by the Government in Cabinet for a six-year period. 
Appointments shall be renewable 
YES   Govern 
ment 
6 years YES 
12(5) Prior to taking up duties, Board members shall take the 
following oath before the Minister responsible for relations 
with the central bank: ―I swear loyalty to the Grand Duke, 
obedience to the Constitution and to the laws of the State. I 
promise to fulfill my duties with integrity, thoroughness and 
impartiality an to maintain the secrecy of deliberations‖.  
      
Malta 8(1) The Governor and the Deputy Governor shall be persons of 
recognised standing and experience in economic, financial or 
YES   Prime 
Minister 
5 Years YES 
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banking matters and shall each be appointed by the President 
of Malta, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. They 
shall be appointed for a term of five years but shall be eligible 
for re-appointment. They shall receive such remuneration as 
shall be set out in their respective letters of appointment 
The 
Netherlands 
12(2); 
6(6) 
Articles 
of Asso-
ciation 
The President and the Executive Directors shall be appointed 
by Royal Decree, each time for a term of seven years. For the 
purpose of each such appointment, a short list containing the 
names of three persons shall be drawn up at a joint meeting of 
the Governing Board and the Supervisory Board. 
YES   N/A 7 years N/A 
Poland 9(1) The President of the NBP shall be appointed and dismissed by 
the Sejm, at the request of the President of the Republic of 
Poland. 
  YES President 
of the 
Republic 
  
9(2) The term of office of the President of the NBP shall be six 
years. The same person shall not serve as President of the NBP 
for more than two consecutive terms. 
    6 years YES 
9(3) The President of the NBP shall assume his/her duties after 
taking the following oath before the Sejm: "In assuming the 
duties of the President of Narodowy Bank Polski, I solemnly 
swear that I shall strictly observe the provisions of the 
Constitution and other laws, and that in all my actions I shall 
pursue the economic development of our Homeland and the 
well-being of its citizens". This oath may be taken with the 
addition of the words, "So help me God". 
      
Portugal 27 The Governor and the other members of the Board of Directors 
of the Bank shall be appointed by the Cabinet, on a proposal 
from the Finance Minister.  
 YES  Finance 
Minister 
  
33(2) The members of the Board of Directors shall be in office for 
renewable terms of five years. 
    5 years  YES 
33(3) The five-year term of office shall terminate on the date of the 
approval of accounts for the last fiscal year that started within 
that term 
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Romania 33(3) Members of the National Bank of Romania‘s Board are 
appointed by the Parliament - that also nominates the executive 
management - on the recommendation of the competent 
standing committees of the two Chambers of Parliament. 
  YES standing 
committee 
of the 
Parlia-
ment
823
 
  
33(4) Appointments are made for a period of five years, with the 
possibility of renewal. 
    5 years  YES  
33(5) If the Board becomes incomplete, the vacancies shall be filled 
for the respective office, in compliance with paragraphs (3) 
and (4) hereof. 
      
33(8) Appointment, retirement and recalling from office of any 
member of the National Bank of Romania‘s Board shall be 
published in Monitorul Oficial al României, Part One. 
      
Slovakia 7(2) The Governor and the Vice-Governors shall be appointed and 
dismissed by the President of the Slovak Republic upon the 
recommendation of the Government and with approval of the 
National Council of the Slovak Republic; if they have not been 
appointed from among employees of Národná banka 
Slovenska, they shall become employees of Národná banka 
Slovenska on the date of their appointment. 
YES   Govern-
ment; 
National 
Council 
  
7(3) Eight other members of the Bank Board shall be appointed and 
dismissed by the Government upon the recommendation of the 
Governor of the National Bank of Slovakia. 
      
7(4) The members of the Bank Board shall be appointed for a term 
of five years. The term of office of the Governor, Vice-
Governor or another member of the Bank Board shall start to 
run on the effective date of their appointment to the relevant 
office. The same person can be reappointed as a member of the 
Bank Board but for no more than two consecutive terms of 
office. To be appointed a member of the Bank Board a natural 
    5 years YES  
                                                 
823 It appears that there may be two committees as the law refers to the ‗competent standing committees of the two Chambers of Parliament‘.  
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person must have appropriate professional knowledge and 
experience in the field of monetary policy or finance, and have 
full legal capacity, and moral integrity. Deemed as appropriate 
professional knowledge and experience shall be completed 
university education and at least five years experience in a 
management, scientific, or academic position in the monetary 
or finance areas. Deemed as a person with moral integrity shall 
be a natural person who has never been lawfully convicted of 
an intentional criminal offence; such integrity is to be proven 
by an extract from the criminal records register 
Slovenia 35 The Governor of the Bank of Slovenia shall be appointed by 
the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia for a six-
year term of office upon the proposal made by the President of 
the Republic of Slovenia, and shall be eligible for re-
appointment. 
  YES  President 
of the 
Republic 
6 years YES 
37(1) The Governor of the Bank of Slovenia shall notify the 
President of the Republic of Slovenia and the National 
Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia about the expiry of the 
term of office of any member of the Governing Board of the 
Bank of Slovenia no later than six months prior to the expiry 
of his term of office. 
      
37(2) The President of the Republic of Slovenia shall publish in 30 
days upon the receive of the notification pursuant to the above 
paragraph of this Article in Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Slovenia an announced call for proposals for potential 
candidates for members of the Governing Board of the Bank of 
Slovenia. 
      
37(3) The proposals shall be sent in a term not to be shorter than 30 
days from the publishing of the call for proposals. In the case 
of premature dismissal from the office the term shall not be 
shorter than 15 days from the publishing of the call for 
proposals. The proposals shall be explained and shall include 
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written consent by the candidates. 
37(4) Amongst the entered potential candidates for the members of 
the Governing Board of the Bank of Slovenia, the President of 
the Republic of Slovenia shall propose to the National 
Assembly candidates for members of Governing Board of the 
Bank of Slovenia, although he can also propose other 
candidates. The proposal shall be made in 30 days from the 
expiration of the term defined in the previous paragraph of this 
Article. Each proposal shall be explained and a written consent 
by the candidate shall be added. 
      
37(5) The National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia shall vote 
about the proposed candidate for the member of the Governing 
board of the Bank of Slovenia in 30 days from the submission 
of the proposal. Nomination is made by a secret ballot. The 
proposed candidate is appointed for the office if a majority of 
all deputies voted for him. 
      
37(6) If the proposed candidate does not acquire the necessary 
majority, the President of the National Assembly immediately 
shall notify the President of the Republic of Slovenia who shall 
in the next 14 days notify the President of the National 
Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia about his decision 
regarding the further procedure of appointment. 
      
Spain 24(1) The Governor of the Bank shall be appointed by the King 
following a proposal by the President of the Government. 
Nominees shall be Spanish and will have recognised 
competence in monetary or banking matters. Prior to the 
appointment of the Governor, the Economy and Finance 
Minister shall appear before the relevant parliamentary 
committee under the terms envisaged in article 203 of the 
Spanish Parliamentary Internal Regulations, to report on the 
proposed candidate. 
YES   Prime 
Minister 
  
25(1) The terms of office of the Governor and the Deputy Governor     6 years No 
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will be simultaneous, for a period of six years, and non-
renewable for the same position. 
Sweden Chapter 
1, Article 
4(1) 
Pursuant to Chapter 9, Article 13 of the Instrument of 
Government, the activities of the Riksbank are managed by an 
Executive Board, consisting of six members, who are 
appointed by the General Council for a period of six years. The 
General Council appoints the Chairman of the Executive 
Board, who at the same time shall be the Governor of the 
Riksbank, and at least one Vice-Chairman, who at the same 
time shall serve as Deputy Governor of the Riksbank. 
  General 
Council
824
  
 6 years N/A 
The United 
Kingdom 
Schedule 
1 
1(1) 
Appointment as Governor or Deputy Governor of the Bank 
shall be for a period of 5 years. 
      
 
Table 3-9 Appointment of an alternate under national law 
Member State Article Text Governor replaced by: Authority granted when:   
Member of the 
same decision-
making body 
Other Governor 
remains in the 
office 
No Governor 
appointed  
Austria 34(4) Should the Governor be absent or unable to perform his duties, 
he shall be represented by the Deputy Governor or, in the latter‘s 
absence, by the Governing Board member with the longest term 
of office. If this applies to several members of the Governing 
Board, the oldest Governing Board member shall deputize.  
Yes  Yes N/A 
Belgium 18 (1);(2) 
28(1);(2) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Governor shall direct the Bank and preside over the Board 
of Directors and the Council of Regency. If he is unable to 
attend, he shall be replaced by the Vice-Governor without 
prejudice to the application of Article 10.2 of the Statute of the 
Yes  Yes  
                                                 
824 The Swedish NCB General Council is composed of members of Parliament.  
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ESCB. 
71(1) The Governor shall sign agreements, settlements and documents 
of all kinds without being required to furnish proof of any power 
whatsoever vis-à-vis third parties. He may delegate this 
authority. 
  Yes  
Bulgaria 15(2) The sessions of the Governing Council shall be presided by the 
Governor of the Bank; should the Governor be absent, by a 
Deputy Governor appointed by him. 
Yes   No 
18(1) The Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank shall organize, 
direct and supervise the activities of the Bank, other than those 
mandated by this or another law exclusively to the Deputy 
Governors, and shall represent the Bank at home and abroad. He 
may delegate some of his competences to other officials. 
  Yes  
12(7) When a member of the Governing Council resigns, the duties of 
this member shall cease after a period of three months if a new 
member of the Governing Council is not elected/appointed 
within this period 
   No 
Cyprus 9(6) Chairman of the Committee shall be the Governor, who shall 
convene a meeting of the Committee, at least once a month and 
whenever necessary, or in his temporary absence or temporary 
incapacity the Deputy Governor. 
Yes  Yes  
17(2) The Governor shall preside at the meetings of the Board, or in 
his temporary absence or temporary incapacity the Deputy 
Governor, and in case of the absence of both from any meeting, 
the remaining members of the Board attending such meeting 
shall elect one of them to preside at such meeting. 
Yes  Yes  
21 The Deputy Governor shall assist the Governor in the 
performance of his tasks and , in the absence or temporary 
incapacity of the Governor, shall perform all the tasks of the 
Governor as provided by the Constitution or under this Law 
Yes  Yes  
The Czech 7(1) The Governor, or, in his absence, a Vice-Governor nominated by Yes  Yes  
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Republic him, shall chair the meetings of the Bank Board. The Bank 
Board shall act by a simple majority of the votes cast. The Bank 
Board shall have a quorum if the Governor, or his nominee, and 
at least three other members of the Bank Board are present. In 
the event of a tie, the chairperson shall have the casting vote. 
8 The Governor shall represent the Czech National Bank 
externally; in his absence, a Vice-Governor nominated by him 
shall act on his behalf 
Yes  Yes  
Denmark 3 By-laws No person in the service of the Bank may be a member of the 
Board of Directors. During the absence of a Governor a member 
of the Board of Directors may temporarily be appointed 
Governor; but the person appointed shall not in that period be 
entitled to vote on the Board of Directors. A deputy of the 
Governor nominated by the King shall be appointed by the 
Royal Bank-Commissioner. A deputy of a Governor appointed 
by the Board of Directors shall be appointed by the Chairman of 
the Board of Directors, as far as possible after conference with 
the Committee of Directors. 
Yes  Yes N/A 
Estonia 10(4) In the absence of the Governor of Eesti Pank, a Deputy 
Governor shall substitute for him or her and the Governor of 
Eesti Pank shall transfer his or her authority temporarily to the 
Deputy Governor by a regulation. If it is not possible to transfer 
the authority to a Deputy Governor, the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank shall designate the person to substitute for the 
Governor from among the Deputy Governors. If the Supervisory 
Board has not designated a person to substitute for the Governor, 
the Deputy Governor who is senior in age shall substitute for the 
Governor. The person substituting for the Governor of Eesti 
Pank shall, during his or her term of authority, have the full 
authority of the Governor of Eesti Pank. 
Yes  Yes N/A 
11
3
 If a new Governor of Eesti Pank or a new Chairman or member   Yes  
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of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank has not been appointed 
by the due date for termination of the authority of the Governor 
of Eesti Pank or the Chairman or a member of the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank, the authority of the person in office shall 
extend until the entry into force of a corresponding decision on 
appointment to office. 
Finland 11, second 
part 
In respect of the Bank‘s administration, the Parliamentary 
Supervisory Council shall: 
[2) decide on the principles for determining salaries, leaves of 
absence and annual leaves of members of the Board as well as 
on the execution of their duties during leaves of absence 
exceeding one week;] 
Yes  Yes  
France L. 142-8(5) The Governor shall appoint all of the Bank‘s employees, subject 
to the provisions of Article L. 142-3. The Governor shall be 
assisted by a First Deputy Governor and a Second Deputy 
Governor. The Deputy Governors shall exercise the functions 
delegated to them by the Governor. Should the Governor be 
absent or prevented from attending a meeting, one of the Deputy 
Governors, specifically nominated for that purpose by the 
Governor, shall preside over the Monetary Policy Council and 
the General Council. 
Yes  Yes  
Germany 1(5) 
Organi-
sational 
Statute 
The schedule of responsibilities shall establish the system of 
representation of the members of the Board. If the member of the 
Board concerned is temporarily absent, policy decisions and 
organisational changes may not be made by his alternate without 
a compelling reason. 
Yes  Yes  
Greece 32(2) The senior Deputy Governor, who is second only to the 
Governor, shall replace him when absent, unable to be present or 
non-existing, to the full extent of his duties; in the absence of 
both, the Governor shall be replaced by the junior Deputy 
Governor.  
Yes  Yes Yes 
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32(3) The seniority of Governors shall be determined on the basis of 
the time elapsed since their initial appointment, provided that 
their term of office has been uninterrupted since then. 
    
32(4) If all members of the Administration of the Bank are unable to 
be present, the Governor shall be replaced by another member of 
the General Council, to be appointed at the beginning of the year 
to this effect 
Yes  N/A N/A 
Hungary 50(6) The President of the MNB shall appoint a Vice-President with 
general authorisation to represent him in the event that he is 
obstructed. 
Yes  Yes  
52(6) The Board of Directors shall adopt its resolutions by a simple 
majority of the votes cast. In the event of a tie, the Chairperson 
shall have the casting vote. In the event that the Chairperson is 
unable to vote from voting, the Vice-President described in 
Article 50, paragraph (6) shall have the casting vote. The Board 
of Directors shall have a quorum if at least three of its members 
are present.  
Yes  N/A  
Ireland N/A      
Italy 22(1) The Governor or, in the event of his absence or inability to act, 
the Director General, shall convene the Directorate and set the 
agenda whenever he considers this necessary or upon a 
motivated request from one of the other members of the 
Directorate indicating the matters to be dealt with. 
Yes  Yes N/A 
22(2) The meetings of the Directorate shall be chaired by the Governor 
or, in the event of his absence or inability to act, the person who 
stands in for him as provided for in Articles 25 and 26; the 
quorum shall be three members. 
Yes  Yes  
25(4) The Director General shall assist the Governor in the 
performance of his duties and shall stand in for the Governor in 
the event of the latter‘s absence or inability to act; the signature 
of the Director General shall be full proof thereof vis-à-vis third 
Yes  Yes  N/A 
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parties. 
26(1) The Deputy Directors General shall assist the Director General 
in the performance of his duties and shall stand in for him in the 
event of his absence or inability to act. Each of them may stand 
in for the Governor and the Director General in the event of their 
simultaneous absence or inability to act. 
    
26(2) The signature of one of the Deputy Directors General shall be 
full proof vis-à-vis third parties of the absence or inability to act 
of the Governor and the Director General. 
    
Latvia 28(5) In the event the Governor of the Bank of Latvia is absent, his/her 
rights and obligations shall be fulfilled by the Deputy Governor 
or by the person appointed by an express order. 
Yes Yes
825
 Yes N/A 
29 second 
sentence 
The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Latvia shall be 
entitled to participate in meetings of Republic of Latvia 
Government when authorised by the Governor of the Bank or in 
the event of the Governor's absence, and shall be entitled to 
represent Bank of Latvia interests. 
 Yes Yes N/A 
Lithuania 17(2) In the event of the absence of the Chairperson of the Board of 
the Bank of Lithuania, his or her duties shall be performed by 
one of the Deputy Chairpersons on a mandate from the 
Chairperson of the Board. 
Yes  Yes No
826
 
Luxembourg 8(1) The Council shall be presided by the Director-General of the 
Central Bank or, in his absence, by the oldest member of Board 
of Directors present. 
Yes  Yes  
Malta 8(3) The Deputy Governor shall perform such duties as the Governor 
may direct and, in the event of the absence of, or a vacancy in 
the office of, the Governor, the Deputy Governor shall perform 
the duties of the Governor and shall have and may exercise the 
Yes  Yes Yes 
                                                 
825 The assessment is based on the phrase ―by the person appointed by an express order‖. 
826 The authority can be delegated only by the Chairperson.  
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powers and perform the functions of the Governor 
The Netherlands 6(4) 
Articles of 
Association 
second 
sentence 
With due observance of Article 10.2 of the Statute, the President 
may appoint an alternate as a member of the ECB Governing 
Council.  
Yes  Yes No 
8(1) 
Articles of 
Association  
If one or more members of the Governing Board are absent or 
unable to act, the remaining members shall continue to be 
charged with the management of the Bank. If the President is 
absent or unavailable to act, the office of President shall, with 
due observance of the provision of Article 6(4), be taken 
temporarily by the then most senior Executive Director present 
or, if he is absent or unavailable to act, by the then most senior 
Executive Director present, and so on.  
Yes  Yes No 
8(2) 
Articles of 
Association 
If all members of the Governing Board save one are absent or 
unavailable to act, the remaining member shall continue to be 
charged with the management of the Bank. In that case, the 
Supervisory Board may decide to appoint, whether or not from 
among its own members, one or more persons to bear 
temporarily the responsibility for the Bank‘s management, the 
office of President being taken temporarily by the remaining 
member of the Governing Board.  
 Member of 
the 
Supervisory 
Board 
Yes  
8(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
If all members of the Governing Board are absent or unable to 
act, the Supervisory Board shall be charged temporarily with the 
management of the Bank. In that case, the Supervisory Board 
may decide to appoint, whether or not from among its own 
members, two or more persons to bear temporarily the 
responsibility of the Bank‘s management. The office of 
President shall then be taken temporarily by the Chairman of 
Supervisory Board.  
 Supervisory 
Board 
No Yes 
8(4) The person referred to in Article 11(2) [Supervisory Board     
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Association 
member appointed by the Government] cannot be appointed to 
bear or share temporarily the responsibility of the Bank‘s 
management. 
8(5) 
Articles of 
Association 
In the event that, in his capacity as a member of the ECB 
Governing Council, the President is replaced, the provisions of 
Article 6(5) and (7) shall, to the extent necessary, apply 
correspondingly to the person so replacing the President.  
    
Poland 10(1) In the event of absence, the President of the NBP shall be 
substituted by the Vice-President of the NBP – the First Deputy 
President of the NBP 
Yes  Yes  
16(1a) During the absence of the Chairperson the meeting shall be 
presided by one of the members of the Council. 
Yes  Yes  
16(2) The procedures for the activities of the Council and for selecting 
the member who presides the meeting during the absence of the 
Chairperson of the Council shall be laid down in a bylaw 
adopted by the Council by majority vote. 
    
Portugal 31(1) The Governor, if he is absent or prevented, shall be replaced in 
the following way and order: (a) by the senior Vice-governor or, 
in equal circumstances, by the oldest in age; (b) by the senior 
director or, in equal circumstances, by the oldest in age.  
Yes  Yes  
31(2) The substitution rule laid down in the foregoing paragraph shall 
apply to vacancies. 
Yes  No Yes 
31(3) The signature of a Vice-governor or of a Director, alleging the 
situations envisaged in the foregoing paragraphs, shall be a 
presumption of the aforesaid absence, prevention or vacancy 
before third parties, including notaries, registrars, and other 
public office holders 
    
Romania 35(1) The National Bank of Romania‘s Governor shall take measures 
to enforce legal provisions, the Board‘s decisions and other 
regulations concerning the National Bank of Romania. The 
Governor may delegate some of his powers to the Senior Deputy 
Yes  Yes  
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Governor and to the Deputy Governors, under the terms 
established by the Board. 
35(5) Should the Governor be absent or incapacitated to act, the Senior 
Deputy Governor shall take charge. 
Yes  Yes N/A 
Slovakia 9(1) The Governor shall represent the National Bank of Slovakia vis-
à-vis third parties; when he is not present, he will be represented 
by a Vice-Governor delegated by him, or, if neither of the Vice-
Governors is present, by another member of the Bank Board 
delegated by the Governor. If the function of the Governor 
ceases and a new Governor has not been appointed, the powers 
of Governor of the National Bank of Slovakia shall pass to the 
Vice-Governor authorized by the Bank Board; if neither of the 
Vice-Governors is appointed, these powers shall pass to another 
Bank Board member authorized by the Bank Board.  
Yes  Yes Yes 
Slovenia 30(3) The Governor of the Bank of Slovenia shall empower one of the 
vice-governors to act in the capacity of a deputy 
Yes  Yes No 
Spain 19 The Deputy Governor shall substitute for the Governor when the 
post becomes vacant or in the event of absence or illness, in 
performing managing or representative functions for the Bank. 
In addition, the Deputy Governor shall have the powers assigned 
to him by internal Bank rules and delegated to him by the 
Governor. 
Yes  Yes No 
Sweden Chapter 1 
Article 4(2) 
When required, in the absence or incapacity of the Governor, the 
General Council shall determine in which order the Deputy 
Governors shall serve in his place.  
Yes  Yes No 
The United 
Kingdom 
N/A      
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Table 3-10 Grounds of dismissal and the procedure 
Member 
State 
Article Text Grounds of dismissal:  Dismissal 
procedure 
prescribed in 
the NCB 
Statute 
Court of 
Justice 
competence 
noted 
not 
regulated 
copy of 
Article 14.2  
different than 
Article 14.2  
Austria 33(4) The members of the Governing Board may be removed 
from office only if they no longer fulfil the conditions 
for holding office (paragraph 3) or if they should be 
guilty of serious misconduct. The non-fulfilment of 
conditions for holding office shall also include a 
member of the Governing Board being prevented from 
performing the duties of office for a period of more 
than one year. 
 Yes Yes
827
 No  
Belgium 23(1) 
34(1) 
Articles of 
Association; 
 
The Governor shall be appointed by the King for a 
renewable term of five years. He may be relieved from 
office by the King only if he no longer fulfils the 
conditions required for the performance of his duties or 
if he has been guilty of serious misconduct. With 
regard to this decision, he shall have the right of appeal 
as provided in Article 14.2 of the Statute of the ESCB. 
 Yes  Yes Yes 
Bulgaria 14(1) The competent authority under Article 12 may relieve 
from office a member of the Governing Council only if 
he no longer fulfils the conditions required for the 
performance of his duties under Article 11, para. 4, if 
he is in practical inability to perform his duties for 
more than six months, or if he has been guilty of 
serious misconduct. 
  Yes Yes No 
14(3) From the date of accession of Bulgaria to the European 
Union, a decision to remove the Governor of the BNB 
     
                                                 
827 The text is expanded compared to the wording of Article 14.2 of the Statute.  
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from office may be referred to the Court of Justice by 
the Governor concerned or by the Governing Council 
of the European Central Bank.  
Cyprus 18(4) Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 118 of the 
Constitution, the Governor and the Deputy Governor 
may be relieved from office, only if in the opinion of 
the Council established under paragraph 8 of Article 
153 of the Constitution, they no longer fulfil the 
conditions required for the performance of their duties 
or they are guilty of serious misconduct. 
 Yes  Yes No 
118(4)
828
 The President and the Vice-President of the Republic 
acting jointly may, at any time, terminate the 
appointment of either the Governor or the Deputy 
Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic or both 
as such Governor or Deputy Governor, as the case may 
be 
     
118(6)
829
 Any disciplinary matter in connexion with the exercise 
of the functions of the Governor and the Deputy 
Governor of the Issuing Bank of the Republic shall be 
within the competence of the Council established under 
paragraph 8 of Article 153 
     
153(8)
830
 (1) There shall be established a Council consisting of 
the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court as 
Chairman and the Greek and the Turkish judge of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court as members.  
(2) This Council shall have exclusive competence to 
     
                                                 
828 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.  
829 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.  
830 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus.  
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determine all matters relating to-  
(a) the retirement, dismissal or otherwise the 
termination of the appointment of the President of the 
High Court in accordance with the conditions of 
service laid down in the instrument of his appointment;  
(b) the retirement or dismissal of any Greek judge or 
the Turkish judge of the High Court on any of the 
grounds provided in subparagraphs (3) and (4) of 
paragraph 7 of this Article. 
(3) The proceedings of the Council under subparagraph 
(2) of this paragraph shall be of a judicial nature and 
the judge concerned shall be entitled to be heard and 
present his case before the Council.  
(4) The decision of the Council taken by a majority 
shall be binding upon the President and the Vice-
President of the Republic who shall jointly act 
accordingly.  
The Czech 
Republic 
6(13) The Governor shall be relieved from office by the 
President of the Republic if he no longer fulfils the 
conditions required for the performance of his duties or 
if he has been guilty of serious misconduct. The 
President of the Republic may also relieve the 
Governor from office if he fails to perform his duties 
for a period exceeding six months. A decision to this 
effect may be referred to the European Court of Justice 
by the Governor concerned or the Governing Council 
of the European Central Bank on grounds of 
infringement of the Treaty establishing the European 
 Yes Yes
831
 Yes Yes 
                                                 
831 See footnote 827.  
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Community or of any rule of law relating to its 
application. 
Denmark 9(1) By-
laws 
The Governor nominated by the King as well as the 
Governors elected by the Board of Directors shall be 
appointed for an unlimited time, but may be dismissed 
by the King and the Board of Directors respectively. A 
majority of 2/3 of the whole Board of Directors shall 
be required in the latter case 
  Yes Yes No 
Estonia 12(2) The Governor and a Deputy Governor of Eesti Pank 
may be dismissed only on the basis specified in Article 
14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank 
 Yes  No No 
28(7) 
Articles of 
Association 
If the Governor of Eesti Pank ceases to comply with 
the requirements necessary for the performance of the 
Governor's duties or is convicted of serious 
misconduct, the Supervisory Board may make a 
proposal to the President of the Republic to remove the 
Governor of Eesti Pank before the expiry of the term of 
his or her authority.  
     
Finland 16(1) The President of the Republic may dismiss a member 
of the Board only if the member no longer fulfils the 
conditions required for the performance of his duties or 
if he has been guilty of serious misconduct. 
 Yes  Yes  
16(2) A member of the Board other than the Chairman of the 
Board may appeal a decision referred to above in 
paragraph 1 to the Supreme Administrative Court as 
prescribed in applicable provisions of the Act on 
Application of Administrative Law (586/1996). The 
    Yes
832
 
                                                 
832 The wording of the law suggests that Article 14.2 of the Statute would apply directly to the Chairman of the Board. 
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Statute provides for the right of appeal of the Chairman 
of the Board. 
France L. 142-5(1) The members of the Monetary Policy Council shall be 
bound by professional secrecy. A member may be 
dismissed before his term of office expires only if he is 
no longer capable of performing his duties or if he is 
guilty of serious misconduct. Any such removal from 
office shall require a reasoned submission from the 
Monetary Policy Council acting on a majority vote of 
its members excluding the person concerned. 
 Yes  No  
L. 144-3 Any litigation relating to the internal management of 
the Banque de France or between the Banque de 
France and members of the Monetary Policy Council, 
the General Council or its own staff shall fall within 
the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. 
    No 
L 142-8 (8) The Governor and the two Deputy Governors shall not 
be dismissed before their term of office expires unless 
they become incapable of performing their duties or are 
guilty of serious misconduct. Any such dismissal shall 
be on the basis of a reasoned request by the General 
Council supported by a majority of its members 
excluding the person concerned. 
     
Germany N/A N/A Yes   No No 
Greece 24 The Governor, Deputy Governors and Councillors may 
be relieved from office by the General Meeting of 
Shareholders if they are no longer capable of 
performing their duties or are guilty of serious 
misconduct, especially if they have violated the present 
Statute, disclosed confidential information about the 
affairs of the Bank or abused their position for their 
 Yes Yes Yes No 
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own benefit or for business purposes. 
Hungary 49(8) The mandate of a member of the Monetary Council 
shall terminate upon: 
a) expiration of the term of office; 
b) resignation; 
c) dismissal; or 
d) death. 
     
49(10) The President of the Republic may only terminate the 
mandate of a member of the Monetary Council by 
dismissal, 
a) if the member of the Monetary Council no longer 
fulfils the conditions required for the performance of 
his duties for reasons beyond his control; 
b) if the member of the Monetary Council no longer 
fulfils the conditions required for the performance of 
his duties for reasons within his control, or if he has 
been guilty of serious misconduct, in particular, if he 
deliberately fails to satisfy the obligation to declare his 
wealth or deliberately includes in such a declaration 
essential information or facts which are untrue. 
 Yes Yes
833
   
50(3) The President of the Republic shall dismiss the 
President of the MNB in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in Article 49, paragraph (10), at the 
proposal of the Prime Minister. 
   Yes  
50(4) A proposal for dismissal pursuant to paragraph (3) 
shall be sent to the President of the MNB, who may 
apply to the labour court, in accordance with the 
regulations set forth in the Labour Code. 
   Yes No 
                                                 
833 See footnote 827.  
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50(5) The proposal for dismissal may be submitted to the 
President of the Republic following expiration of the 
period for application to the labour court, or, in the 
event that the labour court is applied to, following the 
rendering of a final decision by the court. 
   Yes  
50(6) A proposal for dismissal may be submitted to the 
President of the Republic following the expiration of 
the period for application to the labour court, or, in the 
event that the labour court is applied to, after the court 
decision has been rendered final. 
     
Ireland 19(7) A person ceases to hold office as Governor if the 
person 
(a) dies, or 
(b) completes a term of office and is not re-appointed, 
or 
(c) resigns by notice in writing given to the President, 
or 
(d) is, with the person‘s consent, nominated as a 
candidate for election as a member of either House of 
the Oireachtas or is nominated as a member of Seanad 
Éireann, or  
(e) is, with the person‘s consent, nominated as a 
candidate for election as a member of the European 
Parliament or to fill a vacancy in the membership of 
that Parliament, or 
(f) is, with the person‘s consent, nominated as a 
candidate for election as a member of a local authority, 
or 
(g) is adjudged bankrupt (either in the State or 
elsewhere) or enters into a composition with the 
  Yes   
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person‘s creditors, or 
(h) becomes physically or mentally incapable of 
performing the duties of Governor, or 
(i) is convicted of an offence (either in the State or 
elsewhere) and sentenced to serve a term of 
imprisonment for the offence, or 
(j) ceases to hold the office because of subsection (6), 
or 
(k) becomes disqualified from holding the office under 
section 20, or 
(l) is removed from the office under section 21. 
21(1) The President may, on the advice of the Government, 
remove the Governor from office on the ground that 
the Governor has, because of ill-health, become 
permanently incapacitated from carrying out the 
responsibilities of Governor. 
   Yes  
21(2) The President may, on the advice of the Government, 
remove the Governor from office if the other members 
of the Board have passed a unanimous resolution 
requesting the President to remove the Governor from 
office on one or more specified grounds of serious 
misconduct. 
   Yes  
21(3) A decision of the President removing a Governor from 
office under this section takes immediate effect from 
the date on which the decision is notified to the 
Governor or the date on which the decision is first 
published, whichever date first occurs. 
   Yes  
21(4) A decision of the President removing a Governor from 
office under this section can be referred to the 
European Court of Justice in such manner and on 
    Yes 
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grounds consistent with Article 14.2 of the ESCB 
Statute. 
Italy 17(1) Pursuant to Articles 19(7) and 19(8) of Law no. 262 of 
28 December 2005, the appointment of the Governor, 
his reappointment and his removal from office in the 
cases provided for by Article 14(2) of the Statute of the 
ESCB shall be enacted by means of a decree issued by 
the President of the Republic, acting on a proposal 
from the President of the Council of Ministers 
following the adoption of a resolution by the Council 
of Ministers after hearing the opinion of the Bank of 
Italy‘s Board of Directors. 
 Yes  Yes  
17(2) In order to express the opinion referred to in the 
previous paragraph, the Board of Directors shall be 
convened and chaired by the senior member in terms of 
appointment or, if this is the same, of age. The opinion, 
approved by a qualified majority of two thirds of the 
members of the Board, shall be issued for the purposes 
of the resolution of the Council of Ministers. 
     
17(4) Without prejudice to the second paragraph, the 
resolutions referred to in this article must be adopted 
with at least two thirds of the Board members present, 
excluding the Governor in the cases referred to in the 
second paragraph, and with the affirmative vote of at 
least two thirds of those present. 
     
Latvia 22(4) The Governor of the Bank of Latvia, the Deputy 
Governor and members of the Council of the Bank of 
Latvia shall be discharged by the Saeima before the 
term of office stipulated by Paragraph 3 of this Article 
if and only if 
  Yes Yes No 
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1) he/she has submitted his/her resignation;  
2) the court decision on sentencing the Governor of the 
Bank of Latvia, the Deputy Governor or a member of 
the Council of the Bank of Latvia for a deliberate crime 
has taken legal effect; 
3) the Governor of the Bank of Latvia, the Deputy 
Governor or a member of the Council of the Bank of 
Latvia is not able to officiate for a period exceeding six 
successive months because of illness. 
Lithuania 12(1) The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania, 
Deputy Chairpersons and Members thereof shall be 
dismissed prior to the expiration of their term of office 
only if they do not fulfil the conditions required for the 
performance of their duties or they have been found 
guilty of serious misconduct. 
 Yes    
12(2) A decision regarding the dismissal of the Chairperson 
of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania on the grounds 
provided for in Paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 
made by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on 
the recommendation of the President of the Republic; a 
decision regarding the dismissal of Deputy 
Chairpersons and Members of the Board shall be made 
by the President of the Republic on the 
recommendation of the Chairperson of the Board of the 
Bank of Lithuania. 
   Yes  
12(3) A decision regarding a dismissal shall be adopted 
within one month from the date of submission of the 
recommendation thereon to the Seimas of the Republic 
of Lithuania or the President of the Republic. In the 
event a decision is not adopted within the above time 
   Yes  
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limit, the person in question shall continue to perform 
his or her duties. 
12(4) The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania 
shall have the right to refer to the European Court of 
Justice a decision regarding his dismissal prior to the 
expiration of his term of office within two months from 
the announcement of the decision or from the receipt of 
the notification thereof or, if the above has not 
occurred, from the date when the decision became 
known to the plaintiff on the grounds that the decision 
was in breach of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community or any other legal provision related to the 
application of the above Treaty. The Deputy 
Chairpersons and the Members of the Board of the 
Bank of Lithuania shall have the right to appeal against 
a decision regarding a dismissal prior to the expiration 
of their terms of office to Vilnius Regional Court. 
   Yes Yes 
13(1) The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania 
may resign from his or her post upon submitting a 
resignation request to the President of the Republic of 
Lithuania; Deputy Chairpersons and Members of the 
Board may resign upon submitting resignation requests 
to the Chairperson of the Board. 
     
13(2) The resignation request submitted by the Chairperson 
of the Board shall be considered by the Seimas and 
requests of Deputy Chairpersons and Members of the 
Board shall be considered by the President of the 
Republic. 
     
13(3) A decision regarding the resignation shall be adopted 
within one month from the date of receipt of a 
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resignation request. 
13(4) In the event a decision is not adopted during the time 
period indicated in Paragraph 3 of this Article, the 
Chairperson of the Board, Deputy Chairpersons and 
Members of the Board shall be considered to have 
resigned after one month from the day of filing such 
request. 
     
13(5) In the event a decision to decline a request is adopted, 
the Chairperson of the Board, Deputy Chairpersons and 
Members of the Board shall be regarded to have 
resigned after one month from the date of the adoption 
of the above decision if they submit a request 
confirming their previous request within two weeks 
after the adoption of the decision to decline the request. 
     
Luxembourg 12(3) The Government may propose to the Grand Duke, after 
consultation with the Central Bank Council, to dismiss 
Board members who no longer satisfy the conditions of 
their employment or are guilty of serious misconduct. 
 Yes  Yes No 
Malta 8(5) The Governor and the Deputy Governor may be 
relieved of their office only if they no longer fulfil the 
conditions required for the performance of their duties 
or if they have been guilty of serious misconduct. 
 Yes  No No 
The 
Netherlands 
12(3); 
6(7) Articles 
of 
Association 
The President and the Executive Directors may be 
suspended or relieved from office only if they no 
longer fulfil the conditions required for the 
performance of their duties or if they have been guilty 
of serious misconduct. 
 Yes  No No 
Poland 9(4) The term of office of the President of the NBP shall 
expire: 
1) following a period of six years, 
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2) in the event of his/her death, 
3) in the event of his/her resignation, 
4) in the event of his/her dismissal. 
9(5) The President of the NBP may be dismissed if: 
1) he/she has been unable to fulfil his/her duties due to 
prolonged illness, 
2) he/she has been convicted of a committed criminal 
offence under a final and legally binding court 
sentence, 
2a) he/she submitted untruthful disclosure declaration 
[disclosure declarations as foreseen by the Law of 18 
October 2006 on disclosure of information relating to 
documents of state security services from the period 
1944-1990 and to the content of such documents], as 
confirmed by a final and legally binding court 
judgement, 
3) the Tribunal of State [Trybunał Stanu] has 
prohibited him/her from occupying executive positions 
or holding posts of particular responsibility in state 
bodies. 
  Yes No  
198(1)
834
 For violations of the Constitution or of a statute 
committed by them within their office or within its 
scope, the following persons shall be constitutionally 
accountable to the Tribunal of State: the President of 
the Republic, the Prime Minister and members of the 
Council of Ministers, the President of the National 
Bank of Poland, the President of the Supreme Chamber 
of Control, members of the National Council of Radio 
    No 
                                                 
834 Constitution of the Republic of Poland.  
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Broadcasting and Television, persons to whom the 
Prime Minister has granted powers of management 
over a ministry, and the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces 
Portugal 33(3) The members of the Board of Directors shall be 
irremovable from office; they may only be relieved 
from office should any of the circumstances envisaged 
in Article 14.2 of the ESCB/ECB Statute occur 
     
33(4) The Governor and the other members of the Board of 
Directors may only be relieved from office should any 
of the circumstances envisaged in Article 14.2 of the 
ESCB/ECB Statute occur. 
 Yes  No  
33(5) The Governor may institute proceedings against such 
decision, pursuant to the provisions laid down in 
Article 14.2 of the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
    Yes 
33(6) The members of the Board of Directors shall vacate 
office upon expiry of their term, or due to permanent 
incapacity, resignation or legal incompatibility 
     
Romania 33(6) A member of the Board may be recalled from office by 
the Parliament, at the joint proposal submitted by the 
competent standing committees of the two Chambers 
of Parliament, if s/he no longer fulfils the conditions 
required for the performance of her/his duties or if s/he 
has been found guilty of serious misconduct. 
 Yes  Yes  
33(7) No member of the National Bank of Romania‘s Board 
can be replaced for other reasons or following a 
procedure other than that stipulated under para. (6) 
hereof. 
   Yes  
33(8) Appointment, retirement and recalling from office of 
any member of the National Bank of Romania‘s Board 
   Yes  
 375 
 
Member 
State 
Article Text Grounds of dismissal:  Dismissal 
procedure 
prescribed in 
the NCB 
Statute 
Court of 
Justice 
competence 
noted 
not 
regulated 
copy of 
Article 14.2  
different than 
Article 14.2  
shall be published in Monitorul Oficial al României, 
Part One. 
33(9) The decision to recall from office a member of the 
National Bank of Romania‘s Board may be appealed to 
the High Court of Cassation and Justice within 15 days 
from its publication in Monitorul Oficial al României. 
   Yes No 
Slovakia 7(2) The Governor and the Vice-Governors shall be 
appointed and dismissed by the President of the Slovak 
Republic upon the recommendation of the Government 
and with approval of the National Council of the 
Slovak Republic; if they have not been appointed from 
among employees of Národná banka Slovenska, they 
shall become employees of Národná banka Slovenska 
on the date of their appointment. 
   Yes  
7(8) The function of a member of the Bank Board shall 
cease 
a) on the day when the member‘s term of office 
expires; 
b) upon resignation from the function, namely on the 
day of the delivery of the letter of resignation from the 
function of a Bank Board member, unless a later date is 
specified in the letter of resignation; 
c) when the member is recalled from the Bank Board in 
cases specified in paragraph 9; 
d) when a member dies or is officially pronounced 
dead; 
e) the day of coming into effect of the appointment of 
the Bank Board member to another function on the 
Bank Board, with his prior written consent. 
     
7(9) A member of the Bank Board may only be recalled  Yes    
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from his function in the event that a member of the 
Bank Board no longer fulfils the conditions required 
for the performance of his duties or if a member of the 
Bank Board has been found guilty pursuant to separate 
legal provision of serious misconduct committed in the 
performance of his office. 
7(10) Any disputes relating to the dismissal of a member of 
the Bank Board from his function shall be decided by a 
court in proceedings pursuant to a separate Act, 
whereby the decision on preliminary question in the 
proceeding is made in accordance with separate legal 
provision; however the disputes involving removing 
the governor from office shall be resolved by the 
European Court of Justice pursuant to separate legal 
provision. Unless separate legal provision stipulates 
otherwise, action for court proceeding on invalidity of 
dismissal of a member of the Bank Board from his 
office needs to be filed with a court within the period 
of two months from the date of delivery of the decision 
on dismissal to the respective member of the Bank 
Board or, if it has not been delivered, from the date 
when the respective member of the Bank Board has 
been made aware of such decision. Filing an action for 
invalidity of dismissal of a member of the Bank Board 
from his office has a suspensory effect on legal force 
and enforceability of the appealed decision on 
dismissal until either the respective court or the 
European Court of Justice resolves the dispute by 
legally effective decision. 
    Yes 
Slovenia 32(1) The Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall also      
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decide on other matters concerning the operations of 
Banka Slovenije, and shall: […] 3. establish the 
incompatibility of functions performed by the members 
of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, […]. 
32(2) The Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall notify 
the National Assembly of its findings from point 3 of 
the previous paragraph of this Article 
     
39(1) A member of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije 
may be relieved from office before expiry of the term 
only if: 
1. they ask to be relieved, 
2. grounds for the incompatibility of functions arise 
during their term of office, 
3. it has been found in a prescribed procedure that they 
no longer fulfil the conditions required for the 
performance of their duties or that they have been 
guilty of serious misconduct. Banka Slovenije shall – 
in agreement with the minister in charge of finance – 
adopt a regulation to govern this procedure 
 Yes    
39(2) A member of the Governing Board of the Bank of 
Slovenia shall be relieved from office prematurely as 
of the day when the National Assembly of the Republic 
of Slovenia establishes that one of the reasons laid 
down in the previous paragraph of this Article has 
arisen 
   Yes  
39(3) Against the decision of the National Assembly of the 
Republic of Slovenia regarding the dismissal  from 
office, an administrative dispute can be brought before 
a court in accordance with the Act governing 
administrative disputes 
   Yes  
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57(1) From the date of accession of the Republic of Slovenia 
to the European Union the Governor of the Bank of 
Slovenia is entitled to appeal to the European Court of 
Justice against the decision of the National Assembly 
of the Republic of Slovenia from the second paragraph 
of Article 39 of this Act 
    Yes 
57(2) From this date on the third paragraph of Article 39 of 
this Act no longer applies for the Governor of the Bank 
of Slovenia 
   Yes Yes 
Spain 25(4) The Governor, the Deputy Governor and elected 
Council members shall leave office for the following 
reasons: 
a. Expiration of their terms of office. 
b. Resignation, which will take effect once the 
government is notified or, in the case of a member of 
the Executive Commission, when the Governing 
Council is notified. 
c. Reaching seventy years of age. 
d. Dismissal decided by the government, due to 
permanent incapacity to perform their functions, 
serious lack of compliance with their obligations, 
incompatibility that may have arisen during the term of 
office, or prosecution for deliberate crimes. In these 
cases, the order opening the oral hearing in the 
proceeding referred to in Title III of book IV of the 
Law of Criminal Justice shall be deemed to be 
equivalent to the bill of indictment. With the exception 
of cases of prosecution for deliberate crimes, the 
separation decision shall be adopted following a 
proposal by the Bank's Governing Council, after a 
  Yes  No No 
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hearing with the individual in question.  
Sweden Chapter 2, 
Article 2(1) 
The right of the General Council to sever a member of 
the Executive Board from his employment follows 
from Chapter 9, Article 13, of the Instrument of 
Government 
     
Chapter 9, 
Article 13
835
 
The Riksbank is the central bank of the Realm and an 
authority under the Riksdag. The Riksbank is 
responsible for monetary policy. No public authority 
may determine how the Riksbank shall decide in 
matters of monetary policy. 
The Riksbank has a Governing Council comprising 
eleven members, who are elected by the Riksdag. The 
Riksbank is under the direction of an Executive Board 
appointed by the Governing Council. 
The Riksdag considers whether the members of the 
Governing Council and the Executive Board shall be 
granted discharge of responsibility. If the Riksdag 
refuses a member of the Governing Council discharge 
of responsibility he is severed thereby from his 
appointment. The Governing Council may remove 
from office a member of the Executive Board only if 
he no longer fulfils the requirements laid down for 
performing his duties or if he has been guilty of gross 
negligence. 
Rules concerning elections for the Governing Council 
and concerning the management and activities of the 
Riksbank are laid down in law. 
  Yes Yes  
Chapter 2, An appeal against a decision on severance from the    Yes Yes 
                                                 
835 Instrument of Government (Constitution of the Kingdom of Sweden).  
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Article 2(2) employment shall be made within two months of the 
decision being served. The Governor of the Riksbank 
may bring a case before the European Court of Justice. 
Other members of the Executive Board may appeal at 
the Supreme Court 
Chapter 2, 
Article 2(4) 
If an appeal is not made within the time prescribed in 
the second paragraph, the party has lost the right to 
appeal 
   Yes  
The United 
Kingdom 
Schedule 1 
7(1) 
A person appointed as Governor or Deputy Governor 
of the Bank shall vacate office if he becomes a person 
to whom paragraph 5(l) applies. [paragraphs 5(1) and 
(2) state (1) A person is disqualified for appointment as 
Governor, Deputy Governor or director of the Bank if 
he is a Minister of the Crown or a person serving in a 
government department in employment in respect of 
which remuneration is payable out of money provided 
by Parliament. (2) A person is disqualified for 
appointment as director of the Bank if he is a servant of 
the Bank.] 
     
Schedule 1 
7(2) 
A person appointed as director of the Bank shall vacate 
office if he becomes a person to whom paragraph 5(l) 
or (2) applies. 
     
Schedule 1 
8 
The Bank may, with the consent of the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, remove a person from office as 
Governor, Deputy Governor or director of the Bank if 
it is satisfied – 
(a) that he has been absent from meetings of the court 
for more than 3 months without the consent of the 
court, 
(b) that he has become bankrupt, that his estate has 
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been sequestrated or that he has made an arrangement 
with or granted a trust deed for his creditors, or 
(c) that he is unable or unfit to discharge his functions 
as a member. 
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Table 3-11 Budget rules 
Member State Article Text 
Austria N/A  
Belgium 20(4); 
30(8) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Council [of Regency] shall approve the expenditure budget 
and the annual accounts submitted by the Board of Directors. It 
shall finally determine the distribution of profits proposed by the 
Board.  
Bulgaria 48(1) The expenditure of the BNB shall be made in accordance with 
the annual budget approved by the Governing Council of the 
BNB and published in Darjaven Vestnik. 
48(2) The administrative expenditure shall be made in accordance with 
the decisions of the Governor or a Deputy Governor authorised 
by him. 
48(3) The reports on the budgeted expenditure of the BNB shall 
be examined by the National Audit Office, which shall 
prepare a special report on its examination. The report on 
the budgeted expenditure of the BNB shall be sent to the 
National Assembly together with the annual report. 
50  The BNB shall send the annual budget, adopted by the 
Governing Council, to the National Assembly, within thirty days 
after its adoption, and twice a year it shall send a report 
reviewing and assessing the BNB‘s activities during the previous 
period. This report shall be published. 
Cyprus 62(1) The Board shall be responsible for the preparation and adoption 
of the annual budget of the Bank. 
62(2) The annual budget of the Bank shall be communicated to the 
House of Representatives. 
The Czech 
Republic 
47(1) The Czech National Bank shall manage its finances in 
compliance with a budget broken down so as to show clearly the 
operating and investment expenditure of the Czech National 
Bank. 
47(2) The Czech National Bank shall defray the necessary costs of its 
operations from its income. The profit it generates shall be used 
to replenish its reserve fund and other funds created from profits 
and for other purposes in the budgeted amount. It shall transfer 
the remaining profit to the state budget. 
59 The Budgetary Rules of the Republic shall apply to the Czech 
National Bank, with the exception of the provisions governing 
the duties of the central bodies of the state administration and 
those governing the inspection of budgetary financial 
management. 
Denmark N/A  
Estonia 9(2)(6) The following issues are within the exclusive competence of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank: 
supervision of the implementation of the budget of Eesti Pank; 
11(1)(7)  The following issues are within the exclusive competence of the 
Governor of Eesti Pank: 
approval of Eesti Pank's budget; 
29(1) The revenue of Eesti Pank includes:  
1) interest on foreign currency reserves invested abroad; 
2) interest on deposits in other banks and on loans granted to 
banks; 
3) revenue from the issue of currency; 
4) revenue from foreign currency operations and from securities 
and collateral transactions; 
5) revenue from other transactions which are not contrary to this 
Act or the statute of Eesti Pank. 
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29(2) The expenditure of Eesti Pank includes:  
1) interest payable on amounts deposited with Eesti Pank or 
received in any other manner;  
2) expenditure relating to cross-border transactions;  
3) interest on and other expenditure relating to foreign loans;  
4) expenditure from foreign currency operations, securities 
transactions and the provision of collateral; 
5) expenditure relating to the production and issue of banknotes 
and coins; 
6) depreciation of fixed assets; 
7) administrative expenses; 
8) other expenditure necessary to perform the functions of Eesti 
Pank. 
Finland 14(1) The Board shall be responsible for the administration of Suomen 
Pankki and for ensuring that all tasks assigned to the Bank are 
duly executed, except for statutory tasks of the Parliamentary 
Supervisory Council and matters that are otherwise provided for 
in the Act on the Financial Supervision Authority (503/1993). 
France Article 
L.142-2 (4) 
The General Council shall also: discuss the use of own funds; 
draw up, making sure to allocate the Banque de France the 
necessary means to carry out the tasks delegated to it as a 
consequence of its participation in the European System of 
Central Banks, the projected and amended expenditure budget; 
and approve the Banque de France‘s balance sheet and accounts, 
as well as the plans for allocating profits and fixing the dividend 
due to the State. 
Germany 26(4) To assist it in its management and administrative tasks, the 
Deutsche Bundesbank shall prepare a cost account. Before the 
start of a financial year, the Deutsche Bundesbank shall draw up 
a standard cost account and an investment plan. At the end of the 
financial year, it shall make a comparative analysis of the 
budgeted figures and the actual costs and investment. This 
analysis shall be reviewed separately by the auditors. 
Greece 31(1) The Governor shall, on behalf of the General Council, be in 
permanent control of the management of the Bank‘s assets and 
general business, taking decisions in all cases not specifically 
reserved to the General Council or the Monetary Policy Council 
or governed by regulations which the said Councils have issued. 
37 The Management Council shall submit to the General Council a 
detailed report every month regarding the business and the 
position of the Bank, in particular those issues relevant to the 
discounts and advances, and shall deliver its opinion on all 
matters referred to it by the General Council. 
Hungary N/A  
Ireland 6G (1) The Bank shall continue to keep and operate the fund called 
the general fund. 
(2) The Bank shall pay into the general fund all money received 
by the Bank and shall pay from that fund all amounts that it is 
required to pay. 
(3) The Bank shall pay its surplus income as and when 
determined under this section into the Exchequer in such manner 
as the Minister for Finance directs and may at any time pending 
such determination pay into the Exchequer such sums on 
account of surplus income as may be agreed on by the Minister 
for Finance and the Bank. 
(4) The expenses incurred by the Bank in performing functions 
or exercising powers under this or any other Act or law are 
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payable out of the general fund of the Bank, except where 
otherwise provided by or under this or any other Act. 
(5) Any claims on or liabilities to the European Central Bank are 
to be treated as assets or liabilities of the general fund or any 
other fund established by order made by the Minister for Finance 
for that purpose. 
(6) The Minister for Finance may, after consultation with the 
Bank, make regulations providing for the periodic determination 
of the Bank‘s surplus income and, in particular, such regulations 
may- 
(a) enable provision to be made for reserves, depreciation and 
other similar matters before the surplus income is determined, 
and 
(b) provide for any matter arising from the implementation of 
Chapters VI, VIII and IX of the ESCB Statute. 
(7) In exercising the powers conferred by this section, the 
Minister for Finance is required to have regard to the functions 
imposed and the powers conferred on the Bank by or under the 
Rome Treaty and the ESCB Statute. 
Italy 18(2) In conformity with legislative and regulatory provisions and, in 
the case of resolutions referred to in points 9) and 10), in 
compliance with the statute of the ESCB and the provisions 
adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB), the Board shall: 
2) approve the annual expenditure budget; 
Latvia 26(2) The Council of the Bank of Latvia shall review and approve the 
annual budget of the Bank, determining that all expenses of the 
Bank shall be financed from the Bank's revenue. 
Lithuania 
 
11(1)(15) The Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall: (…) approve the Bank 
of Lithuania budget. 
21 The Bank of Lithuania shall plan its annual budget taking into 
account the needs related to the implementation of the objectives 
and functions, as well as its activities prescribed by this Law. 
The budget shall consist of operating expenses and investment in 
tangible and intangible assets. 
Luxembourg 6(c) The competences of the Council of the Central Bank shall be: 
To approve, annually, the budget, the financial accounts and the 
report of the Executive Board. 
29(2) No later than the end of each financial year the Executive Board 
shall submit to the Council for approval the income and 
expenditure budget for the forthcoming year. An opinion of the 
staff representatives shall be appended to the budget and form an 
integral part of it together with the organisation chart including 
tables showing the number of staff both current and as planned, 
according to the categories defined in Article 14 (3), and, also, 
guidelines, where appropriate, on remuneration supplements 
pursuant to Article 14 (4) (a). 
30 The budget, annual accounts and reports approved by the 
Council shall be sent to the Government and the Chamber of 
Deputies. The Government in Cabinet shall decide whether the 
Central Bank bodies be granted discharge. Such a decision is 
taken without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 (2) and 
without calling into question the obligations of the Central Bank 
within the framework of the ESCB. The decision granting 
discharge to the bodies of the Central Bank shall be published 
together with the Central Bank's annual accounts in the 
Mémorial (Official Gazette). 
Malta N/A  
The Netherlands 19(2) 
Articles of 
Each year, the Governing Board shall compile a budget of the 
Bank‘s expected expenditure and shall do so before 1 January of 
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Association  the year to which the budget relates. The budget requires the 
prior consent of the Supervisory Board. 
Poland 64 The NBP shall conduct its finances on the basis of an annual 
financial plan. 
17(4) The scope of activities of the NBP Management Board shall 
include, in particular: 
(…) 
6) adopting the NBP plan of activity and financial plan, 
12(2) In consideration of monetary policy guidelines, the Monetary 
Policy Council shall, in particular: 
(…) 
4) approve the NBP financial plan and the report on the activity 
of the NBP 
Portugal 52(1) An operating budget shall be drawn up every year. 
52(2) The annual budget shall be forwarded to the Finance Minister 
not later than November 30 of the preceding year. 
Romania 41 The annual revenue and expenditure budget shall be approved by 
Banca Naţională a României‘s Board and its execution shall be 
verified according to the practices and procedures of internal 
control and audit. 
3(3) Banca Naţională a României shall cooperate with the Ministry of 
Public Finance in setting the macroeconomic indicators based on 
which the annual draft budget shall be drawn up. 
Slovakia 6(2)(b) Furthermore, the Bank Board shall in particular: 
approve the budget of the National Bank of Slovakia, financial 
statements of the National Bank of Slovakia, annual results of 
operations and annual reports of the National Bank of Slovakia, 
decide on the use of profits or settlement of losses of the 
National Bank of Slovakia, and set the types of funds of the 
National Bank of Slovakia, their level and application; 
Slovenia 49(3) Banka Slovenije shall plan its income and expenditure in a 
financial plan to be adopted by 31 December of the preceding 
year. 
49(4) Should the financial plan not have been adopted by 31 December 
of the preceding year, financing shall be carried out pursuant to a 
decision on temporary financing adopted by the Governing 
Board of Banka Slovenije. 
49(6) Banka Slovenije shall notify the National Assembly of the 
annual accounts and financial plan. The annual financial 
statements are an integral part of the annual report and shall be 
published. 
Spain 4(1) The rules governing the State budget, property and contracting 
shall not apply to the Bank unless otherwise specifically 
indicated. 
4(2) The Bank's draft budget for operating expenses and investments, 
once approved by its Governing Council according to article 
21.1.g), shall be forwarded to the government, which will submit 
it to Parliament for approval. The budget shall be prospective in 
nature, and shall not be consolidated with other State public 
sector budgets.  
The government, upon proposal by the Economy and Finance 
Minister, shall have the authority to approve the annual balance 
sheet and accounts of the Bank, which will be sent to Parliament 
for informational purposes. Without prejudice to the terms of 
article 27 of the Statutes of the ESCB, the Bank shall be subject 
to external auditing by the «Tribunal de Cuentas», under the 
terms of Organic Law 2/1982, of May 12, on the Tribunal de 
Cuentas. The report accompanying the annual balance sheet and 
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accounts shall give further detail on different operations or items 
on the balance sheet, according to their characteristics. In 
particular, the Bank's contributions to the Deposit Guarantee 
Funds shall be detailed, as will any loans or other operations 
transacted for the benefit of any other institution or person not 
on an arm's-length basis, or which in any other way involve loss 
of profit or losses for the Bank. In such cases the amount of such 
loss of profit or losses shall be specified. 
21(1) The Governing Council shall:  
f. Approve the internal rules of the Bank at the proposal of the 
Executive Commission. 
Sweden Chapter 10 
Article 2 
The Riksbank's accounting year is the calendar year. 
Each year before the end of December, the Executive Board 
shall draft a budget for the Riksbank's administrative activities 
during the following accounting year. The Executive Board shall 
submit the budget to the Riksdag Committee on Finance and the 
Swedish National Audit Office as well as the General Council 
for information. 
United Kingdom N/A  
 
Table 3-12 Accounting rules 
Member State Article Text 
Austria 67(1) The financial year of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank shall 
commence on January 1 and end on December 31. 
67(2) The rules established by the Governing Council of the ECB in 
accordance with Article 26.4 of the ESCB/ECB Statute shall be 
taken into consideration in drawing up the balance sheet and the 
profit and loss account. The foregoing financial statements shall 
close on December 31 every year. Furthermore, the balance 
sheet and the profit and loss account shall be drawn up according 
to the principles of generally accepted accounting practice. 
67(3) The provisions of the third volume of the Handelsgesetzbuch 
(Commercial Code) shall be applicable only insofar as they are 
compatible with this federal act. In particular, Articles 199 and 
244 to 267 of the Handelsgesetzbuch shall not apply. 
68 (1) No later than May 31 of the calendar year following the financial 
year in question, the Governing Board shall present to the 
General Council for approval a report on the preceding financial 
year as well as the annual accounts expanded by means of an 
appendix and audited by the Auditors. 
68 (2) After approval by the General Council, the report and the annual 
accounts shall be submitted to the General Meeting for adoption. 
68 (3) The provisions of Article 243 paragraphs 1 to 3 (with the 
exception of paragraph 2 last sentence and paragraph 3 items 2 
and 5) of the Handelsgesetzbuch shall apply to the report. 
Belgium 20(4); 
30(8) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Council shall approve the expenditure budget and the annual 
accounts submitted by the Board of Directors. It shall finally 
determine the distribution of profits proposed by the Board.  
 387 
 
Member State Article Text 
33;  
52 Articles 
of 
Association 
 
The accounts and, if appropriate, the consolidated accounts of 
the Bank shall be drawn up : 
in accordance with this Act and the mandatory rules drawn up 
pursuant to Article 26.4 of the Protocol on the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank; 
and otherwise in accordance with the rules laid down by the 
Council of Regency. 
Articles 2 to 4, 6 to 9 and 16 of the Act of 17 July 1975 on 
business accounting and their implementing decrees shall apply 
to the Bank with the exception of the decrees implementing 
Articles 4 (6) and 9, § 2. 
44  The annual accounts shall be drawn up as at 31 December of 
each year. They shall be prepared by the Board of Directors and 
submitted to the Council of Regency, which shall have twenty 
days to examine and approve them. 
Approval of the accounts by the Council of Regency shall 
relieve the administration of responsibility. 
45 Administrative expenses, charges and provisions of all kinds, as 
well as depreciation allowances, shall be deducted from the 
gross profit before or in the balance sheet.  
51  The annual accounts and the distribution of the profit shall be 
published in the Moniteur belge/Belgisch Staatsblad. 
These documents, accompanied by the reports of the Board of 
Directors and the Council of Regency on the financial year's 
operations, shall be sent, at least five days before the Ordinary 
General Meeting, to the shareholders whose shares are the 
subject of a registration by name or who have satisfied the 
conditions for admission to the General Meeting. 
Bulgaria 8(1) To cover uncollectable and unsecured receivables, the BNB shall 
allocate provisions for an amount specified by the Governing 
Council which shall be an expense item in the accounts and an 
adjustment in the balance sheet assets. 
46 The BNB shall keep accounts and records in compliance with 
the Law on Accountancy and in accordance with international 
accounting standards. 
48(3) The reports on the budgeted expenditure of the BNB shall be 
examined by the National Audit Office, which shall prepare a 
special report on its examination. The report on the budgeted 
expenditure of the BNB shall be sent to the National Assembly 
together with the annual report. 
48(4) The implementation of the Public Procurement Law shall be 
monitored by the National Audit Office. The Public Financial 
Inspection Agency shall not carry out inspections of the BNB. 
49(2) The format and contents of the BNB‘s consolidated balance 
sheet, and the separate balance sheets of the Issue and Banking 
Departments, shall be determined by an ordinance issued by the 
BNB and shall comply with the requirements of international 
accounting standards. 
49(3) The consolidated financial statement of the BNB shall be 
certified by an external auditor and shall be published together 
with the auditor‘s report in accordance with the requirements of 
international accounting standards. 
49(4) The external auditor shall be appointed by the Governing 
Council for a term of three years on the basis of a procedure 
complying with the Public Procurement Law. 
Cyprus 57(1) Within three months after the end of each financial year the 
Bank shall prepare the annual financial statements. 
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57(2) The Bank shall determine its net profit or net loss for each 
financial year according to approved accounting standards 
applying from time to time for the European System of Central 
Banks, as they are adopted by the European Central Bank. 
57(3) The Bank shall prepare and publish, by the end of each month a 
summary balance sheet of the Bank as at the end of the 
preceding month. 
The Czech 
Republic 
48(1) The Czech National Bank shall keep accounts in accordance 
with a special legal rule. 
Denmark 12 The Bank shall at the expiration of every month report to the 
Minister of Economic Affairs on the funding of the active note 
circulation. 
In case of any deviation from the rules governing the funding of 
the notes of the Bank under §§ 9-11 it shall be the duty of the 
Bank to redress the deviation within the expiration of the 
succeeding month. 
17 The financial year of the Bank shall be the calendar year. As 
soon as possible after the expiration of the financial year the 
books shall be balanced and the accounts for the year expired 
drawn up. The accounts shall contain a working account and a 
balance sheet. 
The accounts shall under careful consideration of existing values 
and obligations and with the undertaking of necessary writings-
off and allocations be rendered as proper and cautious business 
practice dictates. 
Securities admitted to public quotation on the Royal Exchange 
shall not be entered at a higher value than the latest buying rate 
quoted at the close of the financial year. 
Securities not admitted to public quotation on the Royal 
Exchange shall be entered at the supposed value on the day of 
settlement, but the value shall not exceed the price at which they 
were acquired. 
Foreign currency shall not be entered at a higher value than the 
rate of exchange quoted at the close of the financial year. 
Real estate shall not be booked at a higher value than the buying 
price with addition of costs of improvements and deductions 
corresponding to the depreciation through age and use and not 
exceeding the value assessed for land and building tax. 
The booked value of other assets shall not exceed the market 
value. 
The accounts when approved by the Board of Directors shall be 
sent to the Minister of Economic Affairs together with a report 
on the work of the Bank during the year expired. 
When the accounts have been approved by the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, they shall be published together with the 
Bank‘s report for the year expired.  
Estonia 28 Eesti Pank's financial year begins on 1 January and ends on 31 
December. 
31(2) Eesti Pank's annual report shall be prepared pursuant to the rules 
established on the basis of Article 26.4 of the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank.  
Finland 11 As a body supervising the administration and activities of 
Suomen Pankki, the Parliamentary Supervisory Council shall 
perform the following tasks: 
1) confirm, upon proposal of the Board, the basic principles 
applied in drawing up the annual accounts of Suomen Pankki; 
19(1) Suomen Pankki‘s financial year is the calendar year. 
19(2) Suomen Pankki‘s annual accounts, which comprise the balance 
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sheet, profit and loss account, notes to the financial statements 
and the annual report, shall be drawn up by the end of February 
and published by the end of April. 
19(3) The annual accounts shall provide a true and fair view of 
Suomen Pankki‘s financial condition and on the composition of 
its profit or loss. The annual accounts are drawn up and signed 
by the Board of Suomen Pankki. 
19(4) The Bank‘s balance sheet shall be published monthly during the 
financial year. 
20(1) In respect of its accounting procedures, Suomen Pankki shall 
observe generally accepted accounting principles. 
20(2) Provisions can be made in the annual accounts if necessary for 
safeguarding the real value of the Bank‘s funds or for smoothing 
out variations in profit or loss arising from changes in exchange 
rates or market values of securities. 
20(3) Provisions necessary for covering the Bank‘s pension liability 
may be made in the annual accounts 
France Article 
R.144-1 
 
An expenditure budget and a revenue forecast shall be drawn up 
for each financial year. They shall be communicated to the 
General Council‘s members, to the observer and to the 
observer‘s alternate at least two weeks before the meeting at 
which the General Council will consider them. 
Forecasts and amending budgets may, where necessary, be 
drawn up and decided during the course of the financial year, by 
following the same procedure. 
Article 
R.144-2 
Investment expenditure may only be deducted from reserves that 
have already been established. 
Article 
R.144-3 
 
The financial year shall commence on 1 January and end on 31 
December. At the end of the financial year, the Governor shall 
adopt the annual accounts as well as a written report on the 
Banque de France‘s position and its activities during the 
financial year that has just ended. This report shall be submitted 
to the General Council‘s members, the observer, the observer‘s 
alternate and the auditors 15 days before the General Council 
meets pursuant to the following paragraph. 
The General Council shall meet within the four months after the 
financial year ends to consider and vote on the annual accounts 
for the previous financial year. After reading the Council‘s 
report, the Governor shall present the annual accounts to the 
General Council. 
The auditors shall record in their report that they have completed 
their work. 
The annual accounts and the auditors‘ report shall be sent to the 
national works council within three days after the General 
Council meeting at which the accounts are considered and voted 
on. 
Article 
R.144-4 
 
Where necessary, deductions provided for in the agreement 
mentioned in the first paragraph of Article L. 141-2 shall first be 
applied to the net annual result. 
Subsequently a deduction of 5 % of the net result for the 
financial year shall be allocated to a specific reserve that will no 
be longer funded when it reaches an amount equal to the Banque 
de France‘s capital. 
Finally, the General Council shall decide on proposals relating to 
allocating the balance of the net result to any extraordinary or 
special reserves, relating to carrying over profits and relating to 
the dividend paid to the State. Such proposal shall be submitted 
for approval to the Minister for Economic Affairs. 
Article Articles L. 123-12 to L. 123-14, the first paragraph of Article L. 
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R.144-5 
 
123-15 and Articles L. 123-17 to L. 123-22 of the Commercial 
Code, as well as Article R. 123-181, the second paragraph of 
Article R. 123-186, the first paragraph of Article R. 123-187 and 
R.123-189 of the Commercial Code apply to the Banque de 
France, subject to the derogations in Articles R.143-6 and R. 
143-7. 
An order by the Minister for Economic Affairs, adopted after 
consultation of the Governor, shall determine the classification 
of the on-balance-sheet items and the profit and loss account, as 
well as the entries to include in the annex mentioned in Article 
L. 123-13 of the Commercial Code. 
Article 
R.144-6 
 
The compulsory accounting and valuation rules adopted for 
preparation of the consolidated balance sheet of the European 
System of Central Banks pursuant to Article 26 of the Protocol 
annexed to the Treaty establishing the European Community on 
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank shall apply to the annual accounts 
prepared for the Banque de France in relation to transactions that 
fall within the tasks referred to in Article L. 141-1. 
The general accounting requirements established by the 
Accounting Regulation Committee pursuant to the first 
paragraph of Article 1 of Law No 98-261 of 6 April 1998 
amending the accounting regulations and adapting the regime for 
land registration, as well as the accounting and valuation 
methods fixed by the Accounting Regulation Committee 
mentioned in I of Article 4 of the abovementioned Law, shall 
apply to the Banque de France for operations transaction than 
those entered in the accounts and valued in accordance with the 
rules referred to in the first paragraph of this Article. 
The General Council shall take a decision as to the presentation 
of the published financial statements. It may limit the detail of 
the information that is made public. 
In any event, the General Council may derogate from the second 
paragraph of this Article by applying the accounting and 
valuation rules recommended by the European Central Bank to 
the Banque de France. 
Article 
R.144-7 
 
This subsection shall apply to the entering in the accounts of 
State foreign exchange reserves in gold and currency to the 
extent that it does not conflict with the rules in the agreement 
mentioned in the first paragraph of Article L. 141-2. 
Germany 26(1) The financial year of the Deutsche Bundesbank shall be the 
calendar year. 
26(2) The accounting system of the Deutsche Bundesbank shall 
comply with generally accepted accounting principles. The 
annual accounts shall be drawn up with due regard to the tasks of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank, in particular those deriving from its 
being an integral part of the European System of Central Banks, 
and shall be published with appropriate notes thereon; the 
liability structure need not be disclosed. Unless the provisions of 
the second sentence above require otherwise, valuation shall be 
governed accordingly by the provisions of the Commercial Code 
(Handelsgesetzbuch) relating to corporations. In the course of 
establishing the profit or loss, the creation of liability items for 
general risks associated with domestic and foreign business, 
such as is considered warranted in the light of reasonable 
commercial judgement and after due consideration of the tasks 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank, shall remain unaffected. 
Greece 51 The financial year of the Bank shall begin on January 1st and 
shall end on December 31st. At the end of the financial year, the 
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accounts of the Bank shall be submitted for auditing to the 
Auditors elected by the Annual General Meeting of 
Shareholders, as provided for in Article 44. 
52 The Bank shall draw up a statement of its assets and liabilities at 
the last day of each month, and shall publish it not later than a 
week. 
53 The Bank shall also publish, annually, and not later than one 
month prior to the date of the Annual General Meeting of 
Shareholders, its balance sheet and profit and loss account as at 
December 31st of the preceding year. 
54 The Bank shall publish said statements, balance sheet, profit and 
loss account, and other notifications in the Government Gazette 
and in such newspapers as the General Council may decide. A 
copy of all statements of accounts and notifications and of the 
annual report shall be sent to the Minister of Finance. 
54A The accounts and reports of the Bank shall be drawn up on the 
basis of the accounting rules and techniques applicable each time 
to the ESCB as determined by the ECB. 
Hungary Article 17  (1) The MNB shall allocate to the forint exchange rate 
equalisation reserve the exchangerate gain or loss incurred on its 
receivables and liabilities denominated in foreign currency, such 
gain or loss being calculated according to the revaluation based 
on the official exchange rate as at the last day of the year under 
review. 
(2) The MNB shall allocate to the foreign currency securities 
equalisation reserve the difference determined on the basis of the 
market valuation of receivables in foreign currency securities, 
following re-entry of the opening balance. 
(3) The forint exchange rate equalisation reserve and the foreign 
currency securities equalisation reserve described in Paragraphs 
(1) and (2) above shall form a part of the MNB‘s equity. The 
balances of the equalisation reserves may not be offset against 
one another. 
(4) In the event that, based on the available data, the balance of 
either of the equalisation reserves described in Paragraphs (1) or 
(2) above is negative, the central budget shall make a direct cash 
reimbursement to the appropriate equalisation reserve in the 
amount of the negative balance by 31 March of the year 
following the year under review. Such reimbursement shall be 
recorded in the balance sheet in the reporting year. 
(5) In the event that, based on the final data and with due 
consideration of the reimbursement described in Paragraph (4), 
the balance of either of the equalisation reserves described in 
Paragraphs (1) or (2) above is negative, the central budget shall 
make a direct cash reimbursement to the appropriate equalisation 
reserve within eight days of the Shareholder Resolution made 
pursuant to Point b) of Article 46/A hereof. In the event that the 
reimbursement described in Paragraph (4) exceeds the balance 
determined on the basis of the final data, the MNB shall 
reimburse the amount of overpayment to the central budget 
within eight days of the Shareholder Resolution made pursuant 
to Point b) of Article 46/A hereof, to the debit of the equalisation 
reserve. Such items shall be recorded in the balance sheet for the 
year in which the payments are effected. 
Ireland 6H(1) The Bank shall keep all proper accounting records in respect of 
all of its transactions.  
6H(2) Within 6 months after the end of each financial year, the Bank 
shall prepare and transmit to the Comptroller and Auditor 
General a statement of accounts for the year concerned. The 
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statement must be in a form approved by the Minister after 
consulting the Bank. A form of statement approved under this 
subsection remains in force until superseded by another form of 
statement so approved. 
6H(3) The Comptroller and Auditor General shall audit, certify and 
report on the statement of accounts and, as soon as practicable 
after completing the report, give the report and the statement to 
the Minister 
6H(4) As soon as practicable after being given the report and statement 
of account, the Minister shall arrange for copies of those 
documents to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas. 
6H(5) The accounts of the Bank may be audited in accordance with 
Article 27 of the ESCB Statute and, for that purpose, the Bank 
shall provide any auditors appointed in accordance with that 
Article with full information, books and records. 
6H(6) The Bank shall keep its accounting records for at least 6 years. 
Italy 18(1)  The Board of Directors shall be charged with the general 
administration, managementsupervision and internal control of 
the Bank. 
18(2) In conformity with legislative and regulatory provisions and, in 
the case of resolutions referred to in points 9) and 10), in 
compliance with the statute of the ESCB and the provisions 
adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB), the Board shall: 
1) examine and approve, acting on a proposal from the 
Directorate, the draft annual accounts and resolve to submit them 
to the Board of Auditors and the shareholders‘ meeting for final 
approval. After consulting the Board of Auditors, it shall decide 
on the dividend to be paid to shareholders; 
2) approve the annual expenditure budget; 
3) authorize contracts involving the disposal of real estate for a 
consideration exceeding €1 million and settlements, 
compositions with creditors and assignments in respect of claims 
exceeding €200,000, and express its opinion on all other 
contracts and legal actions which, because of their importance, 
the Governor considers should be submitted to it for approval; 
4) approve the Bank‘s internal regulations; 
5) determine the staffing levels, recruit and dismiss employees; 
6) approve agreements negotiated with trade unions; 
7) adopt resolutions regarding the geographical configuration 
and general organizational structure of the Bank; 
8) appoint and remove from office regents at the main branches 
and councillors at the local branches and determine their number 
and which of them are to act as examiners; 
9) appoint the Bank‘s foreign correspondents; 
10) determine the rules and terms and conditions for the Bank‘s 
operations; 
11) set the annual limit on donations to charity and contributions 
to initiatives of public interest; 
12) decide upon all other matters concerning the general 
administration of the Bank not specifically entrusted to the 
shareholders‘ meeting which the Governor considers should be 
submitted to it. 
19(1) The Board of Auditors shall consist of five auditors, including 
the chairman; there shall be two alternates. The members of the 
Board of Auditors shall remain in office for three years and may 
be re-elected not more than three times. 
19(2) The Board of Auditors shall perform, directly at the Head Office 
and either directly or through examiners at the main branches 
and the local branches, checks on the administration of the Bank 
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with regard to observance of the law, this statute and the Bank‘s 
general regulations. It shall carry out accounting checks, without 
prejudice to the activity of the external auditors referred to in 
Article 38, examine the annual accounts and express its opinion 
in the distribution of the annual dividend. 
19(3) The members of the Board of Auditors shall attend the meetings 
of the Board of Directors. 
19(4) Where necessary the Board of Auditors shall report its own 
observations and any received from the examiners to the 
Governor. 
19(5) The members of the Board of Auditors shall be paid a fixed fee 
established by the shareholders‘ meeting, in addition to the 
reimbursement of expenses. 
29(3) The board of regents shall ensure that the regulations and 
instructions of the Head Office are observed. It shall examine 
and approve the budget of the administrative expenses of the 
main branch. 
38(1) A set of annual accounts and an inventory of the Bank‘s assets 
and liabilities must be prepared each year. 
Latvia 15 The Bank of Latvia shall publish monthly and annual balance 
sheets in accordance with the standards used by the world's 
central banks.  
16 The fiscal year of the Bank of Latvia shall begin on January 1 
and end on December 31. 
43(2) The audit commission, whose members are approved by the 
State Auditors' Office of the Republic of Latvia, shall audit the 
economic activity and documents of the Bank of Latvia. After 
the audit results have been reviewed, the Council of the Bank of 
Latvia shall approve the Bank's annual report, and the report, 
together with the annual balance sheet, shall be published for the 
public knowledge. 
Lithuania 11(1)(16) The Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall: (…) establish the 
financial accounting policy, approve annual financial statements 
and the allocation of profit for the financial year; 
New 
11(1)(16) 
The Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall: (…) in compliance 
with the requirements of the legal acts of the European Central 
Bank, establish the financial accounting policy of the Bank of 
Lithuania, approve annual financial statements and the allocation 
of profit for the financial year, as established in Paragraph 3 of 
Article 23 of this Law; 
48 The financial year of the Bank of Lithuania shall begin on the 
first day of January and end on the thirty-first day of December 
49(1) The Bank of Lithuania shall manage its financial accounting and 
prepare its annual financial statements following the 
recommendations of the European Central Bank for central 
banks participating in the European System of Central Banks. 
49(2) The annual financial statements of the Bank of Lithuania shall 
include a balance-sheet, profit (loss) statement, and explanatory 
notes. 
49(3) The Bank of Lithuania shall, within four months after the end of 
a financial year, submit its annual financial statements together 
with the opinion of an independent auditor to the Seimas and 
shall make it public. 
New 49(1) The Bank of Lithuania shall manage its financial accounting and 
prepare its financial reports in accordance with the legal acts, 
guidelines and instructions of the European Central Bank 
regulating the accounting and reporting of operations undertaken 
by the national central banks. 
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Luxembourg 28 The financial year of the Central Bank shall be the calendar year. 
Malta 21(1) The financial year of the Bank shall begin on the first day of 
January and end on the thirty-first day of December. 
The Netherlands 19(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The financial year shall be equal to the calendar year. 
Poland 67 The NBP accounting principles should conform to the standards 
applied in the European System of Central Banks.  
68(1) The annual accounts of the NBP shall consist of: 
1) balance sheet, 
2) profit and loss account, 
3) supplementary information. 
68(2) The calendar year shall be the accounting (fiscal) year at the 
NBP. 
68(3) The NBP accounting principles, the terms of reference for 
balance sheets and for profit and loss accounts, and the contents 
of the supplementary information shall be specified by the 
Monetary Policy Council. 
Portugal 63(1) The Chart of Accounts of the Bank shall be approved by the 
Finance Minister, on a proposal from the Board of Directors 
after hearing the Board of Auditors. 
Romania 37(1) Banca Naţională a României‘s financial statements shall be 
drawn up in accordance with the accounting principles and rules 
established by international accounting standards applicable to 
central banks and acknowledged by the European Central Bank 
and shall include the following: balance sheet, profit and loss 
account and the notes on the accounts. 
37(2) Banca Naţională a României‘s annual financial statements shall 
reflect accurately the financial standing and the financial 
performance for that financial year. 
37(3) The models of annual financial statements shall be drawn up by 
Banca Naţională a României, having regard to the consultative 
opinion of the Ministry of Public Finance. 
40(1) Banca Naţională a României shall issue its own regulations on 
organising and conducting its accounting, in compliance with the 
legislation in force, having regard to the consultative opinion of 
the Ministry of Public Finance. 
40(2) Banca Naţională a României shall record its economic and 
financial operations in compliance with its own chart of 
accounts, having regard to the consultative opinion of the 
Ministry of Public Finance. 
Slovakia 38(1) As of the euro introduction date the National Bank of Slovakia 
shall maintain accounts and prepare financial statements in 
accordance with the separate legal provisions applicable to the 
European System of Central Banks. 
Slovenia 49(1) Banka Slovenije‘s financial year corresponds to the calendar 
year. 
49(2) Banka Slovenije shall prepare its financial statements in 
accordance with principles, standards and accounting guidelines 
adopted by the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, taking into 
account the principles, standards and accounting guidelines 
adopted by the ECB. 
49(5) The Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall adopt the annual 
accounts for the preceding year by 31 March of every year. 
49(6) Banka Slovenije shall notify the National Assembly of the 
annual accounts and financial plan. The annual financial 
statements are an integral part of the annual report and shall be 
published. 
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63 The subscription of the capital, the transfer of a proportion of 
international reserves and other issues concerning cooperation 
with and integration in the ESCB and the ECB shall be carried 
out in accordance with the Statute of the ESCB and ECB and 
with decisions adopted on its basis by the ECB bodies. 
64 The allocation of a proportion of monetary income or 
expenditure of the ESCB established by the ECB in accordance 
with the Statute of the ESCB and ECB in implementing the 
common monetary policy shall be an integral part of Banka 
Slovenije‘s annual accounts specified in Article 49 of this Act. 
Spain N/A  
Sweden Chapter 10 
Article 2 
The Riksbank's accounting year is the calendar year. 
 
Each year before the end of December, the Executive Board 
shall draft a budget for the Riksbank's administrative activities 
during the following accounting year. The Executive Board shall 
submit the budget to the Riksdag Committee on Finance and the 
Swedish National Audit Office as well as the General Council 
for information 
Chapter 10 
Article 3 
The Riksbank is required to keep accounts. This requirement 
shall be met in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles.  
 
In addition, the European Central Bank's guidelines on the legal 
framework for accounting and financial reporting within the 
European System of Central Banks shall be applied. 
 
Each year, before 15 February, the Executive Board shall submit 
an Annual Report of the Riksbank's activities during the 
preceding accounting year to the Riksdag, the Swedish National 
Audit Office and the General Council. The General Council shall 
make proposals to the Riksdag and the Swedish National Audit 
Office on the allocation of the profit of the Riksbank. The 
Annual Report shall comprise a Profit and Loss Account, a 
Balance Sheet, a Directors‘ Report and an account of foreign 
exchange and monetary policies and on how the Riksbank has 
promoted a safe and efficient payments system. 
The United 
Kingdom 
7(1) The Bank shall keep proper accounts and records in relation to 
the accounts. 
7(2) The Bank shall prepare for each of its financial years a statement 
of accounts consisting of – 
(a) a balance sheet as at the last day of the year, and 
(b) a profit and loss account. 
7(3) In preparing accounts under subsection (2), the Bank shall be 
subject to requirements corresponding to the relevant Companies 
Act requirements, except insofar as the accounts relate to the 
Issue Department. 
7(4) The Bank may disregard a requirement to which it is subject 
under subsection (3) to the extent that it considers it appropriate 
to do so having regard to its functions. 
7(5) The Bank shall appoint an auditor or auditors to audit its 
accounts, including any statement under subsection (2). 
7(6) As soon as practicable after receiving the report of its auditors 
on a statement prepared under subsection (2), the Bank shall 
send a copy of – 
(a) the report, and 
(b) the statement, 
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
7(7) The Treasury may by notice in writing to the Bank require it to 
 396 
 
Member State Article Text 
publish in such manner as it thinks fit such additional 
information relating to its accounts as the Treasury may specify 
in the notice, including information which the Bank has 
excluded under subsection (4) from a statement under subsection 
(2). 
7(8) The Treasury shall consult the Bank before giving a notice under 
subsection (7). 
7(9) In subsection (3), the reference to the relevant Companies Act 
requirements is to the requirements to which the directors of a 
company which is a banking company for the purposes of the 
Companies Act 1985 are for the time being subject under that 
Act (except section 232) in relation to the preparation of 
accounts under section 226(l) of that Act. 
 
Table 3-13 Auditing rules 
Member State Article Text 
Austria 14(1) Within the last eight days prior to the ordinary General Meeting, 
the annual accounts for the preceding financial year shall be 
made available for examination at the head office of the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank in Vienna.  
16(5) The General Meeting shall be entitled: 
to appoint two Auditors and two alternate Auditors; 
37(1) The General Meeting shall, in observance of Article 27 of the 
ESCB/ECB Statute, elect two Auditors and two alternate 
Auditors each year. The Auditors shall audit the annual accounts 
and shall submit a written report on the results of their audit. 
37(2) The Auditors shall be entitled to ask the Governing Board for 
any information they require for the performance of their tasks, 
and in particular they shall have the right to inspect the books of 
the Bank. 
37(3) The Auditors shall be obliged to carry out their audit 
conscientiously and impartially and to observe confidentiality. 
68(1) No later than May 31 of the calendar year following the financial 
year in question, the Governing Board shall present to the 
General Council for approval a report on the preceding financial 
year as well as the annual accounts expanded by means of an 
appendix and audited by the Auditors. 
68(2) After approval by the General Council, the report and the annual 
accounts shall be submitted to the General Meeting for adoption. 
68(3) The provisions of Article 243 paragraphs 1 to 3 (with the 
exception of paragraph 2 last sentence and paragraph 3 items 2 
and 5) of the Handelsgesetzbuch shall apply to the report. 
Belgium 28(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
[The Governor] shall present to the General Meeting the annual 
report on operations and the accounts approved by the Council 
of Regency. 
28(5) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Governor shall send to the Chairmen of the Chamber of 
Representatives and the Senate the annual report referred to in 
Article 109 B(3) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. The Governor may be heard by the competent 
committees of the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate at 
the request of these committees or on his own initiative. 
21b  
32a 
Articles of 
Association 
1. Without prejudice to the responsibilities of the organs of the 
Bank and without prejudice to the execution of the tasks and 
transactions within the domain of the ESCB and their review by 
the statutory auditor, the audit committee shall, at least:  
a) monitor the financial reporting process;  
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b) monitor the effectiveness of the internal control and risk 
management systems, and of the Bank's internal audit; 
c) monitor the statutory audit of the annual accounts, 
including the compliance with the questions and 
recommendations formulated by the statutory auditor;  
d) review and monitor the independence of the statutory 
auditor, and in particular the provision of additional 
services to the Bank.  
2. Without prejudice to Article 27.1 of the Protocol on the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank, and without prejudice to the 
competence of the Works Council with respect to the 
nomination, the proposal of the Board of Directors for the 
appointment of the statutory auditor shall be given on proposal 
of the audit committee. The Works Council shall be informed of 
this proposal. The audit committee shall also advise on the 
tender procedure for the appointment of the statutory auditor.  
3. Without prejudice to any reports and notices of the statutory 
auditor to the organs of the Bank, he shall report to the audit 
committee on key matters arising from the statutory audit, and in 
particular on material weaknesses in internal control in relation 
to the financial reporting process.  
4. The statutory auditor shall: a) confirm annually in writing to 
the audit committee his independence from the Bank; b) disclose 
annually to the audit committee any additional services provided 
to the Bank; c) discuss with the audit committee the threats to 
his independence and the safeguards applied to mitigate those 
threats and that have been documented by him in the audit 
working papers.  
5. The Internal Regulations shall specify the rules of procedure 
of the audit committee.  
Bulgaria 48(3) The reports on the budgeted expenditure of the BNB shall be 
examined by the National Audit Office, which shall prepare a 
special report on its examination. The report on the budgeted 
expenditure of the BNB shall be sent to the National Assembly 
together with the annual report. 
49(3) The consolidated financial statement of the BNB shall be 
certified by an external auditor and shall be published together 
with the auditor‘s report in accordance with the requirements of 
international accounting standards. 
49(4)  The external auditor shall be appointed by the Governing 
Council for a term of three years on the basis of a procedure 
complying with the Public Procurement Law. 
50  The BNB shall send the annual budget, adopted by the 
Governing Council, to the National Assembly, within thirty days 
after its adoption, and twice a year it shall send a report 
reviewing and assessing the BNB‘s activities during the previous 
period. This report shall be published. 
51 The BNB shall send its annual report on its activities, the 
consolidated financial statement, together with the auditor‘s 
report as referred to in Article 49, paragraph 3 and the budget 
report, to the National Assembly no later than 30 April of the 
following year. 
Cyprus 60(1)(a) The annual financial statements of the Bank shall be audited in 
accordance with Article 27 of the Statute and, to this end, the 
Bank shall provide the auditors appointed in accordance with the 
said Article with all the information, books and other records 
necessary for the fulfilment of their task. 
60(1)(b) Without prejudice to Article 38 of the Statute, the Auditor 
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General of the Republic may carry out financial and 
management audit of the activities of the Bank that are not 
related to its tasks and competences [of the Bank] emanating 
from the European System of Central Banks, and under the 
condition that his reports and audit activities do not touch upon 
the Bank‘s independence. 
In order for the Auditor General to carry out the abovementioned 
task, the Bank provides to him all the necessary information, 
books and other records. 
For the purposes of this paragraph ―management audit‖ shall 
mean the audit of the operational efficiency of the activities of 
the Bank that are not related to its tasks and competences [of the 
Bank] emanating from the European System of Central Banks 
and which does not touch upon its independence. 
60(2) The auditors shall submit their report to the Board after the 
pertinent audit, and address a copy to the Minister for 
information. 
61 The Board shall prepare and publish an annual report for the 
activities of the Bank in each financial year, which shall include 
the annual financial statements of the Bank. 
The Czech 
Republic 
48(2) The annual accounts of the Czech National Bank shall be audited 
by one or more auditors appointed by agreement between the 
Bank Board and the Minister of Finance. 
48(3) As soon as the annual accounts are approved and audited, the 
Bank Board shall submit them to the Chamber of Deputies and 
publish them. 
Denmark 18 The accounts for the financial year shall be audited by 2 
chartered accountants appointed by the Minister of Economic 
Affairs for 1 year at a time. 
35 By-laws The financial year of the Bank shall be the calendar year. 
The Board of Governors shall not later than the first day of 
February hand over the annual accounts to the Chartered 
Accountants appointed by the Royal Bank-Commissioner. When 
the Committee of Directors has made its report on the annual 
accounts and the negotiation with the Royal Bank-Commissioner 
has taken place, confer § 7, subsection 5, the annual accounts 
shall be submitted to the Board of Directors, but in no case later 
than the 20th March. 
36 By-laws The daily audit of all the books of the Bank shall be made by 
officials appointed for that purpose. At a branch, however, the 
audit may, on the recommendation of the Board of Governors, 
be made by an auditor appointed by the Committee of Directors. 
This audit shall commence immediately at the beginning of the 
financial year and be continued daily, so that it always follows 
directly after the daily entries. 
The auditors shall keep a record. The auditors‘ record shall be 
submitted to the Board of Governors once a month and produced 
at the monthly meeting of the Committee of Directors. If the 
audit at a branch be made by an auditor specially appointed, a 
report on this audit based on information from this auditor shall 
be entered into the record. 
The auditors shall enter into their records all that may be of 
importance to the Board of Governors, Committee of Directors 
and Board of Directors to learn. In case the auditors discover 
essential irregularities the auditors shall, besides making entries 
thereof into the records, without delay notify the Board of 
Governors and the Chairman of the Committee of Directors. 
It shall be the duty of the auditors to call the attention of the 
Board of Governors and the Committee of Directors to 
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deficiencies in audit and book-keeping if such might be found. 
37 By-laws The Minister of Economic Affairs shall appoint for one year at a 
time two Chartered Accountants to audit the annual accounts of 
the Bank. 
The Chartered Accountants shall be of age, not be deprived of 
the right to dispose of their estate, nor be in the service of the 
Bank, be members of the Board of Directors or Committee of 
Directors nor be attached to any member of the Board of 
Directors, Committee of Directors or Board of Governors, to 
accountant or cashier by being in their service, through marriage, 
relationship or affinity in lineal ascent and descent, or as 
brothers and sisters. 
During the audit, which shall be performed under careful 
consideration of existing values and obligations, the Chartered 
Accountants shall have admission to all books relating to the 
book-keeping of the Bank and to examine the cash in hand and 
the holdings of the cashiers of the Bank. The Committee of 
Directors and the Board of Governors shall be under the 
obligation to give the Chartered Accountants any information 
they might demand to ascertain the correctness of the accounts. 
When the Chartered Accountants have audited the accounts they 
shall enter a report on the audit into the Chartered Accountants‘ 
records. This shall be submitted at the first ensuing meeting of 
the Committee of Directors, and the members of the Committee 
present shall by their signature confirm that they have taken 
notice of the contents. Moreover the records shall be produced at 
the first ensuing meeting of the Board of Directors. 
The Chartered Accountants are under the obligation to keep 
secret what they learn through their activity. 
Estonia 9(2)(7
1
)  The following issues are within the exclusive competence of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank: 
appointment of the independent auditors of Eesti Pank pursuant 
to the procedure provided in subsection 31 (1) of this Act 
9(2)(8)  The following issues are within the exclusive competence of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank: 
approval of Eesti Pank's annual report on the proposal of the 
Governor; 
31(1)  For each financial year, the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
shall appoint independent auditors recommended by the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank and approved 
by the Council of the European Union to monitor Eesti Pank's 
activities during the financial year and to attest to the accuracy 
of the annual report prepared by Eesti Pank. Eesti Pank's 
activities may be examined further if the Riigikogu passes a 
corresponding resolution. 
31(2)  Eesti Pank's annual report shall be prepared pursuant to the rules 
established on the basis of Article 26.4 of the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank. 
31(3)  The annual report shall be approved and, together with the 
auditor's report, submitted to the Riigikogu by the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank. The annual report of the Financial 
Supervision Authority approved by the Supervisory Board of the 
Financial Supervision Authority shall be submitted to the 
Riigikogu at the same time as Eesti Pank's annual report. The 
Riigikogu shall hear a presentation concerning Eesti Pank's 
annual report by the Governor of Eesti Pank. 
31(4)  The annual report shall be published in the Riigi Teataja and in 
Eesti Pank's Yearbook. 
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Finland 18(1) Parliament shall elect five auditors and a deputy for each of 
them, for the purpose of auditing Suomen Pankki‘s annual 
accounts and accounting system and management. 
18(2) A minimum of two of the auditors and their respective deputies 
must be auditors approved by the Central Chamber of 
Commerce or must have passed the Chartered Public Finance 
Auditor‘s examination. 
18(3) The auditors shall elect a chairman from among themselves and 
appoint as secretary a person who is an auditor approved by the 
Central Chamber of Commerce. 
22(1) The auditors elected by Parliament shall audit the Bank‘s 
accounts annually by the end of March following the close of the 
financial year. 
22(2) The audit shall be carried out according to generally accepted 
auditing principles. 
22(3) Auditors shall have access to all documents and information that 
they consider necessary for the auditing task. 
22(4) The powers of auditors approved by the Council of the European 
Union to examine the accounting system and accounts of 
Suomen Pankki and to obtain information on the Bank‘s 
transactions are laid down in the Statute. 
23 The auditors elected by Parliament shall submit a written report 
to the Parliamentary Supervisory Council, which shall include 
statements on the observance of the grounds confirmed by the 
Parliamentary Supervisory Council on the drawing up of annual 
accounts, on the confirmation of the profit and loss account and 
balance sheet and on the Board‘s proposal on measures to be 
taken concerning the Bank‘s profit or loss, as well as any 
comments that may affect confirmation of the profit and loss 
account or balance sheet. 
France L.142-2 The General Council shall administer the Banque de France. 
 
It shall consider matters relating to the management of the 
Banque de France‘s activities other than those which are tasks of 
the European System of Central Banks. 
 
It shall discuss the staff regulations. The Banque de France‘s 
Governor shall submit these regulations for the approval of the 
relevant ministers. 
 
The General Council shall also: discuss the use of own funds; 
draw up, making sure to allocate the Banque de France the 
necessary means to carry out the tasks delegated to it as a 
consequence of its participation in the European System of 
Central Banks, the projected and amended expenditure budget; 
and approve the Banque de France‘s balance sheet and accounts, 
as well as the plans for allocating profits and fixing the dividend 
due to the State. 
 
The General Council shall appoint two auditors to audit the 
Banque de France‘s accounts. They shall be invited to attend the 
General Council meeting which approves the accounts for the 
previous financial year. 
L.143-1 (3) The Banque de France‘s accounts and the auditors‘ report shall 
be sent to the finance committees of the National Assembly and 
the Senate. 
R.144-8 
 
The Banque de France‘s General Council shall nominate 
auditors on a recommendation by the Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank and after approval by the Council of the 
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European Union. 
The auditors shall check that the annual accounts are regular and 
honest and reliably reflect the result of transactions for the 
previous financial year as well as the Banque de France‘s 
financial situation and assets at the end of the financial year. 
Germany 26(3) The Executive Board shall draw up the annual accounts as soon 
as possible. The accounts shall be audited by one or more 
independent auditors appointed by the Executive Board in 
agreement with the Federal Court of Auditors 
(Bundesrechnungshof) and subsequently published. The auditors' 
report serves as the basis for the audit carried out by the Federal 
Court of Auditors. 
26(5) The annual accounts, the standard cost account, the investment 
plan, the analysis of the budgeted figures compared with actual 
costs and investment, and the auditors' reports shall be 
forwarded to the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal 
Court of Auditors. The annual accounts, the analysis of the 
budgeted figures compared with actual costs and investment and 
the auditors' reports shall be presented to the Bundestag (the 
lower house of Parliament). 
26(6) The Federal Court of Auditors shall report its findings under 
subsection (3) above to the Bundestag. 
Greece 19 The Annual General Meeting of Shareholders shall be the only 
competent organ to deal with the following matters:  
(a) approval of the annual report;  
(b) approval of the Balance Sheet following the report of the 
Auditors;  
(c) appropriations to reserve and other special funds; the 
fixing of dividends, and any other disposal of net profits;  
(d) election or removal of members of the General Council 
and of the Auditors and the fixing of their fees and travelling 
expenses;  
(e) discharge from all personal responsibility of members of 
the General Council and of the Auditors. The voting on this 
issue shall be conducted by show ballot and by roll-call;  
44(1) The first General Meeting of Shareholders and, subsequently, the 
Annual General Meeting shall elect three qualified persons and 
two substitutes as Auditors, to examine and report upon the 
balance sheet of the Bank to be presented at the next Annual 
General Meeting, and shall determine their fees. No Councillor 
or other officer of the Bank shall be eligible as Auditor during 
his term of office. Instead of the above mentioned natural 
persons, the General Meeting may elect as auditors a corporation 
or syndicate of Chartered Accountants. 
44(2) The Auditors are entitled to obtain any explanation or 
information they may require from the Governors or Directors 
and to examine the Bank‘s books and documents. 
44(3) The Auditors shall submit a report to the shareholders upon the 
annual balance sheet and accounts, and in every such report they 
shall state whether, in their opinion, the balance sheet is a 
complete and accurate balance sheet containing all necessary 
particulars and properly drawn up so as to present a true and 
correct view of the state of the Bank‘s affairs, and, in case they 
have requested any explanation or information from the 
Governors or Directors, whether it has been given and whether it 
is satisfactory. Any such report submitted to the shareholders 
shall be read at the Annual General Meeting. 
44(4) The Auditors may, at the expense of the Bank, employ 
accountants or other persons to assist them in investigating the 
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accounts of the Bank. 
44(5) With the exception of information provided to the General 
Meeting of Shareholders, the Auditors and their assistants shall 
preserve strict secrecy in regard to the affairs of the Bank. 
44(6) The aforementioned audit shall be carried out without prejudice 
to the audit by independent external auditors under Article 27 of 
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks. 
Hungary 45(2) The authority of the State Audit Office to audit the MNB is 
regulated by the act on the State Audit Office. 
45(3) The Chairman of the State Audit Office shall be consulted before 
the MNB‘s Auditor is elected or his dismissal is proposed. 
46A The Shareholder shall, in a Shareholder Resolution: 
(b) establish the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement; 
(c) appoint and dismiss the Auditor; and 
(d) establish the remuneration of the Auditor. 
52A(2)  The internal audit body of the MNB shall be under the control of 
the Supervisory Board, with the restrictions defined in Paragraph 
(3) of this Article, and it shall be under the control of the 
Governor in matters falling outside the competence of the 
Supervisory Board. … 
59 The auditor of the MNB may be appointed for a maximum term 
of five years. Following expiration of said term the same auditor 
may not be reappointed within five years. 
Ireland 6H(2) Within 6 months after the end of each financial year, the Bank 
shall prepare and transmit to the Comptroller and Auditor 
General a statement of accounts for the year concerned. The 
statement must be in a form approved by the Minister after 
consulting the Bank. A form of statement approved under this 
subsection remains in force until superseded by another form of 
statement so approved. 
6H(3) The Comptroller and Auditor General shall audit, certify and 
report on the statement of accounts and, as soon as practicable 
after completing the report, give the report and the statement to 
the Minister. 
6H(4) As soon as practicable after being given the report and statement 
of account, the Minister shall arrange for copies of those 
documents to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas. 
6H(5) The accounts of the Bank may be audited in accordance with 
Article 27 of the ESCB Statute and, for that purpose, the Bank 
shall provide any auditors appointed in accordance with that 
Article with full information, books and records. 
6I(1) Within 6 months after the end of each financial year, the Bank 
shall prepare a report of its operations during the year and 
present the report to the Minister. 
6I(2) As soon as practicable after receiving such a report, the Minister 
is required to arrange for copies of the report to be laid before 
each House of the Oireachtas, together with any other reports 
required to be included in or attached to the report. 
6I(3) The Bank shall give to the Minister for publication in Iris 
Oifigiúil such periodical returns concerning the transactions of 
the Bank as the Minister directs from time to time. 
Italy 19(1) The Board of Auditors shall consist of five auditors, including 
the chairman; there shall be two alternates. The members of the 
Board of Auditors shall remain in office for three years and may 
be re-elected not more than three times. 
19(2) The Board of Auditors shall perform, directly at the Head Office 
and either directly or through examiners at the main branches 
and the local branches, checks on the administration of the Bank 
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with regard to observance of the law, this statute and the Bank‘s 
general regulations. It shall carry out accounting checks, without 
prejudice to the activity of the external auditors referred to in 
Article 38, examine the annual accounts and express its opinion 
on the distribution of the annual dividend. 
19(3) The members of the Board of Auditors shall attend the meetings 
of the Board of Directors. 
19(4) Where necessary the Board of Auditors shall report its own 
observations and any received from the examiners to the 
Governor. 
19(5) The members of the Board of Auditors shall be paid a fixed fee 
established by the shareholders‘ meeting, in addition to the 
reimbursement of expenses. 
38(2) The annual accounts must be submitted to the Board of Auditors 
not later than 15 April of each year. The Board of Directors, 
after consulting the Board of Auditors, shall approve the 
allocation of the profits and the dividend to be distributed to 
shareholders and paid after approval of the annual accounts by 
the shareholders‘ meeting. ADD Article 19 collegio sindacale 
38(3) The annual accounts of the Bank shall be audited by external 
auditors in accordance with Article 27 of the statute of the 
ESCB. 
41 The Bank of Italy shall submit a report to the Parliament and the 
Government on its activity as provided for by law. 
Latvia 15 The Bank of Latvia shall publish monthly and annual balance 
sheets in accordance with the standards used by the world's 
central banks.  
43(2) The audit commission, whose members are approved by the 
State Auditors' Office of the Republic of Latvia, shall audit the 
economic activity and documents of the Bank of Latvia. After 
the audit results have been reviewed, the Council of the Bank of 
Latvia shall approve the Bank's annual report, and the report, 
together with the annual balance sheet, shall be published for the 
public knowledge. 
Lithuania 49(3) The Bank of Lithuania shall, within four months after the end of 
a financial year, submit its annual financial statements together 
with the opinion of an independent auditor to the Seimas and 
shall make it public. 
50 The annual audit of the Bank of Lithuania shall be carried out by 
an audit company selected by the Bank of Lithuania. 
New 50 The audit of the annual financial statements of the Bank of 
Lithuania shall be carried out by independent external auditors 
selected by the Bank of Lithuania and approved by the Council 
of the European Union upon the recommendation of the 
European Central Bank. 
51 The Bank of Lithuania shall make its annual report public and 
issue it as a separate publication. The annual report shall provide 
information on basic tasks regarding monetary policy and their 
implementation, monetary policy operations, activities while 
supervising credit institutions and discharging other functions 
established by laws, as well as information on the national 
macroeconomic situation, such as analysis of the developments 
in the national economy and financial markets, and on the 
financial position of the Bank and the results of its activities. 
52 The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall 
twice a year  present reports to the Seimas on the 
implementation of the primary objective of the Bank, 
performance of its functions and the situation of the banking 
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system. 
Luxembourg 6(f) The competences of the Council of the Central Bank shall be: 
To propose to the Government the appointment of the Central 
Bank's auditor. 
15 The Government in Cabinet shall appoint an auditor on a 
proposal from the Council of the Central Bank. The auditor shall 
be qualified to exercise the profession of corporate auditor. The 
auditor shall be appointed for one financial year; the 
appointment is renewable. His fees shall be paid by the Central 
Bank. 
16 The auditor shall establish and certify that the accounts of the 
Central Bank are accurate and complete. He shall draw up, for 
submission to the Council, Government and Chamber of 
Deputies, a detailed report on the Central Bank accounts at the 
end of the financial year. He may be ordered by the Council to 
carry out specific investigations. 
29(1) No later than 31 March of each year the Executive Board shall 
submit to the Council for approval the balance sheet and profit-
and-loss account closed on 31 December of the previous year, 
together with the Board‘s report and the auditor's report. 
30 The budget, annual accounts and reports approved by the 
Council shall be sent to the Government and the Chamber of 
Deputies. The Government in Cabinet shall decide whether the 
Central Bank bodies be granted discharge. Such a decision is 
taken without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 (2) and 
without calling into question the obligations of the Central Bank 
within the framework of the ESCB The decision granting 
discharge to the bodies of the Central Bank shall be published 
together with the Central Bank's annual accounts in the 
Mémorial (Official Gazette). 
Malta 20 In accordance with article 27 of the Statute, the accounts of the 
Bank shall be audited by independent external auditors 
appointed by the Board as recommended by the European 
Central Bank and approved by the Council of the European 
Union. 
21(2) The Bank shall, as soon as may be but not later than three 
months after the close of each financial year of the Bank, 
transmit to the Minister - 
(a) a copy of the annual accounts certified by the auditors, 
(b) a statement of the Bank‘s investments; and 
(c) a report on its operations during that year, 
and shall publish the report referred to in paragraph (c). 
21(3) The Minister shall, as soon as may be and, in respect of the 
requirement of paragraph (a) of this sub-article, not later than the 
first sitting of the House of Representatives after the seventh day 
of April - 
(a) cause a copy of the annual accounts, of the statement and of 
the report aforesaid to be laid before the House of 
Representatives; and 
(b) cause a copy of the annual accounts of the Bank to be 
published in the Gazette. 
21(4) The Bank shall, as soon as may be after the last working day of 
each month, make up and publish a return of its assets and 
liabilities as at the close of business on that day. A copy of the 
return shall be transmitted to the Minister who shall cause it to 
be published in the Gazette. 
21(5) The Bank shall observe the standard rules of accounting and 
reporting as may be established by the Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank under article 26(4) of the Statute. 
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The Netherlands 19(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
Each year, within three months of the end of the financial year, 
the Governing Board shall compile the annual accounts and the 
annual report. 
19(5) 
Articles of 
Association 
The annual accounts shall be presented to the Supervisory Board 
together with the annual report. 
19(6) 
Articles of 
Association 
Without prejudice to the provisions of section 17 of the Bank 
Act 1998, the Supervisory Board shall adopt the annual 
accounts. 
19(7) 
Articles of 
Association 
In evidence of this adoption, the annual accounts shall be signed 
by all members of the Governing Board and of the Supervisory 
Board. If the annual accounts are not signed by one or more of 
these members, the reason therefore shall be stated on the annual 
accounts. 
19(8) 
Articles of 
Association 
The annual accounts thus adopted require the approval of the 
general meeting of shareholders. 
20(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The general meeting of shareholders shall, with due observance 
of Article 27.1 of the Statute of the  
European System of Central Banks, commission an expert as 
referred to in article 393 of Book 2 of the  
Dutch Civil Code to audit the annual accounts. 
20(2) 
Articles of 
Association 
The expert shall present a report on his audit simultaneously to 
the Supervisory Board and the Governing Board. The expert 
shall in any event be present at the Supervisory Board meeting at 
which the report is discussed and a decision is taken to adopt the 
annual accounts. He shall receive the financial information 
underlying the interim financial reports and shall be given the 
opportunity to respond to all information. 
20(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
The expert shall reflect the results of his audit in an auditor‘s 
opinion on the annual accounts. The general meeting of 
shareholders may question the expert regarding this opinion. 
20(4) 
Articles of 
Association 
The annual accounts shall not be adopted or approved if the 
body of the company authorised to do so has been unable to take 
note of the auditor‘s opinion, as referred to in paragraph 3. 
21 Articles 
of 
Association 
The annual accounts shall not be adopted or approved if the 
body of the company authorised to do so has been unable to take 
note of the auditor‘s opinion, as referred to in paragraph 3. 
Poland 69(1) The annual accounts of the NBP shall be subject to audit by an 
auditor appointed by the Monetary Policy Council. 
69(2) The NBP shall bear the costs of the audit referred to in para. 1. 
69(3) The President of the NBP shall submit, until April 30 of the year 
following the fiscal year, the annual accounts of the NBP to the 
Council of Ministers for approval. 
70 Within five months after the end of the budget year, the 
President of the NBP shall submit the annual report on the 
activity of the NBP to the Sejm. 
Portugal 43(1)(c) The Board of Auditors shall be responsible for issuing its 
opinion on the budget, the balance sheet, and the annual 
accounts.  
46 Without prejudice to the powers of the Board of Auditors, the 
accounts of the Bank shall also be audited by external auditors, 
pursuant to the provisions laid down in Article 27.1 of the 
ESCB/ECB Statute. 
48(a) It shall be incumbent on the Advisory Board to issue its non-
binding opinion on the annual report of the Bank, before its 
release.  
54(1) Not later than March 31, the Bank shall submit the annual report, 
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balance sheet, and accounts referred to the last day of the 
previous year for the Finance Minister‘s approval, after 
discussion and appraisal thereof by the Board of Directors, with 
the opinion of the Board of Auditors. 
54(2) Unless a decision to the contrary is given by the Finance 
Minister, the report, balance sheet, and accounts shall be 
considered approved thirty days after the date of their receipt. 
54(3) The report, balance sheet, and accounts shall be published in the 
Official Gazette within thirty days after their approval. 
54(4) After the presentation of the report, balance sheet and annual 
accounts, the Governor shall inform the Parliament, through the 
Standing Committee on Economy, Finance and Planning, on the 
monetary and exchange rate policy stance and guidelines. 
54(5) The Bank shall not be subject to the financial system governing 
the autonomous funds and services of the Public Sector. 
54(6) The Bank shall not be subject to the prior control of the Court of 
Auditors, nor to its successive control in the issues relating to its 
participation in the performance of the tasks entrusted to the 
ESCB. 
54(7) The provisions of the foregoing paragraph shall be applicable to 
the Funds operating at the Bank or in whose management the 
Bank participates. 
55 The Bank shall publish monthly and in accordance with the 
provisions laid down in subparagraph b) of paragraph 3 of 
Article 59 a synopsis of its assets and liabilities. 
Romania 35(4) On behalf of the Board, the Governor shall submit to the 
Parliament until 30 June of the following year Banca Naţională a 
României‘s annual report on Banca Naţională a României‘s 
activities, the annual financial statements and the auditor‘s 
report, subject to debate, but not voted, in the joint session of the 
two Chambers of Parliament. 
36(1) Banca Naţională a României‘s annual financial statements shall 
be audited by financial auditors that shall be legal entities 
authorised by the Financial Auditors Chamber in Romania and 
selected by Banca Naţională a României‘s Board as a result of 
bidding. 
36(2) The financial auditor‘s report and opinion shall be submitted to 
Banca Naţională a României‘s Board and shall be published 
along with the annual financial statements. 
46 Subsequent to their adoption by the Board, Banca Naţională a 
României‘s audited annual financial statements shall be 
published in Monitorul Oficial al României, along with the 
financial auditor‘s report. 
Slovakia 38(2) The financial statements of the National Bank of Slovakia shall 
be audited by an independent external auditor designated in 
accordance with the separate legal provisions applicable to the 
Eurosystem. 
38(3) The National Bank of Slovakia shall prepare and publish its 
annual reports in accordance with the separate legal provisions 
applicable to the Eurosystem. 
38(4) The National Bank of Slovakia shall process and provide for 
publication the balance sheet of the assets and liabilities of the 
National Bank of Slovakia. 
39(5) The National Bank of Slovakia shall submit its annual report and 
financial results to the National Council of the Slovak Republic 
for discussion within three months after the end of the calendar 
year; besides the financial statements of the National Bank of 
Slovakia and the auditor's statement on the respective audit, this 
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report shall separately include information on the operating costs 
of the National Bank of Slovakia. If so requested by the National 
Council of the Slovak Republic, the National Bank of Slovakia 
shall, in accordance with that request, have six weeks to provide 
the additional information or to submit an explanation in respect 
of the submitted annual report on the financial results of the 
National Bank of Slovakia. 
Slovenia 32(1)(1) The Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall also decide on 
other matters concerning the operations of Banka Slovenije, and 
shall: propose the external auditor.  
49 (1) Banka Slovenije‘s financial year corresponds to the calendar 
year. 
(2) Banka Slovenije shall prepare its financial statements in 
accordance with principles, standards and accounting guidelines 
adopted by the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, taking into 
account the principles, standards and accounting guidelines 
adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB).  
(3) Banka Slovenije shall plan its income and expenditure in a 
financial plan to be adopted by 31 December of the previous 
year. 
(4) Should the financial plan not have been adopted by 31 
December of the previous year, financing shall be carried out 
pursuant to a decision on temporary financing adopted by the 
Governing Board of Banka Slovenije. 
(5) The Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall adopt the 
annual accounts for the previous year by 31 March of every year. 
(6) Banka Slovenije shall notify the National Assembly of the 
annual accounts and financial plan. The annual financial 
statements are an integral part of the annual report and shall be 
published. 
52(1) The independent international auditor selected in accordance 
with Article 27.1 of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB shall audit 
Banka Slovenije‘s financial statements for a three-year period. 
52(2) After a preliminary public call for bids, at least six months 
before the expiry of the contract concluded with the auditor, the 
Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall select and propose a 
candidate for the final selection procedure. 
64 Details of the allocation of a proportion of monetary income or 
expenditure of the ESCB established by the ECB in accordance 
with the ESCB and ECB Statute in implementing the common 
monetary policy shall be an integral part of Banka Slovenije‘s 
annual accounts specified in Article 49 of this Law. 
65 The selection of the auditors pursuant to Article 52 of this Act 
shall be based on the rules of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB. 
Spain 4(2) The Bank's draft budget for operating expenses and investments, 
once approved by its Governing Council according to article 
21.1.g), shall be forwarded to the government, which will submit 
it to Parliament for approval. The budget shall be prospective in 
nature, and shall not be consolidated with other State public 
sector budgets.  
The government, upon proposal by the Economy and Finance 
Minister, shall have the authority to approve the annual balance 
sheet and accounts of the Bank, which will be sent to Parliament 
for informational purposes. Without prejudice to the terms of 
article 27 of the Statutes of the ESCB, the Bank shall be subject 
to external auditing by the «Tribunal de Cuentas», under the 
terms of Organic Law 2/1982, of May 12, on the Tribunal de 
Cuentas. The report accompanying the annual balance sheet and 
accounts shall give further detail on different operations or items 
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on the balance sheet, according to their characteristics. In 
particular, the Bank's contributions to the Deposit Guarantee 
Funds shall be detailed, as will any loans or other operations 
transacted for the benefit of any other institution or person not 
on an arm's-length basis, or which in any other way involve loss 
of profit or losses for the Bank. In such cases the amount of such 
loss of profit or losses shall be specified. 
Sweden Chapter 10 
Article 5 
The Riksbank shall annually report to the Riksdag what 
measures the Bank has taken in view of the Swedish National 
Audit Office‘s observations.  
Chapter 9, 
Article 2. 
The Head Office shall have an Audit Unit and other units 
decided by the Riksbank. 
Operations of the Audit Unit are governed by the General 
Council. […] 
Chapter 9, 
Article 2a 
The activities of the Audit Unit shall concern independent 
examination of the Riksbank‘s internal governance and control 
and how the Riksbank meets its financial accounting obligations. 
The audit shall follow generally accepted principles for internal 
auditing. 
The Riksbank shall adopt an audit plan for its activities 
following consultation with the Swedish National Audit Office. 
Chapter 10, 
Article 2. 
The Riksbank's accounting year is the calendar year. 
Each year before the end of December, the Executive Board 
shall draft a budget for the Riksbank's administrative activities 
during the following accounting year. The Executive Board shall 
submit the budget to the Riksdag Committee on Finance and the 
Swedish National Audit Office as well as the General Council 
for information. 
Chapter 10, 
Article 3 
The Riksbank is required to keep accounts. This requirement 
shall be met in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles. In addition, the European Central Bank's guidelines 
on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting 
within the European System of Central Banks shall be applied. 
Each year, before 15 February, the Executive Board shall submit 
an Annual Report of the Riksbank's activities during the 
preceding accounting year to the Riksdag, the Swedish National 
Audit Office and the General Council. The General Council shall 
make proposals to the Riksdag and the Swedish National Audit 
Office on the allocation of the profit of the Riksbank. The 
Annual Report shall comprise a Profit and Loss Account, a 
Balance Sheet, a Directors‘ Report and an account of foreign 
exchange and monetary policies and on how the Riksbank has 
promoted a safe and efficient payments system. 
Chapter 10, 
Article 4 
The Riksbank's Profit and Loss Account and Balance Sheet are 
approved by the Riksdag, which also determines the allocation 
of the Riksbank's profit. If the value of the reserve fund has 
declined to less than SEK 500 million, at least ten per cent of the 
profit for the year shall be allocated to the reserve fund until it 
has retained a level of this amount. 
The Riksdag determines whether the General Council shall be 
discharged from liability for its activities and the Executive 
Board for its management of the Riksbank. Discharge from 
liability may only be denied if there are reasons to make claims 
of financial liability against a member of the General Council or 
the Executive Board, or if the member should be prosecuted for 
criminal actions in connection with his assignment or 
employment. 
The United 
Kingdom 
4(1)  As soon as practicable after the end of each of its financial years, 
the Bank shall make to the Chancellor of the Exchequer a report 
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on its activities in that year 
4(2) A report under this section shall, in particular, contain – 
(a) a report by the directors of the Bank on the matters for which 
the sub-committee constituted by section 3 is responsible, and 
(b) a copy of the statement for the year prepared under section 
7(2) and the report of the Bank‘s auditors on it. 
4(3) The report mentioned in subsection (2)(a) shall, in particular, 
include a review of the Bank‘s performance in relation to its 
objectives and strategy, as determined by the court of directors 
of the Bank, in the financial year to which the report under this 
section relates. 
4(4) A report under this section shall also contain – 
(a) a statement of the rate or rates at which directors of the Bank 
have been remunerated in the financial year to which the report 
relates, and 
(b) a statement of the Bank‘s objectives and strategy, as 
determined by the court of directors of the Bank, for the 
financial year in which the report is made. 
4(5) The Bank shall publish every report under this section in such 
manner as it thinks appropriate. 
4(6) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall lay copies of every report 
under this section before Parliament. 
 
Table 3-14 Distribution of NCB profits 
Member State Article Text 
Austria 16(3) The General Meeting shall be entitled: 
to decide on profit appropriation and to fix the dividend to be 
distributed to shareholders;  
69(1) From the total annual income of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank, derived in observance of the provisions of 
Articles 32 and 51 of the ESCB/ECB Statute and the 
provisions of Article 33 of the ESCB/ECB Statute on the 
allocation of net profits and losses of the ECB, the following 
sums shall, irrespective of the operating profit, be deducted 
and not recognized as profit: 
1. The book value of exchange gains accrued over the year (i.e. 
the difference between the book value and the mid-rate of 
nondomestic assets), insofar as these gains are to be transferred 
directly, in accordance with paragraph 4, to a reserve fund 
which serves to cover any exchange risks connected with the 
holding of nondomestic assets; 
2. the earnings from the assets in which the pension reserve, 
i.e. the reserve fund serving to meet the pension claims of the 
Bank‘s employees, has been invested, and which shall be paid 
into that reserve fund; 
3. the amounts of interest which, pursuant to the agreement 
between the Oesterreichische Nationalbank and the ERP Fund 
concluded in accordance with Article 3 paragraph 4 of the 
ERP-Fonds-Gesetz (ERP Fund Act) BGBl. No. 207/1962, 
were credited during the year to the temporary reserve account 
for ERP loans extended by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank; 
4. the earnings from the assets in which the Fund for the 
Promotion of Scientific Research and Teaching set up by the 
Bank is invested, and which shall be appropriated to this Fund. 
69(2) From the profit for the year in accordance with paragraph 1, up 
to 10% shall be transferred to the pension reserve. When the 
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pension reserve has achieved a level which, according to 
actuarial calculations, provides the necessary capital coverage 
to meet the pensions claims of the staff of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank, no further contribution shall be made to this 
reserve. 
69(3) Of the remaining profit, the Bund shall first receive 90%. Of 
the then remaining retained earnings, the shareholders shall, by 
decision of the General Meeting, receive a dividend of up to 
10% of their share of the capital. The portion then remaining 
shall be appropriated as decided by the General Meeting. 
69(4) The obligation to create and release the reserve referred to in 
paragraph 1 item 1 shall depend on the assessment of the risk 
associated with the nondomestic assets. Releases shall be 
accounted for in the profit and loss account. 
Belgium 20(4)  
30(8) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Council [of Regency] shall approve the expenditure 
budget and the annual accounts submitted by the Board of 
Directors. It shall finally determine the distribution of profits 
proposed by the Board.  
30  
54 Articles of 
Association 
Any capital gain realised by the Bank through arbitrage 
transactions of gold assets against other external reserve 
components shall be entered in a special unavailable reserve 
account. This capital gain shall be exempt from all taxation. 
However, where some external reserve components have been 
arbitraged against gold, the difference between the purchase 
price of that gold and the average purchase price of the 
existing gold stock shall be deducted from the amount of that 
special account. 
The net income from the assets which form the counterpart to 
the capital gain referred to in the first paragraph shall be 
allocated to the State.  
External reserve components acquired as a result of the 
transactions referred to in the first paragraph shall be covered 
by the State guarantee as provided in Article 9(2) of this Act.  
The terms and conditions for application of the provisions 
contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be fixed by 
agreements to be concluded between the State and the Bank. 
These agreements shall be published in the Belgian Gazette 
(Moniteur belge/Belgisch Staatsblad).  
55 Articles of 
Association 
Notwithstanding Article 54, the capital gain made from the 
transfer of assets in gold with regard to the issuing by the State 
of numismatic or commemorative coins, shall be allotted to the 
State to the extent of the unused balance of the 2.75% of the 
weight of gold which appeared in the Bank's assets on 1 
January 1987, and which could be used by the State, 
particularly for issuing coins, by virtue of Article 20bis (2) of 
the Act of 24 August 1939 on the National Bank of Belgium. 
32  
49 Articles of 
Association 
The Annual profits shall be distributed as follows: 
1. a first dividend of 6% of the capital shall be allocated to 
the shareholders; 
2. from the excess, an amount proposed by the Board of 
Directors and established by the Council of Regency shall 
be independently allocated to the reserve fund or to the 
available reserves; 
3. from the second excess, a second dividend forming a 
minimum of 50% of the net proceeds from assets forming 
the counterpart to the reserve fund and available reserves 
shall be allocated to the shareholders; 
4. the balance shall be allocated to the State; it shall be 
exempt from company tax. 
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31  
46 Articles of 
Association  
The reserve fund is intended for :  
1. compensating for losses in capital stock;  
2. supplementing any shortfall in the annual profit up to 
a dividend of six per cent of the capital.  
Upon expiration of the Bank's right of issue, the State shall 
have a priority claim to one fifth of the reserve fund. The 
remaining four fifths shall be distributed among all the 
shareholders.  
50 Articles of 
Association 
The profit established for allocation to the shareholders for the 
financial year ended 31 December of each year shall be 
distributed in a oner within the month following the General 
Meeting, on a date fixed by the latter. 
If the profit for distribution among the shareholders is less than 
6% per annum, it shall be supplemented by drawing on the 
reserve fund. 
This drawing shall be refunded to the reserve if, the next year, 
this refund can be made without reducing the profit for 
distribution to below 6%. 
47 Articles of 
Association 
The amount retained, for building up the reserve, shall be 10% 
of the net profit in excess of 6% per annum. 
48 Articles of 
Association 
The use made of the reserve shall be optional. 
The proceeds shall form part of the Bank's general profit. 
Bulgaria 8(1)  To cover uncollectable and unsecured receivables, the BNB 
shall allocate provisions for an amount specified by the 
Governing Council which shall be an expense item in the 
accounts and an adjustment in the balance sheet assets. 
8(2)  The Reserve Fund shall be created by making deductions of 25 
per cent of the annual surplus of the BNB‘s revenue over 
expenditure. The resources of this Fund shall be used to cover 
the BNB‘s losses. 
8(3)  Upon deduction of the amount for the Reserve Fund, the 
necessary amounts for special funds set up under decisions of 
the Governing Council shall be paid out of the annual surplus 
of the BNB‘s revenue over expenditure. 
8(4)  Each year, the state treasury account shall be credited with the 
remainder of the annual surplus of the BNB‘s revenue over 
expenditure within four months of the end of the fiscal year. 
9(1)  If the BNB‘s balance sheet indicates that the amount of its 
assets is less than the amount of its liabilities plus the statutory 
fund, the Minister of Finance shall replenish the statutory fund 
of the BNB by the amount necessary to cover the deficit. 
9(2)  The procedure set out in paragraph 1 for covering a balance 
sheet deficit shall only apply when the resources of the 
Reserve Fund and of the BNB‘s Special Reserve Account 
under Article 36, paragraph 1 have been exhausted. 
36(1) Any unrealised profit of the BNB arising from changes in the 
valuation of the BNB‘s assets or liabilities in gold or 
denominated in gold or in foreign currencies, as a result of a 
change in the price of gold or of the exchange rates of foreign 
currencies against the lev, shall be assigned to a Special 
Reserve Account. Apart from the cases referred to in paragraph 
2, the amounts on this account may be set against other losses 
incurred by the BNB. 
36(2) Losses arising from any change referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
be covered by the funds of the Special Reserve Account and 
the Reserve Fund. 
Cyprus 58(1) The Bank shall have a reserve called the ―General Reserve 
Fund″, which is created by withholding net profits of the Bank, 
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the amount of which shall be determined by the Board, with a 
view to ensuring the continuous and proper functioning of the 
Bank and the financial independence necessary for the 
achievement of the objectives of the Bank. 
58(2) The General Reserve Fund, by a decision of the Board, may be 
used to: 
(a) issue new capital; 
(b) write-off accumulated losses; 
(c) meet extraordinary expenses related to the achievement of 
the objectives of the Bank. 
59 The net profit of the Bank shall be distributed as follows: 
(a) An amount equivalent to twenty per cent (20%) of the net 
profits of the corresponding financial year, shall be transferred 
to the General Reserve Fund; if the General Reserve Fund falls 
below the capital of the Bank, then the Board may transfer to 
the General Reserve Fund an amount not exceeding fifty per 
cent (50%) of the net profits until the General Reserve Fund 
equals the capital of the Bank. 
(b) the balance, after deducting the amount referred to in 
paragraph (a), shall be transferred into the Consolidated Fund 
of the General Government Account, unless the Board decides 
the further withholding of net profits, in case this is required in 
its opinion due to exceptional circumstances. 
The Czech 
Republic 
47(2) The Czech National Bank shall defray the necessary costs of 
its operations from its income. The profit it generates shall be 
used to replenish its reserve fund and other funds created from 
profits and for other purposes in the budgeted amount. It shall 
transfer the remaining profit to the state budget. 
Denmark 19 The profit earned by the Bank shall go to the Exchequer if it be 
not allocated to the Reserve Fund or to special guarantee 
funds. 
Out of the profit of the financial year the Exchequer shall prior 
to other payments receive Kr. 1 million. 
Thereafter 25 per centum of the remainder shall be allocated to 
the Reserve Fund if this fund be less than Kr. 25 millions. 
The rest of the profit shall be paid to the Exchequer under the 
observation of the following rules: 
If the rest of the profit does not exceed Kr. 4 millions, one half 
of the amount shall be paid to the Exchequer and the other half 
written off the General Capital Fund Certificate. In case the 
rest of the profit exceeds Kr. 4 millions, Kr. 2 millions shall be 
paid and the remainder written off the General Capital Fund 
Certificate. When this certificate has been redeemed in full the 
total rest of the profit goes to the Exchequer unless the Board 
of Directors with the approval of the Minister of Economic 
Affairs decides to allocate a part of the amount to reserves. 
In case the losses of preceding years might have entailed 
drawing on the General Capital Fund all payments to the 
Exchequer shall be suspended until the loss of the General 
Capital Fund has been recovered. 
In case the losses of preceding years might have reduced the 
Reserve Fund to less than the amount it constituted when the 
Bank commenced business, the payment under subsection 2 of 
this section shall be made, otherwise the whole profit shall be 
used to increase the Reserve Fund until it has regained the 
original size. 
Estonia 30(1) The profit (loss) of Eesti Pank is the difference between its 
revenue and its expenditure. 
30(2) At least 25 per cent of annual profits shall be used to increase 
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statutory capital up to the amount determined by the Riigikogu. 
30(3) At least 25 per cent of annual profits shall be used to increase 
reserve capital pursuant to a decision of the Supervisory Board 
of Eesti Pank. 
30(4) After the allocations specified in subsections (2) and (3) of this 
section are made, part of the profits may be used, pursuant to a 
decision of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, to establish 
and augment the foundation capital and funds for specific 
purposes prescribed by the statute of Eesti Pank. 
30(5) Any profits remaining after the allocations specified in 
subsections (2), (3) and (4) of this section are made shall be 
transferred to the state budget. 
30(6) Any loss incurred by Eesti Pank shall be covered from reserve 
capital. If the reserve capital is insufficient, losses may be 
covered from statutory capital with the permission of the 
Riigikogu. 
30(7) Eesti Pank, being the central bank of the state, does not pay 
income tax or any other taxes related to its economic activity 
into the state budget or local budgets, except taxes related to 
natural persons. The Government of the Republic has the right 
to release Eesti Pank from the payment of other state taxes in 
exceptional circumstances 
Finland 11 As a body supervising the administration and activities of 
Suomen Pankki, the Parliamentary Supervisory Council shall 
perform the following tasks: […] 
2) decide, on the basis of the auditors‘ report, on the 
confirmation of the Bank‘s balance sheet and profit and loss 
account; 
3) decide, upon proposal of the Board, on measures concerning 
the Bank‘s profit or loss for the financial year; […]. 
20(1) In respect of its accounting procedures, Suomen Pankki shall 
observe generally accepted accounting principles. 
20(2) Provisions can be made in the annual accounts if necessary for 
safeguarding the real value of the Bank‘s funds or for 
smoothing out variations in profit or loss arising from changes 
in exchange rates or market values of securities. 
20(3) Provisions necessary for covering the Bank‘s pension liability 
may be made in the annual accounts. 
21(1) The monetary income accruing within the European System of 
Central Banks in the performance of its monetary policy 
function shall be calculated and allocated between the national 
central banks in accordance with the provisions of the Statute 
and the decisions made by the Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank. 
21(2) Half of the profit, following allocation of the monetary income 
that has accrued within the European System of Central Banks, 
shall be transferred to the reserve fund. The remaining profit 
shall be made available for use in accordance with the needs of 
the state. The Parliamentary Supervisory Council may decide 
on use of the profit for other purposes if this is justifiable 
because of the Bank‘s financial condition or the size of the 
reserve fund. Parliament shall decide on the disposal of the 
profit made available for use in accordance with the needs of 
the state. 
21(3) If the Bank‘s annual accounts show a loss, the loss must be 
covered out of the reserve fund. If the reserve fund is 
insufficient to cover part of the loss, the uncovered part of the 
loss may be left temporarily uncovered. Any profits in 
subsequent years shall be used first to cover such uncovered 
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losses. 
France L.142-2 The General Council shall also: discuss the use of own funds; 
draw up, making sure to allocate the Banque de France the 
necessary means to carry out the tasks delegated to it as a 
consequence of its participation in the European System of 
Central Banks, the projected and amended expenditure budget; 
and approve the Banque de France‘s balance sheet and 
accounts, as well as the plans for allocating profits and fixing 
the dividend due to the State. 
R 144-4 
 
Where necessary, deductions provided for in the agreement 
mentioned in the first paragraph of Article L. 141-2 shall first 
be applied to the net annual result. 
Subsequently a deduction of 5 % of the net result for the 
financial year shall be allocated to a specific reserve that will 
no be longer funded when it reaches an amount equal to the 
Banque de France‘s capital. 
Finally, the General Council shall decide on proposals relating 
to allocating the balance of the net result to any extraordinary 
or special reserves, relating to carrying over profits and 
relating to the dividend paid to the State. Such proposal shall 
be submitted for approval to the Minister for Economic 
Affairs. 
Germany 27 The net profit shall be distributed in the following order: 
1. 20% of the profit, but at least 250 million euro, shall be 
transferred to the statutory reserves until they equal 2.5 billion 
euro; the statutory reserves may only be used to offset falls in 
value and to cover other losses; 
2. the balance shall be paid over to the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
Greece 71(1) 
 
After making provision for bad and doubtful debts, 
depreciation in assets, contributions to Personnel and Pension 
Funds, and such other contingencies as are usually provided 
for by bankers, and after repayment, out of the net profits of 
the Bank, of a dividend at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on 
the capital, one-half of the surplus shall be allocated to the 
regular reserve fund, until such reserve fund is equal to the 
capital, and the remaining one-half shall be paid to the 
Government. After the reserve fund has become equal to the 
capital, a percentage out of the net profits may be paid to the 
shareholders, as additional dividend, as from fiscal year 1973 
onwards, pursuant to a decision of the 1974 General Meeting 
of Shareholders, and thereafter, to be taken after proposal 
made without fail by the General Council, such decision to be 
valid only for each respective year, and the balance thereof to 
be paid to the Government. [Such percentage, fixed pursuant to 
the above decision, shall never exceed that required so that the 
total amount of dividend received by the shareholders become 
equal to 12% on the overall net profits of that fiscal year.] 
71(2) As capital in the preceding paragraph is understood to be the 
amount specified in Article 8 of the Statute, as fixed from time 
to time. 
Hungary 65(1) Based on a Shareholder Resolution, the MNB shall pay 
dividends either from its annual net profit in the reference year 
or from its accumulated profit reserve. This dividend payment 
obligation shall be discharged within 8 days of the Shareholder 
Resolution on the relevant annual financial statements pursuant 
to Article 46/A (b). 
65(2) The MNB shall not pay interim dividend. 
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65(3) To the extent that the losses incurred in the year under review 
exceed the balance of the accumulated profit reserve, the 
difference shall be paid directly by the central budget to the 
credit of accumulated profit reserve within 8 days of the 
Shareholder Resolution on the relevant annual financial 
statements pursuant to Article 46/A (b). 
Ireland 6G(1) The Bank shall continue to keep and operate the fund called 
the general fund. 
6G(2) The Bank shall pay into the general fund all money received 
by the Bank and shall pay from that fund all amounts that it is 
required to pay. 
6G(3) The Bank shall pay its surplus income as and when determined 
under this section into the Exchequer in such manner as the 
Minister directs and may at any time pending such 
determination pay into the Exchequer such sums on account of 
surplus income as may be agreed on by the Minister and the 
Bank. 
6G(4) The expenses incurred by the Bank in performing functions or 
exercising powers under this or any other Act or law are 
payable out of the general fund of the Bank, except where 
otherwise provided by or under this or any other Act. 
6G(5) Any claims on or liabilities to the European Central Bank are 
to be treated as assets or liabilities of the general fund or any 
other fund established by order made by the Minister for that 
purpose. 
6G(6) The Minister may, after consultation with the Bank, make 
regulations providing for the periodic determination of the 
Bank‘s surplus income and, in particular, such regulations may 
 (a) enable provision to be made for reserves, 
depreciation and other similar matters before the   surplus income is determined, and 
 (b) provide for any matter arising from the 
implementation of Chapters VI, VIII and IX of the ESCB 
Statute.  St 
6G(7) In exercising the powers conferred by this section, the Minister 
is required to have regard to the functions imposed and the 
powers conferred on the Bank by or under the Rome Treaty 
and the ESCB Statute. 
6G(8) Any regulations in force under section 23 of the Central Bank 
Act 1989, immediately before the commencement of this 
section are taken to have been made under section 61A(1), and 
may be amended or revoked accordingly. 
Italy 39(1) The Board of Directors shall determine the allocation to be 
made to the ordinary reserve, in an amount up to 20% of the 
net profit for the year. Shareholders shall be paid a dividend 
not exceeding 6% of the capital. 
39(2) The balance, on a proposal from the Board of Directors, may 
be used to establish special provisions and extraordinary 
reserves by setting aside up to 20% of the total net profit and to 
pay an additional amount not exceeding 4% of the capital to 
the shareholders as a supplement to the dividend. The 
remaining sum shall be transferred to the State. 
39(3) The ordinary reserve, if reduced to offset losses or for any 
other reason, must, except as provided for in Article 40, be 
reconstituted entirely as soon as possible. 
40(1) The reserves shall be invested in the manner and forms 
established by the Board of Directors 
40(2) The income arising from the investment of the reserves shall 
be used to increase the same. 
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40(3) On a proposal from the Board of Directors and with the 
approval of the ordinary shareholders‘ meeting, a sum not 
exceeding 4% of the amount of the reserves as shown in the 
annual accounts for the preceding year may be set aside from 
the annual income from the investment of the reserves and 
distributed to shareholders in addition to the amount provided 
for in Article 39. 
Latvia 18
1
 Within 15 days following the approval of the annual report by 
the Council of the Bank of Latvia, the Bank of Latvia shall 
transfer to a state general budget account indicated by the State 
Treasury:  
1) a part of its profit earned during the reporting year, which 
shall be calculated by applying the tax rate established for 
residents by the Law "On Corporate Income Tax";  
2) payments for the usage of state capital in the amount of 50 
percent of the profit earned during the reporting year. 
19 The profit remaining after making the deductions stipulated in 
Article 18
1
 shall be transferred to the reserve capital. The 
reserve capital shall be formed to cover possible losses. Where 
the reserve capital is not sufficient to cover all losses, the 
remaining amount of losses shall be covered from the nominal 
capital. 
Lithuania 22 The profit (loss) of the Bank of Lithuania for the financial year 
shall be calculated by deducting expenses from income. 
23(1) Operations related to the coverage of the loss and allocation of 
the profit of the Bank of Lithuania shall be carried out 
following the approval of the annual financial statements. 
23(2) The loss for the financial year shall be covered from the 
reserve capital of the Bank of Lithuania. 
23(3) The profit for a financial year shall be allocated in the 
following way: 
1) to cover the uncovered loss incurred during the previous 
financial years; 
2) the contribution to the State budget shall be 70 per cent of 
the amount of the profit of the Bank of Lithuania for the 
financial year or a part thereof remaining after the allocation of 
the profit in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1 
herein; 
3) the part of the profit remaining after the allocations 
specified in subparagraphs 1 and 2 herein shall be transferred 
to the authorised and/or reserve capital in equal parts. If the 
amount required for the authorised capital to reach the amount 
specified in Article 20 of this Law is less than available, the 
required amount shall be allocated, and the residual amount 
shall be allocated to the reserve capital. 
24 The contribution of the Bank of Lithuania shall be paid to the 
state budget once a year not later than by the 1st of May of the 
following year. 
Luxembourg 31 The profits of the Central Bank, as shown in the accounts 
approved at the end of the financial year, and after deduction 
of any loss carried forward from previous accounts, shall be 
paid to the Treasury. The Government in Cabinet may, when it 
is called on to grant discharge to the Central Bank bodies, 
decide on the basis of a reasoned proposal by the Central Bank 
to allocate all or part of the profits to the Central Bank's 
reserve fund. However, the allocation of the profit to the 
Central Bank's reserve fund shall be compulsory so long as the 
total of the capital and the reserve fund falls short of the total 
of the Central Bank's assets which do not yield freely-available 
 417 
 
Member State Article Text 
income, after deduction of liabilities which form the direct 
counterpart of such assets. 
Malta 22(1) Subject to the following provisions of this article, the net 
profits of the Bank for each financial year shall be determined 
by the Bank after meeting all expenditure for that year and 
after making such provision as it thinks fit for bad and doubtful 
debts, depreciation in assets, contributions to staff and pension 
funds and all other reserves and contingencies. 
22(2) After such allocations as may be determined by the Bank under 
the provisions of subarticle (1) have been made, the remainder 
of the net profits established as aforesaid shall be paid to the 
Government. 
The Netherlands 19(4) 
Articles of 
Association 
With the approval of the Minister and after consultation with 
the Supervisory Board, the Governing Board may, after 
determination of the profit, create reserves. Transfers to and 
from these reserves shall be made after consultation with the 
Supervisory Board and with the approval of the Minister. 
22(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Governing Board shall only make disbursements to the 
shareholders insofar as the Bank‘s shareholders‘ equity 
exceeds the amount of the paid-up capital plus the reserves that 
must be held pursuant to the law. 
22(2) 
Articles of 
Association 
The profit, as shown in the adopted annual accounts, shall be at 
the disposal of the general meeting of shareholders. 
22(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
Subject to the prior consent of the Supervisory Board, the 
Governing Board may, insofar as this is permitted by the profit 
as evidenced by an interim balance sheet compiled with due 
observance of the provisions of article 105(4) of Book 2 of the 
Dutch Civil Code, disburse an interim dividend on the shares 
before the adoption of the annual accounts. 
Poland 69(4) Within a period of 14 days following the approval of the 
annual accounts of the NBP [by the Council of Ministers], a 
portion of the annual profit of the NBP (payment from the 
NBP profit) shall be remitted to State budget.  
Portugal 53(1) The result for the fiscal year shall be assessed by deducting 
from the total income and other profit attributable to the fiscal 
year, the amounts corresponding to the following costs: 
a) Annual operating and administrative costs; 
b) Annual appropriations for the building up of, or increase in, 
provisions for the coverage of asset depreciation risks, or 
emergence of other contingencies that must be handled, as well 
as for the building up of a special reserve related to gains in 
gold sale operations, under the terms defined by the Board of 
Directors; 
c) Special appropriations to the Pension Fund. 
d) Extraordinary profits and losses. 
53(2) The profit for the fiscal year, assessed according to the 
foregoing paragraph, shall be distributed as follows: 
a) 10 per cent to the legal reserve; 
b) 10 per cent to other reserves to be decided by the Board of 
Directors; 
c) The remainder to the State, as dividends, or to other reserves 
proposed by the Board of Directors and approved by the 
Finance Minister 
Romania 42(1) Banca Naţională a României shall assess periodically, and at 
least annually, the records entered in its financial statements. 
42(2) The net differences resulting from the evaluation of assets and 
liabilities denominated in foreign currencies, special drawing 
rights, gold, silver and other precious metals, as well as of 
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coins and other objects of gold, silver, other precious metals 
and gems, pursuant to a change in their value or a change in 
the leu exchange rate, shall be recorded separately in the 
special revaluation account. 
43(1) Banca Naţională a României shall transfer to the State budget a 
share of 80 percent of the net revenues left after deducting the 
following: 
a) expenses related to the financial year, including expenses for 
the provisions established under paragraph (3) hereof; 
b) the loss related to the previous financial years that remained 
uncovered after applying the provisions of Article 44. 
43(2) The share referred to in paragraph (1) hereof shall be 
transferred monthly before the 25th of the following month 
inclusive, based on a special statement. This share shall 
represent revenue to the State budget. The adjustments related 
to the financial year shall be performed by the deadline for 
submission of the annual balance sheet according to the law, 
based on a rectifying special statement. 
43(3) Banca Naţională a României shall set up provisions for credit 
risk according to its own norms approved by Banca Naţională 
a României‘s Board, having regard to the consultative opinion 
of the Ministry of Public Finance thereon. 
43(4) The provisions set up by Banca Naţională a României 
according to its own norms approved by the Board, other than 
those referred to in paragraph (3) hereof, shall be borne out of 
the profit remaining after applying the provisions of paragraph 
(1) hereof. 
43(5) The profit remaining after applying the provisions of 
paragraphs (1) and (4) hereof shall be distributed and used in 
accordance with the following priority order: 
a) for statutory reserves – up to 60 percent; 
b) for setting up its own financing sources – up to 30 percent; 
c) for the employees‘ profit-sharing scheme – up to 10 percent; 
d) the amounts remaining after the distributions stipulated 
under points a), b) and c) hereof shall be used for the purposes 
established by Banca Naţională a României‘s Board. 
44 In the event of a loss incurred by Banca Naţională a României 
during a financial year, the loss shall be covered from the 
available sources in the following priority order: 
a) special revaluation account; 
b) statutory reserves. 
Slovakia 6(2)(b) Furthermore, the Bank Board shall in particular: 
approve the budget of the National Bank of Slovakia, financial 
statements of the National Bank of Slovakia, annual results of 
operations and annual reports of the National Bank of 
Slovakia, decide on the use of profits or settlement of losses of 
the National Bank of Slovakia, and set the types of funds of the 
National Bank of Slovakia, their level and application; 
39(3) The assets and liabilities of the National Bank of Slovakia 
which fall under the Eurosystem shall be maintained and 
reported in accordance with the separate legal provisions 
applicable to the Eurosystem. The National Bank of Slovakia 
shall participate in the allocation of monetary income within 
the Eurosystem and in the allocation of the net profit and loss 
of the European Central Bank, to the extent and under the 
conditions laid down in accordance with the separate legal 
provisions applicable to the Eurosystem. 
39(4) The financial result of the National Bank of Slovakia for an 
accounting period is the profit or loss it has generated. The 
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National Bank of Slovakia shall use the generated profit for 
allocations to the reserve fund and other funds created from 
profit, or for covering accumulated losses from previous years. 
To cover the loss made in an accounting period, the National 
Bank of Slovakia may use the reserve fund or other funds. The 
remaining accumulated loss, the amount of which is decided 
by the Bank Board shall be carried over to the following 
accounting period. 
Slovenia 49a(1) After introduction of the euro as the Republic of Slovenia‘s 
currency, the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije may, with 
the intention of maintaining the real value of assets in the 
context of the annual accounts, take a decision to create 
provisions for anticipated exchange rate, interest rate and price 
risks. 
49a(2) Provisions may not be created if they should, together with the 
unrealised exchange rate differences, securities‘ valuation 
effects and gold valuation effects, exceed 20% of established 
surplus of income over expenditure. 
50(1) The surplus of income over expenditure shall be allocated to 
special reserves, general reserves and to the Republic of 
Slovenia‘s budget. 
50(2) The unrealised income from exchange rate and price changes 
shall be allocated in its entirety to special reserves. It may only 
be used to cover a deficit deriving from unrealised expenditure 
from exchange rate and price changes. 
50(3) Twenty-five per cent of the surplus of income over expenditure 
after the allocation of funds to special reserves shall be 
allocated to the Republic of Slovenia‘s budget, while the 
remainder shall be allocated to the general reserves. 
50(4) Notwithstanding the previous paragraph of this Article, should 
the general reserves of Banka Slovenije in the preceding year 
exceed 5 per cent of Banka Slovenije‘s balance sheet total, 
Banka Slovenije and the minister in charge of finance may 
agree to allocate a larger share of the surplus specified in the 
previous paragraph of this Article to the Republic of 
Slovenia‘s budget. 
50(5) Notwithstanding the third paragraph of this Article, should the 
general reserves of Banka Slovenije in the preceding year not 
reach of 1 per cent of Banka Slovenije balance sheet total, 
Banka Slovenije and the minister in charge of finance may 
agree to allocate a smaller share of the surplus specified in the 
third paragraph of this Article to the Republic of Slovenia‘s 
budget. 
50a(1) After introduction of the euro as the Republic of Slovenia‘s 
currency, the unrealised income deriving from exchange rate 
and price changes shall be allocated in its entirety to the 
valuation accounts. 
50a(2) Unrealised income specified in the previous paragraph, 
allocated to the valuation accounts, may only be used to cover 
unrealised expenditure deriving from exchange rate and price 
changes. 
50a(3) After the allocation of the assets to the valuation accounts, the 
surplus of income over expenditure shall be allocated to the 
general reserves and to the Republic of Slovenia‘s budget. 
51(1) Banka Slovenije shall cover a deficit of income over 
expenditure from the general reserves. 
51(2) Funds for the coverage of deficit of income over expenditure 
that cannot be covered in the manner specified in the first 
paragraph of this Article shall be provided from the Republic 
 420 
 
Member State Article Text 
of Slovenia‘s budget. 
Spain 4(2) The Bank's draft budget for operating expenses and 
investments, once approved by its Governing Council 
according to article 21.1.g), shall be forwarded to the 
government, which will submit it to Parliament for approval. 
The budget shall be prospective in nature, and shall not be 
consolidated with other State public sector budgets.  
The government, upon proposal by the Economy and Finance 
Minister, shall have the authority to approve the annual 
balance sheet and accounts of the Bank, which will be sent to 
Parliament for informational purposes. Without prejudice to 
the terms of article 27 of the Statutes of the ESCB, the Bank 
shall be subject to external auditing by the «Tribunal de 
Cuentas», under the terms of Organic Law 2/1982, of May 12, 
on the Tribunal de Cuentas. The report accompanying the 
annual balance sheet and accounts shall give further detail on 
different operations or items on the balance sheet, according to 
their characteristics. In particular, the Bank's contributions to 
the Deposit Guarantee Funds shall be detailed, as will any 
loans or other operations transacted for the benefit of any other 
institution or person not on an arm's-length basis, or which in 
any other way involve loss of profit or losses for the Bank. In 
such cases the amount of such loss of profit or losses shall be 
specified. 
Sweden Chapter 10 
Article 4 
The Riksbank's Profit and Loss Account and Balance Sheet are 
approved by the Riksdag, which also determines the allocation 
of the Riksbank's profit. If the value of the reserve fund has 
declined to less than SEK 500 million, at least ten per cent of 
the profit for the year shall be allocated to the reserve fund 
until it has retained a level of this amount. 
The Riksdag determines whether the General Council shall be 
discharged from liability for its activities and the Executive 
Board for its management of the Riksbank. Discharge from 
liability may only be denied if there are reasons to make claims 
of financial liability against a member of the General Council 
or the Executive Board, or if the member should be prosecuted 
for criminal actions in connection with his assignment or 
employment. 
The United 
Kingdom 
Section 8  The Bank of England Act 1946, as amended by the Bank of 
England Act 1998, requires the Bank to pay to HM Treasury, 
in lieu of dividend on the Bank‘s capital, on the fifth day of 
April and October (or prior working day), a sum equal to 25% 
of the Bank‘s post-tax profit for the previous financial year or 
such other sum as the Bank and HM Treasury may agree. The 
overall effect is that the Bank and HM Treasury will normally 
share post-tax profits equally. 
 
Table 3-15 Financial liability for supervisory authorities 
Member State Article Text 
Austria N/A  
Belgium N/A  
Bulgaria N/A  
Cyprus N/A  
The Czech 
Republic 
N/A  
Denmark N/A  
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Estonia N/A  
Finland N/A  
France N/A  
Germany N/A  
Greece N/A  
Hungary N/A  
Ireland 33B(1) There is established by this section a body called ―Údarás Rialála 
Seirbhísí Airgeadais na hÉireann‖ or in the English language the 
―Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority‖. 
33B(2) The Regulatory Authority is a constituent part of the Bank. 
33B(3) The Regulatory Authority is separate from its members and 
continues in existence despite any vacancy or change in its 
membership. 
33AJ(1) This section applies to the following persons:  
(a) the Bank; 
(b) the members of the Board and of the Regulatory Authority; 
(c) the Registrar of Credit Unions; 
(d) the Registrar of the Appeals Tribunal; 
(e) employees of the Bank; 
(f) agents of the Bank or of any of its constituent parts. 
33AJ(2) A person to whom this section applies is not liable for damages 
for anything done or omitted in the performance or purported 
performance or exercise of any of its functions or powers, unless 
it is proved that the act or omission was in bad faith. 
33AJ(3) The fact that the Bank has authorised or revoked the 
authorisation, or regulates the activities, of a person, under any of 
its functions is not a warranty by the Bank as to the person‘s 
solvency or performance. 
33AJ(4) The fact that the Bank in performing any of its functions  
(a) has approved or revoked the approval, or regulates the affairs 
or activities, of a stock exchange or a financial futures and options 
exchange, or 
(b) has approved, amended, revoked or imposed rules, or has 
consented or refused to consent to amendments of rules, is not a 
warranty by the Bank as to the solvency or performance of the 
exchange or any member of the exchange. 
33AJ(5) Neither the State nor the Bank is liable for losses incurred because 
of the insolvency, default or performance of a person or body 
referred to in subsection (3) or (4). 
33AJ(6) Nothing in subsections (3) to (5) limits the effect of subsection 
(2). 
33AJ(7) In this section, ―agent‖ includes a person appointed or authorised 
by the Bank, the Governor or the Chief Executive to perform any 
function or exercise a power under the Central Bank Acts or any 
other Act. 
Italy N/A  
Latvia N/A  
Lithuania 46
1
(1) The damage caused by the illegal actions of the Bank of Lithuania 
or Bank of Lithuania staff in relation to the performance of the 
supervisory function of credit and payment institutions shall be 
reimbursed only in the case if the person to have suffered the 
damage proves the Bank of Lithuania or Bank of Lithuania staff 
guilty of such damage. 
46
1
(2) The Bank of Lithuania shall pay a compensation to its current or 
former staff equal to their expenses incurred due to criminal or 
administrative actions brought against them or due to other 
actions taken by law enforcement institutions in relation to such 
acts or omissions, or due to civil actions brought against them in 
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relation to their acts or omissions done in the performance of the 
professional duties related to the supervisory function. The 
reimbursement procedure shall be established by the Board of the 
Bank of Lithuania. 
46
1
(3) A member or former member of the staff of the Bank of Lithuania 
must repay the compensation paid by the Bank of Lithuania as 
provided by paragraph 1 herein in the following cases: 
1) when he or she, following the settlement of criminal or 
administrative actions against him or her, is found guilty of 
criminal act or violation of administrative law or is found guilty 
by the court of causing damage; 
2) when the expenses incurred by him or her and the legal charges 
he or she is awarded are paid by the party ordered to pay the 
charges. The amount to be repaid shall be equal to the sum paid 
by the party ordered to pay the charges. 
Luxembourg N/A  
Malta 15(1) The Bank, directors, officers or servants thereof, and any other 
person appointed to perform a function under this Act, or under 
any rules or regulations made thereunder, shall not be liable in 
damages for anything done or omitted to be done in the discharge 
or purported discharge of any functions under this Act, or any 
rules or regulations aforesaid, unless the act or omission is shown 
to have been done or omitted to be done in bad faith. 
15(2) The provisions of subarticle (1) shall also apply to the Bank and 
to any director, officer or servant thereof and to any other person 
appointed by the Bank, in the performance or purported 
performance of any function assigned to the Bank or to any 
director, officer, servant or other person under any other law. 
The Netherlands N/A  
Poland N/A   
Portugal N/A  
Romania 25(3) The members of Banca Naţională a României‘s Board and Banca 
Naţională a României employees charged with prudential 
supervision tasks shall not be subject to any civil or penal 
sanctions, as the case may be, if the Court finds that these persons 
fulfilled or failed to fulfil in good faith and with due care any 
action or fact related to the performance, under the conditions set 
out in the law, of prudential supervision tasks. 
25(4) The costs associated with the judicial proceedings instituted 
against the persons under paragraph (3) hereof shall be borne by 
Banca Naţională a României. 
Slovakia N/A  
Slovenia N/A  
Spain N/A  
Sweden N/A  
The United 
Kingdom 
N/A  
 
Table 3-16 Autonomy in staff matters 
Member State Article Text 
Austria 32(3) The Governing Board shall recruit the employees of the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, insofar as this is not reserved to 
the Federal President. The Governing Board shall also be 
responsible for the retirement, notice or dismissal of employees 
recruited by it. 
38(1) The Bank staff‘s employment status shall be governed by private 
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law. 
38(2) The conditions of employment, the duties and rights of office as 
well as the remuneration and pensions of the Bank employees 
shall be subject to the provisions laid down by the General 
Council. The emoluments payable under these provisions shall, 
for purposes of tax and social security legislation, be treated in 
the same way as emoluments paid in accordance with statutory 
regulations. 
38(3) The employees of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank that are 
entitled to retirement and survivor‘s benefits (pensions) under 
the Bank‘s pension regulations shall be exempt from 
participating in the accident, disability and employees‘ insurance 
(pension insurance). 
39 The Governing Board shall be responsible for supervising the 
entire staff of the Bank and shall decide on taking disciplinary 
action against Bank employees. The method of conducting such 
disciplinary action shall be laid down in the conditions of 
employment adopted by the General Council. 
Belgium 29(2) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Board shall be responsible for the administration and 
management of the Bank and shall decide on the direction of its 
policy. 
It shall appoint and dismiss members of staff, fix their salaries 
and the allocation of the profit share assigned to the staff or to 
institutions in its favour. 
It shall have the right to make settlements and compromises. 
Bulgaria 16, point 6  The Governing Council shall[…] adopt Rules of Procedure for 
the BNB‘s activities 
18 (1)  The Governor of the BNB shall organise, direct and supervise 
the activities of the Bank, other than those activities mandated 
by this or by some other law exclusively to the Deputy 
Governors, and shall represent the BNB in Bulgaria and abroad. 
The Governor may delegate some of his or her competences to 
other officials. 
19(2)  Other departments and offices may also be established by a 
decision of the Governing Council. 
 
21  
 
In the Rules of Procedure, the Governing Council shall define 
the structures, specific functions and responsibilities of the 
departments and offices of the BNB, as well as the rules 
regulating the relationships between them and the competences 
of their managers. 
23(2)  
 
The employees of the BNB shall not disclose any information 
concerning negotiations, contracts entered into, the amount of 
assets on customers‘ deposits and their operations, information 
received by the BNB, as well as any circumstances concerning 
the BNB‘s activities or its customers which constitute official 
(служебна), banking, commercial or other secrecy protected by 
law, even after the termination of their contracts of employment. 
23(3)  The remuneration of the BNB‘s employees shall be determined 
by the Governing Council, but it shall not be less than the 
average remuneration for employees with similar functions in 
other banks in the Bulgaria. 
54(1), point 
1  
The BNB may not acquire real estate and real property rights 
except for […] acquiring premises for the performance of its 
tasks and housing for its employees; 
Cyprus 16C The Board may issue directives: on the recommendation of the 
Governor, for the organisation of the Bank, defining the schemes 
of service of all employees of the Bank and regulating their 
powers and duties, as well as matters of recruitments, 
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promotions and the exercise of disciplinary control. 
23(1) For the purpose of carrying out the tasks of the Bank under this 
Law, there shall be appointed, as in this Law provided, such 
employees as may be necessary. 
23(2) The appointment of any employee of the Bank shall be 
remunerated and under such terms and conditions as may be 
provided in any directives or the schemes of service, issued in 
this respect by the Board under section 16 of this Law. 
23(3) Subject to any directives, issued under this Law in this respect, 
no person shall hold any office in the Bank who, at the same 
time – 
(a) holds any office in any other banking or financial institution 
or their subsidiary operating in the Republic or controlled by an 
organisation operating in the Republic; 
(b) has any participation in the capital of such banking or 
financial institution or their subsidiary without disclosing this 
participation in advance and obtaining the permission of the 
Board: 
Provided that the Board shall by directive determine the terms 
and conditions under which employees of the Bank may 
participate in the capital of such banking or financial institutions 
or their subsidiary. 
The Czech 
Republic 
5(2) …, the Bank Board shall, in particular: 
… 
e) execute the rights and duties arising from labour-law relations 
in respect of the staff of the Czech National Bank. The Bank 
Board may delegate these activities to other members of staff; 
f) grant its consent to the entrepreneurial activities of the staff of 
the CNB; 
g) fix the salary and other emoluments of the Governor; the 
salaries and other emoluments of Vice-Governors and other 
members of the Bank Board shall be fixed by the Governor; 
… 
Denmark 26 The Board of Directors shall on the recommendation of the 
Committee of Directors and subject to confirmation by the 
Minister of Economic Affairs draw up the By-laws of the 
National Bank of Denmark, by which rules shall be laid down 
governing the functions and the management of the Bank and the 
salaries and old age pensions for the Board of Governors and the 
Staff etc. and the duties of the Auditors. 
The By-laws may be amended by the Board of Directors subject 
to confirmation by the Minister of Economic Affairs. The 
amendments shall be valid when passed by a simple majority of 
the whole Board of Directors. 
14 By-laws The regulations for the salaries and old age pensions of the 
Governors and other members of the staff of the National Bank 
in Copenhagen shall remain in force for the Governors and staff 
of this Bank until they be altered in conformity with the rules 
laid down. 
The Board of Directors shall fix the number of the officials of 
the Bank with a higher charge than that of senior clerk. 
Estonia 13 Management Board is responsible for management and 
administration of the Bank. 
33 The Bank may hold deposits of its employees and pay interest 
that does not exceed the average payable interest. The Bank may 
grant loan to its employees upon conditions set by the 
Supervisory Board of the Bank.  
Finland 11(2)  In respect of the Bank‘s administration, the Parliamentary 
Supervisory Council shall: 
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1) make proposals to the Council of State on the filling of the 
position of Chairman of the Board; 
2) decide on the principles for determining salaries, leaves of 
absence and annual leaves of members of the Board as well as 
on the execution of their duties during leaves of absence 
exceeding one week; 
3) decide on the issuance of warnings to members of the Board 
and settle other issues related to their service; 
4) appoint, upon proposal of the Board, directors of Suomen 
Pankki 
5) appoint the Deputy Chairman of the Board; 
6) confirm Suomen Pankki‘s Pension and Survivors‘ Pension 
Regulations and issue regulations concerning the management of 
the Bank‘s pension liability, upon proposal of the Board, and 
7) issue, upon proposal of the Board, regulations concerning the 
language skills required of officials of Suomen Pankki 
14(1) The Board shall be responsible for the administration of Suomen 
Pankki and for ensuring that all tasks assigned to the Bank are 
duly executed, except for statutory tasks of the Parliamentary 
Supervisory Council and matters that are otherwise provided for 
in the Act on the Financial Supervision Authority. 
14(3)  The Board has the right to issue more detailed regulations on the 
tasks and powers of the Bank‘s units and employees. 
France L 142-2 The General Council shall administer the Banque de France. 
 
It shall consider matters relating to the management of the 
Banque de France‘s activities other than those which are tasks of 
the European System of Central Banks. 
 
It shall discuss the staff regulations. The Banque de France‘s 
Governor shall submit these regulations for the approval of the 
relevant ministers. 
 
The General Council shall also: discuss the use of own funds; 
draw up, making sure to allocate the Banque de France the 
necessary means to carry out the tasks delegated to it as a 
consequence of its participation in the European System of 
Central Banks, the projected and amended expenditure budget; 
and approve the Banque de France‘s balance sheet and accounts, 
as well as the plans for allocating profits and fixing the dividend 
due to the State. 
 
The General Council shall appoint two auditors to audit the 
Banque de France‘s accounts. They shall be invited to attend the 
General Council meeting which approves the accounts for the 
previous financial year. 
L 142-8 (5) The Governor shall appoint all the Banque de France‘s staff 
members, subject to Article L 142-3. The Governor shall adopt 
the measures that are necessary to implement the European 
Central Bank‘s guidelines. 
L 142-9 Banque de France staff shall be bound by professional secrecy 
 
Banque de France staff shall be prohibited from taking or 
accepting an equity share in, or any interest in or remuneration 
for, working for or advising a public or private industrial, 
commercial or financial undertaking, unless the Governor grants 
a derogation. This rule shall not apply to the production of 
scientific, literary or artistic works. 
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The General Council shall determine, in accordance with the 
conditions laid down in the third paragraph of Article L. 142-2, 
the rules applicable to Banque de France staff in areas where the 
provisions of the Employment Code are incompatible with the 
status of or the public service tasks entrusted to the Banque de 
France. 
 
The third to eighth paragraphs of Article L. 432-1 of the 
Employment Code and Articles L. 432-5 and L. 432-9 of that 
Code shall not apply to the Banque de France. 
 
The provisions of Chapter II of Title III of Part III of Book IV of 
the Employment Code, other than those referred to in the 
foregoing paragraph, shall only apply to the Banque de France in 
relation to the tasks and other activities which fall within the 
General Council‘s powers pursuant to Article L. 142-2 of this 
Code. 
 
The national works council and, if applicable, the local works 
councils of the Banque de France may only appeal to the expert 
referred to in the first paragraph of Article L. 434-6 of the 
Employment Code after the procedure laid down in Article L. 
321-3 of that Code has been initiated. 
 
A Conseil d‘Etat decree shall specify the conditions under which 
Article L. 432-8 of the Employment Code shall apply to the 
Banque de France. 
R 142-21-1 
 
In application of the final paragraph of Article L. 142-9 of this 
Code, the Banque de France‘s General Council shall establish 
the budget allocated each year for social and cultural 
expenditure. The total contribution by the Banque de France to 
this expenditure may not be less than 2,5 % of the gross wage 
bill. The third paragraph of Article R. 432-11 of the Employment 
Code shall not apply. The allocation of this aggregate 
contribution may be decided by means of an organisation-level 
agreement. 
Germany 31(1) The Deutsche Bundesbank shall employ civil servants (Beamte), 
other salaried staff (Angestellte) and wage earners (Arbeiter). 
31(2) The President of the Deutsche Bundesbank shall appoint the 
Bank's civil servants. He is the supreme institutional authority 
(oberste Dienstbehörde) and in this capacity shall represent the 
Bank in and out of court. As the supreme institutional authority, 
he shall have full disciplinary powers; he shall impose 
disciplinary measures, unless their imposition is the remit of the 
relevant courts. The President may delegate his powers provided 
for in this subsection to a member of the Executive Board, who 
may then delegate them further. 
31(3) The civil servants of the Deutsche Bundesbank shall be indirect 
Federal civil servants. 
Except as otherwise provided by this Act, the regulations 
generally applicable to Federal civil servants shall apply to them. 
The entry into force of this Act shall supersede the entry into 
force of the Federal Civil Servants Act (Bundesbeamtengesetz). 
31(4) Subject to the approval of the Federal Government, the 
Executive Board may regulate the legal relationships of the civil 
servants and other salaried staff of the Deutsche Bundesbank 
through staff regulations if this is required to ensure orderly and 
efficient banking operations. 
The staff regulations may provide only 
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1. that for civil servants of the Bank, the following provisions of 
the legislation relating to Federal civil servants be departed 
from: 
a) section 21, second sentence, section 24, third sentence, section 
26 (1), section 30 (2), section 66 (1), number 1 (c) and number 3, 
of the Federal Civil Servants Act and section 11, number 3 (a), 
of the Civil Servants' Benefits Act (Beamtenversorgungsgesetz); 
b) sections 42 to 50a of the Federal Civil Servants‘ Pay Act 
(Bundesbesoldungsgesetz) as amended, insofar as a revocable, 
non-pensionable bank allowance is granted which does not 
exceed 9% of the basic salary for staff at the Central Office and 
5% for staff at the Regional Offices, and a bonus for exceptional 
performance is granted as an allowance and/or a one-off 
payment at the Central Office, the Regional Offices and the 
branches; 
c) the provisions on the granting of maintenance allowances to 
civil servants undergoing preparatory training; 
2. that, insofar as the bank allowance pursuant to number 1 (b) 
has been abolished or cut with effect from 1 August 2006 by 
means of the Act Accompanying the 2006 Federal Budget, a 
compensatory allowance shall be paid in the amount of the 
difference between the former and the new bank allowance or, in 
the event of abolition, the full amount of the former bank 
allowance. The basis for the compensatory allowance shall be 
the amount of the bank allowance granted on 31 July 2006. For 
staff on leave of absence on this date, the basis for the 
compensatory allowance shall be the bank allowance to which 
they would have been entitled had they not been on leave on this 
date. The compensatory allowance shall be paid insofar as and 
for as long as the former entitlement criteria remain fulfilled. 
With each pay increase within the meaning of section 13 (4) of 
the Federal Civil Servants‘ Pay Act, the compensatory allowance 
shall decrease by half the amount of the increase; this does not 
apply to increases to adjust remuneration to remuneration paid in 
the previous Federal territory (ie Federal territory before 
reunification on 3 October 1990); 
3. that the other salaried staff of the Bank 
a) shall require prior permission to engage in any of the 
secondary occupations specified in section 66 (1), number 1 (c) 
and number 3, of the Federal Civil Servants Act, 
b) receive the payments specified under number 1 (b) and the 
compensatory allowance pursuant to number 2 above; 
4. that the wage earners shall receive the bonus for exceptional 
performance specified under number 1 (b) above. 
31(5) The aggregated bonuses for exceptional performance specified 
in subsection (4), second sentence, number 1 (b) above may not 
exceed one-twentieth of the expenditure on the remuneration of 
the civil servants, other salaried staff and wage earners of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. From 1 August 2006, the Bank 
allowance will not be adjusted in line with general increases in 
pay. 
31(6) Subject to the approval of the Federal Government, the 
Executive Board shall issue regulations on the educational 
background and careers of civil servants of the Deutsche 
Bundesbank; in agreement with the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern), it shall issue 
regulations for specific career paths (regulations governing 
career paths, training and examination). The Executive Board 
may depart from the provisions of the legislation relating to 
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Federal civil servants with respect to the duration of the 
preparatory training, the duration of the probationary period and 
the duration of the proficiency period for achieving promotion in 
the Upper Intermediate Service and for qualifying for admission 
to the Higher Service. 
Greece 33 The staff of the Bank, with the exception of Directors, shall be 
appointed and may be dismissed by the Governor on the 
proposal of the Management Council, in accordance with Article 
38. 
38(1) 
 
The staff of the Bank, with the exception of the Directors, shall 
be appointed and may be dismissed by the Governor on the 
proposal of the Management Council. Employees shall be 
appointed only to positions created by a decision of the General 
Council. The number of employees on the Bank‘s staff, of any 
rank or category whatsoever, shall be determined by the General 
Council taking into account the relevant needs. No employee 
shall be appointed, up to the rank of assistant accountant 
inclusive, without having passed an examination, details of 
which shall, on each occasion, be specified by regulations. For 
the auxiliary personnel (collectors etc.), a test of qualifications of 
each, compared with the qualifications of the other candidates, 
shall be sufficient. Special technical personnel may be appointed 
for either a specific period of time or not, by a decision of the 
General Council, determining their salary. Said employees may 
be appointed to permanent posts by a decision of the General 
Council, following an examination 
38(3) The Directors and employees of the Bank shall receive their 
salaries, pensions, or any other remuneration, on terms laid down 
by the General Council. Their remuneration cannot take any 
form of commission (tantieme) or share in the profits of the 
Bank. 
39 The Directors and all other officials or employees of the Bank 
shall not be entitled to engage in business for their own account. 
No bills or notes signed by them shall be accepted for discount 
or as guaranty for an advance granted by the Bank. 
Hungary 56 The provisions of the Labour Code shall apply to the employees 
of the MNB, with the exceptions set forth in this Act. 
50 (1)  The head of the MNB shall be the Governor. The Governor shall 
be liable for the implementation of the decisions of the Monetary 
Council and for the governance of the operation of the MNB. 
The Governor shall: 
…. 
c) exercise the employer‘s rights over the employees of the 
MNB (excluding the members of the Monetary Council pursuant 
to Point c) of Paragraph (4) of Article 49), with the exception of 
the powers concerning the appointment and dismissal of Deputy 
Governors; 
d) take any decisions related to the governance of the operation 
of the MNB and outside the competence of the Monetary 
Council. 
Ireland 6D(1) Subject to this section, the Board shall appoint a Secretary to the 
Bank and such other employees of the Bank as it considers 
necessary for the effective performance and exercise of the 
functions and powers of the Bank and each of its constituent 
parts. 
6D(3) Except as regards the appointment of a Secretary to the Bank 
and the Secretary to the Regulatory Authority— 
(a) the Governor has the same power to appoint employees of 
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the Bank as the Board has under subsection (1), but that power is 
only exercisable in respect of responsibilities specified in section 
19A(1)(a) and (b) and (2), 
(b) the Chief Executive has the same power to appoint 
employees of the Bank as the Board has under subsection (1), 
but that power is only exercisable with the agreement of the 
Regulatory Authority. 
6D(5) The employees of the Bank are to be employed on such 
conditions (including conditions as to remuneration and 
allowances) as the Board fixes from time to time. However, in 
fixing the conditions of employment of the Secretary to the 
Regulatory Authority and employees appointed by the Chief 
Executive under subsection (3), the Board shall obtain the 
concurrence of the Regulatory Authority or Chief Executive (as 
the case requires) with respect to those conditions of 
employment. 
6D(6) Subject to subsection (8), an appointment under this section is to 
be made by competition to be conducted in accordance with 
rules made by the Board. 
6D(7) The Board may, in relation to a particular competition, impose 
conditions of entry, limitations and safeguards. If the 
competition relates to an appointment to be made under 
subsection (2) or (3), the Board may impose such conditions 
only with the concurrence of the Regulatory Authority or the 
Chief Executive, as the case requires. 
6D(8) Subsection (6) does not apply to an appointment to a position if 
the Board, or, in relation to appointments under subsection (2) or 
(3), if the Regulatory Authority or Chief Executive (as the case 
requires), decides that appointment to the position by 
competition would be inappropriate. 
6D(9) The Board shall establish and operate a policy under which 
provision is made for employees of the Bank to be given 
opportunities for training and experience in various activities, 
and in different constituent parts, of the Bank. 
6E The Board shall arrange for employees of the Bank to be 
assigned to the Regulatory Authority and to any divisions, 
branches or offices established under section 6C. However, any 
assignment of an employee to or from the Regulatory Authority 
shall take place only with the agreement of the Chief Executive. 
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Italy 18  The Board of Directors shall be charged with the general 
administration, management supervision and internal control of 
the Bank. 
In conformity with legislative and regulatory provisions and, in 
the case of resolutions referred to in points 9) and 10), in 
compliance with the statute of the ESCB and the provisions 
adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB), the Board shall: 
[…] 
5) determine the staffing levels, recruit and dismiss employees;  
6) approve agreements negotiated with trade unions;  
7) adopt resolutions regarding the geographical configuration 
and general organizational structure of the Bank;  
8) appoint and remove from office regents at the main branches 
and councillors at the local branches and determine their number 
and which of them are to act as examiners;  
9) appoint the Bank‘s foreign correspondents; 
[…] 
The Board shall be informed by the Governor of the material 
facts regarding the administration of the Bank, and in particular: 
[…] 
- of the investment of liquid balances, reserves set up under this 
statute and provisions for supplementary staff pensions. 
Latvia 28(2) The Governor of the Bank shall approve the Bank of Latvia's 
structure, and shall have the power to hire and fire Bank of 
Latvia employees. 
30 The remuneration of the Governor of the Bank of Latvia, 
members of the Council of the Bank of Latvia and the Board, as 
well as Bank employees shall be determined by the Council of 
the Bank of Latvia. The Council also approves the staff numbers, 
positions, and salaries. 
Lithuania 17(1)(3) The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall: 
(…) conclude employment contracts with staff members and 
heads of the branches, representative offices, institutions and 
enterprises of the Bank of Lithuania, provide incentives for 
distinguished employees and impose disciplinary penalties; 
18(1) The staff of the Bank of Lithuania shall perform the functions of 
the Bank of Lithuania laid down in this Law by implementing 
resolutions of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania and orders of 
the Chairperson, and by observing the regulations of a relevant 
structural division and employment contracts. 
18(2) Laws regulating labour relations shall be applicable to the staff 
of the Bank of Lithuania. 
18(3) The staff of the Bank of Lithuania may only be employed at the 
Bank of Lithuania. Upon the consent of the Board of the Bank of 
Lithuania, they may also be employed elsewhere. 
18(4) The Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall have the right to 
delegate a staff member for temporary work at the European 
Union and international institutions and bodies or institutions or 
bodies of another state at the request of the staff member and at 
its own initiative, subject to the consent of such staff member, 
without cancelling the employment contract and suspending the 
counting of the period of employment at the Bank of Lithuania, 
without changing the terms of remuneration set in the 
employment contract or by changing said terms by mutual 
agreement between the parties of the employment contract. At 
the request of the staff member and subject to the consent of the 
Board of the Bank of Lithuania, such staff member may take up 
employment for a certain period of time at the institutions and 
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bodies mentioned herein by requesting for a leave of absence, 
without suspending the counting of the period of employment at 
the Bank of Lithuania. 
18(5) The staff of the Bank of Lithuania may be granted financial 
services pursuant to the procedure and terms established by the 
Board of the Bank of Lithuania. 
18(6) The Bank of Lithuania shall disclose information concerning a 
staff member only in the cases and pursuant to the procedure 
provided for by law. 
18
1
(1) The Staff of the Bank of Lithuania must avoid engaging in the 
activities that would cause a conflict of public and private 
interests 
18
1
(2) The Board of the Bank of Lithuania, in ensuring the lawful 
interests of the Bank of Lithuania and in order to ascertain that 
the staff of the Bank of Lithuania avoid a conflict of public and 
private interests and do not use or allow the use by third parties 
of the information constituting a state, official and bank secret in 
their own or the third parties‘ interests, may establish the kinds 
of information on personal and family financial operations to be 
disclosed by the Bank of Lithuania staff to the Bank of 
Lithuania, and may establish restrictions on entering into certain 
financial transactions or engaging in certain activities. 
Luxembourg 14(1) The Central Bank‘s Executive Board shall be assisted in its task 
by staff members recruited and appointed by the Board and 
placed under its authority. 
14(2) Prior to taking up their duties, each Central Bank staff member 
shall swear the following oath before a member of the Executive 
Board: "I swear loyalty to the Grand Duke, obedience to the 
Constitution and to the laws of the State. I promise to fulfill my 
duties with integrity, thoroughness and impartiality and not to 
disclose information which comes to my knowledge in the 
course of my duties." 
14(3)(a) Central Bank staff members who occupy the posts specified in 
the organisation chart referred to in Article 29 (2), and involving, 
either directly or indirectly, the exercise of public power and 
tasks safeguarding the general interests of the State or other 
public authorities, have a public law status consisting in the 
application, if necessary by analogy, of the provisions relating to 
officials and probationer officials, save as otherwise provided in 
a Grand-Ducal Regulation to be adopted in the interests of the 
proper functioning of the Central Bank. 
14(3)(b) For posts other than those specified in Paragraph 3 (a), Central 
Bank staff members may include, within the framework of the 
organisation chart referred to in Article 29 (2): 
• employees who satisfy all the conditions required to be 
employed by the State and whose status is treated as equivalent 
to the arrangements for state employees pursuant to Article 13 of 
the law of 27 January 1972 establishing rules for state 
employees; also applicable to them, if necessary by analogy, are 
the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 5, of the law of 16 April 
1979 as amended, together with the laws and regulations 
establishing rules governing state employees; 
• employees who fail to satisfy all the conditions for state 
employment and whose situation is governed by the law of 24 
May 1989 on contracts of employment; 
• workers whose situation is governed by the collective 
agreement in force for state workers. 
14(3)(c)  Statutory staff members and those equivalent to probationers 
employed at the Central Bank at the time of the entry into force 
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of this law, and until such time as the Grand-Ducal regulation 
referred to in (a) above comes into force, shall, whatever post 
they occupy, be subject to the status defined in subparagraph (3) 
(a) above and shall continue to benefit from the application of 
the Grand-Ducal regulation of 21 June 1984 establishing service 
regulations for staff members of the Luxembourg Monetary 
Institute. The new Grand-Ducal regulation shall not make their 
situation less favourable. Staff members of the Central Bank 
who satisfy the requisite conditions at the time of the entry into 
force of this law shall have the status of state employees. 
14(4)(a) The remuneration of Central Bank staff members shall be paid 
by the Central Bank. The Executive Board may grant non-
pensionable additional remuneration to staff members referred to 
in paragraph (3) (a) and the first indent of paragraph 3 (b) above, 
by virtue of their duties or qualifications. 
14(4)(b) The statutory pension rights of each Central Bank staff member 
are those corresponding to his legal status, according to the 
categories defined in paragraph (3). The pensions of the Central 
Bank's staff members shall be paid by the Bank. This charge 
shall be financed by a Central Bank pension fund. The pension 
fund shall be financed on the one hand by statutory deductions 
from staff members‘ salaries in accordance with the rules 
governing the pension scheme corresponding to their status, and 
on the other hand by contributions made by the Central Bank 
itself. For the practical implementation of the BCL‘s agents‘ 
pension rights, the BCL may have recourse to the decision-
making bodies and services of the Luxembourg pension 
agencies. This recent amendment of the BCL organic law 
(October 2008) has to be read in conjunction with the 
simultaneous amendment of the law of 28 July 2000 on the 
coordination of the legal pension regime, that organises the 
financial transfers to be operated between the pension fund of 
the BCL and the other pension agencies, in case of transfer of a 
State or private agent from (or to) the BCL. 
Malta 14 The appointment of officials and other employees of the Bank 
shall be made by the Board and on such terms and conditions as 
may be established by the Board. 
The Netherlands N/A  
Poland 11(1)  The President of the NBP shall be the superior of all NBP staff. 
The rights and obligations of NBP staff shall be governed by the 
Labour Code and professional rules set out in separate 
legislation. 
66(2)  The rules of remunerating the NBP staff shall be determined by 
the NBP Management Board. 
Portugal 56(1) The staff of the Bank shall be subject to the legal regulations of 
the individual labour contract. 
56(2) The Bank may sign collective labour regulation instruments, 
under the terms of the general law, for whose purpose its 
legitimate representatives shall be the members of the board of 
directors or the holders of a written mandate, expressly entrusted 
with contracting powers. 
56(3) The staff of the Bank shall benefit from the social security 
scheme and from the other social benefits, established in the 
collective labour regulation instruments of the banking sector. 
57(1) The Board of Directors, bearing in mind the specific nature of 
the functions entrusted to the Bank, shall define the personnel 
policy after hearing the institutional bodies of representation of 
the workers. 
57(2) The Board shall provide for the instruments required for the 
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proper execution and disclosure of the personnel policy, defined 
under the foregoing paragraph. 
58(1) Within the scope of the Bank‘s social action, there exists a 
welfare fund with the appropriations which the Board of 
Directors decides to allot thereto so as to ensure the achievement 
of its purpose. 
58(2) The welfare fund shall be governed by the regulations approved 
by the Board of Directors and shall be managed by a committee 
appointed by the said Board, with delegated powers for the 
purpose, and which will include representatives of the workers‘ 
committee of the Bank. 
Romania 33(1) Under the conditions set out in the law, Banca Naţională a 
României‘s Board decides on: 
… 
c) the guidelines for managing the operations and the 
responsibilities incumbent on Banca Naţională a României‘s 
staff; 
d) the internal organisational structure, indemnities, salaries and 
other pecuniary rights granted to the staff; 
… 
35(2) The Governor shall appoint the staff of Banca Naţională a 
României‘s headquarters and the managers of the branches and 
agencies. 
52(1) Members of the Board and employees of Banca Naţională a 
României shall observe the professional secrecy of any 
information not intended for disclosure acquired in the 
performance of their duties and shall not use this information for 
their personal benefit, any infringement being punished by law. 
Members of the Board and employees of Banca Naţională a 
României shall further be bound by professional secrecy 
requirements even after their duties have ceased, any 
infringement being punished by law. The provisions of this 
paragraph shall also apply to the financial auditors authorised to 
perform supervisory actions under the conditions set out in Law 
No 58/1998 on banking activity [repealed by Government 
Emergency Ordinance No 99 of 6 December 2006 on credit 
institutions and capital adequacy], as subsequently amended and 
supplemented. 
Slovakia 6(2)(f) Furthermore, the Bank Board shall in particular: set the salary 
and other emoluments of the Governor, Vice-Governors and 
other Bank Board members; 
43 The provisions of separate legal provisions (that is the Labour 
Code) shall apply to employees of the National Bank of 
Slovakia. Employees of the National Bank of Slovakia shall be 
subject, as appropriate, to the provisions of Article 7(5) to (7). 
The Governor and other members of the Bank Board are subject 
to separate mandate agreements in accordance with Article 7(11) 
concluded under the conditions of the Commercial Code 
(Articles 566 to 576 of the Commercial Code). However, in 
compliance with article 7(2) they are considered to be employees 
of the NBS. 
Slovenia 32(1) (1) The Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall also decide 
on other matters concerning the operations of Banka Slovenije, 
and shall: […] 2. regulate rights and obligations of members of 
the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije arising from 
employment relationships, […] 4. rule on internal administrative 
issues of Banka Slovenije. 
38(1) Members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall carry 
out their functions on the basis of full-time employment at 
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Banka Slovenije. 
40 (1) The organisation and operations of Banka Slovenije shall be 
regulated by internal acts adopted by the Governor of Banka 
Slovenije.  
(2) A Banka Slovenije internal act shall also determine the tasks 
of employees with special authorisations, their rights and 
obligations, and the procedure by which and term for which they 
are appointed. 
(3) The Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall decide on the 
appointment of employees specified in the previous paragraph 
on a proposal by the Governor of Banka Slovenije. 
42(1) The rights, obligations and responsibilities of the staff employed 
by Banka Slovenije shall be laid down in an internal act adopted 
by the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije in accordance with 
the law governing employment relationships. 
42(2) The rights, obligations and responsibilities of the Governor and 
Vice-Governors which arise from employment relationships 
shall be laid down in an internal act adopted by the Governing 
Board of Banka Slovenije in accordance with the law governing 
employment relationships. 
42(3) The rights, obligations and responsibilities of staff with special 
authorisations pursuant to Article 40 of this Act deriving from 
employment relationships shall be laid down in an internal act in 
accordance with the law governing employment relationships. 
The Governing Board of Banka Slovenije shall adopt the internal 
act on a proposal by the Governor of Banka Slovenije. 
42(4) The internal acts pursuant to the first, second and third 
paragraphs of this Article shall be published in the Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia. 
Spain 6 bis Employment law shall govern the relations between the Banco 
de España and its members of staff.  
Banco de España members of staff who may have access to 
confidential information shall report, in accordance with the 
applicable internal rule approved by the Executive Commission, 
securities market operations they carry out, whether directly or 
through an intermediary. This internal rule shall determine the 
restrictions applying to these members of staff concerning the 
purchase, sale or availability of these securities, in addition to 
the reporting obligations and restricitions applying to financial 
operations carried out by these members of staff with entities 
subject to the Banco de España´s supervision, whether by 
themselves or by an intermediary. Infringement of the provisions 
of this paragraph shall be subject to the sanctions laid down in 
the Banco de España´s internal rules.  
Data provided under these reporting obligations shall be kept for 
a maximum of five years. 
Sweden Chapter 4, 
Article 5.  
Stipulations governing the remuneration to members and deputy 
members of the General Council are contained in the Act 
(1989:185) on Fees, etc. for Assignments within the Riksdag, its 
Authorities and Bodies. 
Salaries and other employment benefits for members of the 
Executive Board are established by the General Council. 
Chapter 9, 
Article 4  
The General Council decides the Rules of Procedure for the 
Riksbank. 
In addition, the Riksbank makes decisions on an individual basis 
in matters concerning personnel and persons appointed for 
specific assignments at the Riksbank, to the extent that such 
matters are not governed by legislation or decisions of the 
Riksdag or the Riksdag Administration. 
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The United 
Kingdom 
N/A  
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Table 3-17 Accountability 
Member State Article Text Accountability to the 
executive 
Accountability to the 
parliament 
Austria 32(5) The Governor and the Vice Governor shall report to 
the Finance Committee of the Nationalrat at least twice a year 
on the measures taken in the field of monetary policy, while 
observing the obligation of professional secrecy laid down in 
Article 38 of the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
 Yes 
Belgium 22(1) 
41(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
Except as regards the tasks and transactions within the domain of 
the ESCB, the Minister of Finance, through his representative, 
shall have the right to supervise the Bank's transactions and to 
oppose the implementation of any measure which is contrary to 
the law, the Statutes or the interests of the State. 
Yes  
22(2) 
41(2) 
Articles of 
Association  
The representative of the Minister of Finance shall, ex officio, 
attend the meetings of the Council of Regency and the Board of 
Censors. Except as regards the functions and transactions within 
the domain of the ESCB, he shall supervise the Bank's 
transactions and suspend and bring to the attention of the 
Minister of Finance any decision which is contrary to the law, 
the Statutes or the interests of the State. 
If the Minister of Finance has not given a decision within eight 
days on the suspension, the decision may be implemented. 
Yes  
22(3) 
41(3) 
Articles of 
Association 
The salary of the representative of the Minister of Finance shall 
be fixed by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the 
management of the Bank and shall be borne by the latter. 
The representative of the Minister shall report to the Minister of 
Finance each year on the performance of his task 
Yes  
28(5) 
Articles of 
Association 
The Governor shall send to the Chairmen of the Chamber of 
Representatives and the Senate the annual report referred to in 
Article 109 B(3) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. The Governor may be heard by the competent 
committees of the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate at 
the request of these committees or on his own initiative. 
 Yes 
42 Articles Except as regards the transactions within the domain of the Yes  
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Accountability to the 
parliament 
of 
Association 
ESCB, the representative of the Minister of Finance shall have 
the right to take cognisance at any time of the state of business 
and to check the accounts and the cash holdings. 
The Bank's administration shall be required to provide him, 
whenever he so requests, with a certified true copy of the Bank's 
financial statement. 
He shall attend the General Meetings when he deems fit. 
Bulgaria 3 In the formulation of the general outlines of the monetary policy, 
the Bulgarian National Bank and the Council of Ministers shall 
inform each other. 
Yes  
50 The Bulgarian National Bank shall address the annual budget 
approved by the Governing Council to the National Assembly 
within a thirty-day period, and twice a year a report which 
reviews and assesses the Bank‘s activities during the previous 
period. This report shall be published. 
 Yes 
51 The Bulgarian National Bank shall address its annual report on 
the Bank‘s activity, the consolidated financial statement, 
together with the auditor‘s report under Article 49, para. 3, and 
the budget report thereof to the National Assembly no later than 
30 April of the following year. 
 Yes 
Cyprus 53(1) The Bank may render advice to the Government and to the 
Minister on any matter which in its opinion is likely to affect the 
attainment of the objectives of the Bank as defined in section 5. 
Yes  
53(2) The Government and the Minister may request from the Bank to 
provide them with data on the prevailing economic conditions or 
advice on any particular measures which may be taken and 
information on the general conditions of money and the banking 
system. 
Yes  
54(1) Without prejudice to section 7, the Governor may be invited and 
may attend meetings of the Council of Ministers or competent 
committees of the Council of Ministers whenever the issues 
discussed pertain to the objectives and tasks of the Bank. 
Yes  
55(1) Subject to paragraph 5 of Article 119 of the Constitution, the  Yes 
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Bank shall lay before the President of the Republic and the 
House of Representatives an annual report on the monetary 
policy of the previous and the current year. 
55(2) Subject to the provisions of Article 108 of the Treaty and 
Articles 10.4 and 38 of the Statute, the Governor, when duly 
asked in this respect, shall appear before the committees of the 
House of Representatives to report on matters relating to the 
fields of competence of the Bank. 
 Yes 
60(2) The auditors shall submit their report to the Board after the 
pertinent audit, and address a copy to the Minister for 
information.  
Yes  
The Czech 
Republic 
3(1) The Czech National Bank shall submit a report on monetary 
development to the Chamber of Deputies of Parliament at least 
twice a year for review. If the Chamber of Deputies so resolves, 
the Czech National Bank shall submit an extraordinary report on 
monetary development within thirty days. The resolution of the 
Chamber of Deputies must state what the extraordinary report 
should contain. 
 Yes 
3(2) The report on monetary development shall be submitted to the 
Chamber of Deputies by the Governor of the Czech National 
Bank, who in such an event shall be entitled to attend the session 
of the Chamber of Deputies and must be called upon to speak 
 Yes 
3(3) The Chamber of Deputies shall acknowledge the report on 
monetary development or shall ask for a revised report. 
 Yes 
3(4) If the Chamber of Deputies asks for a revised report, the Czech 
National Bank shall within six weeks submit a revised report 
that complies with the requirements of the Chamber of Deputies. 
 Yes 
3(5) The Czech National Bank shall inform the public on monetary 
development at least once every three months. 
 Yes 
3a The Czech National Bank shall submit a financial stability report 
to the Chamber of Deputies for information at least once a year. 
 Yes 
45d(1) The Czech National Bank shall each year compile and submit for 
information to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate and the 
 Yes 
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Government a report on the performance of financial market 
supervision. This report shall be submitted by 30 June of the 
following year. 
45d(2) Before the report on the performance of financial market 
supervision is submitted, its content shall be discussed by the 
Committee, which shall be entitled to append its opinion to the 
report. 
 Yes 
47(3) Within three months of the end of the calendar year, the Czech 
National Bank shall submit its annual financial report to the 
Chamber of Deputies for review. This report shall include 
information on the salaries of the members of the Bank Board of 
the Czech National Bank. 
 Yes 
47(4) The Chamber of Deputies may either:  
a) approve,  
b) acknowledge, or  
c) reject  
the financial report of the Czech National Bank. 
 Yes 
47(5) If the Chamber of Deputies rejects the financial report of the 
Czech National Bank, the Czech National Bank shall within six 
weeks submit a revised report that complies with the 
requirements of the Chamber of Deputies 
 Yes 
48(3) As soon as the annual accounts are approved and audited, the 
Bank Board shall submit them to the Chamber of Deputies and 
publish them. 
 Yes 
Denmark N/A    
Estonia 4(2) Eesti Pank shall advise the Government of the Republic in 
matters relating to economic policy. The Government of the 
Republic shall not take any important economic policy decisions 
without hearing the opinion of Eesti Pank 
Yes  
4(4) Eesti Pank shall, within the limits of its authority, support the 
economic policy of the Government of the Republic provided 
that this policy is not in conflict with the objectives and 
functions of Eesti Pank provided by § 2 of this Act and does not 
Yes  
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prevent Eesti Pank from performing them 
31(3) The annual report shall be approved and, together with the 
auditor's report, submitted to the Riigikogu by the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank. The annual report of the Financial 
Supervision Authority approved by the Supervisory Board of the 
Financial Supervision Authority shall be submitted to the 
Riigikogu at the same time as Eesti Pank's annual report. The 
Riigikogu shall hear a presentation concerning Eesti Pank's 
annual report by the Governor of Eesti Pank 
 Yes 
Finland 4(2) The Bank of Finland shall cooperate as necessary with the 
Council of State and other authorities.  
Yes  
27 The Bank of Finland shall be obliged to provide any concerned 
committee of Parliament with all information that is necessary 
for the performance of the Committee‘s tasks. 
 Yes 
France L 143-1 At least once a year, the Banque de France‘s Governor shall send 
the President of the Republic and the Parliament a report on the 
Banque de France‘s transactions, on the monetary policy it 
implements within the framework of the European System of 
Central Banks and on its forecasts. 
 
In accordance with Article 108 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and the European Central Bank‘s 
confidentiality rules, the Banque de France‘s Governor is asked 
to appear before the finance committees of the two chambers of 
Parliament and the Governor may ask to appear before them. 
 
The Banque de France‘s accounts and the auditors‘ report shall 
be sent to the finance committees of the National Assembly and 
the Senate. 
Yes Yes 
Germany 13(1) The Deutsche Bundesbank shall advise the Federal Government 
on monetary policy issues of major importance and shall furnish 
it with information on request. 
Yes  
13(2) The Federal Government should invite the President of the Yes  
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Deutsche Bundesbank to attend its deliberations on important 
monetary policy issues. 
26(5) The annual accounts, the standard cost account, the investment 
plan, the analysis of the budgeted figures compared with actual 
costs and investment, and the auditors' reports shall be 
forwarded to the Federal Ministry of Finance and the Federal 
Court of Auditors. The annual accounts, the analysis of the 
budgeted figures compared with actual costs and investment and 
the auditors' reports shall be presented to the Bundestag (the 
lower house of Parliament). 
Yes Yes 
26(6) The Federal Court of Auditors shall report its findings under 
subsection (3) above to the Bundestag. 
 Yes 
Greece 5B(1) The Bank of Greece shall submit to the Parliament and to the 
Council of Ministers an annual report on the monetary policy of 
the previous and the current year. During the year, the Bank 
shall submit a supplementary report on monetary developments 
and monetary policy. As from the establishment of the ESCB, 
the Bank of Greece shall assist the ECB in fulfilling its reporting 
commitments, as laid down in Article 109B, paragraph 3 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community and Article 15 of 
the Statute of the ESCB. 
Yes Yes 
5B(2) The Governor of the Bank of Greece, when asked, shall appear 
before the competent parliamentary committee to report on 
matters relating to the Bank‘s fields of competence. For the same 
reason, the Governor may ask the Speaker of the Greek 
Parliament to invite him to appear before the committee. 
 Yes 
5B(3) Without prejudice to the previous article, the Governor of the 
Bank of Greece shall be invited and may attend meetings of the 
Council of Ministers or of competent committees thereof 
whenever the issues discussed pertain to the objectives and tasks 
of the Bank of Greece. 
Yes  
5B(4) The Bank of Greece shall be consulted on any draft legislative 
provision concerning the tasks referred to in Article 2 hereof. 
Yes  
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The Bank of Greece may submit proposals to the government on 
matters in the fields of competence of the Bank. 
Hungary 2 The Governor of the MNB shall report to the Parliament.  Yes 
35 The Governor of the MNB shall report to the Parliament in 
respect of the activities and monetary policy of the MNB on an 
annual basis. The Parliament may also request information on an 
ad hoc basis. 
 Yes 
36 The MNB shall be consulted regarding the drafts of decisions 
and legislative provisions related to the tasks of the MNB and 
the operation of the financial system. 
Yes  
37 The Minister shall provide the MNB with preliminary 
information regarding the budget proposal. The MNB may 
express its opinion on the budget proposal to the Government 
and to the competent parliamentary committee following 
submission of the budget draft to the Parliament 
Yes  
28(2) The MNB shall publish all important information related to the 
operation of the credit institution system and to the financial 
situation of the country, and shall regularly provide detailed data 
on such information to the Parliament, the Government and the 
ministries (bodies of central state administration). 
Yes Yes 
41(2) Upon request, the MNB shall provide information to the 
Government and the ministries on an ad hoc basis in respect of 
monetary developments and other important issues related to its 
basic tasks. 
Yes  
41(3) The Governor of the MNB shall notify the Minister of his 
decisions relating to the management of the operation of the 
MNB and of high priority in respect of the operations of the 
MNB, made under his powers pursuant to Paragraph (1) of 
Article 50 after such decisions have been taken. The MNB shall 
report to the Minister on the foreign exchange transactions 
performed as well as on the gold and foreign exchange reserves 
on a weekly basis. Each year, the Minister and the Governor of 
the MNB shall agree in writing on the scope of additional 
Yes  
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information to be made available by the MNB. 
42 The Government and the ministries (bodies of central state 
administration) shall, at the request of the MNB, provide the 
MNB with information related to their activities. 
Yes  
Ireland 6A(3) The Minister may, from time to time, request the Governor, the 
Board or the Regulatory Authority to consult with the Minister, 
in relation to their respective functions, as regards the 
performance by the Bank of any function of the Bank (other than 
one imposed on it by the Rome Treaty or the ESCB Statute). 
Yes  
6A(4) The Minister may, from time to time, request the Governor to 
inform the Minister with respect to the pursuit of the primary 
objective of the Bank. 
Yes  
6A(5) The Governor, or the Board, shall comply with a request made to 
the Governor or the Board under this section in so far as the 
request is consistent with the Rome Treaty, the ESCB Statute or 
any law of the State. 
Yes  
6I(1) Within 6 months after the end of each financial year, the Bank 
shall prepare a report of its operations during the year and 
present the report to the Minister. 
Yes  
6I(2) As soon as practicable after receiving such a report, the Minister 
is required to arrange for copies of the report to be laid before 
each House of the Oireachtas, together with any other reports 
required to be included in or attached to the report. 
Yes Yes 
6I(3) The Bank shall give to the Minister for publication in Iris 
Oifigiúil such periodical returns concerning the transactions of 
the Bank as the Minister directs from time to time. 
Yes  
Italy 41 The Bank of Italy shall submit a report to the Parliament and the 
Government on its activity as provided for by law. 
Yes Yes 
Latvia 6(1) The Bank of Latvia shall advise the Saeima and the Cabinet of 
Ministers on monetary policy and other matters pertaining to the 
execution of its tasks. 
Yes Yes 
28(4) The Governor of the Bank of Latvia shall be entitled to 
participate in meetings of the Government of the Republic of 
Yes Yes 
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Latvia. 
43(1) The Saeima of the Republic of Latvia shall supervise the Bank 
of Latvia. 
 Yes 
Lithuania 41 The Bank of Lithuania may consult and give proposals to the 
Government on the issues related to financial markets and State 
Treasury policy. 
Yes  
52 The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall 
twice a year  present reports to the Seimas on the 
implementation of the primary objective of the Bank, 
performance of its functions and the situation of the banking 
system. 
 Yes 
Luxembourg 11(2) [The Executive Board] shall prepare the measures and take the 
decisions required for the fulfillment of the tasks of the Central 
Bank. The Central Bank shall submit an annual report to the 
Government and to the Chamber of Deputies on its activities and 
on the monetary policy of the previous year and the current year. 
 Yes 
30 The budget, annual accounts and reports approved by the 
Council shall be sent to the Government and the Chamber of 
Deputies. The Government in Cabinet shall decide whether the 
Central Bank bodies be granted discharge. Such a decision is 
taken without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 (2) and 
without calling into question the obligations of the Central Bank 
within the framework of the ESCB. The decision granting 
discharge to the bodies of the Central Bank shall be published 
together with the Central Bank's annual accounts in the 
Mémorial (Official Gazette). 
Yes Yes 
Malta 21(2) The Bank shall, as soon as may be but not later than three 
months after the close of each financial year of the Bank, 
transmit to the Minister - 
(a) a copy of the annual accounts certified by the auditors, 
(b) a statement of the Bank‘s investments; and 
(c) a report on its operations during that year, 
and shall publish the report referred to in paragraph (c). 
Yes  
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21(3) The Minister shall, as soon as may be and, in respect of the 
requirement of paragraph (a) of this sub-article, not later than the 
first sitting of the House of Representatives after the seventh day 
of April - 
(a) cause a copy of the annual accounts, of the statement and of 
the report aforesaid to be laid before the House of 
Representatives; and 
(b) cause a copy of the annual accounts of the Bank to be 
published in the Gazette. 
Yes Yes 
25 The Bank shall advise the Government generally on financial 
and economic matters 
Yes  
29 The Bank shall keep the Minister informed of the policy of the 
Bank: 
Provided that: 
(a) this does not result in interference with the independence of 
the members of the Bank‘s decision making bodies; 
(b) the special status of the Governor in his capacity as member 
of the Governing Council and General Council of the European 
Central Bank is fully respected; and 
(c) confidentiality requirements resulting from the Statute 
are observed 
Yes  
The Netherlands 14(1) 
12(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
On behalf of Our Minister, the person appointed to the 
Supervisory Board pursuant to the provisions of section 13(2) 
may, at the request of Our Minister or on his own initiative, and 
with due observance of Article 107 of the Treaty, obtain from 
the Governing Board of the Bank data and information about the 
manner in which the Bank performs its tasks. At the request of 
Our Minister or on his own initiative, and with due observance 
of Article 1071 of the Treaty, he may communicate his findings 
to Our Minister. 
Yes  
14(2) 
12(2) 
Articles of 
The Governing Board of the Bank shall be obliged at all times to 
provide the person referred to in subsection (1) at his request 
with all such data and information as he may deem necessary for 
Yes  
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Association the proper performance of his task as referred to in subsection 
(1), with the exception of data and information which, pursuant 
to the Treaty or the statutory regulations referred to in section 4, 
are secret. 
18(1) Our Minister is authorized, with due observance of Article 107 
of the Treaty, to request the Bank to provide such data or 
information, in connection with the tasks and activities 
performed in order to achieve the objective referred to in section 
2(1), as he deems necessary for the purpose of determining the 
Government‘s financial and economic policy. 
Yes  
18(2) The Bank is obliged, with due observance of Articles 10.4 and 
38 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks, to 
provide Our Minister with the data and information referred to in 
subsection (1). 
Yes  
19 With regard to the tasks and activities performed in order to 
achieve the objective referred to in section 2(1), the President of 
the Bank may, with due observance of Article 1071 of the Treaty 
and Articles 10.4 and 38 of the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks, be heard by the First or the Second Chamber 
of Parliament at their request 
 Yes 
Poland 21 In performing its tasks, the NBP shall collaborate with the 
competent State bodies in developing and implementing national 
economic policy, in so doing striving to ensure the proper 
performance of monetary policy guidelines, and in particular 
shall: 
1) submit the monetary policy guidelines as well as reports on 
the performance of monetary policy and on the situation within 
the banking system to State bodies, 
2) collaborate with the Minister of Finance in developing 
financial plans of the State, 
3) present its opinion on draft legislation relating to economic 
policy, 
4) present its opinion on draft legislation concerning the activity 
Yes  
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of banks and having significance to the banking system. 
22(1) The President of the NBP may attend the sessions of the Sejm.  Yes 
22(2) The President of the NBP and other representatives of NBP 
bodies referred to in Article 6 are required to submit information 
and provide explanations on monetary policies and activity of 
the NBP to the Sejm and the Senate, as well as to their 
commissions. 
  
23(1) Acting on behalf of the Council, the President of the NBP shall: 
1) submit to the Sejm and Council of Ministers: 
a) quarterly reports on the balance of payments, 
b) annual survey of the international investment position, 
2) forward to the Council of Ministers and Minister of Finance 
draft monetary policy 
guidelines, opinions on the draft law on budget, balance of 
payments forecasts and the rulings of the Council, 
3) draw up periodic reports on transfers of (payments from) 
profit. 
Yes Yes 
70 Within five months after the end of the budget year, the 
President of the NBP shall submit the annual report on the 
activity of the NBP to the Sejm. 
 Yes 
Portugal 54(1) Not later than March 31, the Bank shall submit the annual report, 
balance sheet, and accounts referred to the last day of the 
previous year for the Finance Minister‘s approval, after 
discussion and appraisal thereof by the Board of Directors, with 
the opinion of the Board of Auditors. 
Yes  
54(2) Unless a decision to the contrary is given by the Finance 
Minister, the report, balance sheet, and accounts shall be 
considered approved thirty days after the date of their receipt. 
  
54(4) After the presentation of the report, balance sheet and annual 
accounts, the Governor shall inform the Parliament, through the 
Standing Committee on Economy, Finance and Planning, on the 
monetary and exchange rate policy stance and guidelines. 
 Yes 
Romania 3(2) Any draft legal act adopted by the central public authorities on Yes  
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matters related to Banca Naţională a României tasks shall be 
adopted after previously having sought the Banca Naţională a 
României‘s opinion. The opinion shall be submitted within 30 
days at most from the date on which it was sought. 
3(3) Banca Naţională a României shall cooperate with the Ministry of 
Public Finance in setting the macroeconomic indicators based on 
which the annual draft budget shall be drawn up. 
Yes  
35(4) On behalf of the Board, the Governor shall submit to the 
Parliament until 30 June of the following year Banca Naţională a 
României‘s annual report on Banca Naţională a României‘s 
activities, the annual financial statements and the auditor‘s 
report, subject to debate, but not voted, in the joint session of the 
two Chambers of Parliament. 
 Yes 
Slovakia 12(2) The Governor or a member of the Bank Board delegated by the 
Governor shall inform the Government of the conclusions from 
meetings of the Bank Board and on the adopted decisions. 
Yes  
13(1) The National Bank of Slovakia shall take position on such 
proposals submitted for consideration to the Government that 
concern the scope of authority of the National Bank of Slovakia, 
and which have not been submitted by the National Bank of 
Slovakia; this shall be without prejudice to the duty to consult 
the European Central Bank in matters of its competence under a 
separate legal provision. 
Yes  
13(2) The National Bank of Slovakia shall perform advisory functions 
vis-á-vis the Government in areas falling within the scope of its 
authority. 
Yes  
13(3) The Governor of the National Bank of Slovakia or, during his 
absence, a Vice- Governor delegated by him, shall have the right 
to participate in meetings of the Government 
Yes  
Slovenia 26(1) Notwithstanding other laws, Banka Slovenije shall report on its 
work exclusively to the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Slovenia. Banka Slovenije shall report on its work at least bi-
annually. 
 Yes 
 449 
 
Member State Article Text Accountability to the 
executive 
Accountability to the 
parliament 
27 Banka Slovenije and the ministry in charge of finance shall by 
virtue of an agreement set out the type, scope, conditions and 
manner of conducting of operations that Banka Slovenije 
performs for the Republic of Slovenia on the basis of points 3, 4 
and 7 of Article 12(1) of this Act. 
Yes  
49(6) Banka Slovenije shall notify the National Assembly of the 
annual accounts and financial plan. The annual financial 
statements are an integral part of the annual report and shall be 
published. 
 Yes 
Spain 10(1) The Bank shall regularly inform Parliament and the government 
of the objectives and the implementation of monetary policy, 
without prejudice to the terms of article 107 of the Treaty (11) 
and the ECB rules on professional secrecy. 
To this end, the Governor of the Bank may be asked to appear, 
in accordance with Parliamentary regulations, before any 
Congress or Senate committee or joint committee of both 
chambers, or be asked to attend for this purpose cabinet 
meetings or meetings of its Commission for Economic Affairs. 
Yes Yes 
10(2) In addition, the Governor of the Bank may be asked to attend the 
meetings of the «Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera de las 
Comunidades Autónomas» referred to in article 3 of Organic 
Law 8/1980, of September 22, on Financing of Comunidades 
Autónomas and to report on issues within the scope of the 
Bank's authority, with a view to facilitating the tasks of financial 
coordination of the above-mentioned Consejo. 
  
Sweden Chapter 1 
Article 1 
The Riksbank (the Swedish Central Bank), which pursuant to 
Chapter 9, Article 13 of the Instrument of Government is the 
country's central bank and a public authority under the Riksdag 
(the Swedish Parliament), may only conduct, or participate in, 
such activities for which it has been authorised by Swedish law. 
 Yes 
Chapter 4 
Article 1 
If the Riksbank's activities give rise to a question of statutory 
amendment or any other governmental measure, the General 
Council or the Executive Board may within their respective area 
Yes Yes 
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of competence make a proposal concerning the matter to the 
Riksdag, in accordance with the supplementary rule 3.8.3 in the 
Riksdag Act or to the Government. 
Before making a proposal to the Riksdag or the Government, the 
General Council and the Executive Board shall consult one 
another. 
Chapter 4 
Article 2 
Communications issued by the General Council or the Executive 
Board to the Riksdag or the Government must include 
information detailing the members who have taken part in the 
decision and the person who has submitted the facts of the 
matter. If a dissenting vote is given in the matter, this shall be 
indicated in the communication or be evident from an appended 
extract from the minutes of the meeting. 
Yes Yes 
Chapter 6 
Article 3 
Prior to the Riksbank making a monetary policy decision of 
major importance, the minister appointed by the Government 
shall be informed. 
Yes  
Chapter 6 
Article 4 
The Riksbank shall submit a written report on monetary policy 
to the Riksdag Committee on Finance at least twice a year. 
The Riksbank shall make public statistical data concerning 
foreign exchange and credit conditions on a continual basis. 
 Yes 
Chapter 10 
Article 3 
The Riksbank is required to keep accounts. This requirement 
shall be met in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
principles. In addition, the European Central Bank's guidelines 
on the legal framework for accounting and financial reporting 
within the European System of Central Banks shall be applied. 
Each year, before 15 February, the Executive Board shall submit 
an Annual Report of the Riksbank's activities during the 
preceding accounting year to the Riksdag, the Swedish National 
Audit Office and the General Council. The General Council shall 
make proposals to the Riksdag and the Swedish National Audit 
Office on the allocation of the profit of the Riksbank. The 
Annual Report shall comprise a Profit and Loss Account, a 
Balance Sheet, a Directors‘ Report and an account of foreign 
 Yes 
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exchange and monetary policies and on how the Riksbank has 
promoted a safe and efficient payments system. 
Chapter 10 
Article 4 
The Riksbank's Profit and Loss Account and Balance Sheet are 
approved by the Riksdag, which also determines the allocation 
of the Riksbank's profit. If the value of the reserve fund has 
declined to less than SEK 500 million, at least ten per cent of the 
profit for the year shall be allocated to the reserve fund until it 
has retained a level of this amount. 
The Riksdag determines whether the General Council shall be 
discharged from liability for its activities and the Executive 
Board for its management of the Riksbank. Discharge from 
liability may only be denied if there are reasons to make claims 
of financial liability against a member of the General Council or 
the Executive Board, or if the member should be prosecuted for 
criminal actions in connection with his assignment or 
employment. 
 Yes 
Chapter 10 
Article 5 
The Riksbank shall annually report to the Riksdag what 
measures the Bank has taken in view of the Swedish National 
Audit Office‘s observations.  
 Yes 
The United 
Kingdom 
4(1) As soon as practicable after the end of each of its financial years, 
the Bank shall make to the Chancellor of the Exchequer a report 
on its activities in that year. 
Yes  
4(2) A report under this section shall, in particular, contain – 
(a) a report by the directors of the Bank on the matters for which 
the sub-committee constituted by section 3 is responsible, and 
(b) a copy of the statement for the year prepared under section 
7(2) and the report of the Bank‘s auditors on it. 
Yes  
4(3) The report mentioned in subsection (2)(a) shall, in particular, 
include a review of the Bank‘s performance in relation to its 
objectives and strategy, as determined by the court of directors 
of the Bank, in the financial year to which the report under this 
section relates. 
Yes  
4(4) A report under this section shall also contain – Yes  
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(a) a statement of the rate or rates at which directors of the Bank 
have been remunerated in the financial year to which the report 
relates, and 
(b) a statement of the Bank‘s objectives and strategy, as 
determined by the court of directors of the Bank, for the 
financial year in which the report is made. 
4(5) The Bank shall publish every report under this section in such 
manner as it thinks appropriate. 
Yes  
4(6) The Chancellor of the Exchequer shall lay copies of every report 
under this section before Parliament. 
 Yes 
12(1) The Treasury may by notice in writing to the Bank specify for 
the purposes of section 11 – 
(a) what price stability is to be taken to consist of, or 
(b) what the economic policy of Her Majesty‘s Government is to 
be taken to be. 
Yes  
12(2) The Treasury shall specify under subsection (1) both of the 
matters mentioned there – 
(a) before the end of the period of 7 days beginning with the day 
on which this Act comes into force, and 
(b) at least once in every period of 12 months beginning on the 
anniversary of the day on which this Act comes into force. 
  
12(3) Where the Treasury give notice under this section they shall – 
(a) publish the notice in such manner as they think fit, and 
(b) lay a copy of it before Parliament 
 Yes 
19 (1) The Treasury, after consultation with the Governor of the 
Bank, may by order give the Bank directions with respect to 
monetary policy if they are satisfied that the directions are 
required in the public interest and by extreme economic 
circumstances. 
Yes  
19(2) An order under this section may include such consequential 
modifications of the provisions of this Part relating to the 
Monetary Policy Committee as the Treasury think fit. 
Yes  
19(3) A statutory instrument containing an order under this section  Yes 
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shall be laid before Parliament after being made. 
19(4) Unless an order under this section is approved by resolution of 
each House of Parliament before the end of the period of 28 days 
beginning with the day on which it is made, it shall cease to have 
effect at the end of that period. 
  
19(5) In reckoning the period of 28 days for the purposes of subsection 
(4), no account shall be taken of any time during which 
Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either 
House is adjourned for more than 4 days. 
  
19(6) An order under this section which does not cease to have effect 
before the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the day 
on which it is made shall cease to have effect at the end of that 
period. 
  
19(7) While an order under this section has effect, section 11 shall not 
have effect. 
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Table 3-18 Transparency 
Member State Article Text 
Austria N/A  
Belgium N/A  
Bulgaria 49(1) The Bulgarian National Bank shall: 
1. publish weekly the balance sheet of the Issue Department, 
which shall show the position of its basic assets and liabilities, 
inclusive of the gross international reserves as per Article 28, 
para. 3 and the total amount of the Bank‘s monetary liabilities as 
per Article 28, para. 2; 
2. publish in the Darjaven Vestnik the position of its basic assets 
and liabilities at the end of each month, presenting separate 
balance sheets of the Issue and Banking Departments, an annual 
financial statement and the profit and loss account of the Bank. 
Cyprus 43 All measures of general application prescribed by the Bank under 
the provisions of sections 40 and 41, shall be duly published and 
announced with their effective dates, in such manner as the Bank 
may determine and any directives, issued under these provisions, 
shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic. 
57(3) The Bank shall prepare and publish, by the end of each month a 
summary balance sheet of the Bank as at the end of the preceding 
month. 
61 The Board shall prepare and publish an annual report for the 
activities of the Bank in each financial year, which shall include 
the annual financial statements of the Bank. 
The Czech 
Republic 
48(4) The Czech National Bank shall publish an annual report 
containing basic information on monetary development. 
48(5) The Czech National Bank shall produce and publish every ten 
days a report on its financial position 
49b(6) The Czech National Bank shall issue official information 
documents of the Czech National Bank, in which it shall provide 
information, for example, on the Bank Board‘s interest rate 
decisions, interpretative opinions of the Czech National Bank, the 
conditions for the transactions of the Czech National Bank and 
facts important to persons operating on the financial market. The 
official information documents shall be signed by a Bank Board 
member and issued in the Bulletin. 
49b(7) The Bulletin shall be issued in sequentially numbered Volumes 
marked with serial numbers, with the series terminating at the end 
of each calendar year. 
49b(8) The Czech National Bank shall publish a copy of the Bulletin in a 
manner enabling remote access. However, this copy shall not be 
deemed the Bulletin under paragraph 3 and it shall not be possible 
to refer to its wording in administrative or other proceedings. 
Denmark N/A  
Estonia 2(8) Eesti Pank shall compile the balance of payments of Estonia. In 
order to perform its functions, Eesti Pank shall collect information 
to compile and publish monetary, financial and balance of 
payments statistics on the bases and pursuant to the procedure 
provided for in the Official Statistics Act 
New 2(7) The functions of Eesti Pank are: 
to collect and publish statistics necessary for the performance of 
its functions 
9(9) Decisions of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank which are of a 
regulatory nature shall be published in the Riigi Teataja. 
11(6) The regulations of the Governor of Eesti Pank shall be published 
in the Riigi Teataja 
21(5) Eesti Pank shall periodically publish information concerning its 
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Member State Article Text 
activities and the economy of Estonia and the European Union 
31(4) The annual report shall be published in the Riigi Teataja and in 
Eesti Pank's Yearbook 
Finland 19(2) The Bank of Finland‘s annual accounts, which comprise the 
balance sheet, profit and loss account, notes to the financial 
statements and the annual report, shall be drawn up by the end of 
February and published by the end of April. 
19(4) The Bank‘s balance sheet shall be published monthly during the 
financial year. 
France N/A  
Germany 18 In order to fulfil its tasks, the Deutsche Bundesbank shall be 
entitled to order and collect statistics in the fields of banking and 
the monetary system from all credit institutions, investment 
management companies and investment stock corporations. 
Sections 9, 15 and 16 of the Federal Statistics Act 
(Bundesstatistikgesetz) shall apply as appropriate. The Deutsche 
Bundesbank may publish these statistics for general purposes. 
Data relating to individual persons or institutions may not be 
disclosed in such publications. Persons entitled to information 
under section 13 (1) above may be supplied with data on 
individual persons or institutions only if, and insofar as, this is 
provided for in the order under which the statistics are collected. 
33 The Deutsche Bundesbank shall publish announcements intended 
for the general public, particularly the recall of banknotes and the 
ordering of statistics, in the Federal Gazette. 
Greece 52 The Bank shall draw up a statement of its assets and liabilities as 
at the last day of each month, and shall publish it not later than a 
week 
53 The Bank shall also publish, annually, and not later than one 
month prior to the date of the Annual General Meeting of 
Shareholders, its balance sheet and profit and loss account as at 
December 31st of the preceding year 
54 The Bank shall publish said statements, balance sheet, profit and 
loss account, and other notifications in the Government Gazette 
and in such newspapers as the General Council may decide. A 
copy of all statements of accounts and notifications and of the 
annual report shall be sent to the Minister of Finance. 
Hungary 4(6) The MNB shall collect and publish the statistical information 
required for carrying out its tasks. 
11(1) The MNB shall quote and publish official exchange rates for the 
conversion of foreign currencies into forints and for the 
conversion of forints into foreign currencies. 
12 The MNB shall establish the central bank base rate as the key 
interest rate. The MNB shall publish the central bank base rate in 
the Official Gazette. 
28(2) The MNB shall publish all important information related to the 
operation of the credit institution system and to the financial 
situation of the country, and shall regularly provide detailed data 
on such information to the Parliament, the Government and the 
ministries (bodies of central state administration). 
41(1) The MNB shall prepare and publish a report on monetary 
developments and other important issues related to its basic tasks, 
at least on a quarterly basis. The MNB shall publish an 
announcement regarding the method and frequency of providing 
such information. 
Ireland 5A(1)(g) The Bank has the following functions: 
to provide for the collection and study of data that deal with 
monetary and credit problems and to publish information about 
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Member State Article Text 
that data; 
33D(3) Guidelines issued by the Governor or the Board under this section 
shall be in writing and the Governor or the Board, as the case may 
be, shall cause them to be published in Iris Oifigiúil as soon as 
practicable after they are issued. 
Italy N/A  
Latvia 15 The Bank of Latvia shall publish monthly and annual balance 
sheets in accordance with the standards used by the world's 
central banks. 
38(2) The mandatory reserve requirement shall be set by the Council of 
the Bank of Latvia, and shall be published in the press. 
Amendments to the reserve requirement shall take effect within 
the deadline established by the Bank of Latvia, however not 
earlier than three days after they have been published in the press. 
42 Regulations and regulatory directives on the requirements 
regulating the activities of credit institutions, procedures for 
calculating credit institution performance indicators and preparing 
commercial companies business reports approved by the Bank of 
Latvia shall be published in the government journal "Latvijas 
Vestnesis" and shall take effect on the day after publication unless 
a different term for their becoming effective has been established. 
43(2) The audit commission, whose members are approved by the State 
Auditors' Office of the Republic of Latvia, shall audit the 
economic activity and documents of the Bank of Latvia. After the 
audit results have been reviewed, the Council of the Bank of 
Latvia shall approve the Bank's annual report, and the report, 
together with the annual balance sheet, shall be published for the 
public knowledge. 
Lithuania 51 The Bank of Lithuania shall make its annual report public and 
issue it as a separate publication. The annual report shall provide 
information on basic tasks regarding monetary policy and their 
implementation, monetary policy operations, activities while 
supervising credit institutions and discharging other functions 
established by laws, as well as information on the national 
macroeconomic situation, such as analysis of the developments in 
the national economy and financial markets, and on the financial 
position of the Bank and the results of its activities. 
55 The Bank of Lithuania shall at least once a month issue 
information bulletins on the situation in the money and financial 
markets 
new 55 The Bank of Lithuania shall at least once a month publish 
statistical and other information. 
Luxembourg 30 The budget, annual accounts and reports approved by the Council 
shall be sent to the Government and the Chamber of Deputies. 
The Government in Cabinet shall decide whether the Central 
Bank bodies be granted discharge. Such a decision is taken 
without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 (2) and without 
calling into question the obligations of the Central Bank within 
the framework of the ESCB. The decision granting discharge to 
the bodies of the Central Bank shall be published together with 
the Central Bank's annual accounts in the Mémorial (Official 
Gazette). 
32(3) The Central Bank is, however, authorised to publish the statistics 
that it has compiled provided that the publication neither contains 
nor permits the inference of individual data and that it complies 
with the provisions of professional secrecy applicable to the 
ESCB 
Malta 5(1)(h) In accordance with the Treaty and the Statute, the tasks 
of the Bank shall include the following: 
 457 
 
Member State Article Text 
to compile and publish statistics as may be necessary 
to carry out its tasks 
21(2) The Bank shall, as soon as may be but not later than three 
months after the close of each financial year of the Bank, transmit 
to the Minister - 
(a) a copy of the annual accounts certified by the auditors, 
(b) a statement of the Bank‘s investments; and 
(c) a report on its operations during that year, 
and shall publish the report referred to in paragraph (c). 
21(3) The Minister shall, as soon as may be and, in respect of the 
requirement of paragraph (a) of this sub-article, not later than the 
first sitting of the House of Representatives after the seventh day 
of 
April - 
(a) cause a copy of the annual accounts, of the statement 
and of the report aforesaid to be laid before the House 
of Representatives; and 
(b) cause a copy of the annual accounts of the Bank to be 
published in the Gazette. 
21(4) The Bank shall, as soon as may be after the last working 
day of each month, make up and publish a return of its assets and 
liabilities as at the close of business on that day. A copy of the 
return shall be transmitted to the Minister who shall cause it to be 
published in the Gazette. 
24(3) When it deems it necessary in the carrying out of its 
functions under this Act, the Bank shall prepare and publish 
statements, consolidating and, or, aggregating statistical 
information so furnished under this article and, where necessary, 
under article 36(1). 
The Netherlands N/A  
Poland 53 The monetary policy guidelines, the report on the performance of 
monetary policy guidelines and normative acts issued by the NBP 
bodies and Commission – with the exception of those referred to 
in Art. 54, para. 1 subpara. 1 and para. 2 – shall be published in 
the Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland ―Monitor Polski‖ 
54(1) The President of the NBP shall publish the Official Gazette of 
Narodowy Bank Polski [Dziennik Urzędowy Narodowego Banku 
Polskiego], in which the following shall be published: 
1) acts of the NBP bodies and Commission concerning the 
functioning of banks, 
2) balance sheet and profit and loss account of the NBP, 
3) announcements regarding the establishment, liquidation and 
bankruptcy of banks, as well as the takeover of a bank by another 
bank. 
54(2) The President of the NBP may also order the publication of legal 
acts and announcements different from those referred to in para. 1 
above. 
54a(1) The title and graphic design of the first page of the Official 
Gazette of Narodowy Bank Polski may not be used by entities 
other than the NBP for profit-gaining purposes in publications, 
editions or other forms of dissemination of legal acts. 
54a(2) The provisions of Article 3, Article 4, Article 6, Article 7, Articles 
15-20 and Article 27 of the Act of July 20, 2000 on publication of 
normative acts and some other legal acts (Dz. U. no. 62, item 718, 
as amended) shall apply accordingly to the publication of the 
Official Gazette of Narodowy Bank Polski and the publication of 
legal acts therein. 
59 The NBP may initiate and organise academic research, as well as 
undertake publishing and promotional activity. 
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Portugal 54(3) The report, balance sheet, and accounts shall be published in the 
Official Gazette within thirty days after their approval. 
55 The Bank shall publish monthly and in accordance with the 
provisions laid down in subparagraph b) of paragraph 3 of Article 
59 a synopsis of its assets and liabilities. 
Romania 3(4) Banca Naţională a României shall draw up, for its own needs, 
surveys and research studies on money, exchange rate, credit, as 
well as operations of the payment systems and credit institutions. 
36(2) The financial auditor‘s report and opinion shall be submitted to 
Banca Naţională a României‘s Board and shall be published along 
with the annual financial statements. 
46 Subsequent to their adoption by the Board, Banca Naţională a 
României‘s audited annual financial statements shall be published 
in Monitorul Oficial al României, along with the financial 
auditor‘s report. 
56(1) All the regulations adopted by Banca Naţională a României shall 
be published in Part One of Monitorul Oficial al României. 
56(2) Banca Naţională a României shall keep a public register 
comprising its regulations published in Part One of Monitorul 
Oficial al României. 
56(3) The objective of communication is to provide the general public, 
the domestic and international business communities, public 
administration and the academic community, with a clear image 
of the policies and the measures adopted by Banca Naţională a 
României in fulfilling its tasks. 
56(4) Banca Naţională a României shall publish periodically the annual 
report, reports on Romania‘s balance of payments and 
international investment position, inflation report, bulletins and 
press releases concerning money and credit developments, studies 
and other papers supplying information to the general public. 
Slovakia 3(1) The National Bank of Slovakia shall publish information and 
reports of the European Central Bank on the activities of the 
European System of Central Banks and on the common European 
monetary policy, and in doing so it shall proceed in accordance 
with the rules applicable to the European System of Central 
Banks. 
3(2) The National Bank of Slovakia shall submit and publish reports 
on the condition and development of the financial market in 
accordance with a separate legal provision. 
8(4) Bank Board meetings shall not be open to the public. Apart from 
its members, Bank Board meetings may be attended by a 
Government member authorized by the Government, persons 
designated in the Band Board's rules of procedure, and other 
persons invited by the Bank Board. The Bank Board may decide 
to publish the conclusions and materials from of its meetings; 
however, information about approved documents of meetings of 
the Bank Board or other body of the National Bank of Slovakia 
shall be published as required by this Law. 
17h(1) The National Bank of Slovakia shall publish the denominations, 
appearance, technical parameters, principal security features, and 
other particulars of euro banknotes and euro coins issued and 
intended for circulation in the euro area and in participating third 
countries, including the appearance of all the national sides of 
euro coins and commemorative euro coins, as well as the 
denominations, appearance, technical parameters and other 
particulars of collector euro coins issued by the National Bank of 
Slovakia; this shall be done in the scope necessary to inform the 
general public in the Slovak Republic about euro banknotes and 
euro coins and to create the conditions for distinguishing 
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authentic euro banknotes and authentic euro coins from other 
similar objects, in particular, counterfeit banknotes and coins and 
from reproduction banknotes and coins. Such public notices on 
euro banknotes and euro coins shall be published by the National 
Bank of Slovakia under a separate legal provision in the Gazette 
of the National Bank of Slovakia (Article44) and on the internet 
site of the National Bank of Slovakia. 
28(2) The National Bank of Slovakia may set and publish the foreign 
exchange reference rates of the euro to foreign currencies which 
are actively traded or otherwise used in the Slovak Republic and 
whose foreign exchange reference rates are not set and published 
by the European Central Bank. 
38(3) The National Bank of Slovakia shall prepare and publish its 
annual reports in accordance with the separate legal provisions 
applicable to the Eurosystem 
38(4) The National Bank of Slovakia shall process and provide for 
publication the balance sheet of the assets and liabilities of the 
National Bank of Slovakia 
44 The National Bank of Slovakia shall issue the Gazette of National 
Bank of Slovakia [Vestník Národnej banky 
Slovenska](hereinafter referred to as „Gazette―), in which it shall 
publish in particular: 
a) decrees of the National Bank of Slovakia issued to implement 
this Law or a separate law, which are promulgated in the 
Collection of Laws; 
b) decisions of the Bank Board on setting for each calendar year 
the amount of the annual contributions of  supervised entities of 
the financial market, 
c) the pronoucement of an enforceable decision or the 
substantiation of a decision of the National Bank of Slovakia or of 
their part, if they are determined for publication in the Gazette 
pursuant to this Law or a separate law; 
d) methodical instructions and recommendations explaining the 
application of this Law, separate laws1) and other generally 
binding regulations relating to supervised entities or to their 
activities, if they are determined for publication in the Gazette; 
e) other matters of fact stipulated in a separate legal provision; 
f) other important notifications of the National Bank of Slovakia. 
Slovenia 34 Banka Slovenije shall publish general legal acts adopted by the 
Governing Board of Banka Slovenije in the Official Gazette of 
the Republic of Slovenia. 
49(6) Banka Slovenije shall notify the National Assembly of the annual 
accounts and financial plan. The annual financial statements are 
an integral part of the annual report and shall be published. 
Spain 3(2) Both types of regulations shall be published in the «Boletín 
Oficial del Estado» and will enter into force as determined in the 
first point of article 2 of the Civil Code. Previously, the Bank 
should request any technical and legal reports needed from its 
internal services, and any other reports or advice that it deems 
necessary. The terms of article 24 of Law 50/1997, of November 
27, will not be applicable, although in the case of the «Circulares» 
the affected parties should receive a hearing. 
Any regulations adopted by the Bank may be appealed directly to 
the «Sala de lo Contencioso administrative » of the «Audiencia 
Nacional». 
5f Compile and publish statistics related to its functions and assist 
the ECB in the compilation of the statistical information needed 
for the fulfilment of the ESCB's functions 
Sweden Chapter 6 The Riksbank shall submit a written report on monetary policy to 
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Article 4 the Riksdag Committee on Finance at least twice a year. 
The Riksbank shall make public statistical data concerning 
foreign exchange and credit conditions on a continual basis. 
The United 
Kingdom 
14 (1) As soon as practicable after each meeting of the Monetary 
Policy Committee, the Bank shall publish a statement as to 
whether it was decided at the meeting that the Bank should take 
any action, other than action by way of intervening in financial 
markets, for the purpose of meeting its objectives under section 
11 and, if it was, what the action is. 
(2) If, at any meeting, the Committee decides that the Bank 
should intervene in financial markets, it shall also consider at the 
meeting whether immediate publication of the decision would be 
likely to impede or frustrate the achievement of the intervention‘s 
purpose. 
(3) If the Committee decides under subsection (2) that immediate 
publication of a decision would not have the effect mentioned 
there, the Bank shall, when it publishes a statement under 
subsection (1) about the meeting, publish a statement as to what 
action by way of intervening in financial markets the Committee 
has decided the Bank should take. 
(4) If the Committee decides under subsection (2) that immediate 
publication of a decision would have the effect mentioned there, it 
shall keep under consideration the question of whether 
publication of the decision would still have that effect. 
(5) As soon as practicable after the Committee has decided that 
publication of a decision which has not been the subject of a 
statement under subsection (3) would no longer have the effect 
mentioned in subsection (2), the Bank shall publish a statement as 
to what action by way of intervening in financial markets the 
Committee decided the Bank should take and when the decision 
was made. 
(6) Publication under this section shall be in such manner as the 
Bank thinks fit. 
15 (1) After each meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, the 
Bank shall publish minutes of the meeting before the end of the 
period of 6 weeks beginning with the day of the meeting. 
(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to minutes of any proceedings 
relating to – 
(a) a decision to intervene in financial markets, or 
(b) a decision about the publication of a decision to intervene in 
financial markets, unless the Committee has decided that 
publication of the decision to intervene would not be likely, or 
would no longer be likely, to impede or frustrate the achievement 
of the intervention‘s purpose. 
(3) Minutes of proceedings relating to – 
(a) a decision to intervene in financial markets, or 
(b) a decision about the publication of a decision to intervene in 
financial markets, shall, if not required to be published before the 
end of the period of 6 weeks beginning with the day of the 
meeting be published by the Bank before the end of the period of 
6 weeks beginning with the day on which a statement about the 
decision to intervene is published under section 14(5). 
(4) Minutes published under this section shall record, in relation 
to any decision of the Committee, the voting preference of the 
members who took part in the vote on the decision. 
(5) Publication under this section shall be in such manner as the 
Bank thinks fit. 
18 (1) The Bank shall prepare and publish reports in accordance with 
the provisions of this section. 
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(2) A report under this section shall contain – 
(a) a review of the monetary policy decisions published by the 
Bank in the period to 
which the report relates, 
(b) an assessment of the developments in inflation in the economy 
of the United Kingdom in the period to which the report relates, 
and 
(c) an indication of the expected approach to meeting the Bank‘s 
objectives under section 11. 
(3) A report under this section shall relate to – 
(a) a period of 3 months, or 
(b) such other period as the Treasury and the Monetary Policy 
Committee may agree. 
(4) Periods to which reports under this section relate shall be 
successive, the first such period commencing on such day within 
the period of 3 months ending with the day on which this Act 
comes into force as the Treasury shall, after consultation with the 
Bank, specify in writing to it. 
(5) No report under this section shall be published without the 
approval of the Monetary Policy Committee. 
(6) A report under this section shall be published as soon as 
practicable after the end of the period to which it relates and in 
such manner as the Bank thinks fit. 
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Table 3-19 Professional secrecy 
Member State Article Text Duration Exceptions Sanctions 
Austria 45 The Oesterreichische Nationalbank, its shareholders, the 
members of its decision-making bodies, its employees, other 
persons acting for the Oesterreichische Nationalbank as well as 
the State Commissioner and his deputy shall be obliged to 
observe confidentiality with regard to all confidential facts 
which become known to them as a direct consequence of their 
service or function. This shall apply unless information about 
such facts is to be provided as a consequence of an obligation to 
provide information within the framework of the ESCB or as a 
consequence of the existence of circumstances as set out in 
Article 38 paragraph 2 of the Bankwesengesetz (Banking Act) 
BGBl. No. 532/1993. This confidentiality obligation shall 
continue to exist after the transfer of shares, after leaving office 
in one of the decision-making bodies of the OeNB, after the end 
of an employment relationship with the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank or after the end of any other service or function. 
Indefinite ESCB exchange, 
statutory grounds 
 
Belgium 35;  
56 Articles 
of 
Association 
Except when called upon to give evidence in court in a criminal 
case, members of the Bank's organs and members of its staff 
shall be subject to professional secrecy and may not divulge : 
1° to any person or authority whatsoever not qualified to have 
knowledge thereof, the confidential information which has to be 
communicated to the Bank by virtue of statutory provisions or 
regulations, or similar information received from foreign 
authorities; 
2° to any person or authority whatsoever, the confidential 
information which is communicated to the Bank by the 
European Monetary Institute, the ECB, other central banks or 
monetary institutions, other public authorities entrusted with the 
oversight of payment systems as well as Belgian or foreign 
authorities responsible for the supervision of credit institutions, 
 Criminal 
proceedings, 
statutory grounds 
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investment firms, undertakings for collective investment in 
transferable securities, insurance companies and financial 
markets. 
The members of the Bank's organs and its members of staff 
shall be exempt from the obligation contained in Article 29 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure if the information received by 
the Bank originates from authorities or institutions which are 
themselves not subject to or exempt from this obligation. 
Paragraph 1 shall not preclude the communication of such 
information :  
1. to the European Monetary Institute, the ECB, other central 
banks or monetary institutions when such communication is 
necessary for their function as monetary authorities, including 
the oversight of payment systems;  
2. to the authorities responsible for supervising credit 
institutions, investment firms, undertakings for collective 
investment in transferable securities and insurance enterprises 
when such information is necessary for their supervisory 
function;  
3. to the authorities responsible for supervising financial 
markets when such information is necessary to take a decision 
concerning the application of sanctions to participants on the 
market in question;  
4. to other public authorities charged with the oversight of 
payment systems, in so far as the recipients of the information 
are subject to an equivalent obligation to maintain professional 
secrecy  
 
Contraventions of this article shall incur the penalties laid down 
by Article 458 of the Penal Code.  
The provisions of Book I of the Penal Code, including Chapter 
VII and Article 85, shall be applicable to contraventions of this 
article. The first and the second paragraph do not at all prevent 
the observance, by the members of the bodies of the Bank and 
its staff, of more restrictive provisions as to professional 
 464 
 
Member State Article Text Duration Exceptions Sanctions 
secrecy when the Bank, pursuant to article 12, is charged with 
collecting statistical information.  
Bulgaria 4(2) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not disclose or pass to third 
parties any information obtained which is of confidential bank 
or commercial nature for banks and the other participants in the 
money turnover and credit relations, except in the cases 
provided for by the Law on Protection of Classified 
Information. 
   
13(1) Upon entering into office, the Governor, the Deputy Governors 
and the other three members of the Governing Council shall 
swear to abide by the law, to contribute to the performance of 
the tasks entrusted to the BNB, and to keep confidential all 
official, banking, commercial and other secrets protected by 
law, even after their duties have ceased. 
   
23(1) Official (служебна) secrecy means: the information relating to 
preparations for the production of Bulgarian banknotes and 
coins; the technical parameters of the sensors for reading the 
security features of Bulgarian banknotes and coins; the physical 
protection systems and information security management 
systems of the BNB and its subsidiaries; the information 
relating to the transport and protection of valuables; as well as 
other facts and circumstances, the unauthorised access to which 
might adversely affect the interests of the state or another 
interests protected by law, specified by the BNB‘s Governor 
pursuant to Article 26, para. 3 of the Law on Protection of 
Classified Information. 
   
23(2) The employees of the Bulgarian National Bank shall observe 
secrecy concerning negotiations, deals contracted, the amount 
of assets on customers‘ deposits and their operations, the 
information received by the Bank, as well as any circumstances 
concerning the Bank‘s and its customers‘ activities which 
constitute professional, bank or commercial secrecy even after 
termination of their labour contract  
Indefinite   
Cyprus 25(1) Any director and employee of the Bank shall be bound to Indefinite Criminal  
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professional secrecy even after they cease to exercise their 
duties, and shall, for the purposes of the Criminal Code, 
from time to time in force be deemed to be employed in 
the public service and the provisions of the Public Officers 
Protection Law shall apply to them as if they were public 
officers:  
Provided that, persons who were members of the Monetary 
Policy Committee, which was established by and operated 
under the Central Bank of Cyprus Law of 2002, shall continue 
to have the obligation to maintain professional secrecy even 
after the termination of their employment and/or the Committee 
has been abolished 
proceedings 
25(2) (a) Secrecy shall not apply against a Court of the Republic, 
Commission of Inquiry appointed and acting under the 
Commission of Inquiry Law, penal investigator carrying out 
an investigation under article 4 of the Criminal Procedure 
Law, the Unit for Combating Money Laundering under the 
Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering Activities 
Law and Parliamentary Committee under the Submission of 
Data and Information to the House of Representatives and 
the Parliamentary Committees Law, provided that this 
section shall not be interpreted as adding any powers. 
(b) The obligation to maintain professional secrecy shall not 
apply to the provision of information to the European Central 
Bank in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty or the 
Statute. 
 ESCB exchange  
The Czech 
Republic 
49 All banking operations of the Czech National Bank, including 
balances on the accounts it keeps, shall be subject to banking 
secrecy. 
   
50(1) The staff of the Czech National Bank shall maintain 
confidentiality in the performance of their duties. This 
obligation shall remain in effect even after the termination of 
their employment or any similar relation to the Czech National 
Bank. The obligation of confidentiality in matters encountered 
Indefinite   
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in the performance of their duties shall also apply to the 
members of advisory bodies and to auditors. 
50(2) The staff of the Czech National Bank and the members of 
advisory bodies may be exempted from this obligation by the 
Governor on the grounds of the public interest. 
 Public interest  
Denmark 15 By-laws A member of the Board of Directors or the Committee of 
Directors shall have no vote in cases concerning agreements 
between the Bank and such member or relating to actions 
brought against such member nor in case of agreements with or 
actions brought against third party in so far as such member has 
a considerable interest therein, which may be in conflict with 
that of the Bank. 
The Directors are under the obligation to keep secret what they 
learn through their work in the Bank. 
A Governor shall not make nor take part in decisions which 
concern himself in a similar manner. 
During office   
Estonia 21(1)  Eesti Pank shall ensure the confidentiality of information which 
contains banking secrets. 
   
21(1
1
)  Eesti Pank classifies information the disclosure of which would 
damage price stability or financial stability and information to 
which restrictions on access are established by the European 
System of Central Banks as information intended for internal 
use. 
 ESCB exchange  
35(1) Members of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank and persons 
employed by Eesti Pank are required to maintain the 
confidentiality of information pertaining to Eesti Pank, all 
credit institutions and other legal persons if the disclosure of 
such information could result in damage to the Estonian 
economy or to the economic interests of credit institutions or 
their clients. 
   
35(2) The obligation to maintain confidentiality applies to 
information which has become known to employees of Eesti 
Pank solely in connection with their employment at Eesti Pank. 
The obligation to maintain confidentiality applies even after the 
Indefinite   
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persons have left the employment of Eesti Pank. 
35(3) If a professional secret is disclosed, the persons at fault shall be 
punished under disciplinary or criminal procedure pursuant to 
law. 
  Disciplinary or 
criminal sanctions 
Finland 26(1) Other provisions on the secrecy obligation notwithstanding, 
Suomen Pankki shall have the right to obtain from the 
authorities and credit and financial institutions and other 
financial market participants any notifications, reports and other 
information necessary for carrying out the Bank‘s statutory 
tasks. 
   
26(2) Provisions on the secrecy obligation notwithstanding, Suomen 
Pankki shall be obliged to provide information to the authority 
supervising the financial markets and information other than 
that obtained for statistical purposes to other authorities that are 
entitled under the law to obtain such information. Suomen 
Pankki shall be entitled to provide information obtained for 
statistical purposes to other authorities for statistical purposes, 
if such authorities are entitled under the law to obtain such 
information. 
 Statutory grounds  
26(3) Rights to obtain and provide information on the tasks of the 
European System of Central Banks are also laid down in the 
legislation of the European Community. 
 ESCB exchange  
27 Suomen Pankki shall be obliged to provide any concerned 
committee of Parliament with all information that is necessary 
for the performance of the Committee‘s tasks. 
 Reporting to 
Parliament 
 
France L 142-9 Banque de France staff shall be bound by professional secrecy. During office   
Germany 32 All persons in the service of the Deutsche Bundesbank shall be 
pledged to secrecy about the affairs and facilities of the Bank, 
as well as its business operations. Without permission, they 
may not testify or make statements in or out of court about such 
matters of which they have become aware in the course of their 
work, even after they have left the service of the Bank. Where 
the interests of the Bank are involved, such permission shall be 
granted to members of the Executive Board by that Board, and 
During office Criminal 
proceedings upon 
permission 
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to other members of the Bank's staff by the President who may 
delegate this power to a member of the Executive Board, who 
may delegate it further; in respect of a court hearing, permission 
may be refused only if this is necessary for the good of the 
Federal Republic of Germany or in the public interest. 
Greece 35A(5) Members of the Monetary Policy Council shall not disclose, 
even after their duties have ceased, any information acquired 
during the performance of their duties and which is covered by 
the obligation of professional secrecy.  
Indefinite   
38(2) The Directors and employees of the Bank shall be pledged to 
secrecy with regard to all transactions and business of the Bank.  
   
44(5) With the exception of information provided to the General 
Meeting of Shareholders, the Auditors and their assistants shall 
preserve strict secrecy in regard to the affairs of the Bank. 
 Statutory grounds  
48 No representative of the Government shall have access to the 
books of either the Head Office, or the branches of the Bank, 
except in the case of the purposes of the preceding Article, 
where the Government Commissioner may require the 
Administration of the Bank to furnish him with whatever 
evidence may be necessary to enable him to form his opinions. 
The Government Commissioner shall observe strict secrecy in 
regard to the affairs of the Bank. 
   
55C(1) Without prejudice to the statistical reporting requirements of 
the European Central Bank under Article 5 of the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and complementary 
European Union legislation adopted in application thereof, 
credit and financial institutions, natural persons, legal entities of 
other market participants shall be required, without being 
entitled to invoke banking of other secrecy, to report to the 
Bank of Greece all the data and information in their possession, 
which are necessary for the performance of its tasks, in 
accordance with Article 2 thereof.2 The same requirement shall 
also apply to government departments and services 
 ESCB exchange  
55C(4) All individuals acting of having previously acted on behalf of Indefinite   
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the Bank of Greece are forbidden to disclose to any natural 
person or legal entity and to any public authority the 
information or data reported in accordance with the above 
provisions, without prejudice to the exceptions stipulated by 
law. This prohibition shall not apply to the disclosure in 
aggregate form, of the above-mentioned information and data, 
provided that the identity of the entities or persons to which the 
data refer is not revealed 
55C(5) Persons acting of having previously acted on behalf of the Bank 
of Greece shall be penalised under Article 371 of the Penal 
Code if they violate the secrecy mentioned in the present 
paragraph. All other persons disclosing data submitted to the 
Bank of Greece shall be penalised under the same article, 
irrespective of how they may have acquired knowledge of these 
data. 
  Penal code 
55C(6) In the event of non-compliance with the requirements of this 
Article, the Bank may, by virtue of an Act of its Governor or of 
an organ empowered by the Governor to that effect, impose on 
the persons referred to in the first sentence of the first paragraph 
of this Article, as well as on their legal representatives and 
managers, in the case of persons and entities subject to 
supervision by the Bank, the sanctions laid down in Article 
55A, and, in the case of any other person required to report 
data, a fine in favour of the Greek State in an amount of up to 
GRD 100,000,000 (one hundred million drachmae) and, in case 
of repetition, up to 200,000,000 (two hundred million 
drachmae). These amounts may be adjusted by virtue of a 
similar Act 
  Penal code 
55C(7) As from the adoption of the euro as the currency of Greece, the 
provisions of the present Article shall be applicable in the 
context of the tasks performed by the Bank under Article 14.4 
of the ESCB Statute 
  Penal code 
Hungary 54(1) Employees of the MNB and members of the Supervisory Board 
shall be required not to disclose any state secrets, bank secrets, 
Indefinite   
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payment secrets, securities secrets and business secrets of 
which they gain knowledge in the course of discharging their 
duties at the MNB. Such an obligation to maintain secrecy shall 
remain even after their duties have ceased. 
54(2) The provisions of the relevant laws shall be authoritative for the 
concepts of bank secrets, payment secrets, securities secrets and 
business secrets and for the obligation of maintaining such.  
   
Ireland 33AK(1) (a) This subsection applies to the following persons: 
(i) the Governor and every former Governor; 
(ii) every Director and every former Director; 
(iii) every member, member‘s deputy appointed under 
paragraph 4 of Schedule 3, former member and former 
member‘s deputy who had been so appointed, of the Regulatory 
Authority; 
(iv) the Chief Executive and every former Chief Executive; 
(v) the Consumer Director and every former Consumer 
Director; 
(vi) the Registrar of Credit Unions and every former Registrar 
of Credit Unions; 
(vii) every other officer or employee and every other former 
officer or employee of the Bank;  
(viii) every person who is or was formerly employed as a 
consultant, auditor or in any other capacity by the Bank or any 
constituent part of the Bank. 
(b) A person to whom this subsection applies shall not disclose 
confidential information concerning 
(i) the business of any person or body whether corporate or 
incorporate that has come to the person‘s knowledge through 
the person‘s office or employment with the Bank, or (ii) any 
matter arising in connection with the performance of the 
functions of the Bank or the exercise of its powers, if such 
disclosure is prohibited by the Rome Treaty, the ESCB Statute 
or the Supervisory Directives. 
Indefinite   
Italy 45 Persons referred to in Articles 42 and 44 shall observe the During office   
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utmost secrecy in every matter pertaining to the Bank and its 
dealings with third parties. 
Latvia 33 The Bank of Latvia's Governor, Deputy Governor, members of 
the Council of the Bank of Latvia and the Board, and 
employees shall have no right to disclose confidential 
information that has become known to them as a consequence 
of their service or function to any person not qualified to have 
knowledge thereof. This confidentiality obligation shall be in 
effect also after the expiry of the term of office or the 
termination of employment relationship. 
Indefinite   
Lithuania 19(1) The staff of the Bank of Lithuania as well as other persons, who 
have been granted the right of access to the information 
constituting state, official and bank secrets or who have come 
into possession of such information without such a right, shall 
protect the information constituting state, official and bank 
secrets.  This obligation shall continue to exist after the end of 
an employment relationship with the Bank of Lithuania or after 
the end of any other service or function related to the Bank of 
Lithuania. 
Indefinite   
19(2) A secret of the Bank shall be information used in the activities 
of the Bank of Lithuania that does not constitute a state or 
official secret with respect to its significance, the illegal 
disclosure or loss of which could have negative consequences 
on the functioning of the Bank of Lithuania and its activities, 
and could harm legitimate interests of other persons. 
   
19(3) Detailed lists of information constituting state, official and bank 
secrets shall be approved by the Chairperson of the Board of the 
Bank of Lithuania. Detailed lists of information constituting 
state and official secrets shall be approved and amended 
pursuant to the procedure laid down in the Republic of 
Lithuania Law on State and Official Secrets. 
   
19(4) Access and usage procedures in relation to information 
constituting a bank secret shall be approved by the Chairperson 
of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania. 
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19(5) Protection of information constituting a bank secret in court 
proceedings shall be subject to the provisions of the laws of the 
Republic of Lithuania ensuring protection of commercial 
secrets. 
   
New 19(2) A secret of the Bank shall be any non-public information 
related to the European System of Central Banks and any other 
information used in the activities of the Bank of Lithuania that 
does not constitute a state or official secret with respect to its 
significance, the illegal disclosure or loss of which could 
nevertheless have negative consequences on the functioning of 
the Bank of Lithuania and its activities, and could harm 
legitimate interests of other persons. 
   
New 19(3) The Chairperson of the Board of the Bank of Lithuania shall be 
approve detailed lists of information constituting state and 
official secrets. Detailed lists of information constituting state 
and official secrets shall be approved and amended in 
accordance with the procedure laid down by the Republic of 
Lithuania Law on State and Official Secrets. 
   
New 19(4) Usage procedures in relation to information constituting a bank 
secret shall be approved by the Chairperson of the Board of the 
Bank of Lithuania. 
   
46(2) The information received by the Bank of Lithuania for the 
purposes of supervision of credit and payment institutions may 
not be disclosed publicly, released to anyone or made public in 
any other way, except in the cases specified by the laws 
regulating the activities of credit and payment institutions. 
 Statutory grounds  
Luxembourg 10 Apart from official communications issued by the Council, 
members of the Council shall not disclose its deliberations. 
   
33(1) Any member of the bodies of the Central Bank, its auditor and 
staff members who, even after the termination of their 
functions, disclose information acquired in the course of those 
duties, shall be liable to the penalties provided for in Article 
458 of the Criminal Code. 
Indefinite  Penal code 
33(2) Without prejudice to the rules of professional secrecy  ESCB exchange,  
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applicable to the ESCB, the foregoing paragraph shall not 
preclude exchanges of information required in the context of 
the ESCB or prevent the Central Bank from exchanging 
information, to the extent necessary for the performance of its 
tasks and subject to reciprocity, with the Commission de 
surveillance du secteur financier (Commission for Supervision 
of the Financial Sector), the Commissariat aux assurances 
(Insurance Commission) and the Service central de la 
statistique et des études économiques (Central Service for 
Statistics and Economic Studies (STATEC)). 
statutory grounds 
33(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply where the persons concerned are 
called upon to give evidence in judicial proceedings or where 
the law authorises or requires them to disclose certain facts. 
Art. 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply to Board 
members and Central Bank staff members. 
 Criminal 
proceedings 
 
Malta 41(1) The Bank may, on the basis of international agreements or upon 
reciprocity agreements, or otherwise in order to fulfil its 
international obligations including in situations of instability in 
the financial system, disclose information in its possession to 
international and other bodies, authorities and, or organisations, 
when this is required to carry out its duties under the law or to 
fulfil its international obligations including in situations of 
instability in the financial system: 
 Statutory grounds  
41(2) Provided that the bodies, authorities and, or institutions 
receiving the information are obliged to use such information 
solely for such purposes as may be specifically agreed upon 
with the Bank: 
   
41(3) Provided further that the bodies, authorities and, or institutions 
to which information is disclosed are subject to obligations of 
professional secrecy. 
   
The Netherlands 20 To the extent that this Act provides for the performance of the 
acts to achieve the objective referred to in section 2(I), anyone 
who, by virtue of the application of this Act or provisions based 
on it, performs any duty, shall be prohibited from using or 
During the office   
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divulging data or information obtained in the performance of 
that duty in any way beyond or other than that required for the 
performance of that duty or required by this Act. 
23(1) 
Articles of 
Association  
Without prejudice to the provisions of the law, anyone who, by 
virtue of the Bank Act 1998 or of decrees, orders or decisions 
taken in pursuance of that Act performs any duty shall not use 
or disclose data or information in any way beyond or other than 
that required for the performance of his task or by the law. 
   
23(2) 
Articles of 
Association  
The Governing Board shall ensure that, without prejudice to the 
provisions of the law, anyone who, under any title whatever, 
performs activities for the Bank shall be bound towards the 
Bank by rules of secrecy. 
   
23(3) 
Articles of 
Association  
The rules referred to in paragraph 2 shall be made generally 
available. 
   
Poland 55 Staff of the NBP and members of the Council and consultative 
and advisory bodies at the NBP Management Board, shall be 
bound by an obligation not to disclose to unauthorised persons 
any information which they have learned carrying out their 
duties, including information that constitutes a banking secret 
according to the Law of 29 August 1997 on banking, 
information subject to protection according to the provisions on 
protection of confidential information, as well as other 
information protected by statute. This obligation shall continue 
after termination of their employment or of their membership in 
Council or the above-mentioned bodies. 
Indefinite   
Portugal 60 The members of the Board of Directors, Board of Auditors, and 
Advisory Board, as well as all the staff of the Bank are bound 
to secrecy under the terms of the law. 
During the office   
Romania 3(6) To implement the provisions of banking legislation on 
cooperation with the competent authorities of the European 
Union Member States, hereinafter referred to as Member States, 
Banca Naţională a României shall ensure the conditions 
required to perform the exchange of information with these 
 Statutory grounds  
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authorities. The information provided to the competent 
authorities of Member States shall be subject to the professional 
secrecy requirements defined in Article 52(1). 
3(7) Banca Naţională a României may also conclude cooperation 
agreements, referring to the exchange of information, with the 
competent authorities of third countries or with other authorities 
or bodies of third countries as defined in paragraph (8) hereof, 
provided the information disclosed is subject to professional 
secrecy requirements, according to Article 52. The exchange of 
information shall be performed solely for the purpose of 
exercising the supervisory duties of the authorities and bodies 
concerned. Where the information is received from a Member 
State, it may not be disclosed without the express consent of the 
competent authority which has disclosed it, and solely for the 
purposes for which that authority gave its consent. 
 Statutory grounds  
3(14) In order to ensure the smooth operation of the payment systems, 
Banca Naţională a României may communicate information 
covered by professional secrecy to clearing houses or other 
similar bodies legally established, with a view to providing 
clearing and settlement services for any market in Romania or 
in a Member State. 
 Statutory grounds  
3(15) The information Banca Naţională a României receives from the 
competent authorities of Member States may not be disclosed to 
clearing houses or to other similar structures without the 
express consent of the competent authorities which disclosed it. 
 Statutory grounds  
52(1) Members of the Board and employees of Banca Naţională a 
României shall observe the professional secrecy of any 
information not intended for disclosure acquired in the 
performance of their duties and shall not use this information 
for their personal benefit, any infringement being punished by 
law. Members of the Board and employees of Banca Naţională 
a României shall further be bound by professional secrecy 
requirements even after their duties have ceased, any 
infringement being punished by law. The provisions of this 
Indefinite Statutory grounds  
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paragraph shall also apply to the financial auditors authorised to 
perform supervisory actions under Law No 58/1998 on banking 
activity, as subsequently amended and supplemented. 
52(2) Information mentioned under paragraph (1) hereof may be 
supplied on being signed by Banca Naţională a României‘s 
Governor or by the authorised persons, in the following 
situations: 
a) during judicial proceedings, at the written request of 
competent judicial authorities, or of criminal investigation 
authorities on approval of the public prosecutor, as the case 
may be; 
b) during negotiations or when carrying out international 
agreements to which Romania or Banca Naţională a României 
is part; 
c) within the framework of cooperation agreements with other 
authorities or at Banca Naţională a României‘s initiative with a 
view to ensuring the fulfilment of the specific tasks of 
supervision and control of compliance with the legal 
provisions; 
d) during civil or commercial proceedings related to the 
bankruptcy of a credit institution or to its winding-up, following 
authorisation withdrawal, except for information concerning 
third parties attempting to restore to viability the credit 
institution in question. 
 Upon 
authorisation in 
judicial 
proceedings or 
carrying out 
duties 
 
52(3) Persons entitled to require and receive information considered 
as banking professional secrecy shall be bound to 
confidentiality and may use such information only for the 
purpose for which the information was required or supplied by 
law or in accordance with the concluded agreements, any 
infringement being punished by law. 
  Penal code 
52(4) When exercising its tasks in the field of authorisation, 
regulation and prudential supervision of credit institutions, 
Banca Naţională a României may use the information received 
under the conditions of professional secrecy only in the 
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following situations: 
a) to check that the conditions governing the establishment of 
credit institutions are met; 
b) to supervise, on an unconsolidated basis and on a 
consolidated basis, the activity of credit institutions, especially 
with regard to their liquidity, solvency, large exposures, 
administrative and accounting procedures and internal control 
mechanisms; 
c) to impose sanctions; 
d) appeal filed by credit institutions against administrative acts 
adopted by Banca Naţională a României; 
e) court proceedings initiated pursuant to Article 83 of Law No 
58/1998 on banking activity, as subsequently amended and 
supplemented. 
52(5) Where the information originates in another State, it may not be 
disclosed without the express consent of the authority that has 
disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purpose for 
which that authority has given its consent. 
   
Slovakia 40 Banking secrecy shall apply to all banking operations of the 
National Bank of Slovakia, including balances of the accounts 
it keeps. In providing information on matters relating to a 
National Bank of Slovakia client without his consent, which is 
subject to banking secrecy, the National Bank of Slovakia shall 
proceed pursuant to a separate law 
   
41 Members of the Bank Board and other employees of the 
National Bank of Slovakia and engaged persons shall be 
obligated to observe confidentiality with regard to matters of 
their office. This obligation shall remain in effect even after 
termination of employment or other similar relationship. In 
pursuance of a public cause, members of the Bank Board may 
be released from this obligation by the Bank Board, and other 
employees of the National Bank of Slovakia and engaged 
persons may be released from it by the Governor. Deemed as 
public shall be causes specified in a separate law, where the 
Indefinite ESCB exchange, 
statutory grounds, 
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information is provided pursuant to Article 40, the exchange of 
information pursuant to Article 34a, paragraph 2, and, to the 
extent necessary for the performance of supervision by the 
National Bank of Slovakia, also the exchange of information 
between the National Bank of Slovakia and other bodies of 
public administration in the Slovak Republic in charge of 
supervision pursuant to separate laws and foreign supervisory 
authorities in the area of the financial market. It shall not be 
possible to release one from the secrecy obligation and to 
disclose information on matters related to the participation of 
the National Bank of Slovakia in the European System of 
Central Banks, should this be in contradiction with the tasks 
and obligations of the National Bank of Slovakia ensuing from 
its participation in the European System of Central Banks 
Slovenia 47(1) Members of the Governing Board of Banka Slovenije, Banka 
Slovenije‗s employees, and other persons shall protect 
confidential data of which they have learnt in connection with 
performance of their function or work, even after they have 
ceased to perform their function or work. 
Indefinite ESCB exchange  
47(2) Banka Slovenije may send confidential data under the 
conditions set out by the law and the Statute of the ESCB and 
ECB. Banka Slovenije may also send confidential data within 
the framework of cooperation pursuant to Article 48 of this Act, 
provided that the relevant obligation to protect confidential data 
applies to the recipients of the data. 
   
47(3) Banka Slovenije shall prescribe the criteria for defining 
confidential data and the procedures for handling confidential 
data concerning the performance of Banka Slovenije‗s tasks 
pursuant to this Act or any other law or concerning the 
activities of Banka Slovenije in the European System of Central 
Banks. 
   
Spain 6(1) The members of its governing bodies and the personnel of the 
Bank shall keep secret, even after their duties have ceased, any 
confidential information which they might receive in the 
Indefinite  Internal bank rules 
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exercise of their responsibilities. Any breach of this obligation 
shall be sanctioned according to internal Bank rules, in the case 
of Bank personnel, and under the terms of article 29, in the case 
of members of its governing bodies. 
6(2) The secrecy obligation shall be without prejudice to the 
reporting requirements on monetary policy imposed on the 
Bank by article 10 of this law, and the terms of specific 
provisions which, in keeping with European Community 
directives on credit institutions, regulate the secrecy obligation 
of supervisory authorities. 
 Statutory grounds  
6(3) Parliamentary access to information falling under the secrecy 
obligation must be channelled through the Governor of the 
Bank, under the conditions laid down in parliamentary 
regulations. To this end, the Governor may request that the 
appropriate parliamentary body hold a secret session or use the 
appropriate procedures for access to classified material. 
 Reporting to 
Parliament 
 
Sweden Chapter 11, 
Article 4 
The Riksbank shall, without prejudice to the stipulations laid 
down in  Chapter 31, Article 1, first paragraph of the Law on 
public access and secrecy (2009:400), notify the police or the 
public prosecution authority if information emerges in its 
activities, as referred to in these stipulations, that gives cause to 
assume that a crime has been committed. 
In special circumstances, the Riksbank may refrain from 
submitting such information. 
N/A Criminal 
proceedings 
 
The United 
Kingdom 
Schedule 7 
1(1) 
Subject to sub-paragraph (2), information is restricted 
information for the purposes of this paragraph if 
(a) it is obtained by the Bank by virtue of the power conferred 
by section 17(l) or paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 (whether or not it 
was obtained pursuant to a notice under that provision), and 
(b) it relates to the business or other affairs of any person. 
   
Schedule 7  
1(2) 
Information is not restricted information for the purposes of this 
paragraph if 
(a) it has been made available to the public from other sources, 
or 
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(b) it is in the form of a summary or collection of information 
so framed as not to enable information relating to any particular 
person to be ascertained from it. 
Schedule 7 
1(3) 
Except as permitted by the following provisions of this 
Schedule, restricted information shall not be disclosed by 
(a) the Bank or any officer or servant of the Bank, or 
(b) any person obtaining the information directly or indirectly 
from the Bank, without the consent of the person from whom 
the Bank obtained the information and, if different, the person 
to whom the information relates. 
 Upon consent 
from the person 
concerned 
 
Schedule 7 
1(4) 
Any person who discloses information in contravention of this 
paragraph shall be guilty of an offence and liable 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 2 years, or to a fine, or to both; 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 3 months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum, or to both. 
  Penal code 
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Table 4-1 Comparison of national financial stability provisions 
Question 1: Whether there is there explicit reference to financial stability in the NCB Statute? 
Question 2: Whether the NCB‘s status as a prudential supervisory authority has been reflected in its Statutes? 
Question 3: Whether the principle of lending based on adequate collateral has been stated in the NCB Statute? 
 
Member State Article Text 1 2 3 
Austria 44b (1) In the public interest, Oesterreichische Nationalbank shall monitor all circumstances that may have 
an impact on safeguarding financial stability in Austria. 
YES   
44b (2) The FMA shall make available to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, on the latter‘s demand, data 
relating to all financial firms (Article 2 no. 7 Finanzkonglomerategesetz – Financial Conglomerates 
Act, BGBl. Part I No. 70/2004) and pension funds which the Oesterreichische Nationalbank needs 
in order to fulfill its tasks specified in paragraph (1). The Oesterreichische Nationalbank must 
record those data in the database specified in Article 79 paragraph 4 a Bankwesengesetz (Banking 
Act) and may process the data. Insofar as this is appropriate, the FMA may input those data directly 
into the database. Should the FMA not have available data requested by the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank, the FMA shall compile the data, record them in the database specified in Article 79 
paragraph 4 a Bankwesengesetz, and inform the OeNB accordingly. Required data that the FMA 
does not have available may also be compiled from credit institutions by the OeNB directly; again, 
these data must be recorded in the database specified in Article 79 paragraph 4 a Bankwesengesetz. 
   
44b (3) The Oesterreichische Nationalbank shall, in the field of financial stability, report observations and 
findings of a fundamental nature or of special significance to the Federal Minister of Finance and to 
the FMA, and upon request it shall provide any factual explanations which appear necessary as well 
as relevant documents and opinions. 
   
47(2) In order to achieve the objectives and carry out the tasks of the ESCB, the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank shall be empowered, in accordance with the general principles established by the 
ECB, 
2. to conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants, with lending 
being based on adequate collateral. 
  YES 
Belgium 5(1)  In order to achieve the objectives of the ESCB and to carry out its tasks, the Bank may :   YES 
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16(1) 
Articles of 
Association 
- conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other money market or capital market 
participants, with lending being based on adequate collateral. 
9 
20 Articles 
of 
Association 
 
Without prejudice to the powers of the institutions and organs of the European Communities, the 
Bank shall implement the international monetary cooperation agreements by which Belgium is 
bound in accordance with the procedures laid down by agreements concluded between the Minister 
of Finance and the Bank. It shall provide and receive the means of payment and credits required for 
the implementation of these agreements. 
The State shall guarantee the Bank against any loss and shall guarantee the repayment of any credit 
granted by the Bank as a result of the implementation of agreements or as a result of its 
participation in international monetary cooperation agreements or transactions to which, subject to 
approval by the Council of Ministers, the Bank is a party. The State shall also guarantee the Bank 
the repayment of any credit granted in the context of its contribution to the stability of the financial 
system and guarantee the Bank against any loss incurred as a result of any transaction necessary in 
this regard. 
   
12 
23 Articles 
of 
Association 
 
The Bank shall contribute to the stability of the financial system. For all decisions and transactions 
made in the context of its contribution to the stability of the financial system, the Bank shall enjoy 
the same degree of independence as that determined by Article 108 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community. 
The Bank may further be charged with the gathering of statistical information or with the 
international cooperation relating to any task referred to in Article 21. 
YES   
Bulgaria 2(6) The Bulgarian National Bank shall regulate and supervise other banks‘ activities in this country for 
the purpose of ensuring the stability of the banking system and protecting depositors‘ interests. 
YES
836
 
YES  
20(3) Supervision over the banking system shall be exercised by the Deputy Governor heading the 
Banking Supervision Department, in accordance with the rules provided for by law and the 
regulations for its enactment. In exercising his supervisory powers, he shall apply, separately and at 
his own discretion, the actions and penalties as provided for by law. 
 YES  
32 The Bulgarian National Bank shall have the right to carry on: 
1. credit operations against collateral; 
  YES 
Cyprus 5A(2) The Bank shall contribute, as an integral part of the European 
System of Central Banks, to the performance of the tasks and the 
YES
837
 
  
                                                 
836  References to the stability of the banking system and the protection of depositors‘ interests can be regarded as reference to financial stability.  
837 Financial stability is referred to in Article 127(5) TFEU, replicated in Article 3.3 of the Statute.  
 483 
 
Member State Article Text 1 2 3 
exercise of the competences entrusted to or conferred upon the latter in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty or of the Statute. 
6(2) (d) and 
(e) 
Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) and to the 
obligations resulting from the participation of the Bank to the European System of Central Banks, 
the main tasks of the Bank shall be the following: 
(d) the supervision of banks, without prejudice to the provisions of the Banking Law; 
(e) ensuring the stability of the financial system; 
YES YES  
39(2)(b) In order to achieve its objectives and carry out its tasks, the Bank 
may – 
(b) engage in lending and borrowing operations with credit institutions and other market 
participants with lending or other relevant financing operations being based on adequate collateral. 
  YES 
The Czech 
Republic 
2(2) In accordance with its primary objective, the Czech National Bank shall: 
d) supervise the activities of entities operating on the financial market, analyse the evolution of the 
financial system, see to the sound operation and development of the financial market in the Czech 
Republic, and contribute to the stability of its financial system as a whole; 
YES YES  
3a The Czech National Bank shall submit a financial stability report to the Chamber of Deputies for 
information at least once a year. 
YES   
29(1) The Czech National Bank may grant to banks for a maximum of three months credits guaranteed by 
the securities referred to in Article 28 or by government bonds or other securities underwritten by 
the Government, or by stock lists of bulk goods fully insured against loss and damage, or by other 
assets. 
  YES 
44(1) The Czech National Bank shall perform supervision of:  
a) banks, foreign bank branches, credit unions, electronic money institutions, branches of foreign 
electronic money institutions and other entities issuing electronic money pursuant to special legal 
rules, and of the sound operation of the banking system;  
b) investment firms, securities issuers, the central depository, other entities keeping a register of 
investment instruments, investment companies, investment funds, settlement system operators, 
organisers of investment instrument markets and other persons specified in special legal rules 
governing capital market undertakings;  
c) insurance corporations, reinsurance corporations, pension funds and other entities active in 
insurance and private pension schemes pursuant to special legal rules;  
d) the safe, sound and efficient operation of payment systems pursuant to a special legal rule;  
e) the activities of other entities that have a licence pursuant to special legal rules. 
 YES  
44(2) Supervision shall include:   YES  
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a) decisions on licence and permit applications and prior approvals pursuant to special legal rules;  
b) inspection of adherence to the conditions stipulated in licences and permits;  
c) inspection of adherence to laws, insofar as the Czech National Bank has the power to conduct 
such inspections under this Act or special legal rules, and inspection of adherence to the decrees 
and provisions issued by the Czech National Bank;  
d) collection of the information needed to perform supervision pursuant to special legal rules and its 
enforcement, and verification of whether it is true, complete and up-to-date;  
e) the imposition of remedial measures and penalties pursuant to this Act or a special legal rule;  
f) proceedings regarding administrative offences. 
44(3) The Czech National Bank shall also perform supervision of the entities specified in paragraph 1 on 
a consolidated or group basis as well as supplementary supervision of such entities in financial 
conglomerates to the extent set forth in special legal rules. 
 YES  
44a(1) The Czech National Bank shall perform supervision of compliance with the obligations set out in 
the Civil Code as regards the remote conclusion of financial services agreements and supervision of 
observance of the prohibition of unfair business practices
 
by persons referred to in Article 44(1), 
save for persons that issue electronic money under a licence pursuant to a special legal rule. 
 YES  
44a(2) In the case of cross-border co-operation, the Czech National Bank shall perform supervision under 
paragraph 1, proceeding in accordance with the relevant legal rule of the European Communities. 
 YES  
44a(3) If the Czech National Bank detects an infringement of an obligation or reasonably suspects that the 
collective interests of consumers
 
may be infringed by a person supervised under paragraph 1 which 
has committed unlawful conduct in a Member State of the European Communities or another state 
of the European Economic Area, it shall prohibit that person from carrying on the unlawful 
conduct. 
 YES  
45(1) [Procedural issues regarding prudential supervision omitted]    
45(2)    
45a(1)    
45a(2)    
45a(3)    
45a(4)    
45b(1)    
45b(2)    
45b(3)    
45b(4)    
45b(5)    
 485 
 
Member State Article Text 1 2 3 
45c(1)    
45c(2)    
45c(3)    
45d(1) The Czech National Bank shall each year compile and submit for information to the Chamber of 
Deputies, the Senate and the Government a report on the performance of financial market 
supervision This report shall be submitted by 30 June of the following year. 
   
45d(2) [Procedural issues regarding prudential supervision omitted]    
46 – 46f [Administrative offences omitted]    
Denmark N/A     
Estonia 2(5)   Eesti Pank shall co-operate with the Financial Supervision Authority in order to ensure financial 
stability. Eesti Pank has the right to obtain information from the Financial Supervision Authority 
which is necessary for the performance of its functions. 
YES YES
838
 
 
New 
2(3)(3) 
The functions of Eesti Pank are: 
to promote the smooth operation of the payment systems and the stability of the financial system; 
YES   
14 Eesti Pank has the right to apply primarily the following measures in order to regulate currency 
circulation: 
5) grant of loans to credit institutions if they provide sufficient collateral; 
  YES 
New 14(1) In order to perform its duties, Eesti Pank has the right to: 
1) take and grant loans against adequate collateral; 
  YES 
Finland 3(2)(3) The Bank of Finland shall also: 
participate in maintaining the reliability and efficiency of the payment system and overall financial 
system and participate their development; 
YES
839
 
  
7(1) The Bank of Finland shall hold adequate collateral in connection with the granting of credit.   YES 
France N/A     
Germany 3 The Deutsche Bundesbank, being the central bank of the Federal Republic of Germany, is an 
integral part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). It shall participate in the 
performance of the ESCB's tasks with the primary objective of maintaining price stability, shall 
hold and manage the foreign reserves of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall arrange for the 
execution of domestic and cross-border payments and shall contribute to the stability of payment 
YES
840
 
  
                                                 
838 The Financial Supervision Authority forms part of the NCB. 
839  Although the wording is not the same as in Article 127(5) TFEU, replicated in Article 3.3 of the Statute, the aim of the provision is sufficiently clear. 
840  Financial stability is referred to in Article 127(5) TFEU, replicated in Article 3.3 of the Statute.  
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and clearing systems. In addition, it shall fulfil the tasks assigned to it under this Act or other 
legislation. 
19 Without prejudice to Chapter IV of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank (Federal Law Gazette 1992 II pages 1251, 1297), the Deutsche Bundesbank 
shall be entitled to conduct the following transactions with credit institutions and other market 
participants: 
1. grant loans backed by collateral and trade in the open market by buying and selling claims, 
marketable securities and precious metals outright (spot or forward) or under repurchase 
agreements; when the debt falls due, the Bank is entitled to sell pledged assets by auction 
through one of its employees or through a person authorised to sell by auction or, if the 
pledged asset has a stock market or market price, to sell it at the current price through one 
of the aforementioned persons or through a broker and to indemnify itself for expenses, 
interest and principal out of the proceeds or to acquire the pledged asset, in which case the 
claims of the Bank in the amount of the stock market or market price lapse; the Bank also 
has these rights relative to other creditors, relative to the estate of an insolvent debtor and 
in the event of a previous protective measure taken in respect of the debtor; this also 
applies if the Bank is acting on behalf of another member of the European System of 
Central Banks; 
  YES 
Greece 2(1)(d) The main tasks of the Bank of Greece shall be to:  
supervise credit institutions, as well as other enterprises and institutions of the financial sector, in 
accordance with Article 55A hereof.  
 YES  
55(10) The business of the Bank shall be restricted to the following operations. The Bank, acting in 
accordance with the provisions applicable each time in the ESCB legal framework, may: 
conduct lending or borrowing operations with credit institutions or other money and capital market 
participants. Lending should be based on adequate collateral, including book-entry securities or 
purchase of securities with a resale agreement or with other specific agreements. The form and the 
general terms and conditions of collateral shall be specified by the Monetary Policy Council in 
accordance with the provisions applicable each time in the ESCB legal framework. 
  YES 
55A(1) The Bank of Greece shall exercise prudential supervision over credit institutions and the following 
categories of financial enterprises and organisations:  
a) financial leasing companies,  
b) factoring companies,  
c) mutual guarantee companies,  
d) counter-guarantee funds,  
 YES  
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e) bureaux de change,  
f) money-market broker companies. 
55A(2) Other categories of enterprises and organisations may also be brought under the prudential 
supervision of the Bank of Greece, as provided for by law, without prejudice to the provisions of 
the last paragraph of Article 5B hereof. The scope and content of prudential supervision for each of 
the above-mentioned categories of institutions, undertakings and organisations is stipulated in each 
case by law. The objectives of prudential supervision shall be to enhance the stability and 
effectiveness of the credit system and of the financial sector in general. Prudential supervision shall 
also be aimed at ensuring transparency of the procedures and terms of transactions carried out by 
those subject to supervision. In performing its supervisory tasks, the Bank may impose 
administrative sanctions on all persons subject to its supervision, as well as their legal 
representatives and managers, in cases of non-compliance with provisions pertaining to the 
responsibilities of the Bank of Greece.  
YES
841
 
YES  
55A(3) [Administrative sanctions omitted]    
55A(4)    
55A(5)    
55A(6)    
Hungary 4(7) The MNB shall promote the stability of the financial system and the development and smooth 
conduct of policies related to the prudential supervision of the financial system. 
YES YES  
7(a) The MNB shall implement its monetary policy with the following instruments: 
a) accepting deposits and, subject to the restrictions described in Article 16, lending based on 
adequate collateral, within the scope of its account management; 
  YES 
Ireland 6A(2)(a) The Bank also has the following objectives:  
(a) contributing to the stability of the financial system; 
YES   
33C(9) If a matter relating to the financial stability of the State‘s financial system arises in connection with 
the performance or exercise by the Regulatory Authority of its functions or powers, that Authority 
shall consult the Governor on the matter. 
 YES
842
 
 
Italy N/A     
Latvia 36 In order to achieve its objective and fulfil its tasks, the Bank of Latvia shall be entitled to effect, 
against adequate collateral, crediting transactions with credit institutions and other financial market 
participants. The Bank of Latvia shall not be entitled to issue credits to the Government and to buy 
  YES 
                                                 
841 Also, as a Eurosystem NCB, Article 127(5) TFEU, replicated in Article 3.3 of the Statute, would apply.  
842 The Regulatory Authority forms part of the Central Bank.  
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government securities on the primary market. 
Lithuania 8(1) Implementing its primary objective, the Bank of Lithuania shall perform the following functions: 
6) in the manner and cases established by laws and other legal acts, issue and revoke licenses for 
credit institutions of the Republic of Lithuania as well as branches of credit institutions of foreign 
states, and supervise the activities thereof; it shall also perform other functions related to the 
activities of credit institutions, established by laws; 
 YES  
New 8(2) 2) in the manner and cases established by laws and other legal acts, issue and revoke licenses of 
credit institutions of the Republic of Lithuania as well as branches of credit institutions of foreign 
states, and supervise the activities thereof; it shall also perform other functions related to the 
activities of credit institutions, established by laws; 
5) without prejudice to the requirements derived from its participation in the European System of 
Central Banks and notably those resulting from operations on behalf of public entities, be able to 
grant loans secured by adequate collateral for the Bank of Lithuania, to credit institutions registered 
in the Republic of Lithuania in accordance with the procedure, conditions and terms established by 
the Bank of Lithuania. 
 YES  
27(1) The Bank of Lithuania, pursuant to the procedure, terms and conditions laid down by the Bank, 
shall have the right to make loans in Litas to credit institutions registered in the Republic of 
Lithuania that have their accounts at the Bank of Lithuania. 
  YES 
27(2) The loans made by the Bank of Lithuania shall be secured by the pledge of the following assets of a 
credit institution which obtains the loan: 
1) debt securities  issued by the Government or the Bank of Lithuania; 
2) foreign currency or precious metals; and 
3) bills of exchange, other debt instruments and real estate which satisfy the terms established by 
the Bank of Lithuania. 
  YES 
27(3) Loans may also be secured by a state guarantee, or a surety or guarantee of a credit institution.   YES 
42 A credit institution shall be a bank, another legal person or a subdivision of a foreign credit 
institution who holds a licence issued by the Bank of Lithuania to provide licensed financial 
services. 
 YES  
43(1) The Bank of Lithuania shall issue licences to credit institutions to provide licensed financial 
services. 
 YES  
43(2) The terms and procedure for the issue of licences shall be established by the laws which regulate 
the establishment and activities of credit institutions and other laws of the Republic of Lithuania, as 
well as legal acts issued by the Bank of Lithuania. 
 YES  
44 The Bank of Lithuania shall establish prudential requirements for credit institutions, and the ratios  YES  
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and methods for the calculation thereof. 
45(1) [Administrative provisions omitted]    
45(2)    
46(1)    
46(2)    
46
1
(1)    
46
1
(2)    
46
1
(3)    
Luxembourg 22(2) To enable it to achieve its objectives and fulfill its tasks, the Central Bank may: 
conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants, with lending being 
based on adequate collateral. 
  YES 
Malta 5(1) In accordance with the Treaty and the Statute, the tasks of the Bank shall include the following: 
(c) to ensure the stability of the financial system; 
YES   
17(1) In accordance with the Treaty and the Statute, in order to achieve its objectives and to carry out its 
tasks, the operations of the Bank shall include the following:  
(e) to grant to any credit or financial institution in Malta loans and advances against adequate 
security; 
(g) when it deems such action necessary to safeguard financial stability or in other exceptional 
circumstances, to grant a loan or advance to any credit institution incorporated in Malta against 
such forms of security as the Board may consider appropriate. 
YES  YES 
30(1) The Bank may act as banker to credit and financial institutions in Malta and may open accounts for 
and accept deposits from such credit and financial institutions. 
   
The Netherlands 3(2) In implementation of the Treaty, the Bank shall, within the framework of the European System of 
Central Banks, contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the competent authorities 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the stability of the financial system. 
YES   
4(1) The Bank shall have the task of supervising financial institutions in pursuance of the relevant 
statutory regulations. 
 YES  
8(1) The Bank is authorized to effect transactions in the financial markets, including receiving current-
account deposits from account-holders, accepting securities and other documents of value for safe 
custody, and effecting credit transactions insofar as these are covered by adequate collateral. 
  YES 
Poland 3(2) The tasks of the NBP shall also include: 
6) establishing the necessary conditions for the development of the banking system 
6a) supporting the stability of the national financial system referred to in Article 2 (1) of the Law 
on the Financial Stability Committee of  7 November 2008   
YES   
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50 The NBP may accept securities, including those issued by itself, for safekeeping and custody, and 
as collateral. 
  YES 
Portugal 12(c) Without prejudice to the requirements derived from its participation in the ESCB it shall be 
particularly incumbent upon the Bank to: 
c) Provide for the stability of the national financial system, performing for the purpose, in 
particular, the function of lender of last resort; 
YES   
17 In accordance with the legal rules on financial supervision, the Bank shall be responsible for the 
supervision of credit institutions, financial companies and other bodies legally subject to the Bank, 
namely by issuing directives to guide their action and to ensure the centralisation services of credit 
risks. 
 YES  
24(1)(c) In order to meet the objectives and to perform the ESCB tasks, the Bank may carry out any 
operations justified by virtue of its capacity as central bank, namely the following: 
c) To grant loans or to open current account credits to credit institutions and financial companies, in 
such forms as the Bank may deem appropriate, and duly secured by collateral; 
  YES 
25(b) The Bank shall specifically not: 
b) Grant overdraft facilities or credit collateralized under forms, which run counter to the provisions 
of this Organic Law; 
  YES 
Romania 2(2)(b) The main tasks of Banca Naţională a României shall be: 
b) to authorise, regulate and prudentially supervise credit institutions and to promote and oversee 
the smooth operation of payment systems with a view to ensuring financial stability; 
YES YES  
19(1) Within the framework of its monetary and exchange rate policies, Banca Naţională a României may 
grant loans with maturities no longer than 90 days to credit institutions, against collateral consisting 
of, but not limited to: 
a) government securities from public issues, by their remittance into Banca Naţională a României‘s 
portfolio, or 
b) deposits with Banca Naţională a României or with other legal entities approved by Banca 
Naţională a României. 
  YES 
19(2) On Romania‘s accession to the Eurosystem, the scope of the assets eligible to collateralise the loans 
granted by Banca Naţională a României shall be extended to the two categories of eligible assets 
defined by the European Central Bank. 
  YES 
20(1) Banca Naţională a României shall set and disclose the lending terms, the minimum interest rate on 
loans granted to credit institutions and the criteria that credit institutions must meet to qualify to 
apply for loans from Banca Naţională a României on a competitive basis. 
  YES 
20(2) Banca Naţională a României may set lending ceilings, interest rates, repayment dates and other   YES 
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terms for lending on a competitive basis from Banca Naţională a României. 
20(3) For all its lending operations, Banca Naţională a României shall set and collect interest and fees.   YES 
25(1) Banca Naţională a României shall have exclusive competence to authorise credit institutions and 
shall be responsible for the prudential supervision of the credit institutions it has authorised to 
operate in Romania according to Law No 58/1998 on banking, as subsequently amended and 
supplemented. 
 YES  
25(2) [Administrative supervisory provisions omitted]    
25(3)    
25(4)    
25(5)    
Slovakia 2(3) In the area of the financial market, the National Bank of Slovakia shall contribute to the stability of 
the financial system as a whole, as well as to the secure and sound functioning of the financial 
market for the sake of maintaining its credibility, client protection and out of respect for the rules of 
economic competition; whereby the National Bank of Slovakia shall perform  
a) financial market supervision pursuant to this Law and separate legal provisions;1b) 
b) other activities in the area of the financial market pursuant to this Law and separate legal 
provisions. 
YES YES  
23 The National Bank of Slovakia is entitled to perform credit transactions, and credits provided by 
the National Bank of Slovakia shall be secured by adequate collateral. The National Bank of 
Slovakia shall in respect of its transactions accept collateral in the form of securities or other asset 
values which as of the euro introduction date are defined in accordance with the separate legal 
provisions applicable to the Eurosystem. 
  YES 
Slovenia 4(3) In pursuing the primary objective specified in the first paragraph of this Article and the objective 
specified in the second paragraph of this Article, Banka Slovenije shall strive for financial stability, 
while taking into account the principles of an open market economy and free competition. 
YES   
11 In performing its tasks and exercising its powers pursuant to this Act and other laws, Banka 
Slovenije shall, in particular: 
3. be responsible for the banking system‘s general liquidity, 
YES   
12(1) In addition to the tasks specified in the previous Article, Banka Slovenije shall also engage in other 
tasks, in particular: 
9. it shall define, implement and supervise a system of prudential rules for the operation of banks 
and savings banks; 
14. it may grant loans to banks, savings banks and electronic money institutions, given adequate 
collateral, taking into account Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty establishing the European 
 YES YES 
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Community and Article 21 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank 
18(1) Banka Slovenije may, in order to achieve objectives and carry out tasks under this Act, conduct 
credit and lending transactions, based on adequate collateral, with banks and savings banks, and 
with other market participants. 
  YES 
18(2) Banka Slovenije shall determine the terms and conditions for credit and lending offers, the forms of 
transactions, and the type of assets to be used as collateral. 
  YES 
23(1) Banka Slovenije shall supervise banks, savings banks and other persons pursuant to the law 
governing banking, and shall on that basis define, implement and control a system of rules ensuring 
the standards for the safe operation of banks and savings banks. 
 YES  
23(2) In defining the system of rules, supervising and enforcing the measures under the previous 
paragraph, Banka Slovenije shall take account of the relevant standards and recommendations 
drawn up by competent domestic and international institutions for this purpose. 
 YES  
Spain 7(5)(b) Promote the smooth operation and the stability of the financial system and, without prejudice to the 
terms of 3.d) above, of national payment systems. 
YES   
7(6) The Bank shall supervise, in accordance with existing regulations, the solvency activities and 
compliance with specific regulations of credit institutions, and any other financial institution or 
market it has been called on to oversee, without prejudice to the prudential supervision of 
Comunidades Autónomas in their areas of responsibility, and the co-operation between these 
Comunidades Autónomas and the Bank in performing such regional supervisory tasks. 
 YES  
9(1) To achieve the objectives of the ESCB and carry out is functions, the Bank may conduct all types 
of financial operations, complying with the general principles and instruments established by the 
ESCB,and in particular the following: 
b. Conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants, ensuring such 
operations are based on adequate collateral. 
  YES 
Sweden Chapter 4 
Article 3; 
 
In matters of major importance connected with the stability of the payments system or involving the 
supervisory activities of the Financial Supervisory Authority, the Riksbank shall consult with the 
Authority. In such a consultation, the Riksbank shall provide the Financial Supervisory Authority 
with the necessary information. 
N/A
843
 
  
Chapter 6, 
Article 5 
In pursuance of its monetary policy, the Riksbank may: 
1. grant credit against adequate collateral and receive deposits; 
Generally applicable interest terms for such lending and borrowing according to the first paragraph 
  YES 
                                                 
843 In a broader context, this duty appears to be related to the financial stability.  
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1, shall be made public. 
Chapter 6, 
Article 7 
The Riksbank may make available systems for settlement of payments and participate in other ways 
in the settlement of payments. 
In order to promote the function of the payment system, the Riksbank may grant intraday credit to 
participants in the system. Credit may only be granted against adequate collateral. The State does 
not need to provide collateral. 
  YES 
The United 
Kingdom 
N/A     
 
 
Table 4-2 National and cross-border supervisory information sharing arrangements 
1: national cross-border information sharing arrangements 
2: cross-border information sharing arrangements 
3: confidentiality requirement for the information sharing arrangements 
 
Member State Article Text 1 2 3 
Austria 43 The Oesterreichische Nationalbank shall, for the purposes of fulfilling the objective set out in Article 
105 paragraph 5 of the Treaty, provide support within its statutory purview to the supervisory 
authorities listed thereunder of Member States participating in the third stage of EMU. 
 YES  
44b (2) The FMA shall make available to the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, on the latter‘s demand, data 
relating to all financial firms (Article 2 no. 7 Finanzkonglomerategesetz – Financial Conglomerates 
Act, BGBl. Part I No. 70/2004) and pension funds which the Oesterreichische Nationalbank needs in 
order to fulfill its tasks specified in paragraph (1). The Oesterreichische Nationalbank must record 
those data in the database specified in Article 79 paragraph 4 a Bankwesengesetz (Banking Act) and 
may process the data. Insofar as this is appropriate, the FMA may input those data directly into the 
database. Should the FMA not have available data requested by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, the 
FMA shall compile the data, record them in the database specified in Article 79 paragraph 4 a 
Bankwesengesetz, and inform the OeNB accordingly. Required data that the FMA does not have 
available may also be compiled from credit institutions by the OeNB directly; again, these data must be 
recorded in the database specified in Article 79 paragraph 4 a Bankwesengesetz. 
YES   
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44b (3) The Oesterreichische Nationalbank shall, in the field of financial stability, report observations and 
findings of a fundamental nature or of special significance to the Federal Minister of Finance and to the 
FMA, and upon request it shall provide any factual explanations which appear necessary as well as 
relevant documents and opinions. 
   
51 Furthermore, the Oesterreichische Nationalbank shall be empowered: 
1. to establish relations with central banks and financial institutions in third countries and, where 
appropriate, with international organizations; 
2. to conduct all types of banking transactions in relations with third countries and international 
organizations, including borrowing and lending operations; 
3. to acquire, sell, hold and manage, spot and forward, all types of foreign exchange assets, securities, 
precious metals and other assets, in whatever form. 
 YES  
Belgium 35 
56 Articles 
of 
Association 
 
Except when called upon to give evidence in court in a criminal case, members of the Bank's organs 
and members of its staff shall be subject to professional secrecy and may not divulge : 
1° to any person or authority whatsoever not qualified to have knowledge thereof, the confidential 
information which has to be communicated to the Bank by virtue of statutory provisions or 
regulations, or similar information received from foreign authorities; 
2° to any person or authority whatsoever, the confidential information which is communicated to the 
Bank by the ECB, other central banks or monetary institutions, other public authorities entrusted with 
the oversight of payment systems as well as Belgian or foreign authorities responsible for the 
supervision of credit institutions, investment firms, undertakings for collective investment in 
transferable securities, insurance companies and financial markets. 
The members of the Bank's organs and its members of staff shall be exempt from the obligation 
contained in Article 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the information received by the Bank 
originates from authorities or institutions which are themselves not subject to or exempt from this 
obligation. 
In so far as the recipients of the information are subject to an equivalent obligation to maintain 
professional secrecy, paragraph 1 shall not preclude the communication of such information : 
1° to the ECB, other central banks or monetary institutions when such communication is necessary for 
their function as monetary authorities, including the oversight of payment systems; 
2° to the authorities responsible for supervising credit institutions, investment firms, undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities and insurance enterprises when such information is 
necessary for their supervisory function; 
3° to the authorities responsible for supervising financial markets when such information is necessary 
to take a decision concerning the application of sanctions to participants on the market in question; 
YES YES YES 
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4° to other public authorities charged with the oversight of payment systems. 
Contraventions of this article shall incur the penalties laid down by Article 458 of the Penal Code. 
The provisions of Book I of the Penal Code, including Chapter VII and Article 85, shall be applicable 
to contraventions of this article. 
The first and the second paragraph do not prevent the observance, by the members of the bodies of the 
Bank and its staff, of more restrictive provisions as to professional secrecy when the Bank, pursuant to 
article 23 (2), is charged with collecting statistical information. 
Bulgaria 4(2) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not disclose or pass to third parties any information obtained which 
is of confidential bank or commercial nature for banks and the other participants in the Money turnover 
and credit relations, except in the cases provided for by the Law on Protection of Classified 
Information. 
  YES 
5 The Bulgarian National Bank may participate organizationally and financially in international 
organizations aiming at the development of International cooperation in the sphere of foreign 
exchange, monetary and credit policy, as well as take part on its own behalf in the activity carried out 
by such organizations when in the interest of the Republic of Bulgaria. 
 YES  
Cyprus 25(2)(b) The obligation to maintain professional secrecy shall not apply to the provision of information to the 
European Central Bank in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty or the Statute. 
  YES 
The Czech 
Republic 
2(3) When performing its tasks, the Czech National Bank shall co-operate with the central banks of other 
countries, with the authorities supervising the financial markets of other countries, and with 
international financial organisations and international organisations engaged in the supervision of 
banks, electronic money institutions and financial markets. 
 YES  
Denmark N/A     
Estonia 2(5)   Eesti Pank shall co-operate with the Financial Supervision Authority in order to ensure financial 
stability. Eesti Pank has the right to obtain information from the Financial Supervision Authority which 
is necessary for the performance of its functions. 
YES   
2(6) Eesti Pank shall co-operate with international monetary, banking and credit organisations and 
maintains relations with the central banks of other countries. 
 YES  
21(1) Eesti Pank shall ensure the confidentiality of information which contains banking secrets.   YES 
21(1
1
) Eesti Pank classifies information the disclosure of which would damage price stability or financial 
stability and information to which restrictions on access are established by the European System of 
Central Banks as information intended for internal use. 
   
21(4) Eesti Pank has the right to disclose information at its disposal concerning credit institutions provided 
that such information does not contain banking secrets. 
   
Finland 4(2) The Bank of Finland shall cooperate as necessary with the Council of State and other authorities. YES   
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26(1) Other provisions on the secrecy obligation notwithstanding, the Bank of Finland shall have the right to 
obtain from the authorities and credit and financial institutions and other financial market participants 
any notifications, reports and other information necessary for carrying out the Bank‘s statutory tasks. 
YES  YES 
26(2) Provisions on the secrecy obligation notwithstanding, the Bank of Finland shall be obliged to provide 
information to the authority supervising the financial markets and information other than that obtained 
for statistical purposes to other authorities that are entitled under the law to obtain such information. 
The Bank of Finland shall be entitled to provide information obtained for statistical purposes to other 
authorities for statistical purposes, if such authorities are entitled under the law to obtain such 
information. 
YES  YES 
26(3) Rights to obtain and provide information on the tasks of the European System of Central Banks are 
also laid down in the legislation of the European Community. 
 YES  
France L 144-1(2) The Banque de France may disclose all or any information that it holds concerning the financial 
situation of undertakings to other central banks and institutions that carry out duties similar to those 
entrusted in France to the Banque de France, and to credit and financial institutions. 
  YES 
Germany N/A     
Greece N/A     
Hungary 43(1) In the course of performing its tasks, the MNB shall cooperate with the Supervisory Authority. YES   
44(1) The MNB and the Supervisory Authority shall exchange data and information which are necessary for 
the partner organisation to perform its tasks. 
 YES  
44(2) The MNB and the Supervisory Authority shall conclude an agreement governing the method and 
system of exchanging data and information which are necessary to perform their tasks. 
  YES
844
 
Ireland 5A(1) The Bank has the following functions:  
(d) to establish and maintain, either directly or indirectly, contact with the monetary authorities 
established in other countries and in territories; 
(e) whenever it thinks fit, to provide to governments of, and financial institutions and other bodies 
established in, other countries and in territories advice or other assistance on matters within its 
expertise and, when appropriate, to co-ordinate application of the resources of its constituent parts for 
that purpose; 
 YES  
33C(9) If a matter relating to the financial stability of the State‘s financial system arises in connection with the  
performance or exercise by the Regulatory Authority of its functions or powers, that Authority shall 
consult the Governor on the matter. 
YES   
Italy N/A     
                                                 
844 Assuming that such kind of agreement also covers provisions regarding confidentiality.  
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Latvia 6(2) The Bank of Latvia shall be entitled to receive information necessary for the execution of its tasks from 
the Financial and Capital Market Commission and other state and government institutions. 
YES   
7 The Bank of Latvia shall represent the Republic of Latvia in foreign central banks and international 
monetary institutions. The Bank of Latvia shall be entitled to participate in the activities of other 
international financial and credit organisations, provided that these activities comply with the 
objectives and tasks of the Bank of Latvia. 
 YES  
Lithuania 47 In carrying out the functions of the supervision of credit institutions, the Bank of Lithuania shall have 
the right to exchange information with the institutions of other states performing the supervision of 
credit institutions on the activities of any credit institution, and it shall have to ensure the 
confidentiality of such information. The information received from another institution performing the 
supervision of credit institutions may be communicated to other persons only in the cases provided for 
in laws regulating the activities of credit institutions. 
 YES YES 
New 47 The Bank of Lithuania shall have the right to conclude agreements on cooperation in the area of 
supervision of credit institutions with the institutions of other states performing the supervision of 
credit institutions. 
 YES  
New 54(2) The Bank of Lithuania may provide information to the European Central Bank, central banks of the 
states of the European Union, international monetary and financial institutions, state and municipal 
institutions, if such information is required for the performance of their functions and if such provision 
of information is not prohibited by this and other laws of the Republic of Lithuania. This prohibition 
shall not be applicable to the provision of statistical information to the European Central Bank, to 
which the confidentiality procedure established in Article 8 of the Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2533/98 of 23 November 1998 concerning the collection of statistical information by the European 
Central Bank shall be applicable. 
 YES  
Luxembourg 33(2) Without prejudice to the rules of professional secrecy applicable to the ESCB, the foregoing paragraph 
shall not preclude exchanges of information required in the context of the ESCB or prevent the Central 
Bank from exchanging information, to the extent necessary for the performance of its tasks and subject 
to reciprocity, with the Commission de surveillance du secteur financier (Commission for Supervision 
of the Financial Sector), the Commissariat aux assurances (Insurance Commission) and the Service 
central de la statistique et des études économiques (Central Service for Statistics and Economic Studies 
(STATEC)). 
YES  YES 
Malta 41(1) The Bank may, on the basis of international agreements or upon reciprocity agreements, or otherwise 
in order to fulfil its international obligations including in situations of instability in the financial 
system, disclose information in its possession to international and other bodies, authorities and, or 
organisations, 
YES YES  
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when this is required to carry out its duties under the law or to fulfil its international obligations 
including in situations of instability in the financial system: 
41(2) Provided that the bodies, authorities and, or institutions receiving the information are obliged to use 
such information solely for such purposes as may be specifically agreed upon with the Bank: 
 YES YES 
41(3) Provided further that the bodies, authorities and, or institutions to which information is disclosed are 
subject to obligations of professional secrecy. 
  YES 
The Netherlands N/A     
Poland 23(7) The President of the NBP may disclose the individual data referred to in paras. 2, 2a and 3 above and 
the statistical surveys, studies and assessments referred to para.6 above to the following entities:  
1) the European Central Bank – in the performance of the obligations related to the participation of the 
NBP in the European System of Central Banks;  
2) other foreign entities – in the performance of the international obligations undertaken by the 
Republic of Poland; 
3) other entities than referred to in items 1) and 2) above - pursuant to separate applicable provisions.  
 YES  
23(8) Individual data referred to in para. 3 above, may be disclosed to the Minister of Finance and the 
Commission for Financial Supervision within the scope necessary for the proper performance of the 
tasks and activities of the Financial Stability Committee. 
YES   
23(9) The provisions of para. 8 above shall apply accordingly to the information containing data protected by 
separate legal acts, including data protected by bank secrecy. 
  YES 
Portugal N/A     
Romania 3(5) To fulfil the commitments arising from agreements, treaties and conventions to which Romania is 
party, Banca Naţională a României shall cooperate with domestic and foreign authorities by providing 
information, by adopting appropriate measures or in any other way consistent with this Law. 
YES YES  
3(6) To implement the provisions of banking legislation on cooperation with the competent authorities of 
the European Union Member States, hereinafter referred to as Member States, Banca Naţională a 
României shall ensure the conditions required to perform the exchange of information with these 
authorities. The information provided to the competent authorities of Member States shall be subject to 
the professional secrecy requirements defined in Article 52(1). 
  YES 
3(7) Banca Naţională a României may also conclude cooperation agreements, referring to the exchange of 
information, with the competent authorities of third countries or with other authorities or bodies of 
third countries as defined in paragraph (8) hereof, provided the information disclosed is subject to 
professional secrecy requirements, according to Article 52. The exchange of information shall be 
performed solely for the purpose of exercising the supervisory duties of the authorities and bodies 
concerned. Where the information is received from a Member State, it may not be disclosed without 
 YES  
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the express consent of the competent authority which has disclosed it, and solely for the purposes for 
which that authority gave its consent. 
3(8) In exercising its supervisory function, Banca Naţională a României shall ensure the exchange of 
information with: 
a) authorities responsible for the supervision of other financial institutions and insurance companies 
and with the authorities responsible for the supervision of financial markets in Romania and in 
Member States; 
b) bodies and institutions in Romania and in Member States involved in the bankruptcy and winding-
up of credit institutions as well as in other similar proceedings; 
c) persons in Romania and in Member States responsible for carrying out the financial audit of credit 
institutions and other financial institutions; 
d) bodies managing deposit guarantee schemes in Romania and in Member States. 
YES YES  
3(9) Banca Naţională a României may cooperate, including through exchange of information, with 
authorities in Romania and in Member States, responsible for: 
a) supervising the institutions or bodies involved in the bankruptcy and winding-up of credit 
institutions as well as in other similar proceedings; 
b) supervising the persons carrying out the financial audit of credit institutions, financial investment 
services companies, insurance companies and other financial institutions. 
YES YES  
3(10) The exchange of information referred to in paragraph (9) shall comply with the following minimum 
requirements: 
a) the information shall be used by the said authorities for the sole purpose of performing the 
supervisory tasks referred to in paragraph (9); 
b) the information received shall be subject to professional secrecy requirements as defined in Article 
52; 
c) where the information is received from a Member State, it may not be disclosed without the express 
consent of the competent authority which has disclosed it, and solely for the purposes for which that 
authority gave its consent. 
  YES 
3(11) To strengthen the financial stability and preserve the integrity of the financial system, Banca Naţională 
a României may cooperate, including through exchange of information, with the authorities or bodies 
vested with legal competencies in tracing and investigating breaches of corporate law. The exchange of 
information shall comply with the following minimum requirements: 
a) the information shall be used by the said authorities for the sole purpose of performing their tasks; 
b) the information received shall be subject to professional secrecy requirements as defined in Article 
52; 
YES YES YES 
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c) where the information is received from a Member State, it may not be disclosed without the express 
consent of the competent authority which has disclosed it, and solely for the purposes for which that 
authority gave its consent. 
3(12) Banca Naţională a României shall communicate to the European Commission and to Member States 
the names of the Romanian authorities which may receive information pursuant to paragraphs (9) - 
(11) hereof. 
   
3(13) Banca Naţională a României may exchange information with monetary authorities, central banks or 
other bodies with similar functions, as well as with other public authorities responsible for overseeing 
payment systems for the purpose of performing Banca Naţională a României‘s tasks within the area of 
authorisation, regulation and prudential supervision of credit institutions and of fulfilling the tasks of 
the abovementioned authorities. 
YES YES  
3(14) In order to ensure the smooth operation of the payment systems, Banca Naţională a României may 
communicate information covered by professional secrecy to clearing houses or other similar bodies 
legally established, with a view to providing clearing and settlement services for any market in 
Romania or in a Member State. 
  YES 
3(15) The information Banca Naţională a României receives from the competent authorities of Member 
States may not be disclosed to clearing houses or to other similar structures without the express consent 
of the competent authorities which disclosed it. 
   
3(16) The entities which received information, as laid down in paragraphs (8) – (11) and paragraphs (13) and 
(14) hereof, shall be bound by professional secrecy requirements. 
  YES 
3(17) Public authorities and institutions shall provide Banca Naţională a României with the information they 
deem necessary or with the information required by Banca Naţională a României to perform effective 
supervision and to fulfil the primary objective and tasks of Banca Naţională a României. 
YES   
3(18) Until the date of Romania‘s accession to the European Union, the exchange of information provided 
for in this Article shall be made solely on a mutual basis. 
   
3(19) On Romania‘s accession to the European Union, the provisions of paragraph (18) hereof shall also 
apply to the exchange of information with entities in third countries. 
   
Slovakia 4(3) In performing supervision of the financial market pursuant to a separate legal provision, the National 
Bank of Slovakia shall perform tasks in the area of international cooperation. 
 YES  
34a(2) The National Bank of Slovakia may, to the extent necessary for the performance of its tasks pursuant to 
this Law and separate legal provisions, cooperate and exchange information with public authorities in 
the Slovak Republic and other countries, with the Deposit Protection Fund, Investment Guarantee Fund 
and with international organizations. 
YES   
Slovenia 48 In order to perform its tasks, Banka Slovenije may cooperate with other central banks, supervisory YES YES  
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institutions, international financial organisations, and organisations and funds concerned with 
guaranteeing deposits. 
Spain 6(2) The secrecy obligation shall be without prejudice to the reporting requirements on monetary policy 
imposed on the Bank by article 10 of this law, and the terms of specific provisions which, in keeping 
with European Community directives on credit institutions, regulate the secrecy obligation of 
supervisory authorities. 
  YES 
7(8) The Bank may establish relationships with other central banks, with financial supervisory authorities 
and financial institutions in other countries, and with international monetary and financial 
organisations. 
 YES  
Sweden Chapter 4, 
Article 3 
In matters of major importance connected with the stability of the payments system or involving the 
supervisory activities of the Financial Supervisory Authority, the Riksbank shall consult with the 
Authority. In such a consultation, the Riksbank shall provide the Financial Supervisory Authority with 
the necessary information. 
YES   
The United 
Kingdom 
N/A     
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Table 4-3 Emergency liquidity assistance 
1: Independence requirement 
2: Collateral requirement 
3: Short term nature requirement  
4: Illiquidity requirement  
5: Credit institution as counterparty 
6: Exceptionality requirement (systemic risk, exceptional circumstances, case-by-case basis, in the last resort) 
 
Member State Article Text 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Austria N/A        
Belgium N/A        
Bulgaria 20(2) In case any systemic risk for the stability of the banking system arises, the Banking 
Department shall perform the lender of last resort function under the terms and procedure 
set forth by this Law and by the regulations as adopted by the Governing Council. 
*      
33(1) The Bulgarian National Bank may not extend credits to banks, except in the cases under 
para. 2. 
      
33(2) Upon emergence of a liquidity risk that may affect the stability of the banking system, the 
Bulgarian National Bank may extend to a solvent bank lev-denominated credits with 
maturity no longer than three months, provided they are fully collateralized by gold, 
foreign currency or other such high-liquid assets. The terms and procedure for extension 
of such credits, as well as the criteria establishing the occurrence of a liquidity risk, shall 
be determined by an ordinance of the Bulgarian National Bank. 
 YES YES YES  YES YES 
33(3) Credits under para. 2 may be extended solely up to the amount of the excess of the lev 
equivalent of the gross international reserves over the total amount of monetary liabilities 
of the Bulgarian National Bank. 
      
45(1) The Bulgarian National Bank shall not extend credits and guarantees in any form 
whatsoever, including through purchase of debt instruments, to the Council of Ministers, 
municipalities, as well as to other government and municipal institutions, organizations 
and enterprises. 
      
45(2) Paragraph 1 shall not apply to extension of credits to state-owned and municipal banks in 
the cases under Article 33, para. 2. 
      
Cyprus 46(3) Without prejudice to its obligations resulting from its participation to the European  YES YES  YES * 
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System of Central Banks and, in particular, Article 21 of the Statute, the Bank may grant 
advances against collateral security, or make loans against collateral security to banks for 
fixed periods and for purposes which the Bank may designate. 
The Czech 
Republic 
29(2) In the interests of maintaining a bank‘s liquidity, the Czech National Bank may 
exceptionally provide short-term credit for a period of up to three months. When 
providing such credit, the Czech National Bank shall require adequate collateral 
 YES YES YES YES YES 
Denmark N/A        
Estonia N/A        
Finland N/A        
France N/A        
Germany N/A        
Greece N/A        
Hungary 14 In the event that circumstances arise which jeopardise the stability of the financial system 
due to the operation of a credit institution, the MNB may extend an emergency loan to the 
credit institution, observing the prohibition of monetary financing as set forth in 
Paragraph (1) of Article 16. The MNB may make the extension of such a loan subject to 
performance of actions by the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (hereinafter 
referred to as the ‗Supervisory Authority‘) or performance of actions by the credit 
institution, at the proposal of the Supervisory Authority. 
    YES YES 
Ireland N/A        
Italy N/A        
Latvia N/A        
Luxembourg N/A        
Malta 17(1) In accordance with the Treaty and the Statute, in order to achieve its objectives and to 
carry out its tasks, the operations of the Bank shall include the following: 
(g) when it deems such action necessary to safeguard financial stability or in other 
exceptional circumstances, to grant a loan or advance to any credit institution incorporated 
in Malta against such forms of security as the Board may consider appropriate. 
 YES   YES YES 
The Netherlands N/A        
Poland 42(1) The NBP may grant refinancing loans to banks, in złoty, in order to replenish their 
funding.  
YES    YES  
42(2) In granting refinancing loans, the NBP shall consider the capacity of the bank to repay the 
loan together with interest, on the contractual repayment dates, subject to the reservation 
indicated in para. 3. 
   *   
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42(3) The NBP may also grant refinancing loan to a bank for the purpose of implementation of 
the programme of bank rehabilitation proceedings. 
      
42(4) Refinancing facilities may be granted: 
1) up to a specified amount, as a line of credit, 
2) against pledges of securities, up to an amount corresponding to a specified proportion 
of the face value of such securities (lombard facilities), 
3) in other forms, as specified by the NBP Management Board. 
 YES     
42(5) The contract for refinancing loan may be terminated by each of the parties with a seven 
days termination notice. 
      
42(6) In the event of the financial situation of the bank using the refinancing facilities has 
worsened to the extent putting the timely repayment of the loan at risk, or such bank does 
not observe the substantial provisions of the contract for loan, the NBP may terminate the 
contract for refinancing loan and demand an earlier repayment of the loan, partial or total, 
within a period shorter than stipulated in such contract. 
     * 
42(7) The provisions of the Act referred to in Article 25 para. 3 shall apply to the contract for 
refinancing loan, subject to modifications resulting from the present Act. 
      
43 In the event and under the conditions referred to in Article 34 item 3 of the Act on the 
Bank Guarantee Fund of 14 December 1994  (Dz. U. 2007 no. 70, item 474 and Dz.U. 
2008 No. 196, item. 1214 and no. 209, item 1315), the NBP may grant loans to the Bank 
Guarantee Fund 
      
Portugal N/A        
Romania 26 To carry out its tasks on ensuring financial stability, under exceptional circumstances and 
only on a case-by-case basis, Banca Naţională a României may grant to credit institutions 
loans that are either unsecured or secured with assets other than those provided by Article 
19 hereof. 
 NO   YES YES 
Slovakia 24(1) The National Bank of Slovakia may exceptionally grant a short-term loan to a bank for 
temporary support of liquidity, provided that it is in compliance with prohibition of 
monetary financing; the claim to repayment of such a loan shall take priority over all other 
liabilities of the bank. Any such loan shall be secured by adequate collateral pursuant to 
Article23 and granting such loan shall not be made so as to advantage or disadvantage 
any one bank in relation to other banks. 
 YES YES YES YES YES 
24(2) The National Bank of Slovakia may grant a short-term loan to the Deposit Protection 
Fund or the Investment Guarantee Fund in order to cover the fund's urgent and unforeseen 
needs for supply of liquidity, if aspects of the systemic stability are threatened and 
 YES YES YES NO YES 
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provided that it is in compliance with the prohibition on monetary financing. Any such 
loan shall be sufficiently secured by adequate collateral pursuant to Article23. 
Slovenia N/A        
Spain N/A        
Sweden Chapter 6, 
Article 9 
In exceptional circumstances, the Riksbank may, with the aim of supporting liquidity, 
grant credits or provide guarantees on special terms to banking institutions and Swedish 
companies subject to the supervision of the Financial Supervisory Authority. 
    YES* YES 
The United 
Kingdom
845
 
N/A        
 
                                                 
845  Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority, agreed on or about 22 March 2006.  
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Table 5-1 Proposals 
Law on Eesti Pank as of 1 January 2011 
 
Proposal 
Chapter I 
General Provisions 
 
§ 1. Legal bases of Eesti Pank 
(1) Eesti Pank is the central bank of the Republic of 
Estonia and a member of the European System of 
Central Banks. Eesti Pank is the legal successor of 
Eesti Pank which was established as the central bank 
of the Republic of Estonia in 1919. 
(2) Eesti Pank is a legal person with its own statute, 
seal, coat of arms and other attributes permitted by 
law. 
(3) Eesti Pank operates pursuant to the Constitution of 
the Republic of Estonia, the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia Amendment Act, the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, the Statute of 
the European System of Central Banks and of the 
European Central Bank, legislation of the European 
Central Bank, this Act, other Acts and its statute. 
(4) The legal status of Eesti Pank can only be changed 
by passing an Eesti Pank Act Amendment Act 
(5) In order for the functions of Eesti Pank to be 
performed, the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall 
issue decisions and the Governor of Eesti Pank shall 
issue regulations and decrees. 
(6) Eesti Pank and its divisions shall be registered in 
the state register of state and local government 
agencies pursuant to the procedure provided for in the 
statutes of the register 
§ 1.  
 
(3) Eesti Pank operates pursuant to the Constitution of 
the Republic of Estonia, the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia Amendment Act, the Treaty on 
European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, 
legislation of the European Central Bank, this Act, 
other Acts and its statute. 
 
§ 2. Objective and functions of Eesti Pank 
(1) The primary objective of Eesti Pank is to maintain 
price stability. Eesti Pank also supports the 
achievement of other economic policy objectives in 
accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
(2) The functions of Eesti Pank are: 
1) to help to define the monetary policy of the 
European Union and to implement the monetary 
policy determined by the Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank; 
2) to hold and manage the official foreign exchange 
reserves; 
3) to promote the smooth operation of the payment 
systems and the stability of the financial system; 
4) to participate in the development of the payment 
systems and the financial system; 
5) to regulate currency circulation, contribute to the 
issuance of euro banknotes and issue of euro coins; 
6) to compile the balance of payments of Estonia; 
7) to collect and publish statistics necessary for the 
performance of its functions;  
8) other functions of Eesti Pank arising from the law 
which are not in conflict with the objectives specified 
in subsection (1) of this section and the functions 
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specified in clauses 1)-7) of this subsection. 
§ 3. Autonomy of Eesti Pank 
(1) Eesti Pank operates independently of other state 
agencies. Eesti Pank shall report on its activities to the 
Riigikogu and it is not subordinated to the 
Government of the Republic or any other executive 
state agency or any third person.  
(1
1
) As part of the European System of Central Banks, 
Eesti Pank and members of its directing bodies may 
apply for and receive instructions to be carried out 
only from the European Central Bank. 
(2) Eesti Pank shall not be held liable for any 
proprietary obligations of the state and the state shall 
not be held liable for any proprietary obligations of 
Eesti Pank. 
 
§ 4. Co-operation between Eesti Pank and 
Government of Republic 
(1) [Repealed] 
(2) Eesti Pank shall advise the Government of the 
Republic in matters relating to economic policy. The 
Government of the Republic shall not take any 
important economic policy decisions without hearing 
the opinion of Eesti Pank. 
(3) Eesti Pank is authorised by the Government of the 
Republic to represent the Republic of Estonia in 
international organisations of which the Republic of 
Estonia is a member. 
(4) [Repealed] 
 
§ 4
1
. Financial Supervision Authority 
(1) The Financial Supervision Authority, established 
pursuant to law, operates as an agency at Eesti Pank. 
(2) The Financial Supervision Authority has 
autonomous competence in the conduct of state 
financial supervision and has its own directing bodies, 
a separate budget and its own reporting system. 
(3) The Financial Supervision Authority has the right 
to obtain information necessary for the performance of 
its functions from Eesti Pank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 4
1
. 
(4) Eesti Pank has the right to obtain information from 
the Financial Supervisory Authority which is 
necessary for the performance of its functions.  
 
Explanation: this right will be corresponding to the 
righ of the Financial Supervision Authority to obtain 
information from Eesti Pank.  
§ 5. Seat of Eesti Pank 
(1) The seat of Eesti Pank is in Tallinn. 
(2) Eesti Pank may open independent divisions and 
representative offices which operate pursuant to their 
own statutes both in Estonia and abroad. 
 
Chapter II 
Directing Bodies of Eesti Pank and their 
Competence 
 
§ 6. Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
The highest body of Eesti Pank is the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank, which consists of a Chairman 
and seven members. 
 
§ 7. Chairman of Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
(1) The Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank is appointed to office for a term of five years by 
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the Riigikogu on the proposal of the President of the 
Republic. 
(1
1
) The Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank shall notify the President of the Republic of his 
or her resignation from office at least four months in 
advance. 
(2) The Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank must be an Estonian citizen and have a university 
degree. The Governor of Eesti Pank or the Minister of 
Finance shall not be appointed as the Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. 
(3) The Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank shall organise the activities of the Supervisory 
Board, chair the meetings of the Supervisory Board, 
monitor the implementation of the Supervisory 
Board's decisions, represent the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank and respond to interpellations concerning 
the activities of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
submitted to him or her in the Riigikogu. 
§ 8. Members of Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
(1) The members of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank are appointed by the Riigikogu on the proposal 
of the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank. 
(2) Members of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
must be Estonian citizens and have a university 
degree. 
(3) Members of the Government of the Republic and 
employees of Eesti Pank shall not be members of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. 
(4) A member of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
shall not be an employee of any management 
institution, investment fund, investment company, 
credit institution, insurance company or other subject 
of financial supervision, nor be a member of the 
decision-making body of any such institution. 
(5) The members of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank shall be appointed for a term of five years. 
(6) The authority of a member of the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank shall terminate upon the expiry of 
his or her term of authority, upon his or her resignation 
or, pursuant to the procedure prescribed in § 12 of this 
Law, dismissal, or in the event of his or her death. 
(6
1
) A member of the Supervisory Board shall notify 
the Chairman of the Supervisory Board of his or her 
resignation from office at least four months in 
advance. 
(7) If a member of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank is appointed as a member of the Government of 
the Republic or commences work at Eesti Pank, the 
Riigikogu shall, on the proposal of the Chairman of 
the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, appoint an 
alternate member of the Supervisory Board whose 
authority terminates when the member of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank leaves the office 
which precludes his or her membership of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank or when he or she 
ceases to be employed at Eesti Pank. 
(8) The authority of members appointed to the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank at a later time 
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terminates at the same time as the authority of the 
given composition of the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank. 
§ 9. Competence of Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
(1) The Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall exercise 
supervision over all the activities of Eesti Pank. 
(2) The following issues are within the exclusive 
competence of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank: 
1) [Repealed]  
2) making a proposal to the President of the Republic 
for appointment of the Governor of Eesti Pank; 
3) [Repealed] 
4) appointment to office and release of Deputy 
Governors of Eesti Pank, the heads of the independent 
divisions and representative offices of Eesti Pank, and 
the head of the internal audit department of Eesti Pank 
and for the appointment and removal of members of 
the Supervisory Board of the Financial Supervision 
Authority on the proposal of the Governor of Eesti 
Pank; 
 
 
 
5) approval of the statute of Eesti Pank, the statutes of 
the independent divisions and representative offices of 
Eesti Pank and the statutes of the internal audit 
department; 
6) supervision of the implementation of the budget of 
Eesti Pank; 
7) appointment of internal auditors of Eesti Pank and 
approval of the work schedule for internal audits; 
7
1
) appointment of the independent auditors of Eesti 
Pank pursuant to the procedure provided in subsection 
31 (1) of this Act; 
8) approval of Eesti Pank's annual report on the 
proposal of the Governor; 
9) decision on the design of the national side of 
Estonian euro coins and on the nominal value and 
design of collector coins; 
10) deciding, on the proposal of the Governor of Eesti 
Pank, on the establishment, reorganisation and 
liquidation of independent divisions of Eesti Pank; 
11) review and approval of written proposals and other 
documents submitted to the Riigikogu in the name of 
Eesti Pank. 
(2
1
) The Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall 
regularly obtain information from the Governor of 
Eesti Pank concerning Estonia's economy and 
monetary policy, the situation in the financial sector 
and the implementation of Eesti Pank's budget. 
(3) Resolutions concerning the activities of Eesti Pank 
shall be formulated as decisions of the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank. 
(4) Meetings of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
shall be held as necessary but not less frequently than 
eight times a year. 
(5) Meetings of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
shall be closed unless otherwise decided by the 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. The 
Governor and Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank 
§ 9. (2): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
1
) granting permission to the Governor or Deputy 
Governors of Eesti Pank, to conduct research or carry 
out pedagogical activities; 
 
Explanation: see proposal amending Article 10 
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participate in the meetings with the right to speak. The 
Minister of Finance can participate in the meetings 
bearing in mind Article 130 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.  
(6) The Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall adopt 
decisions and issue statements. The Governor of Eesti 
Pank shall be responsible for the implementation of 
decisions of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. 
(7) The Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank has a quorum 
if at least five members participate in the meeting. In 
the absence of the Chairman, a member of the 
Supervisory Board elected from among those present 
shall chair the meeting. 
(8) Decisions on issues specified in clauses (2) 2), 5), 
6) and 8) of this section shall only be passed by a 
majority vote of the members of the Supervisory 
Board. Other decisions shall be passed by a majority 
vote of those members of the Supervisory Board 
present at the meeting. If the votes are equally divided, 
the Chairman of the Supervisory Board shall have the 
deciding vote. 
(9) Decisions of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
which are of a regulatory nature shall be published in 
the Riigi Teataja. 
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§ 10. Governor and Vice-Governors of Eesti Pank 
(1) The Governor of Eesti Pank is appointed to office 
for a term of seven years by the President of the 
Republic on the proposal of the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank. The Governor of Eesti Pank shall not be 
appointed to office for more than one consecutive 
term. 
 
(1
1
) The Governor of Eesti Pank shall notify the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank of his or her 
resignation at least four months in advance. 
(2) The Governor of Eesti Pank must be an Estonian 
citizen and have a university degree. A Deputy 
Governor of Eesti Pank must be Estonian citizen and 
have a university degree. 
(2
1
) Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank shall be 
appointed to office by the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank for a term of five years on proposal of the 
Governor of Eesti Pank. 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) The Governor and Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank 
shall be independent in the performance of their 
functions. They shall not hold any other office, be in 
service or be party to any activities which, by their 
nature, restrict or may restrict the autonomy of Eesti 
Pank or adversely affect or may adversely affect Eesti 
Pank in the achievement of its objectives or the 
performance of its functions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) In the absence of the Governor of Eesti Pank, a 
Deputy Governor shall substitute for him or her and 
the Governor of Eesti Pank shall transfer his or her 
authority temporarily to the Deputy Governor by a 
regulation. If it is not possible to transfer the authority 
to a Deputy Governor, the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank shall designate the person to substitute for the 
Governor from among the Deputy Governors. If the 
Supervisory Board has not designated a person to 
substitute for the Governor, the Deputy Governor who 
is senior in age shall substitute for the Governor. The 
person substituting for the Governor of Eesti Pank 
§ 10. Governor and Vice-Governors of Eesti Pank 
(1) The Governor of Eesti Pank is appointed to office 
for a term of seven years by the President of the 
Republic on the proposal of the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank. The Governor of Eesti Pank shall not be 
appointed to office for more than one consecutive 
term. 
(1
1
) The Governor of Eesti Pank shall notify the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank of his or her 
resignation at least four months in advance. 
(2) The Governor of Eesti Pank must be an Estonian 
citizen and have a university degree. A Deputy 
Governor of Eesti Pank must be Estonian citizen and 
have a university degree. 
(2
1
) Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank shall be 
appointed to office by the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank for a term of five years on proposal of the 
Governor of Eesti Pank. 
 
(2) The appointment of the Governor of Eesti Pank 
shall not be renewed. 
(3) Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank shall be appointed 
to office by the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank for a 
term of five years on proposal of the Governor of Eesti 
Pank. Their term of office may be renewed once.  
(4) The Governor and Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank 
shall meet the following conditions: 
1) be an Estonian citizen; 
2) have the full legal capacity; 
3) have either a proof of university education or high 
integrity and prominent qualifications in economics, 
finance or banking; 
4) have sound background, eligible for highest 
security clearance, be not sentenced to imprisonment 
or being adjudicated on bankruptcy in the past. 
(5) The Governor and Deputy Governors of Eesti Pank 
shall be independent in the performance of their 
functions. They shall not hold any other office, be in 
service or be party to any activities which, by their 
nature, restrict or may restrict the autonomy of Eesti 
Pank or adversely affect or may adversely affect Eesti 
Pank in the achievement of its objectives or the 
performance of its functions. They may have no other 
position outside Eesti Pank, except for research or 
pedagogical activities upon consent from the 
Supervisory Board.  
 
(6) In the absence of the Governor of Eesti Pank, a 
Deputy Governor shall substitute for him or her and 
the Governor of Eesti Pank shall transfer his or her 
authority temporarily to the Deputy Governor by a 
regulation. If it is not possible to transfer the authority 
to a Deputy Governor, the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank shall designate the person to substitute for the 
Governor from among the Deputy Governors. If the 
Supervisory Board has not designated a person to 
substitute for the Governor, the Deputy Governor who 
is senior in age shall substitute for the Governor. The 
person substituting for the Governor of Eesti Pank 
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shall, during his or her term of authority, have the full 
authority of the Governor of Eesti Pank. 
shall, during his or her term of authority, have the full 
authority of the Governor of Eesti Pank. 
Explanation: since the Estonian NCB Statute foresees 
the dismissals on the basis of Article 14.2 of the 
Statute, Article 10 needs to be amended in order to 
reflect the conditions required for the performance of 
the Governor‟s duties as well as the duties themselves 
(the duty of loyalty and the duty of non-competition 
Breach of these duties would constitute a serious 
misconduct.  
§ 11. Competence of Governor of Eesti Pank 
(1) The following issues are within the exclusive 
competence of the Governor of Eesti Pank: 
1) designing of banking policies, general management 
§ 11. 
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of Eesti Pank's activities and organisation of the 
performance of the tasks of the European System of 
Central Banks; 
2) organisation of the implementation of decisions of 
the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank and the 
application of measures (including sanctions) 
necessary to ensure their implementation; 
3) [Repealed] 
4) representation of Eesti Pank without special 
authorisation in all matters and instances both in 
Estonia and abroad; 
5) grant of authorisation to represent Eesti Pank in 
certain cases or in certain matters; 
6) making proposals to the Supervisory Board of Eesti 
Pank for the appointment to office and release of the 
Deputy Governors and the head of the internal audit 
department of Eesti Pank and the heads of the 
independent divisions of Eesti Pank, and for the 
appointment and removal of members of the 
Supervisory Board of the Financial Supervision 
Authority; 
7) approval of Eesti Pank's budget. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) The Governor of Eesti Pank shall report to the 
Riigikogu and respond to interpellations concerning 
Eesti Pank's activities submitted to him or her in the 
Riigikogu. 
(3) If the Governor of Eesti Pank does not agree with a 
decision of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank, he or 
she shall report to the President of the Riigikogu not 
later than within three working days and make a 
proposal to submit an interpellation in the matter to the 
Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. 
(4) The Governor of Eesti Pank shall report regularly 
on his or her activities to the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank. 
(5) The Governor of Eesti Pank shall issue regulations 
and decrees. 
(6) The regulations of the Governor of Eesti Pank shall 
be published in the Riigi Teataja.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1
1
) The Governor of Eesti Pank shall: 
1) organise the activities of the Executive Board;  
2) chair the meetings of the Executive Board;  
3) attend the meetings of the decision-making bodies 
of the ECB where he is a member; 
4) attend the meetings of the Supervisory Board of the 
Financial Supervisory Authority; 
5) participate in other bodies as set forth by law. 
 
Explanation: this amendment clarifies the Governor‟s 
duties in addition to the general duty described in 
Article 10(5) above. 
[§ 11
1
, 11
2 
Security vetting of the candidates for the 
positions of the Governor and the member of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank] 
 
§ 11
3
. Extension of authority 
If a new Governor of Eesti Pank or a new Chairman or 
member of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank has 
not been appointed by the due date for termination of 
the authority of the Governor of Eesti Pank or the 
Chairman or a member of the Supervisory Board of 
Eesti Pank, the authority of the person in office shall 
extend until the entry into force of a corresponding 
decision on appointment to office. 
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§ 12. Dismissal 
(1) The Chairman and members of the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank may be dismissed upon the entry 
into force of a judgment of conviction. 
(2) The Governor and a Deputy Governor of Eesti 
Pank may be dismissed only on the basis specified in 
Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and of the European Central Bank. 
 
§ 13. Executive Board of Eesti Pank 
(1) Eesti Pank's activities are managed by the 
Executive Board of Eesti Pank, the Chairman of which 
by virtue of office shall be the Governor of Eesti 
Pank.The Executive Board of Eesti Pank is composed 
of the Governor of Eesti Pank and the Deputy 
Governors. 
(1
1
) The Executive Board shall be responsible for 
planning and organising Eesti Pank's activities.The 
Governor of Eesti Pank may assign additional 
functions to the Executive Board. The Executive 
Board passes decisions for performance of the 
functions thereof. 
(2) The division of tasks and bases for the organisation 
of work of the Executive Board of Eesti Pank shall be 
provided for in the statute of Eesti Pank. 
 
Chapter III 
Monetary Policy and Currency Circulation 
 
§ 14. Rights of Eesti Pank 
(1) Taking into account the competences of the 
European Central Bank and the European System of 
Central Banks, Eesti Pank has the right to: 
1) take and grant loans against adequate collateral; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) make and accept deposits; 
3) trade in securities, precious metals and foreign 
currency; 
4) conclude other transactions in money, securities or 
foreign currency markets; 
5) process payment instructions and clearing 
payments; 
6) own shares and other holdings or real estate; 
7) establish rules regulating the money market, and 
prudential standards based on law; 
8) establish rules regulating the handling of euro 
banknotes and coins; 
9) impose sanctions on persons violating the rules of 
currency circulation, except for the sanctions imposed 
by the European Central Bank based on Article 34.3 of 
the statute of the European System of Central Banks 
and of the European Central Bank; 
10) receive information from state and local 
government authorities and other persons and agencies 
required for the performance of its functions;  
11) perform other acts for the performance of its 
functions. 
 
§ 14. (1)  
 
 
 
 
1
1
) exceptionally, a short-term loan to a credit 
institution for temporary support of liquidity may be 
granted, provided that it is in compliance with 
prohibition of monetary financing and will be granted 
in the interest of financial stability; 
 
Explanation: Assuming that the emergency liquidity 
assistance in the euro area will remain a national task 
as discussed in Section 4.3.1, one would need a clear 
legal basis for that kind of activity. Due to the unclear 
status of State guarantees with regard to ELA, no 
drafting suggestions have been made in this regard.  
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§ 14
1
. Euro banknotes and coins 
(1) With the permission of the European Central Bank, 
Eesti Pank has the right to emit euro banknotes. 
(2) Eesti Pank has the exclusive right to emit euro 
coins in the Republic of Estonia. The amount of the 
issue of euro coins must be approved by the European 
Central Bank in advance. 
(3) Eesti Pank and credit institutions authorised 
thereby shall receive mutilated or damaged euro 
banknotes notes and coins and substitute them with 
new banknotes and coins pursuant to the procedure 
provided by the legislation of the European Union. 
The Governor of Eesti Pank has the right to establish 
specific rules for handling mutilated or damaged euro 
banknotes and coins. 
 
§ 15. Regulation of foreign currency operations 
(1) The procedure for foreign currency operations is 
determined by law. 
(2) Eesti Pank shall, pursuant to law, establish rules 
for the import into Estonia and the export of foreign 
currency and for the formation and use of foreign 
currency reserves. 
(3) Eesti Pank shall establish the conditions and rules 
for the performance of cross-border banking 
transactions by credit institutions and other legal 
persons. 
(4) [Repealed] 
(5) [Repealed] 
 
§ 16. [Repealed]  
Chapter IV 
Supervision over Activities of Credit Institutions 
 
§ 17. [Repealed]  
§ 18. [Repealed]  
§ 19. Correspondent accounts and reserve accounts of 
credit institutions 
Eesti Pank shall hold the correspondent accounts and 
reserve requirement accounts of credit institutions, 
monitor that the balances of these accounts meet the 
established requirements and, in the case of deviations, 
implement measures to ensure that the requirements 
are met. 
 
§ 20. [Repealed]  
§ 21. Confidential and public information 
(1) Eesti Pank shall ensure the confidentiality of 
information which contains banking secrets. 
(1
1
) Eesti Pank classifies information the disclosure of 
which would damage price stability or financial 
stability and information to which restrictions on 
access are established by the European System of 
Central Banks as information intended for internal use. 
(2) [Repealed] 
(3) [Repealed] 
(4) Eesti Pank has the right to disclose information at 
its disposal concerning credit institutions provided that 
such information does not contain banking secrets. 
(5) Eesti Pank shall periodically publish information 
concerning its activities and the economy of Estonia 
and the European Union.  
 
§ 22. [Repealed]  
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§ 23. [Repealed]  
§ 24. [Repealed]  
 
Chapter V 
Assets and Reporting of Eesti Pank 
 
§ 25. Capital and funds of Eesti Pank 
(1) The own capital of Eesti Pank includes: 
1) statutory capital; 
2) reserve capital; 
3) foundation capital and funds for specific purposes. 
(2) The statutory capital of Eesti Pank is 100 000 000 
euros. 
(3) [Repealed] 
 
§ 26. Assets of Eesti Pank 
(1) [Repealed] 
(2) Eesti Pank shall possess, use and dispose of its 
assets independently. 
(3) Immovable and movable property which was in the 
ownership of the Eesti Pank established as the central 
bank of the Republic of Estonia in 1919 and which 
was unlawfully expropriated in 1940 also belongs to 
Eesti Pank. 
(4) The holding and management of the official 
foreign exchange reserves shall be carried out pursuant 
to Acts, the Statute of Eesti Pank and the guidelines of 
the Governing Council of the European Central Bank. 
 
§ 27. Reserve capital, foundation capital and funds for 
specific purposes of Eesti Pank 
(1) Reserve capital, foundation capital and funds for 
specific purposes shall be established from the profits 
of Eesti Pank and from other revenue intended for 
specific purposes and prescribed by the statute. 
(2) When reserve capital becomes equal to statutory 
capital, the Riigikogu shall decide whether the size of 
reserve capital shall be increased further or not. 
(3) The procedure for the establishment and use of 
reserve capital, foundation capital and funds for 
specific purposes shall be prescribed by the statute of 
Eesti Pank. 
 
§ 28. Financial year 
Eesti Pank's financial year begins on 1 January and 
ends on 31 December. 
 
§ 29. [Repealed]  
§ 30. Profit and loss of Eesti Pank 
(1) The profit (loss) of Eesti Pank is the difference 
between its revenue and its expenditure. 
(2) At least 25 per cent of annual profits shall be used 
to increase statutory capital up to the amount 
determined by the Riigikogu. 
(3) At least 25 per cent of annual profits shall be used 
to increase reserve capital pursuant to a decision of the 
Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. 
(4) After the allocations specified in subsections (2) 
and (3) of this section are made, part of the profits 
may be used, pursuant to a decision of the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank, to establish and augment the 
foundation capital and funds for specific purposes 
prescribed by the statute of Eesti Pank. 
(5) Any profits remaining after the allocations 
specified in subsections (2), (3) and (4) of this section 
§ 30. 
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are made shall be transferred to the state budget. 
(6) Any loss incurred by Eesti Pank shall be covered 
from reserve capital. If the reserve capital is 
insufficient, losses may be covered from statutory 
capital with the permission of the Riigikogu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(7) Eesti Pank, being the central bank of the state, does 
not pay income tax or any other taxes related to its 
economic activity into the state budget or local 
budgets, except taxes related to natural persons. The 
Government of the Republic has the right to release 
Eesti Pank from the payment of other state taxes in 
exceptional circumstances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(6
1
) Upon deciding on the coverage of losses from the 
statutory capital, the Riigikogu shall also decide, 
whether the method referred to in Article 30(2) shall 
be used or whether the necessary amount shall be 
allocated from the State budget in order to recover the 
statutory capital. 
 
Explanation: In the cases the statutory capital needs 
to be written off as a result of losses, the central bank 
needs to be recapitalised. 
§ 31. Monitoring of activities and annual report of 
Eesti Pank 
(1) The Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank shall appoint 
independent auditors recommended by the Governing 
Council of the European Central Bank and approved 
by the Council of the European Union to monitor Eesti 
Pank's activities during the financial year and to attest 
to the accuracy of the annual report prepared by Eesti 
Pank. Eesti Pank's activities may be examined further 
if the Riigikogu passes a corresponding resolution. 
(1
1
) An auditor of Eesti Pank shall audit the annual 
profit and loss account of the Financial Supervision 
Authority. 
(2) Eesti Pank's annual report shall be prepared 
pursuant to the rules established on the basis of Article 
26.4 of the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank. 
(3) The annual report shall be approved and, together 
with the auditor's report, submitted to the Riigikogu by 
the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank. The annual 
report of the Financial Supervision Authority 
approved by the Supervisory Board of the Financial 
Supervision Authority shall be submitted to the 
Riigikogu at the same time as Eesti Pank's annual 
report. The Riigikogu shall hear a presentation 
concerning Eesti Pank's annual report by the Governor 
of Eesti Pank. 
(4) The annual report shall be published in the Riigi 
Teataja and in Eesti Pank's Yearbook. 
 
Chapter VI 
Final Provisions 
 
§ 32. Relations with central banks of other countries 
and cross-border transactions 
Eesti Pank shall maintain relations with the central 
banks of other countries and other financial 
institutions and it has the right to carry out transactions 
therewith for the performance of functions specified in 
this Act. 
§ 33. Banking operations with own employees 
(1) Under the conditions approved by the Supervisory 
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Board of Eesti Pank, Eesti Pank has the right to accept 
cash deposits from members of the Supervisory Board 
of Eesti Pank and employees of Eesti Pank and to pay 
interest thereon not exceeding the average rates of 
interest paid by banks. 
(2) [Repealed] 
(3) Eesti Pank has the right to grant loans to its 
employees and members of the Supervisory Board 
under the conditions approved by the Supervisory 
Board of Eesti Pank. 
§ 34. Compilation of balance of payments 
(1) Taking into account the competences of the 
European Central Bank and the European System of 
Central Banks, Eesti Pank shall collect monetary, 
financial and balance of payments statistics, necessary 
for performance of its functions, on the basis and 
pursuant to the procedure provided by the Official 
Statistics Act. 
(2) Eesti Pank has the right to obtain, free of charge, 
the information necessary for drawing up the balance 
of payments of Estonia from all state and local 
government agencies and persons conducting cross-
border economic transactions in the territory of 
Estonia. 
 
§ 35. Obligation to maintain confidentiality of 
professional secrets 
(1) Members of the Supervisory Board of Eesti Pank 
and persons employed by Eesti Pank are required to 
maintain the confidentiality of information pertaining 
to Eesti Pank, all credit institutions and other legal 
persons if the disclosure of such information could 
result in damage to the Estonian economy or to the 
economic interests of credit institutions or their 
clients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) The obligation to maintain confidentiality applies 
to information which has become known to employees 
of Eesti Pank solely in connection with their 
employment at Eesti Pank. The obligation to maintain 
confidentiality applies even after the persons have left 
the employment of Eesti Pank. 
(3) If a professional secret is disclosed, the persons at 
fault shall be punished under disciplinary or criminal 
procedure pursuant to law. 
§ 35.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1
1
) Eesti Pank may exchange confidential information 
within the ESCB and with third parties, provided that 
the confidentiality of information shall be ensured by 
the recipients at the classification level established by 
Eesti Pank.    
 
Explanation: In accordance with the case law of the 
Court of Justice, it is necessary, that professional 
secrets will be known only to a limited number of 
persons. It must then be information whose disclosure 
is liable to cause serious harm to the person who has 
provided it or to third parties. Finally, the interests 
liable to be harmed by disclosure must, objectively, be 
worthy of protection. Depending on the impact an 
unauthorised disclosure may cause, the information 
needs to be classified and treated in accordance with 
its classification. If confidential information is 
exchanged, the same level of protecton shall be 
ensured by the recipient.  
§ 36. Participation in enterprise 
Eesti Pank may establish enterprises which are 
necessary for the performance of its functions and may 
participate in the activities of such enterprises. 
 
§ 37. [Omitted]  
§ 38. [Omitted]  
§ 39. [Omitted]  
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